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A Note for Impatient or Skeptical Minds 
Impatient or skeptical minds should probably begin the 
New Précis, (“In a Nutshell”) –at the very beginning of Chapter 1 
and then skip to Chapter 12 which show two relatively 
contemporaneous criticisms of my ideas and my answers to them.  
1  I  
This should resolve many difficulties before they start.  
This is a very difficult subject to present with any perspective 
other than the standard ones:  i.e. the very ones that have already 
clearly failed!  Give me some space and I’ll try to make a 
revolutionary out of you!  I think the answer is important. 
On the other hand, let me insert an apology at this point.  I 
am currently 71 years old, and have had several strokes which 
have impaired my abilities.  And yet, I consider the new content 
of this book important.  What it is lacking is an overall stylistic 
form of sufficient refinement to do it justice as my concentration 
has been narrowed to specific problems which I have responded 
                                                 
 
 
clarity, but I felt the material included in the endnotes, (in Roman numerals), 
interrupted the flow of thought.  Hence it was relegated to its endnote status.) 
1 (Note: This is the third edition of “Virtual Reality: Consciousness really 
Explained” which was completed in 1995, (revised 1998).  Though it lacks some 
of the detail of the former, it incorporates a later and richer perspective with 
much new material and elucidates my second thesis far better than the original.  I 
do not think it changes, but rather enriches the substance and sense of the earlier 
edition and clarifies its rationale.  This version uses a mix of footnotes and 
endnotes.  The footnotes, (in ordinary numerals), are necessary for immediate 
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to and which I think make my perspective clearer.2  Some of the 
citation references might need “tweeking”, but that should be 
achievable with minimal effort given sufficient interest.  There is 
also a certain amount of redundancy –partly from a lack of 
sustainable concentration, and partly because this MS may 
perhaps be read in parts wherein certain citations must be  
explicit and considered in context.  This is the “hard problem” 
and you’d better begin by expecting it to be so.  
 Jerome Iglowitz, 2010 
 
P.S.   If you need a C.V. to cause you to evaluate even the very 
plausibility of these ideas, then you had probably best go 
elsewhere as you will not do well here.  I abandoned academia 
long ago as I felt it was not possible to fully explore this huge 
problem within its rigid confines.  I think my completed answer 
validates this presupposition.  Is it complete and final?  Of course 
not.  This is the very beginning of a dialogue and I have 
repeatedly asked for help, but it will take more courage than I 
have found in academia to go beyond trivial answers, risk 
                                                 
 
 Purely from the standpoint of organization, my first edition is clearly 
superior to this one.  From the standpoint of understanding however, I feel this 
edition is a marked improvement. 
 
2
association with a maverick mind, and face up to the real problem
 like a man, (woman)!  No sexism intended. 
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Preface: 
There is a wonderful though longish passage by the 
famous logician W.V.O.Quine1 which I will quote in its entirety 
to serve as an introduction:  
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from 
the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges.  Or, to 
change the figure, total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience.  A conflict 
with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments 
in the interior of the field.  Truth values have to be 
redistributed over some of our statements.  Reevaluation 
of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because 
of their logical interconnections- the logical laws being in 
turn simply certain further statements of the system, 
certain further elements of the field.  Having reevaluated 
one statement we must reevaluate some others, which 
may be statements logically connected with the first or 
may be the statements of logical connections themselves.  
                                                 
 
 
1 (recently deceased) 
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of 
choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of 
any single contrary experience.  No particular experiences 
are linked with any particular statements in the interior of 
the field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.......  
Furthermore it becomes folly to see a boundary between 
synthetic statements… and analytic statements...Any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make 
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system...  
Conversely… no statement is immune to revision… even 
the logical law of the excluded middle... and what 
difference is there in principle between such a shift and 
the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein 
Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?"I 
 
And another much shorter quote from another of his 
writings which displays the full extent of his horizons: 
 
"One could even end up, though we ourselves shall not, 
by finding that the smoothest and most adequate overall 
account of the world does not after all accord existence to 
ordinary physical things.....Such eventual departures from 
Johnsonian usage”, (Samuel Johnson is said to have 
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demonstrated the reality of a rock by kicking it!), “could 
partake of the spirit of science and even of the 
evolutionary spirit of ordinary language itself."II  
This has always been my personal goal – i.e. of “finding 
…. the smoothest and most adequate overall account of the 
world” –but to include my own mind as well!  But it will involve 
a conceptual framework as large as Quine’s. 
Piaget had a relevant comment which I think is 
applicable.  The famous child psychologist was interested in the 
foundations of mathematics as a secondary interest.  He evaluated 
mathematical Platonism, and concluded, (paraphrasing):  
“if a mathematician (thinker), were to arrive at some 
conclusions that neither he nor his readers were able to fully 
understand, and if he were to write these conclusions down, (that 
is, to date stamp them), and if, furthermore, they were found to be 
correct at some future time –then the conclusive case for 
Platonism would be made.” 
  I think the argument is applicable to ideas in general.  If 
I am right in my conclusions, (and I do not dogmatically claim 
that I am), then the future of science will come to my perspective 
asymptotically.  When and if that happens, hear me again!  I will 
probably be gone, but my cause will not be.   
Finally, let me cite Kepler regarding his profound 
revelations in astronomy: 
“Now, since the dawn eight months ago, and since a few 
days ago, when the full sun illuminated my wonderful 
 19
speculations, nothing holds me back.  I yield freely to the 
sacred frenzy; I dare frankly to confess that I have stolen 
the golden vessels of the Egyptians to build a tabernacle 
for my god far from the bounds of Egypt.  If you pardon 
me, I shall rejoice; if you reproach me, I shall endure.  
The die is cast, and I am writing the book –to be read 
either now or by posterity, it matters not.  It can wait a 
century for a reader, as god himself has waited six 
thousand years for a witness.”III 
Take care, and good luck,    Jerry Iglowitz 2010 
 20
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Preamble: 
Let me state at the outset that I am as much a realist as 
any one of you –maybe more so.  I enjoy, and fear as well, my 
naïve reality at least as much as anyone1.  It is the foundations of 
realism I question.  But so does realism itself.  Science 
continually changes the rules of the game.  The world is no 
longer truly made up of the simple atoms of Democritus, nor is it 
made up of the subatomic particles of Bohr and Heisenberg.  It is 
made up of whatever it is that was most recently proposed –and 
seems to work, (quarks, bosons, superstrings,…)- as “substance” 
or “material”.  Supposedly hierarchy and emergence resolve the 
difficulty, but is this, in fact, true?2  (See footnote –it is a total 
misuse of legitimate concepts drawn from other disciplines!) 
                                                 
 
 
1 I have lived more on the “rough side” of life probably more than most of my 
expected readers, though less so than many others who have been forced to deal 
with unimaginable horrors. 
2 “Emergence” supposedly solves the problem of hierarchy in materialist 
explanations of the mind-brain problem.  It purportedly explains how new 
phenomena “emerge” from more fundamental explanations.  These new 
emergent phenomena are said to embed themselves hierarchically in ontic 
material -taken at the deepest level.  The conception seems to derive from, or at 
least be analogous to the embedding of mathematical explanations –or of 
computer languages, (high vs low level languages).  In point of fact, however, 
we are allowed to embed some higher level axiom system, (or computer 
language), in some more fundamental or different axiom system or language if 
and only if we can prove/derive each of the axioms, (or new computer language 
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It is the phenomenology of realism –those relations that 
work -and the “naïve realistic world” itself –that hard, cold, 
violent, passionate and very concrete reality we all must live in 
and survive in that must be preserved.  But the ever changing 
substance of the “objects” per se  of realism is at constant peril.  I 
wish to severely question realism’s ultimate “objects” themselves 
to resolve the deepest dilemma of mankind:  i.e. the mind-body 
relationship. 
But I must do so in a way that preserves the realism of 
science, the realism of the naïve world, and the reality of the 
mind which perceives them both.    This is the core and the center 
of my conception.  I think that all of us, deep down, accept these 
                                                                                                           
 
 
terms), of the higher system from the lower one.  But that implicit level of proof 
is always there.  No new “phenomena” are allowed to exist in the former that 
cannot be reduced to perhaps more complicated implications of the grounding 
system.  (One need only replace any usage of the axioms, (terms), of the higher 
system with its proof system in the lower to derive the same result.)  Nothing 
radically new comes from such an approach.  The rationale for instituting the 
higher system derives from operational simplicity.  Nothing emerges –hierarchy 
will not allow it.  In the computer language example, all the computer itself ever 
sees is machine language! 
 
Materialist explanations of consciousness of the usual sort all have this flaw.  As 
I will state the problem later: “how can a (biological) machine/mechanism 
whose parts are discrete in time and space ever know anything whatsoever?  But 
I mean “knowing” in a different sense than simple mechanical, “zombie-like” 
performance, and I think you wish it to be taken so too.  “Consciousness” could 
never arise in any normal sense of the word!  It would constitute too great a 
divide from the current, and specifically (meta)physical models of brain 
function. 
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perspectives as our most fundamental realist presuppositions.  It 
is in the attempt at their mutual resolution that this pervasive 
paradox endures. 
It has been said of my work3 that I am simply repeating 
Kant.  This is fair in one perspective –I am very much like Kant 
insofar as the “What” of reality is concerned, though we differ 
about the categories and ethics, and fundamentally about 
epistemology.  My particular thesis consists in supplying the 
actual “How” and the “Why” –and the “Where”- of Kant’s 
profound insight however, and which he never even attempted to 
explain.  I think I have accomplished that goal.  If you would 
argue with me, argue with me here. 
                                                 
 
 
3 By an anonymous JCS reviewer who questioned my claim of the novelty and 
the “outrageousness” of my proposal. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction and New Précis:  “In a 
Nutshell” 
A Current Note: January, 2010 
I feel I must try to restart this dialogue yet again as I have 
been so grossly misunderstood.  Reviewers just don’t seem to get 
it.   
In my conclusion I will argue that you will have to come 
to the same conclusions about the mind and the brain, (but not 
necessarily my own), no matter what perspective you start with 
initially –whether from materialism, from dualism, from 
idealism… provided that you do it rigorously enough.  
Provisionally accepting that conclusion then, let me start again 
from the easiest perspective therefore. Let me approach the 
problem as a strict materialist would see it. 
First though, a codicil:  all materialist explanations of 
science and in this instance of the mind-brain relationship must 
necessarily start with mechanics.   
 
To quote Maturana: 
"The key to understanding all this is indeed simple: as 
scientists, we can deal only with unities that are 
structurally determined.  That is, we can deal only with 
systems in which all their changes are determined by their 
structure, whatever it may be, and in which those 
structural changes are a result of their own dynamics or 
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triggered by their interactions."1  Maturana & Varela: 
Tree of Knowledge, [96] 
In this case we must start with the structure of the brain 
per se, and ultimately reduce it to mechanics –in this instance to 
the biological and physical mechanics of brain process at some 
fundamental level.  
 Computer people do essentially the same thing in their 
quest for artificial intelligence.  (I took a half dozen computer 
classes long ago to try to see if the “brain-is-a- computer” people 
had anything important to say at this fundamental level.  When I 
came to the “systems” course, I concluded that they didn’t.  It all 
came down to microcoding of the CPU which entailed essentially 
nothing other than  “nots”’ and “ands” chasing each other around 
the CPU at unimaginable speeds, but adding nothing new to 
content and no new insight to the essential problem.) 
 
Emergence 
 Let me start by promoting the footnote made early in the 
Preamble of this book which has something to say on this 
subject:  
                                                 
 
 
1 Maturana & Varela: tree of knowledge, [96] 
 
“Emergence” supposedly solves the problem of hierarchy 
in materialist explanations of the mind-brain problem, (e.g. P.S. 
Churchland’s).  It purportedly explains how new phenomena 
“emerge” from more fundamental explanations.  These new 
emergent phenomena are said to embed themselves hierarchically 
in ontic material -taken at the deepest level.  The conception 
seems to derive from, or at least be analogous to the embedding 
of mathematical explanations –or of computer languages, (high 
vs low level languages).   
In point of fact we are allowed to embed some higher 
level axiom system, (or computer language), in some more 
fundamental or different axiom system or language but if and 
only if we can prove/derive each of the axioms, (or new computer 
language terms), of the higher system from the lower one.  But 
that implicit level of proof is always there. 
 No new “phenomena” are allowed to exist in the former 
that cannot be reduced to perhaps more complicated implications 
of the grounding system.  (One need only replace any usage of 
the axioms, (or terms), of the higher system with its proof system 
in the lower to derive the same result.)  Nothing radically new 
comes from such an approach.  The rationale for instituting the 
higher system derives from operational simplicity.  Nothing 
“emerges” –hierarchy will not allow it.  In the computer language 
example, all the computer itself ever sees is machine language: 
i.e. ones and zeros! 
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Materialist explanations of consciousness of the usual sort 
all have this flaw.  As I will state the problem later: “how can a 
(biological) machine/mechanism whose parts are discrete in time 
and space ever know anything whatsoever?  But I mean 
“knowing” in a different sense than simple mechanical, “zombie-
like” performance, and I think you wish it to be taken so too.  
“Consciousness” could never arise in any normal sense of the 
word!  It would constitute too great a divide from the current, and 
specifically (meta)physical models of brain function. 
 
A Very Basic Argument –An Argument from Fundamentals 
 
In light of my opening comments, (i.e. my assertion of the 
ultimate irrelevancy of the particular choice of beginning 
perspective), let us therefore begin our dialogue at the materialist 
level of mechanism.  Let us begin at the level of the machine we 
call the brain.   
Consider your opinions and your objections well –as I 
will expect you to follow them to the limits of reason. 
 
1. First of all I assert that no machine can ever “know 
where it is”!  Now this may seem silly, but a machine only 
processes inputs on route to outputs.  This is Nagel’s “brain in a 
vat” argument.  If we could simulate any input with a high 
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enough level of sophistication, the machine could not tell the 
difference, (reversing the sense of the “Turing test”). 
 
 
 
The machine therefore lives in a space of what I will call 
“ontic indeterminacy”.  It cannot know where or what it is!  (See 
fig.1)  It is a complicated linear sequence from start to back 
consisting of pure mechanics –“gears and levers”, chips … It 
does not cognate the space which supplies its input nor does it 
cognate the space wherein its output is received.  And it doesn’t 
“care”!  There is nobody home! 
 
 29
2. But for higher order, better functioning machines, we 
would want some form of feedback to allow it to “learn”.  That 
“learning”, however, must be understood solely in the sense of a 
progressive optimization of the initial process,  (see figure 2)  But 
again there is nobody home! 
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  3.  A.significant point occurs at this stage however.  The 
“learning” in the step just above leads us to bend the linear 
diagram into a circle.  (See Fig. 3.)  What good would feedback 
do if it were not imprinted right back onto the very output which 
then again re-affects its input?   It implies some connection 
between its input and its output domains.  This is the one good 
thing I found in Merleau-Ponty.   
 
         
To quote W.J. Freeman:    
“In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in "The 
Phenomenology of Perception" [2] conceived of 
perception" [itself] "as the outcome of the "intentional 
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arc", by which experience derives from the intentional 
actions of individuals that control sensory input and 
perception. Action into the world with reaction that 
changes the self is indivisible in reality, and must be 
analyzed in terms of "circular causality" as distinct from 
the linear causality of events as commonly perceived and 
analyzed in the physical world."  W.J. Freeman, 1997, my 
emphasis.     
But this is essentially the same conclusion I derived in the 
first version of my paper “Mind-Brain: the Argument from 
Evolutionary Biology”. (See Fig. 4.) 
4.  But the “where” and the “what”–the “what and which” 
of the input/output domain remains just as indeterminate at this 
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step, (Figs. 3 and 4), as it was in steps one, and two.  There is still 
nobody home! 
5. This, however, is precisely the particular model I 
propose as the initial stage in beginning to understand the brain 
mechanism!  If you are a materialist, I think you must accept it.   
On the face of it, this result seems profoundly damning to 
even the very possibility of “mind” in all the normal senses of the 
word.  But I assert that this model is fully rigorous and fully 
legitimate within the confines of materialism.  How then could 
there even exist a “mind” within such a picture?  Where is there 
even the possibility of such a thing?  Mechanisms just do, by 
definition they cannot “know” in the sense we all mean the word 
and in the sense of the materialist picture sketched above.  So it 
seems I have just disproved the possibility of “mind” in all our 
intuitive conceptions of it.   
 
The “Hard Core”: 
This is the hard point around which my conception 
centers and becomes meaningful!  However I should emphasize 
here that this is a problem for all materialists.  Their best answers 
to date are vague and ambiguous at best and duplicitous at worst. 
 
David Hilbert: 
6. Early on when studying mathematics, I had a revelation 
pertinent to this issue.  There was precisely one sense I 
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concluded, (and I challenge you to suggest some other), wherein 
an actual possibility consistent with science –and with the 
materialist picture above -arose.  There was one case, I found, 
wherein a purely operative system, “a machine” can know 
something!.  It can know its own “objects”!  I discovered it in 
David Hilbert’s profound, but purely mathematical “concept of 
implicit definition”.  Was it a vague correlation, did it need 
deepening and reorientation to this specific problem?  Of course 
it did.  (See Chapters 2 and 3 for a full discussion of the idea and 
an explanation of my interaction with it.)   
Though solely mathematical entities of course, Hilbert’s 
“axiom systems” actually define their specific mathematical 
“things”, (their “objects”) –and they actually know them!  What 
in fact is a line? What is a point?  These concepts arise from the 
whole of an axiom system, (see citation below), and it is only as 
a whole that they can know them –and they actually do! 
Here is a quote from Hilbert answering an objection to his 
conception by Gottlob Frege: 
“It is impossible to give a definition of point, for example, 
since only the whole structure of axioms yields a 
complete definition. A concept can be fixed logically only 
by its relations to other concepts. These relations [are] 
formulated in certain statements (which) I call axioms, 
thus arriving at the view that axioms are the definitions of 
the concepts.”  (Hilbert via ShapiroI) 
And another: 
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“I do not want to assume anything as known in advance. I 
regard my explanation ...as the definition of the concepts 
point, line, plane ... If one is looking for other definitions 
of a ‘point’, e.g. through paraphrase in terms of 
extensionless, etc., then I must indeed oppose such 
attempts in the most decisive way; one is looking for 
something one can never find because there is nothing 
there; and everything gets lost and becomes vague and 
tangled and degenerates into a game of hide and seek.”  
(ibid) 
Here was Moritz Schlick’s early characterization of Hilbert’s 
brilliant original conception:  
"[Hilbert's] revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic 
or primitive concepts are to be defined just by the fact that they 
satisfy the axioms.... [They] acquire meaning only by virtue of 
the axiom system, and possess only the content that it bestows 
upon them. They stand for entities whose whole being is to be 
bearers of the relations laid down by the system." 
 
 Otherwise stated:  its “objects” are a function of the 
system itself; the system is not a function of its objects!  These 
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latter are, in fact, clearly and specifically virtual objects!2  They  
“acquire both meaning and content “only by virture of the axiom 
system”!  The discovery of this conceptual possibility opened the 
keyway to  the solution of my particular “hard problem”, (defined 
above), that I had sought!  
Maturana and Freeman: 
If the mechanics of the brain were biologically analogous 
to such an “axiom system”, (think of nerve nets –W.J. Freeman’s 
“equivalence classes” perhaps, as “axioms” as I will later 
suggest), and if the “we”, (“my mind”), were taken to be the 
whole of that system of the brain, (see Hilbert’s  reference to the 
“whole of the axiom system” above), then it would indeed be 
possible for “us”, (the “me”), to actually know something, (sans 
any necessity of a homunculus), in something like our usual 
meaning of the word.   
We, (I), could know our objects in the profoundest sense 
of “knowing”!  The bad part of this, however, is that the only 
thing we, (I), would be capable of knowing would be the 
implicitly defined objects of the biological “axiom system” itself 
                                                 
 
 
2 See Resnick’s discussion of mathematical structuralism in Chapter 2 which 
essentially reaffirms this interpretation. 
 
–i.e. its virtual objects/artifacts –themselves relevant only to the 
mechanism itself.   
7. This latter was the huge problem I addressed in my first 
hypothesis wherein I argued that the brain is organizationally 
rather than referentially defined.  I argued that our very “objects” 
of perception themselves, (our “gears and levers”), are 
organizational and virtual –that they are the evolutionarily 
derived metaphorical and virtual reflections of process. Taking 
“axioms” in a biological/mechanical sense then, seeing them as 
the fundamental operative units of brain biology, we are allowed 
for the very first time to legitimately conceive, (i.e. as 
materialists), of an actual physical mind! 
8. (Some of you, I am sure, have some limited knowledge 
of Hilbert and his concept of implicit definition.  I had a reviewer 
totally mischaracterize it in his response as solely a formalistic 
theory of mathematical proof, but it was profoundly larger and 
different from that, (see chapters 1- 3).  True, Hilbert later went 
astray, but the young Hilbert saw something that I think he later 
forgot.  I think he was, in the language of Chapter 2, clearly the 
first “mathematical structuralist”! 
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9. One last 
point here and it is 
highly relevant to our 
base problem:  I 
believe in “other 
minds”, (and I think 
you do too) –which, I 
think defines much of 
the rest of our 
problem.   
These minds, I 
believe, see through 
the exactly same 
evolutionarily derived 
“gears and levers” 
that I do).  That our 
conclusions about 
reality should ,  
Figure 5   therefore agree neither 
surprises nor impeaches me, (contrary to Durant’s similar 
negative commentary on Kant.  See Chapter 12 re: Durant).   I 
believe we all see with the same indeterminacy that Figure 5 
shows, but through the same parameters, i.e. through the same 
“gears and levers”!II  (Please note how closely Figure 5 
resembles the picture of philosophical idealism!  But the “black
space” is not non-existence; it is ontic unknow
 
ability.) 
This, I assert, is the reality of our human linguistic and 
cognitive world: we all speak the same language, but we are all 
equally ontologically blind!  Therefore the totality of our 
dialogue must be interpreted heterophenomenologically, (using 
Dennett’s word). 
Kant 
I guess I could quote Kant ad nauseum at this point, but I 
will not.  I consider my ideas an extension and a completion of 
much of his conception.  I feel that Kant was, and still remains 
the deepest thinker on the mind-brain problem. 
End current note.  January, 2010 
A more explicit Nutshell summary extracted from an 
early webpage rendition below: 
Old Precis Follows: 
The Brain: A Materialist Perspective: 
1. From the physicalist perspective, what I propose is that 
“mind” is specifically a function of the organization of behavior 
itself, not a function of knowledge.  Loosely stated, I propose that 
the brain/mind is the evolutionary result (by a multicellular 
organism) of an optimization of process.  It is the result of the 
self-organized evolutionary optimization –but an optimiation of 
blind behavior per se and not one of knowledge! 
In that process, I maintain that our naive perceptual 
"objects" are non-representative, purely behavioral, 
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(i.e.organizational 
and virtual), artifacts, 
but stable ones.  
(This, though 
biologically 
plausible, is a very 
radical 
hypothesis, but I 
believe it is the only 
viable scientific 
pathway to the solution of the other leg of the problem –i.e. my 
second hypothesis.)  
 I propose that these artifacts/"objects" are re-used in the 
"intentional arc", (re: Merleau-Ponty), to test our (behavioral) 
hypotheses -i.e. both scientific and non-scientific.  They are the 
ground for the whole of cognition. 
But these artifacts, (our naive objects), need not correlate 
hierarchically to absolute reality, (see W.J. Freeman for instance, 
-Freeman’s fig. 2—my Figure 6- above wherein he reveals a 
specifically non-hierarchical mapping into, (not onto), the 
cortex). 
  It is necessary only that these “objects” be locked into 
the re-entrant loop between action and perception which passes 
we know not where.                  
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 (Note how closely this perspective of “circular causality” fits 
with modern quantum theory -i.e. in the Schrödinger equation vis 
a vis "measurement"!3) 
“But there is something very odd about the relation 
between the time-evolved quantum state’, (the 
Schroedinger equation), “and the actual behaviour of the 
physical world that is observed to take place.  From time 
to time –whenever we consider that a ‘measurement’ has 
occurred – we must discard the quantum state that we 
have been laboriously evolving, and use it only to 
compute the various probabilities that the state will 
’jump’ to one or another of a set of new possible states.”  
(Penrose, 1989, pps. 226-227) 
But each new instance of a measurement causes yet 
another “loop”!  The mind, I assert, is a similar looping and 
circular probability machine -in this case utilizing the 
feedback/intentional aspects of the brain.  It must countenance 
each “measurement” against our biologically innate, (and stable), 
evolutionary objects/artifacts and then recompute its overall 
picture and strategies.   This is what cognition is.   
                                                 
 
 
3 You might also consider it in the light of the Raichle discussion of Chapter 3. 
I maintain that our mental “objects” are the evolutionary 
yardstick we carry.  They function to crystallize and organize our 
input, and to crystallize and organize our output.  But they must 
be rigidly maintained as the “working gears”, (alternatively the   
Figure 7  “A/D converters”, or, better still, as the 
hierarchical/non-hierarchical converters), of perception.  I argue 
that they are organizational artifacts only! 
 This is the answer to the question of how a non-
hierarchical mapping, (e.g. Walter Freeman's chaotic dispersive 
mapping, or Edelman's non-topological "global mapping"), could 
specifically function in cognition.  I think it also gives a very 
pointed clue to Penrose’s problem. 
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"In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in "The 
Phenomenology of Perception" [2] conceived of 
perception" [itself] "as the outcome of the "intentional 
arc", by which experience derives from the intentional 
actions of individuals that control sensory input and 
perception. Action into the world with reaction that 
changes the self is indivisible in reality, and must be 
analyzed in terms of "circular causality" as distinct from 
the linear causality of events as commonly perceived and 
analyzed in the physical world."  W.J. Freeman, 1997 
{22} (as cited previously)  
This particular thesis, (my first of three hypotheses), 
supplies the necessary perspective of biology and the brain.  It is 
our very own "cave of shadows", (Plato), -but it need not even be 
projective, (as a “shadow”)!  I propose that it is the evolutionary 
result of a self-organized and virtual optimization of pure 
response.  It is instead as a GUI, (graphic user interface), rather 
than as a “shadow” or a “projection” that it functions.  And 
GUI’s actually have the potential for this.   
This potential per se was a specific target of my argument 
in my paper:  “Why: Mind- the Argument from Evolutionary 
Biology, (Virtual Reality -A Working Model)”.  It culminated in 
my discovery and interpretation of the experimental neurological 
researches of the noted neurophysiologist Walter J. Freeman 
which validate exactly that possibility.   I argue that our "objects" 
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are deep metaphors of process, and virtual; they are not objects, 
(even indirectly), of representation 
The “Mental” Perspective: 
(2) Mind as the functional organization of behavior, (as 
proposed above), gives us the first viable answers to the other 
profound questions of mind.  It gives answers to the 
"homunculus" problem, to the "Cartesian theatre" problem, to the 
problem of "meaning", and to Leibniz's pentultimately profound 
question: how can the one know the many, (That is, how is it 
possible that a unity, (e.g. a unified mind), could somehow 
actually know the (localized) “objects” it contained –i.e. “the 
many”)?   
These answers are found in the specifically operative 
interpretation and application of David Hilbert's mathematical 
thesis of "implicit definition" as applied to the working “axioms” 
of the brain.  Implicit definition allows an operative knowledge 
specifically of functioning itself, (sans a homunculus); it does not 
allow "representative knowledge".   
But this is "knowing" in all the crucial aspects we require 
as mechanisms!  This perspective is that of "mind" itself, (rather 
than of “brain”), and constitutes my second and central 
hypothesis.  We can know our "objects" if (and only if), they are 
specifically (and purely) operative objects!  This is the whole 
sense of Hilbert’s sally as interpreted within the context of 
materialism.  Mathematics has already solved this problem! 
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The Concordance: 
(3) At this point I argued what I called “the concordance” 
between my first and second hypotheses above.  I argued that 
hypotheses one and two are fundamentally isomorphic.  It is 
proved by reconstruing and embedding logic, (-per se!), as a 
purely biological and evolutionary faculty -which I argue is the 
necessary interpretation for any strict materialist.  This 
reconception forces the identification of my first two theses.  It is 
just such correspondences that are the most valuable clues to 
science. 
(4)  From there, my thesis gets harder, but justifiably so, I 
think.  It is very “sophisticated”, (in the mathematical usage of 
the term), and relativistic, most of it lying outside the bounds of a 
short précis such as this, so I will merely sketch its outline. (See 
Chapters five through ten for a full explanation).  It will take a 
very sophisticated mind to comprehend it adequately, but I think 
it actually does complete the project I initially set myself.  I think 
it actually does answer the question: “What and where is the 
mind?” 
“Symbolic Forms” 
Employing Ernst Cassirer's "Theory of Symbolic Forms", 
I argue a case of ontic indeterminism, (likened and clearly similar 
to the Input/Output Domain question discussed initially in this 
précis).  I argue that it is a legitimate extension of Kant's 
beginnings.  I propose that a modification of Cassirer’s thesis is 
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the only plausible answer for what it is that we must finally 
consider ourselves, (that is, scientifically –from the materialist 
perspective again) -as purely biological organisms.  Organisms, 
(aka Mechanisms), do not know, organisms do -organisms are 
"triggered", (after Maturana).  Or rather, the only "knowing" of 
which we are capable is an operative knowing –following 
Hilbert- of the artifacts of our very own process!  Ontology is, 
and must always be, an indeterminate.  It is the Input / Output 
Domain problem characterized initially.   
5. But Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” provides much 
broader and deeper insights as well.  It provides the means for the 
mutual reconciliation of the many perspectives on the mind-body 
problem promised above.   Cassirer argued that each of the 
perspectives of thought asks its own legitimate questions, “each 
from its own standpoint”, but each employs an implicit logical 
context specific to itself as well. 
Without, or in the act of  relativizing, that specific logical 
context, the “object” itself becomes “a mere X”. (Cassirer)   
How close his conclusions are to our beginning 
materialist perspective –to the brain/machine’s total inability to 
know its input/output domain and to the purely intentional, (i.e. 
feedback) functioning of that mechanism!  The further 
implications I have drawn from Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” 
reconcile these multitudinous perspectives and the broader 
perspectives of epistemology as well and makes them whole.  
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“The Interface”  
6. In Chapters nine and ten, I suggest “interface”, defined 
abstractly and by necessity heterophenomenologically4, (as the 
invariant commonality, the “mathematical ideal”, of all 
materialistic interpretations of the sensory boundary), as a 
necessary and legitimate realist ontological existence postulate in 
itself.  Of those realist ontological existence postulates,  I assert 
there are exactly three –largely parallel to Putmam’s postulates of 
realist belief.   
I then propose “interface” as being essentially equivalent 
to the concept of the GUI presented earlier.  (This is my third and 
final hypothesis.)  Each is “implicitly defined”, and I argue that 
they are isomorphic!  (See Chapter 9).  Granting the actual 
ontological existence of this interface, then, it in itself supplies 
the ontological reality of an actual mind.  All the “hard 
problems” have been solved en route to this point. 
 
Conclusion: 
Mine is admittedly a very long and a very complicated 
solution, but it is the nature of the problem and not my inclination 
which has made it so.   I think you probably expected a 10,000 
                                                 
 
 
4 Using Dennett’s word 
word answer to a 60,000 word problem.  The normal size of 
scientific papers is about that  word length, and I guess that most 
ordinary ideas could be covered in such a scope –at least in 
summary.  But I think any even reasonably comprehensive, mere 
statement of this particular problem  will require at least 60,000 
words -and with a conceptual depth to match. 
 
Kant made a highly relevant comment on this point: 
 [The problem of the mind] "is a sphere so separate and 
self-contained that we cannot touch a part without 
affecting all the rest.  We can do nothing without first 
determining the position of each part and its relation to 
the rest ...  It may, then, be said of such [an argument] that 
it is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, 
down to the minute elements [of pure reason].  In the 
sphere of this faculty you can determine and define either 
everything or nothing."  ("Prolegomena", P. 11) 
Now finally, hear Cassirer: 
"A glance at the history of physics shows that precisely its 
most weighty and fundamental achievements stand in 
closest connection with considerations of a general 
epistemological nature.  Galileo's 'Dialogues on the Two 
Systems of the World' are filled with such considerations 
and his Aristotelian opponents could urge against Gallilei 
that he had devoted more years to the study of philosophy 
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than months to the study of physics.  Kepler lays the 
foundation for his work on the motion of Mars and for his 
chief work on the harmony of the world in his 'Apology 
for Tycho', in which he gives a complete methodological 
account of hypotheses and their various fundamental 
forms; an account by which he really created the modern 
concept of physical theory and gave it a definite concrete 
content.  Newton also, in the midst of his considerations 
on the structure of the world, comes back to the most 
general norms of physical knowledge, to the regulae 
philosophandi 
… But all these great historical examples of the real inner 
connection between epistemological problems and 
physical problems are almost outdone by the way in 
which this connection has been verified in the foundations 
of the theory of relativity.... Einstein...appeals primarily to 
an epistemological motive, to which he grants...a decisive 
significance."  (Cassirer: "Einstein's Theory of 
Relativity",P.353-354, my emphasis.)   
How could you think that our particular problem –the 
self-referentiality of the brain- would not require such 
epistemological considerations more than any other?   Our 
conclusions must turn upon themselves to validate our very 
beginnings.  They are progenitors and antecedents of theories.  
But these would have to be an integral part of the new science, 
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not mere reflections upon it –as, in fact, were the epistemological 
presuppositions of the entire history of our greatest thinkers on 
our hardest problems.  Philosophy, i.e. constructive philosophy in 
the service of science and integrated within the science must be 
our focus. 
 It is a current buzzword amongst neurophilosophers that 
the solution to this problem will be “multidisciplinary”, but most 
of this is merely talk, supporting and applying mainly to the 
assumed “obvious truths” of naïve realism.  My argument is that 
this is truly a multidisciplinary problem, involving radical 
departures across the whole spectrum of human thought.  My 
thesis actually fulfills this core requirement within a plausible 
perspective.  In some ways, surprisingly, my conclusions are very 
similar to our current deepest scientific worldview except that 
they substitute the idea of a non-hierarchical GUI for the notions 
of  hierarchical embedding and emergence.  Our world is not a 
“shadow”, it is an algorithm. My thesis will require an 
intellectual sophistication that we are not normally required to 
maintain however. But whatever made you think that a solution 
to this millennia-old problem would be simple? If you read it, I 
will answer. 
I believe the very act of the presentation of any adequate 
solution to this problem is probably the hardest (technical) 
writing problem that has ever existed.  There are so many 
preconceptions and prejudices, so many "prior certainties", so 
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much confusion over even the basic beginnings, that it is almost 
impossible -and the resulting reactions often strongly hostile.   
There is also, I feel on the other hand, a built-in biological 
prejudice against a real answer. (Absolute dedication to the innate 
algorithm is clearly biologically essential.)  I need, (and anyone 
with a similar case needs), active participation from my, (his), 
reader -and the realization of the necessity for a bravery to 
believe differently.  The problem demands it.   
My original book stated my basic case, but there were 
crucial later advancements in my online papers, “A Very 
Different Kind of Model: Mind, The Argument from 
Evolutionary Biology”, and “A Shortcut to the Problem: 
Consciousness per se!”  This third edition of my original book 
gives the best overall rendition of my conception as it attempts to 
outline the origins of my own very different beginning 
perspective on the basic problem.  That perspective is very unlike 
any you have ever seen before.   
I will ask that you examine my whole case before 
rendering a judgment.  I start out with an extremely abstract 
approach, but reach very concrete and specific answers.  I think 
this is the shortest and easiest path between this profound 
problem and its solution. 
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Chapter 2: Exotic Mathematics: What is it, and how 
is it relevant to the Mind-Brain Problem?   
(A deeper look at Hilbert.) 
I have been very careful in my choice of words in the 
chapter heading because I do not wish to be misunderstood.  By 
“exotic mathematics” I do not refer to arithmetic, ordinary 
algebra or the slight but profound extension of the latter which is 
called “the calculus”.   
Nor do I refer to the manifestations of formal logic, 
ordinary set theory, statistics or ordinary topology.  Instead I wish 
to refer to new developments in the very core of mathematics 
itself.  I refer specifically to Mathematical Structuralism and to 
Category Theory which have been proposed as new and radical 
foundations for the whole of mathematics. 
It is an old saying that reality is written in the language of 
mathematics. The question I propose to address is whether that 
language is only descriptive and pragmatic or is it fundamental to 
the problem –and to reality itself. And why would the philosophy 
of the foundations be relevant?  It is relevant just in case the latter 
is true –i.e. it is relevant if the foundations of our reality are just 
the foundations of mathematics itself! 
I believe there remains just one truly significant question 
in the mind-brain problem.  It is a simple question, but it is as 
crucial as it is blatant, i.e. how can a (biological) 
machine/mechanism whose parts are discrete in time and space 
ever know anything whatsoever?  That it can mechanically 
function is no longer in question, but mechanical functionality is 
not the same as “knowing”.  (Dennett addressed this problem 
quite well, but, he concludes, we are necessarily mechanical 
“zombies”!I)   
 This was the question that overpowered me over fifty 
years ago, and the one I still must reevaluate each day and every 
day -even today.  I think it is the relentless, recurring and 
irrepressible question underlying all objections to any proposed 
solution of the mind-brain problem. 
Long ago when I was very young I was extremely lucky 
in that I stumbled across what I saw as the beginnings of an 
answer.II  In the summer of my nineteenth birthday I read 
Saunders MacClane’s “A Survey of Modern Algebra”.III  This 
book, very little concerned with ordinary “algebra” per se, was 
significant not because it dealt specifically with Mathematical 
Structuralism or Category Theory as such, but because I believe 
the book’s very own structure and content was framed within that 
context.   
The very layout of its content inherently defined its 
origins –and I perceived them intuitively.  (MacLane, of course, 
was the actual co-discoverer/inventor of mathematical Category 
Theory which he conceived long before writing this particular 
book.)  I think the book proselytized its origins -sotto voce! 
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In my autodidactic digestion of this book in that summer 
fifty years ago, it became apparent to me that its subject matter 
had more to do with structures themselves and very little to do 
with the content of the “objects” of those structures.  I understood 
it furthermore as an exploration and extension of the 
mathematical possibilities of all abstract “orderings” rather than 
about ontology.   
But I understood that “ordering” itself largely from the 
perspective of Ernst Cassirer’s “Substance and Function” which I 
had read earlier and whose relevance to this specific 
mathematical and logical problem we will examine later.  
The strong implication I derived from MacClane’s book 
was that the “objects” of mathematics were in fact only virtually 
defined “positions”, defined implicitly within the structures of 
their axiom systems.IV 
 Resnik, one of the leading contemporary proponents of 
mathematical structuralism and recently discovered by me, says it 
this way: 
“The view’s [Mathematical Structuralism’s] leading ideas 
are that mathematics studies structures or patterns and that 
reference to mathematical objects figures in this study 
only as a means for depicting structures.   
Mathematical languages do not refer to determinate 
elements of fixed domains, as, to use Hellman’s term, 
“objects-Platonists” hold, but rather, in so far as they refer 
at all, they refer to positions whose identities are fixed 
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only through their relationships to other positions in the 
structure under discussion.”  V 
Here is a relevant quote from my original manuscript, 
(Iglowitz 1998), on the subtleties of the mind-brain problem 
which proposed an equivalent view: 
“The mere existence of a multiplicity of alternately viable 
calculuses, (sic), and the allowable incommensurability of their 
objects suggests an interpretation of the objects of those models 
contrary to representation or denotation however. It suggests the 
converse possibility that the function and the motivation of the 
“objects” of those models, specifically as entities per se, (in what 
I will call these “schematic models”), is instead to illustrate, to 
enable, -to crystallize and simplify the very calculus of relation 
proposed between them!   
They are a byproduct of deep ordering!1  The “objects” of 
these schematic models, I propose, are manifestations of the 
structure; the structure is not a resolution of the objects.  It is the 
structure which is predictive, [or better, “operative”]; its objects 
merely enable [reflect] it! 
I continued: “The rationale for this move comes from 
Hilbert’s profound mathematical notion of ‘implicit 
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definition’…”  [Note September, 2008: Hilbert is the focus of 
much of the current debate over mathematical structuralism and 
Category theory -see Shapiro section to follow.] 2 
 
Quoting Stefanik re: Resnik’s structuralism: 
“These objects [for Resnik] serve as only positions within 
these structures, with their identity determined only by 
their relationships with other positions within that 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of Cassirer’s conception of the innate 
ordering of Concepts themselves. 
2   I continued: “(Under this conception, the ‘objects’ of a mathematical system 
are not given beforehand, but are, in fact, a resolution of the operative rules of 
the system itself. [See prior Schlick quote.]    They exist solely as focuses, 
nexuses (sic), [i.e. virtual expressions] of the interaction of those rules.  Now let 
us consider applying this notion of ‘objects’ to the ‘objects’ of the mind.  If this 
shocks you –and I hope its implications will at least interest you- consider this: it 
presents the very first, truly scientific pathway around the problems of the 
homunculus, of knowing, and enables the first possibility of an actual scientific 
existence of an actual mind!  If ‘the (biological) system’ were to know, and ‘we’ 
were the system itself, then it would indeed be possible for us to know our 
objects.  But only, however, if those objects were like the ‘objects’ of implicit 
definition.”  This is the revelation I had 40 years ago.)  There are many profound 
difficulties in it, I know, e.g.  in regard to what I have referred to as “the static 
problem” which I addressed in the “Dennett Appendix” in my book, [Iglowitz, 
1995], and in the “Freeman Appendix” to [Iglowitz, 2005].  The latter comments 
deal with the biological viability of such evolutionarily determined objects in a 
changing environment.  See the reference in the latter to “A/D converters” [ibid].  
(My conception raises deep logical problems as well.  I will address these 
presently.)  Contrarily, it seems to be the only possible pathway to “knowing” 
per se within the context of modern science. 
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structure.  His basic underlying metaphor3 is that of 
geometric points, and he claims that we do not have 
knowledge of mathematical objects given in isolation but 
rather as ‘pieces of structures.’”VI 
 Here is a much older viewpoint on Hilbert’s related 
conception of “implicit definition” that I was aware of almost 
from the beginning and which helped form my initial conception.  
(From Moritz Schlick, physicist/philosopher and founder of the 
famous "Vienna Circle", and, according to Cassirer, the actual 
inventor of the phrase “implicit definition).  He grasped the deep 
implications of Hilbert's innovation early on: 
"[Hilbert's] revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic 
or primitive concepts are to be defined just by the fact that 
they satisfy the axioms.... [They] acquire meaning only by 
virtue of the axiom system, and possess only the content 
that it bestows upon them. They stand for entities whose 
whole being is to be bearers of the relations laid down by 
the system."VII  
I do not claim to be a mathematician, or even a 
philosopher of mathematics, but the perspective Mac Lane’s 
                                                 
 
 
3 Please note that the usage of geometry is a “metaphor” only.  The objects of 
mathematics may be more complexly ordered than is possible for geometry. 
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book engendered was the one I held from the very beginning of 
my quest for an answer to the mind-brain problem.  I saw the 
blinding possibility of the first truly viable answer to the core 
question cited above. 
My purpose here is to solicit the help of real 
mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics in the 
completion of a formal and rigorous resolution of this problem 
capable of empiric verification.VIII  I think this is the ground 
where neuroscience must go.  My own thrust for most of my 
intellectual life has been to pursue the profound further 
consequences of this idea –and they are huge and difficult. 
In my mistaken youthful naivety and humility, (which I 
renounce in this my old age), I had assumed that all minds bright 
enough to approach the deepest problems of our species, (the 
brightest minds of my elders and of my contemporaries), had 
long since understood and internalized these lucent, sophisticated 
ideas.4  These ideas seemed to be an absolutely essential part of 
the working tools of the intellect.   
                                                 
 
 
4 This was the second of my naive youthful intellectual assumptions.  The first 
was that such minds –which I had idealized- had realized and adopted the 
profundity of Cassirer’s redefinition of the formal, technical “concept” of logic 
itself –which he had reformulated in terms of “ordering” rather than of 
“extensionality”- and which had struck me with a profound force at about the 
same time. 
It seems I was wrong.  It seems clear from their writings 
that most neurophilosophers have very limited conceptions of the 
dimensions and scope of modern mathematics. 
Mac Clane’s book suggested to me what I still believe is 
the only genuine possibility for an answer to the question posed 
above, viz: “How can a (biological) machine/mechanism, whose 
parts are discrete in time and space, ever know anything 
whatsoever?”  It also suggested an answer to Leibniz’ earlier and 
more purely philosophical question as well, i.e. “How is it 
possible for ‘the one’ to know ‘the many’?”  That is, how is it 
possible that a unity, (e.g. a unified mind), could somehow 
actually know the (localized) “objects” it contained –i.e. “the 
many”?   
Equivalently, how is it possible that a “Cartesian theatre” 
could exist without a homunculus? 
What Mac Clane’s book spoke to me under my prior 
perspective of Cassirer’s “Concept” in which I saw it,5 was that a 
system of mathematical “axioms”IX when taken as a whole, (see 
the relevant Hilbert quotes following shortly), could actually 
create its “objects”, (albeit virtually).  It could actually “know 
them” moreover, rather than the other way around.  Tentatively 
taking a system of “axioms” in a specifically operative sense, 
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[Note: 2010: (think of nerve nets –W.J. Freeman’s “equivalence 
classes” perhaps, as “axioms”)], –in a biological sense then –as 
the fundamental units of brain process6- it suggested that as a 
system, (i.e. as a whole), it could create and actually know its 
“objects”.   
 Here is some very recent material I have found and 
which buttresses my early interpretation:  Quoting Hilbert’s 
response to Frege, (David Hilbert, of course, was one of the most 
famous mathematicians in history and the actual father of 
“implicit definition”).  Please note his emphasis on the “whole 
structure”: 
“It is impossible to give a definition of point, for example, 
since only the whole structure of axioms yields a complete 
definition. A concept can be fixed logically only by its 
relations to other concepts. These relations [are] 
formulated in certain statements [which] I call axioms, 
thus arriving at the view that axioms are the definitions of 
the concepts.”X 
                                                                                                           
 
 
5 –see later Cassirer sections –especially Chapter 3. 
6 Please do not be put off in considerations of size.  Mathematics has no problem 
with axiom systems of even infinite size.  I do not propose that they are that 
large, (sic), but a few hundred billion, (probably too large), probably wouldn’t 
raise many mathematical eyebrows. 
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Here is Hilbert’s expansion of his perspective:   
“I do not want to assume anything as known in advance. I 
regard my explanation ...as the definition of the concepts 
point, line, plane ... If one is looking for other definitions 
of a ‘point’, e.g. through paraphrase in terms of 
extensionless, etc., then I must indeed oppose such 
attempts in the most decisive way; one is looking for 
something one can never find because there is nothing 
there; and everything gets lost and becomes vague and 
tangled and degenerates into a game of hide and seek.”XI 
From my early intuitive interpretation of MacClane’s 
book, I proceeded at that early stage in my life to tentatively 
assume “axioms”7 as the fundamental operative units of the brain 
to see where the assumption led.  (The repercussions are 
enormous, I realize, but please bear with me.)  This was the 
perspective I started with fifty years ago and have pursued it ever 
since.  I believe it has been fruitful. 
I concluded early on that the (virtual) “objects” of this 
particular system, (i.e. of the brain conceived in this way), could 
actually function as the perceptual and conceptual objects of the 
“mind” and that the problems which I later came to know as “the 
                                                 
 
 
7 i.e. “atomic processes” 
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homunculus” and “the Cartesian Theatre” would be solved.8  
This was the one case in which a mechanism could actually know
its “objects” –but only in precisely the case where those “objects
were, in fact, a manifestation of the ordering, (structure), of the 
mechanism itself.
 
” 
                                                
9   
The problem I then faced, and it was not a simple one, 
was that they would have to be mathematical objects per se!  And 
how could this be?XII 
I spent many decades investigating and developing the 
biological and philosophical implications of my early insight with 
some success I think, though communication of them has been 
almost impossible for the reasons stated previously, I think.   
After long consideration, (too long!), I have recently 
concluded that the difficulty has always been a direct result of my 
original naïve assumption.  These tools are not in the workchests 
of neuroscientists or neurophilosophers!     
As a whole I think these ideas make sense.  Their 
ramifications are huge but admittedly raise substantial and 
profound doubts which are extremely difficult.  
 
 
 
8 These problems are implicit in the core problem stated at the outset of course.  
I always saw the problems, but their naming came much later.  See Chapter 3 
:“Cassirer” for a rationale. 
9  It also clearly seemed to resolve the deepest problems of “meaning” as well. 
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I will not minimize this fact.  But I feel the latter 
objections are themselves essential to the problem however as 
they must constantly be clashed against the core problem raised 
at the outset.  This was the hammer and the anvil on which my 
ideas were forged.  Only recently did I discover the actual formal 
mathematics which elucidate my beginning insight and seem to 
validate it.XIII  
  
Mathematical Structuralism and Category Theory: 
Let me begin by quoting pieces of the modern dialogue.  I 
will not be able to truly elaborate this discussion, but my purpose 
here is to give you a flavor and to establish the legitimacy and the 
“legality” of my perspective.XIV 10 (See Footnote) 
First let me repeat the short quote of Resnik defining 
Mathematical Structuralism as a place for us to start: 
“The view’s leading ideas are that mathematics studies 
structures or patterns and that reference to mathematical 
objects figures in this study only as a means for depicting 
structures.   
                                                 
 
 
10 I claim no expertise in Category Theory whatsoever save through these 
references, but I have a greater confidence in my understanding of 
Mathematical Structuralism as I came to the same conclusions myself over 
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Mathematical languages do not refer to determinate 
elements of fixed domains, as, to use Hellman’s term, 
“objects-platonists” hold,; but rather, in so far as they 
refer at all, they refer to positions whose identities are 
fixed only through their relationships to other positions in 
the structure under discussion.”XV 
There is so much to present here, so many 
misunderstandings, so many presuppositions that it is almost 
impossible to even begin to communicate fluently on this subject.  
One aspect lies in the foundations of logic itself.  Almost 
everybody, it seems, assumes set theory as the logical primitive 
of thought, (which assumption lies at the basis of some of the 
deepest problems here):  
Benacerraf counters however: 
 “Very often philosophical logicians are really logicists 
who are promoting the program of reducing mathematical 
objects to logic and set theory.  This is clearly distinct 
from the activities of mathematicians who are not 
interested in a reductionist program…” 
                                                                                                           
 
 
fifty years ago.  See my youthful arguments in the next chapter on Cantor’s 
Diagonal Argument. 
 ….We will see that category theory has been proposed as 
an alternative to set theory as a foundation of 
mathematics.  “The search for urelements, fundamental 
objects of the mathematical universe, is a mistaken 
enterprise that underlies an absolute theory of identity and 
the platonic philosophy of mathematics. …”.XVI XVII 
Here is another perspective:  
“Mac LaneXVIII correctly states that many interesting 
questions cannot be settled on the basis of the Zermelo-
Fraenkel axioms of set theory.  
‘Various additional axioms have been proposed, including 
axioms which ensure the existence of some very large 
cardinal numbers and an axiom of determinacy (for 
certain games) which in its full form contradicts the 
axiom of choice.  
This variety and the undecideability results indicate that 
set theory is indeterminate in principle: There is no 
unique and definitive list of axioms for sets; the intuitive 
idea of a set as a collection can lead to wildly different 
and mutually inconsistent formulations.  
On the elementary level, there are options such as ZFC, 
ZC, ZBQC or intuitionistic set theory; on the higher level, 
the method of forcing provides many alternative models 
with divergent properties. The platonic notion that there 
 66
is somewhere the ideal realm of sets, not yet fully 
described, is a glorious illusion.’ ” XIX 
Stefanik continues: 
“MacLane believes that this situation is similar to that of 
geometry after the proof of consistency for non-Euclidean 
geometry demonstrated that there are many geometries, 
and not just one. In a similar manner, the intuitive idea of 
a collection leads to different versions of set theory. For 
Mac Lane, this is sufficient reason to consider alternatives 
to set theory as a foundation for mathematics. The 
alternative that he proposes is category theory.”XX 
 
And a few more: 
“Category theory is essentially anti-platonistic, for it 
undermines the received idea that the meaning of any 
mathematical concept is fixed by referring it to the 
context of a unique absolute universe of sets.”XXI 
“...it becomes natural, indeed mandatory, to seek for the 
set concept a formulation that takes account of its 
underdetermined character, that is, one that does not  bind 
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it so tightly to the absolute universe of sets with its rigid 
hierarchical structure.”11 12 
I studied the Zermelo-Frankel set-theoretic foundation for 
numbers -a well-accepted and pretty much standard interpretation 
briefly, (long ago).  Surprisingly, I found that there is precisely 
one thing that actually, (i.e. ontologically), exists for mathematics 
under this set-theoretical interpretation:  “the empty set”!  
Everything else –all else- is grounded in sets and sets of sets and 
sets of sets of sets of….that selfsame “empty set” –i.e. the set 
which has no members!   
The actual (ontological) existence of that empty set –that 
empty basket in the real world- is proved moreover solely on the 
basis of a logical contradiction.13  Assume it does not exist and a 
logical contradiction arises!  Therefore it, our most crucial 
ontological logical building block is “proved” thereby to actually 
exist!  I think this is not a viable beginning for anything; much 
less as the very foundation for the logic we apply to the very core 
                                                 
 
 
11 Note: W.J. Freeman and I both specifically argued against hierarchy in the 
compositing of the brain.  He has supplied a physical model.  See Chapter 4 and  
Iglowitz, 2005 
12 Bell, 238,my emphasis 
13 The proof is grounded in “material implication”. 
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of our world.XXII  It is a self-serving and circular argument.14  
The solution I have evolved is harder, but I think it works. 
                                                
 
Back to the sources of mathematical structuralism and 
category theory: 
Resnick: 
“…  As positions in structures, they have no identity 
outside of a structure.  Furthermore, the various results of 
mathematics which seem to show that mathematical 
objects such as the numbers do have internal structures, 
e.g. their identification with sets, are in fact interstructural 
relationships.”XXIII 
Repeating Stefanik: 
“These objects [for Resnik] serve as only positions within 
these structures, with their identity determined only by 
their relationships with other positions within that 
structure.”  
 
 
 
14  I say it is circular because the logicians stand on the foundations of 
mathematical logic, and the mathematical logicians stand on the foundations of 
philosophical logic.  I had a well known philosophy professor who used to sit in 
on my beginning mathematical logic classes and take ferocious and copious 
notes even at that level.  So an appeal to philosophical logic to support 
mathematical logic seems very strange to me. 
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But how could “a structure” serve a biological mechanism 
without the further inclusion of actual “objects”15 within that 
structure?16  On the other hand, how could “a structure” serve a 
biological mechanism at all? 
  Either it is conceived to exist externally in the unknown 
input/output domain in which case it is merely manipulated, (and 
still unknown), or it is conceived internally to that mechanism 
itself, in which case it is a part of the intentional feedback loop of 
the mechanism described early on, but here, as argued in the very 
beginning, there is still nobody home!  
The better answer is that virtual “objects”, (and I think it 
is pretty clear that the objects of structuralist mathematics are 
truly virtual), could serve the organism as a highly effective and 
optimizing organization of response17, alternatively as a cohesive 
operative metaphorXXIV of its primitive structural units, (serving 
as a “higher level language” for intentionality perhaps),XXV and 
this is just what I propose for the human brain.XXVI   
I will argue in Chapter 4 that our “perceptual objects” are 
a byproduct of the deep evolutionary self-organization (ordering) 
                                                 
 
 
15 How about a structure of neural connections, for instance? 
16 Considering it as a connectionist structure –as we will do- will make more 
sense. 
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of our primitives!  Our “objects”, I will propose, are 
manifestations of the structure; the structure is not a resolution of 
the objects.  It is the structure which is predictive and operative; 
its objects merely enable or “reflect” it!XXVII  There is 
considerably more to the solution of this problem than I have 
discussed so far,18 but, surprisingly many of these further deep 
ramifications are actually mirrored in the current (mathematical 
CategorialXXVIII) dialogue as well! 
  This is our deepest and ultimate problem and we must 
expect the implications to be vast on all fronts. 
One of these implications, and it is very real, relates to my 
investment long ago in Ernst Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” which 
incorporates an absolute relativism of epistemology.19  (This is 
clearly consistent with our present, albeit conditional, 
materialistic perspective!) 
                                                                                                           
 
 
17 See Iglowitz, 2005, for a precise biological elaboration of this possibility, and 
the later citation of my letter to Rosen in Chapter 3 as an expansion of my ideas 
on this subject. 
18 Briefly, I have argued for evolutionary “objects” as primitives, but I also 
strongly suggest the inclusion of intentional axioms as well -as an answer to the 
“static problem” –see Freeman Appendix of  Iglowitz 2005, and the “Dennett 
Appendix” in  Iglowitz, 1995 
19 Which fits very nicely with my base ideas, of course –i.e. with the 
necessities of the brain as “machine”. 
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The absolute ontological object for Cassirer becomes “a 
mere X”.20 
“Even in ‘nature’, the physical object will not coincide 
absolutely with the chemical object, nor the chemical with 
the biological –because physical, chemical, biological 
knowledge frame their questions each from its own 
particular standpoint and, in accordance with this 
standpoint, subject the phenomena to a special 
interpretation and formation21…. 
The end of this development [“critical idealism”XXIX] 
seems to negate its beginning –the unity of [ontological] 
being, for which it strove….The One Being, to which 
thought holds fast and which it seems unable to relinquish 
without destroying its own for, eludes cognition.  The 
more its metaphysical unity as a ‘thing in itself’ is 
asserted, the more it evades all possibility of knowledge, 
until at last it is relegated entirely to the sphere of the 
unknowable and becomes a mere ‘X’”.XXX 
                                                 
 
 
20 Ontology is clearly relevant to the mind-body problem which occurs as a self-
referential question within it. 
21 i.e. each discipline incorporates its own specialized logical structure –without 
that particular structure the “object” becomes faceless 
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Simply put, Cassirer argued that each of the forms of 
science incorporates its own specialized logical perspective, 
(“each frame(s) their questions each from its own particular 
standpoint”), and, if that unique, purely logical, and specialized 
framework were removed -or relativized, all that would remain of 
the ontological “object” would be “a mere X”! XXXI  
But note how closely Cassirer’s conception of reality 
matches the materialist perspective I sketched in the Precis!  
There is no way that a machine, (and this is the precise 
characterization of the brain implicit in materialism), could have 
knowledge of the space which constitutes its input or its output 
domains! 
Cassirer’s conception seems to be precisely mirrored 
mathematically in Bell’s "Category Theory and the Foundations 
of Mathematics",22 [J.L. Bell]. (Citation shortly) 
                                                 
 
 
22 If these, (structuralism and category theory), are, in fact, the foundations of 
our mathematics, then they are also the foundations of our logic.  This should 
be confirmed with even a casual glance at the present mathematical state of 
logic.  As such they strongly imply that Cassirer’s conclusions are relevant to 
logical thought at the very bottom level.  This seems to be confirmed from 
Bell’s perspective. 
But first, in close parallel to my comments above, 
Stefanik cites Benacerraf:  
“[Hilbert] argues that what constitutes an object varies 
from theory to theory, category to category, and that 
Frege failed to realize this fact. It is a thesis that is 
supported by the activity of mathematicians, and is 
essential to the philosophical perspective underlying 
category theory, as we shall discuss later.  
The search for urelements, fundamental objects of the 
mathematical universe, is a mistaken enterprise that 
underlies an absolute theory of identity and the platonic 
philosophy of mathematics.’, “[and of neuroscience as 
well I propose],”… ‘It [logic]XXXII remains the tool 
applicable to all disciplines and theories, the difference 
being only that it is left to the discipline or theory to 
determine what shall count as an 'object' or 'individual.' 
[Benacerraf, 288] 
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Quoting Stefanik, (solely for definitional purposes here): 
“Any topos23 may be regarded as a mathematical domain 
of discourse or ‘world’ in which mathematical concepts 
can be interpreted and mathematical constructions 
performed.  Bell develops an analogy between 
mathematical frameworks and local coordinate systems of 
relativity theory.  Each serves as the appropriate reference 
frame for fixing the meaning of mathematical or physical 
concepts respectively.” [Stefanik, 1994] 
Here are the promised relevant citations from Bell: 
“The topos-theoretical viewpoint suggests that the 
absolute universe of sets be replaced by a plurality of 
‘toposes of discourse’, each of which may be regarded as 
a possible ‘world’ in which mathematical activity may 
(figuratively) take place.  The mathematical activity that 
takes place within such ‘worlds’ is codified within local 
set theories; it seems appropriate, therefore, to call this 
codification local mathematics, to contrast it with the 
absolute (i.e., classical) mathematics associated with the 
absolute universe of sets.   
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Constructive provability of a mathematical assertion now 
means that it is invariant, i.e., valid in every local 
mathematics.”XXXIII 
“There is an evident analogy between mathematical 
frameworks and the local coordinate systems of relativity: 
each serve as the appropriate reference frames for fixing 
the meaning of mathematical or physical concepts 
respectively.  Pursuing this analogy suggests certain 
further parallels. 
For example, consider the concept of invariance.  In 
relativistic physics, invariant physical laws are statements 
of mathematical physics (e.g. Maxwell’s equationsXXXIV) 
that, suitably formulated, hold universally, i.e. in every 
local coordinate system.  Analogously, invariant 
mathematical laws are mathematical assertions that again 
hold universally, i.e. in every mathematical framework.”  
[Bell, 241] 
The trick is to understand that Cassirer’s epistemological 
relativism is based, like Bell’s and Einstein’s, in the absolute 
                                                                                                           
 
 
23 “Topos”: In mathematics, a topos (plural "topoi" or "toposes") is a type of 
category that behaves like the category of sheaves of sets on a topological space.  
(Wiki) 
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preservation of connective –i.e. translatory invariants.24  I came 
to these conclusions by an independent route -by a continual 
reexamination of the original core question, (matched against 
Cassirer’s ideas and those structuralist implications I inferred 
from my early exposure to MacClane’s book), which I feel lead 
inexorably to Cassirer’s ultimate perspective.   
How is it possible for a pure mechanism to actually know, 
(in the sense of ontology), anything whatsoever?”  As I argued in 
the Precis, the ultimate answer is that, other than the “objects” of 
its own operationality,  it cannot!  But it is possible for a 
mechanism to have “beliefs” –i.e. operative 
strategies/organizations each of which addresses  the invariant 
core, (transformed through our evolutionary artifacts), of raw 
experience instead!25 
  I believe that invariant core, (of experience), its 
primitive objects are, in fact, evolutionary artifacts implicitly 
defined by the structure of brain process!XXXV  These artifacts, I 
think, are our primitive “percepts”.XXXVI 
  They function, as I said in one of my papers, as fixed 
“A/D” converters,XXXVII ( or, better: hierarchical/chaotic 
                                                 
 
 
24 For Cassirer, these invariants are preserved in “the phenomena”. 
25 The “invariants” for Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” are our raw percepts 
themselves sans an interpretation. 
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converters), so to speak, mediating between input26 and central 
brain process27.  (These are the “schematic artifacts” of the 
“GUI”, (graphic user interface), that I argue in Chapter 4.)  I 
believe this was how evolution organized and optimized the 
behavior of the seventy trillion celled megacollosus called man! 
  Here is a bit from my original manuscript on the subject 
of “objects: (note:  where I have used  the term “implicit 
definition” you may substitute the terms “mathematical 
structuralism” or “category theory” if you like.  I don’t 
automatically agree, (that is, I do not automatically agree in a 
“knee-jerk” sense.  I don’t know enough.)  It should work 
however. 
“I propose that the boundaries -the demarcations and 
delimitations of these schematic objects, (their “contiguity” if 
you will) -are formed specifically to meet the needs of the 
operations themselves. I propose that they exist to serve the 
structure, (the rules of the “calculus”) - not the converse.XXXVIII 
  I propose that the ‘objects’ of these schematic models –
specifically as objects qua objects - serve to organize process, 
(i.e. analysis or response). They are not representations of actual 
                                                 
 
 
26 “Triggering” to use Maturana’s more profound perspective 
27 which, I propose in agreement with W.J. Freeman and consistent with the 
categorial perspective as well, is not organized hierarchically 
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objects or actual entities in reality.XXXIX This, I propose, is why 
they are taken [utilized] as “things” in the first place. 
 They functionally bridge reality in a way that physical, 
(i.e. ontological), objects do not and I suggest that they are, in 
fact, materialized metaphors of analysis or response. The 
rationale for using them, (as any good “seminarian”28 would tell 
you), is clarity, organization and efficiency. XL  
As a side issue, remember that axiom systems may 
embody “space” itself. Hilbert’s original axioms in the 
“Grundlagen”, (itself only a small part of the beginning of his 
massive revelation), also deal with “between”, “dimension”, 
“point”, “motion”, etc –i.e. his conception includes spatiality 
itself.   So I think do the axioms of the brain!  Is spatiality then 
external?  Or is it just an extremely useful part of the reactive and 
pragmatic organization of brain process?29 XLI  
I believe we will never know as I concur with Cassirer 
that ontology in its entirety “is a mere X”. Maturana’s 
perspective is absolutely relevant here.  Briefly Maturana 
proposes that we do not pass or receive information from 
                                                 
 
 
28 The intended humor will become apparent in the discussion at the early 
stages of Chapter 4 –it applies to “the training seminar”. 
29 The self-referential aspect of this viewpoint is addressed in my adoption of a 
modification of Cassirer’s epistemological relativism –again based in invariants- 
as my third hypothesis. 
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externality, we are simply “triggered” by that externality to 
preserve our “Autopoietic entity”, -just as externality in its turn is 
merely “triggered” by us. 30    
But isn’t this just the conclusion that we might have 
expected from our opening discussion regarding a mechanism?31 
 
And another:32 
“Even idealism and dualism do not resolve the underlying 
logical problem however -the how of Leibniz’s “expression of the 
many in the one”, for even then how could this part of even a 
mental “substance” know that part?XLII  These are [precisely and 
profoundly] logical problems [per se] -the problem of the 
“homunculus” and the problem of the “Cartesian theatre”.  Where 
does there exist even the possibility of a solution? 
Implicit definition, virtual existence -and logic as 
biology33- this triad is the only example within our intellectual 
horizons that seems to hold even any promise for sentiency in 
this our ordinary sense of it.  It suggests the only scientifically 
                                                 
 
 
30.  See Chapter 6.  Maturana 1987. 
31 I addressed this issue as “the (intentional) axiom of externality” in my MS. 
(Iglowitz, 1995 and in the current MS in Chapter 6.) 
32 Since this is just me quoting me, I don’t think I have to apologize for the 
length of my citations. 
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plausible solution to “the mind’s eye” and the “Cartesian theatre” 
and the only non-eliminativist, (for “mind”), [biological] answer 
to the homunculus problem.   
These are answers which must exist if mind in our 
ordinary sense is, in fact, to be real.  Implicit definition, taken 
operatively, permits knowing as a whole what are, in some real 
sense, our distinct and separate parts.  This is precisely because 
those parts, (objects), are in fact non-localized and virtual 
(logical) expressions specifically of the whole.  It opens the first 
genuine possibility, therefore, for a resolution of this essential 
requirement of “naive” consciousness. 
But that pathway, (implicit definition), does not make 
sense from the standpoint of representation!  For implicit 
definition solves the problem logically -from the standpoint of 
constitutive logic -and speaks to nothing other than its own 
internal structure.  Repeating myself: “objects”, (under implicit 
definition), are known to a system, (i.e. universally/globally), 
only because they are specifically expressions of the system.   
It becomes a viable and natural solution to the problem of 
awareness, therefore, only when the objects of consciousness 
                                                                                                           
 
 
33 See Iglowitz, 1995 and the heading to follow shortly in Chapter 3: “Logic as 
Biology”. 
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themselves are conceived operationally and schematically, (and 
specifically, logically34), rather than representatively.35   
When our objects are taken specifically as schematic 
representations of process itself however, (as per my first thesis 
[Chapter 4 of current MS]), the solution becomes both natural 
and plausible -the specifically logical problem of sentiency is 
resolved.36  I assert that no other actual solution, (other than a 
denial of the problem itself), has ever been suggested.  This is the 
argument from the second to the first hypothesis -and different 
from the argument from the first to the second presented earlier 
[in the original MS, Chapter 4 here]. 
But this conclusion is greatly strengthened by the 
arguments I will propound in Chapter 4 …and by the conclusions 
of several eminent contemporary biologists.XLIII  
 My biological thesis, considered biologically, (i.e. aside 
from its admittedly profound, but purely epistemological 
difficulties -which I will make good in Chapters 5 through 10 in 
                                                 
 
 
34 and “bio-logically” 
35 That the objects of this constitutive logic would further “represent”, however, 
would be a genuine assumption of the miraculous -possible but difficult.  See 
P.S. Churchland: “and then a miracle happened….”  [Churchland, 1988]  
Representative objects are not the right sort of mathematical objects to be 
applicable here.  Representative objects are based in reference, denotation and 
not in connectivity.  At the very beginning they resurrect the homunculus. 
36 Though not the substance problem.  That is a separate epistemological and 
metaphysical issue addressed by my third thesis. 
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an extrapolation of Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms”), is exceedingly 
strong.  How could evolution organize -as it had to organize- the 
reactive function of this colossus of seventy trillion cells?   
Even this formulation of the question disregards the yet 
more profound complexity of the reactivity of the individual cells 
-also organisms- themselves!  It was the overwhelmingly crucial 
issue in the evolution of complex metacellulars.  My thesis of 
schematism is both viable and plausible in this context.  But what 
does this evolutionary development and organization of the 
reactive process of complex metacellulars have to do with 
[actual] ‘information’ “?37  There is still, again, “nobody home”! 
As an aside: I dealt with this “information” problem from 
the perspective of Humberto Maturana in Chapter 3 of my MS, 
(Chapter 6 of the current writing).  I believe this brilliant, if 
slightly flawed workXLIV is the modern equivalent of Kant’s 
“Prolegomena” and is clearly relevant to the problem at hand.   
 
                                                 
 
 
37 “Information” is a subject that must be discussed, obviously.  Both the 
materialists and myself see the function of the brain in the light of optimized 
efficiency.  From their standpoint, this is accomplished by the incorporation of a 
realistic model of externality within it.  From my standpoint this is an 
impossibility –it goes against the whole grain of the evolutionary perspective.  
Evolution works by the selection of processes.  But the subsequent extension 
into “information processes” invokes a miracle.  How did, and how could it 
start?  Maturana attempted it in his “structural parallelism”, but I find that this 
aspect of his arguments is faulty.  [See  Iglowitz, 1995] 
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Back to the mathematical problem: 
Presently I will introduce Shapiro’s critique of the 
structuralist claims.  I think it is important because I think it 
seriously challenges my position and causes me to deepen and 
clarify it.  It will lead me to a discussion of the other main thrust 
of my conception, starting with Ernst Cassirer’s reinterpretation 
of the deepest problem of all –of the fundamental technical 
logical “concept” itself.  This in turn will lead to a 
reconsideration of even the fundamental concept of the “class” 
which grounds modern set theory. 
Remember, I asserted previously that our problem here is 
a profound problem of logical possibility per se!  This is the 
ground in which Shapiro’s discussion, (and most of mathematics’ 
preconceptions), must necessarily be evaluated. 
 
But first hear Goldblatt:   
“Now, since category theory, through the notion of topos, 
has succeeded in axiomatising set-theory, the outcome is an 
entirely new categorial foundation of mathematics!  The category 
theorists attitude that “function”38 rather than “set membership: 
                                                 
 
 
38 “One of the primary perspectives offered by category theory is that the 
concept of arrow, abstracted from that of function or mapping, may be used 
instead of the set membership relation as the basic building block for developing 
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can be seen as the fundamental mathematical concept has been 
entirely vindicated.”XLV  (Do you hear a distant echo of 
Cassirer’s “mathematical concept of function” here? I think you 
will when we enter Chapter 3!) 
                                                                                                          
 
Back to the Sources of Category Theory and Structuralism: 
Shapiro Part One 
I will cite just one more perspective from mathematical 
structuralismXLVI, and then go on to present my own solution to 
the Mind-Brain problem.  Shapiro’s perspective on mathematical 
structuralism exposes what I think is a critical defect in our 
thinking about mathematics and “reality” generally -and about 
the mind-brain problem specifically.  I think it derives from the 
presumed foundations of the classical logical “concept” itself. 
Shapiro dealt fairly deeply with Hilbert’s original 
conception of “implicit definition”.  But he argued that the issue 
of consistency/coherence is the more critical. He distinguished 
 
 
 
mathematical constructions, and expressing properties of mathematical entities.  
Instead of defining properties of a collection by reference to its members, i.e. 
internal structure, one can proceed by reference to its external relationships, with 
the other collections.  The links between collections are provided by functions, 
and the axioms for a category derive from the properties of functions under 
composition.” Goldblatt, Robert, Dover 1984, p.1 Yes, I do see the problem! 
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strongly between the “young Hilbert” and the “older Hilbert”.  
(And, most definitely, so do I!)   
The former was the father of “implicit definition” who 
proved consistency only algebraically and relativistically.  The 
latter sought an answer in Formalism with its “finitary 
arithmetic”, “tokens” and “assertatory statements” and Shapiro 
seems to have approved.   
My own perspective based on fifty years of contemplation 
in a much broader and very different context is that the young 
Hilbert was closer to the truth than the older Hilbert.  This was 
the young man who was called “the king of invariants” and I 
think his breeding showed in his apotheosis as embodied in his 
concept of “implicit definition”.39   
“In this note, I hope to shed a little light on the question, 
or questions, by relating the present debate to a clash that 
took place over a hundred years ago, between two 
intellectual giants, Gottlob Frege and David Hilbert. I 
propose to focus on the role and function of meta-
                                                 
 
 
39 I think he was later seduced by Cantor’s easier, but highly alluring 
perspective.  “No one will drive us from the paradise which Cantor created for 
us" [Hilbert] 
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mathematics40, which, I suggest, does not fit smoothly 
into Hilbert’s algebraic perspective at the time.  
The problem was directly remedied in the subsequent 
development of the Hilbert program some decades later, 
where it is explicit that the proper meta-mathematics is 
finitary arithmetic. But, the story goes, this resolution was 
undermined with the incompleteness theorems, thanks to 
Gödel. So there is some unfinished business in the 
original debate, at least from Hilbert’s side of it.”XLVII 
“A crucial aspect of the axiomatization is that the system 
is what I call ‘free-standing’. Anything at all can play the 
role of the undefined primitives of points, lines, planes, 
etc., so long as the axioms are satisfied. Hilbert was not 
out to capture the essence of a specific chunk of reality, 
be it space, the forms of intuition, or anything else.  
Otto Blumenthal reports that in a discussion in a Berlin 
train station in 1891, Hilbert said that in a proper 
                                                 
 
 
40 Please note and remember that it is metamathematics per se which is 
Shapiro’s focus throughout this paper. But, as he later states: “For one thing, the 
meta-theory is not axiomatized in the Grundlagen, and so there is no implicit” 
[or explicit] “definition of the meta-theoretic notions.”  I think they originated in 
Hilbert’s native but superb, mathematical and logical perspective, (as the “king 
of invariants”), and not from his later (Cantorian) perspective.  I think his 
conversion was one of the greatest mistakes in intellectual history. 
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axiomatization of geometry, ‘one must always be able to 
say, instead of “points, straight lines, and planes”, “tables, 
chairs, and beer mugs”.41’ [ibid 64]XLVIII 
To further quote Shapiro:   
“the early pages of Hilbert [1899] contain phrases like 
“the axioms of this group define the idea expressed by the 
word ‘between…” and “the axioms of this group define 
the notion of congruence or motion…..we think of 
…points, straight lines and planes as having certain 
mutual relations, which we indicate by means of such 
words as ‘are situated’, ‘between’, ‘parallel’, congruent’, 
‘continuous’, etc.  The complete and exact description of 
these relations follows as a consequence of the axioms of 
geometry”. [ibid] 
 
 But “Anything at all can play the role of the undefined 
primitives”!  He quotes Hilbert: 
“... it is surely obvious that every theory is only a 
scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their 
necessary relations to one another, and that the basic 
                                                 
 
 
41 This is pretty nearly equivalent to Wilder’s “permissive”.  See Wilder 1952 
 
elements can be thought of in any way one likes.  If in 
speaking of my points, I think of some system of things, 
e.g., the system love, law, chimney-sweep ...and then 
assume all my axioms as relations between these things, 
then my propositions, e.g., Pythagoras’ theorem, are also 
valid for these things ... [Any] theory can always be 
applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements.  
One only needs to apply a reversible one-one 
transformation and lay it down that the axioms shall be 
correspondingly the same for the transformed things. This 
circumstance is in fact frequently made use of, e.g., in the 
principle of duality ... [This] ...can never be a defect in a 
theory, and it is in any case unavoidable.” [Hilbert via 
Shapiro] 
But what precisely could the Pythagorean Theorem mean 
for "beer mugs", "love", "chimney sweeps" for example?  These 
terms are proposed as co-equal to “line”, “between” … as 
primitive terms, not as derivational from other primitive terms!  
If we were to translate the question into one of the positions of 
beer mugs for instance, we would only have come back to the 
very “points”, “lines”, etc. that we started out with and begged 
the question, as we would not have done an actual substitution of 
the basic terms.  It would have been a circular argument and a 
completely trivial conclusion.  Hilbert was certainly brighter than 
that!   
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In my earlier papers, I had adopted Wilder’s interpretation 
–i.e. in “Consciousness: a Simpler Approach to the Mind-Brain 
Problem.”XLIX  This was a completely workable answer I believe 
for the purposes of my central thesis, but in Chapter 3 I will 
explore a different and deeper interpretation of Hilbert’s remarks 
which will broaden our context considerably. 
 
In those earlier papers I had interpreted Hilbert’s 
comments in the most minimal sense -that these “objects” were, 
using Wilder’s terminology, “permissive and presumptive only”, 
that is, semantically neutral.  
These objects, (of its domain -and "existence" terms 
generally), are assumed only, (as Wilder points out) 
"presumptive(ly)" and "permissive(ly)" however.  We are 
told nothing about them in an objective sense.”L 
  I began with an interpretation of Hilbert where the 
“objects” of a system are taken in a purely impartial sense. 
“... it is surely obvious that every theory is only a 
scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their 
necessary relations to one another, and that the basic 
elements can be thought of in any way one likes.  If in 
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speaking of my points, I think of some system of things, 
e.g., the system love, law, chimney-sweep ...and then 
assume all my axioms as relations42 between these 
things”. 
 
 
 
Shapiro continues: 
“It is hard to be definitive on what his view was, or 
should have been, but I suggest that the meta-theory—the 
mathematical theory in which the consistency of an 
axiomatization is established” [ontologically established –
but where?] “—is not to be understood algebraically, not 
as another theory of whatever satisfies its axioms.  
Instead, the statement that a given theory, such as 
Euclidean geometry, is consistent43 is itself assertory. 
[My emphasis] The notion of consistency is a contentfulLI 
                                                 
 
 
42 But what kind of relations?  What is the conception of relation itself that 
Hilbert had in mind? 
43 I have no idea whether Euclidean Geometry is indeed consistent.  All I know 
of it is that it works exceedingly well –and that is the most we can demand of 
an evolutionary artifact.  See my illustration: “Bounds and Limits” in Iglowitz, 
1995.  Relative consistency is all we can demand -but this is the actual 
meaning of “invariance”! 
 92
property of theoriesLII, and is not to be understood as 
defined implicitly by the axioms of the meta-theory.  
For one thing, the meta-theory is not axiomatized in the 
Grundlagen, and so there is no implicit definition of the 
meta-theoretic notions.44 [my emphasis] This, of course, 
is not decisive. It would be a routine exercise for a 
graduate student in mathematical logic to axiomatize the 
meta-theory of the Grundlagen.  
Given the structural analogy between natural numbers and 
strings, [See footnote45], the meta-theory would resemble 
elementary arithmetic.  However, if a Hilbertian 
algebraist did think of the axiomatized meta-theory as 
algebraic, then she would have to worry about its 
                                                 
 
 
44 But why would there have to be?  I don’t think that Hilbert, at this stage, 
intended one.  I think, in Quine’s words, he meant to “kick away the [Fregean] 
ladder”.   
45 This claim assumes the adequacy of current formal (set-theoretic-based) logic 
to Hilbert’s (then) perspective.  I think it is suspect.  It is not string 
representations, but meanings –which may differ- which are significant here.  
Within a rigidly abstractive and hierarchical worldview, these are essentially the 
same.  But within a non-hierarchical conception of the mind and brain, they are 
most definitely not.  See the W.J. Freeman quote to follow (~p.53).  It is “Alice 
down the hole”, i.e. the non-parallel distributive mapping and a non-hierarchical 
meaning for each individual recipient brain, but these can be quite different.  
This is a wholly new perspective on this mathematical problem.  
    Or, to quote Edelman:  “certain symbols do not match categories in the world 
. ... Individuals understand events and categories in more than one way and 
sometimes the ways are inconsistent.” 
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consistency. How would we establish that? The ensuing 
regress is vicious to the epistemological goals of the 
Grundlagen.“ LIII  
It is quite clear that Shapiro and I have quite different 
ideas of the meaning and the goals of “epistemology!  As a brief 
excerpt from the footnote immediately above:  “Or, to quote 
Edelman:  “certain symbols do not match categories in the world 
. ... Individuals understand events and categories in more than 
one way and sometimes the ways are inconsistent.” 
 
“In the later Hilbert program (e.g., [1925]) relative 
consistency gives way to absolute consistency. There, the 
meta-theory is finitary proof theory, focused directly on 
formal languages themselves. It is explicit that finitary 
proof theory is not just the study of another structure, on a 
par with geometry and real analysis.  
Finitary proof theory has its own unique subject matter, 
related to natural numbers and formal syntax, and it is 
ultimately founded on something in the neighborhood of 
Kantian intuition. [The older] Hilbert said that finitary 
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proof theory is contentful. In present terms, the theorems 
of finitary proof theory are assertory,LIV not algebraic.”LV 
I think that Shapiro falls into the trap of his own 
philosophical prejudices in failing to understand and accept the 
thoroughgoing relativism of Hilbert’s original idea.  In Quine’s 
words, “we must kick away the ladder” in order to appreciate the 
full brilliance of Hilbert’s insight.  “Relative proofs only”?  How 
could they be anything but?46  I think the young Hilbert 
understood that, but lost his insight in his new passion. 
“Hilbert’s claim that a concept can be fixed only by its 
relations to other concepts is a standard motivation for 
structuralism.” [ibid] 
  
Shapiro now exhibits a viewpoint, (fundamental for him), 
which I will oppose through the rest of this book!   
“Nowadays we have a rough and ready distinction which 
we can apply here. The algebraist says that a group is 
anything that satisfies the axioms of group theory; a ring 
is anything that satisfies the ring axioms, etc.” [but] 
“there is no such thing as ‘the group’ or ‘the ring’ ”.LVI  
“Hilbert says”, [Shapiro says –but which Hilbert? Young 
                                                 
 
 
46  To tie in with the early pages of the present book, how could a mechanism, 
(brain), ever know –i.e. assert absolute truth to features of its environment.  
This is the “assertatory” that Shapiro demands! 
or Old?], “the same thing about geometry, and, by 
extension, arithmetic, real analysis, and so forth.”   
 If “the concept” –and “the class” below and within it- is 
truly all about extensionality, then I think Shapiro stands on solid 
ground.  If it is about something more, (as Cassirer’s ideas, and 
my own thesis of the “schematic object” will suggest), then I 
think his ground becomes far less secure.
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Chapter 3: Adventures of the Mind: A Critical 
Turning Point and the Origins of my Conception 
At this point I feel I must interpose another necessary but 
somewhat lengthy tangential discussion of fundamentals so that 
you may have some understanding of my very different and 
unique beginnings from which I approached these problems.  
Hopefully it will help you to better understand my 
conclusions.  Then I will return to and try to answer Shapiro’s 
objections, (and even Mac Lane’s similar ones to which I will 
come presently).I  Since I have structured this paper on my own 
intellectual history, let me continue to do so here as well.  I think 
it is the most efficient way to pursue this new logical perspective 
on the problem. 
I said very early in this paper that even before my 
exposure to Hilbert’s “implicit definition”, I had encountered 
Ernst Cassirer’s radical reformulation of the very definition of the 
“concept” of logic itself.1  It was through this filter that I 
interpreted the mathematics and modern algebra, (which I saw as 
an extension and fulfillment of the profound possibilities of 
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Cassirer’s notion of ordering within concepts2and which we will 
come to very soon) -and through which I interpreted  Hilbert’s 
conception of “implicit definition” that I was exposed to shortly 
thereafter as well. 
 
Cassirer and Logic: 
"... Every attempt to transform logic must concentrate 
above all upon this one point: all criticism of formal logic 
is comprised in criticism of the general doctrine of the 
construction of concepts."II (Ernst Cassirer)III 
When I went as a beginning freshman to the University of 
Chicago, I rode the train from the north side of the city of 
Chicago –about an hour’s commute in all.  In the very beginning, 
I visited the campus bookstore, and acquired a copy of Cassirer’s 
doubly bound volume:  “Substance and Function” and “Einstein’s 
Theory of Relativity”. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 This reformulation of the logical “concept” by Cassirer’s is different and 
distinct from his “Theory of Symbolic Forms”, another powerful insight which I 
will go into presently. 
2 I conceived mathematics then as the study of Concepts, not of Classes, (of 
objects), nor of Sets, (of objects) –I think this is a relevant and defensible 
perspective in light of the discussion to follow.  It enables, for instance, the 
concept of “the (general) class” -or the concept of a particular class.  Also, 
obviously, it enables the concept of “the (general) ‘set’” and the concept of a 
particular ‘set’ as a subspecies!  I think, shorty, that this will become clearly 
relevant to the Shapiro discussion begun above. 
I won’t say I read it all at that point, but I started at the 
beginning while on my daily commute and discovered Cassirer’s 
radical re-assessment of the very meaning of the word “concept” 
as used in logic, (and in everyday  thought as well), in the 
opening chapter.  It shaped my understanding of everything that 
followed. 
He reinterpreted the formal logical “concept” quite 
differently from the classical Aristotelian understanding of the 
idea.  He did not interpret it hierarchically –by the abstraction and 
inclusion of properties of objects, but reformulated it instead as 
“the mathematical concept of function”.IV 
Please forgive the longish quotes, but please try to follow 
his argument.  It was my actual starting point and understanding 
it is crucial to your understanding my ultimate perspective.  I 
think, in conjunction with just a few other steps, it lays the 
groundwork required for a scientific understanding of 
Consciousness itself!   
He characterized the traditional, Aristotelian concept this 
way: 
“A series of presentations”, [“things” with 
characteristics=properties], “with characteristics: (a,b,c,d), 
(a,c,d), (a,c,e), for instance, is held to bring forth the 
 99
 100
classical concept: {a,c}.3  From mere abstraction, (via 
attention), the whole of the doctrine of the classical 
Concept follows from these simplistic origins.”4  It is a 
concept based on and fully resolved in the extensionality 
of its properties.  It is a concept based on the properties of 
real things, i.e. of “objects”. 
Under that classical Concept it follows that "every series 
of comparable objects has an ultimate generic concept, which 
comprehends within itself all the determinations in which these 
objects agree, while on the other hand, within this supreme 
genus, the sub-species at various levels are defined by properties 
belonging only to a part of the elements."V   
The end result of this process is horrific to normal thought 
however.  Hear him carefully!   
“But the successive broadening of a concept necessarily 
correlates to a progressive lessening of its content; so that 
finally, the most general concepts we can reach no longer 
                                                 
 
 
3 The specific order within a class is not relevant, of course. 
4 But are not the quantifiers of more modern logic an exception? “Set 
membership” ?f(a,b), (a rule) , but membership here is not primitively defined 
by abstraction as it is in the Aristotelian concept; it is defined by a rule instead.  
What is {x:   x memb s} where “s” defines a rule?  Where does the rule come 
from?  It certainly does not come from abstraction.  See later Lakoff and 
Cassirer references on “cue validity”. 
 
possess any definite content.", [at all!].  The ultimate 
genus -"something"- is totally (and logically) devoid of 
specific content! 
The Concept in this classical form, however, is clearly not 
adequate or consistent with scientific, or even with ordinary 
usage however: 
"When we form the concept of metal by connecting gold, 
silver, copper and lead, we cannot indeed ascribe to the 
abstract object that comes into being the particular color 
of gold, or the particular luster of silver, or the weight of 
copper, or the density of lead; however, it would be no 
less inadmissible if we simply attempted to deny all these 
particular determinations of it." 
It would not be sufficient to characterize "metal", for 
instance, "that it is neither red nor yellow, neither of this or that 
specific weight, neither of this or that hardness or resisting 
power"; but we have to add that “it is colored in some way in 
every case, that it is of some degree of hardness, density and 
luster."  Similarly, we could not maintain the general concept of 
"animal", "if we abandoned in it all thought of the aspects of 
procreation, of movement and of respiration, because there is no 
form of procreation, of breathing, etc., which can be pointed out 
as common to all animals." (My emphasis) 
These few paragraphs sum up what I considered, and still 
do consider to be Mirabile dictu, (i.e. I don’t think it could be 
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said better or more convincingly).  I think it exposes the critical 
flaw at the ultimate foundations of logic.  I believe his 
reformulation of that concept is more appropriate to both 
ordinary and to formal logical thought than is the classical 
concept. 
Cassirer’s new “Concept”VI was reformulated instead as a 
functional rule, a complex rule of series but that rule per se, he 
concluded, was necessarily generated internally to the 
mind,(/brain), and not from the percepts themselves !  That is to 
say: it is not primitively defined (specifically as a rule) in the 
presentation itself.5  It comes from elsewhere!  It is not, he 
argued moreover, abstractive. 
                                                 
 
 
5 There is an uncanny parallelism of argument throughout between Lakoff’s and 
Cassirer’s treatment of logic.  Consider, as an example, the following: “Category 
cue validity defined for such psychological (or interactional) attributes might 
correlate“, (his emphasis), “with basic-level categorization, but it would not pick 
out basic-level categories; they would already have to have been picked out in 
order to apply the definition of category cue validity so that there was such a 
correlation.” (Lakoff: P.54, my emphasis)  This is almost an exact parallel to one 
aspect of Cassirer’s argument against the classical concept, and the “theory of 
attention”, (see Chapters 2 and 5), –and for a “new form of consciousness”.   
Discussing Erdman, Cassirer writes: “…instead of the community of ‘marks,’ 
the unification of elements in a concept is decided by their ‘connection by 
implication.’  And this criterion, here only introduced by way of supplement and 
as a secondary aspect, proves on closer analysis to be the real logical prius”, (his 
emphasis), “for we have already seen that ‘abstraction’ remains aimless and 
unmeaning if it does not consider the elements from which it takes the concept 
to be from the first arranged and connected by a certain relation.”  Cassirer, 
“Substance and Function”, p.24 
He characterized his reformulated Concept as “a new 
form of consciousness” as I will discuss presently.  He proposed 
instead an alternative and considerably more plausible basis for a 
different technical logical Concept -borrowed from mathematics.  
He called it "the Functional Concept of Mathematics": 
"Lambert pointed out that it was the exclusive merit of 
mathematical 'general concepts' not to cancel the 
determinations of the special cases, but in all strictness 
fully to retain them.  When a mathematician makes his 
formula more general, this means not only that he is to 
retain all the more special cases, but also be able to 
deduce them from the universal formula." 
But this possibility of deduction does not exist in the case 
of the scholastic, (Aristotelian), Concepts, "since these, according 
to the traditional formula, are formed by neglecting the particular, 
and hence the reproduction of the particular moments of the 
concept seems excluded." 
"The ideal of a scientific concept here appears in 
opposition to the schematicVII general presentation which 
is expressed by a mere word.  The genuine concept does 
not disregard the peculiarities and particularities, which it 
holds under it, but seeks to show the necessity of the 
occurrence and connection of just these particularities.  
What it gives is a universal rule for the connection of the 
particulars themselves....  Fixed properties are replaced by 
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universal rules that permit us to survey a total series of 
possible determinations at a single glance."   
Of critical importance is the fact that Cassirer's new 
formal Concept is no longer logically derivable from its 
extension, (its membership), however: 
"The meaning of the law that connects the individual 
members is not to be exhausted by the enumeration of any 
number of instances of the law; for such enumeration 
lacks the generating principle that enables us to connect 
the individual members into a functional whole."  
“If we know the relation according to which a b c . . . are 
ordered, we can deduce them by reflection and isolate 
them as objects of thought.  "It is impossible, on the other 
hand, to discover the special character of the connecting 
relation from the mere juxtaposition of a,b,c in 
presentation."  
 
And again: 
"That which binds the elements of the series a,b,c, ... 
together is not itself a new element that was factually 
blended with them, but it is the rule of progression, which 
remains the same, no matter in which member it is 
represented.  The function F(a,b), F(b,c), ..., which 
determines the sort of dependence between the successive 
members, is obviously not to be pointed out as itself a 
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member of the series, which exists and develops 
according to it." 6 (My emphasis) See footnote. 
This is the definitive argument against “abstraction” as the 
general case and against “presentation”, [“things”], as an ultimate 
foundation for logic.VIII 
 
He continued: 
“We do not go therefore from a series: a-alpha1-beta1, a-
alpha2-beta2, a-alpha3-beta3... directly to their common 
element a, (Cassirer argues), but replace the alphas by a 
variable x, and the betas by a variable y.  Therein we 
unify the totality in the expression ‘a-x-y’ ", (actually w-
x-y, where "w" is the constant function w(p) = a, for all 
“p” of the "generic concept").  This expression can be 
changed into the "concrete totality" of the members of the 
series by a continuous transformation, and therefore 
"perfectly represents the structure and logical divisions of 
the concept"!IX 
                                                 
 
 
6 cf. Stewart, 1995, "Fibonacci Forgeries".  Stewart's article illustrates the case.  
The "insufficiency of small numbers" leads to an indeterminability of any finite 
series. 
Cassirer's "series" may be ordered by radically variant 
principles however: "according to equality", (which is the special 
case of the "generic concept"), "or inequality, number and 
magnitude, spatial and temporal relations, or causal 
dependence"X -so long as the principle is definite and consistent. 
But where does this principle, this rule, come from?  Any 
finite series of presentations, no matter how long, is not definitive 
to establish a general case.XI  I could, for instance expand the 
series 1,3,5, … to the googleplexth element, (GP,- i.e. 10 to the 
100th power), and then insert any arbitrary series behind it.  
1,3,5,7, … .EGP-1, EGP, 99, 47, 20075, ….   The rule itself is never 
inherent in the presentation of the series.  To a mathematician 
moreover, any finite number is pretty much as relatively small as 
any other –that is what it means to say that it is finite!   
Googleplex is not significantly different in its 
fundamental nature from “34”, for instance –i.e. they are both 
finite, each could be raised to the GPth power, and for each and 
every such resultant, it could itself be treated likewise ad 
infinitum!  If rules per se are not inherent in presentation, then, 
where do they come from?  I will propose that they come from 
the billions of years of biological self-organization which is itself 
based in pragmatism –i.e. in an optimization of the functioning of 
its neural primitives, and, of course, in their subsequent survival! 
Cassirer continues:  “The distinction between the concept 
and its extension, therefore, is categorical and belongs to the 
'form of consciousness'".  It is "a new expression of the 
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characteristic contrast between the member of the series and the 
form of the series".XII  But the rule itself is now internal to the 
mind(/brain) itself!  It is “a new form of consciousness”!XIII  
Thus he fundamentally reconceived the formal Concept, 
this our ultimate logical building block, as "the "Functional 
Concept of Mathematics".  It is the functional rule, F(x,y,z, ...), 
which organizes and embodies the totality of its extension. 
For Cassirer the association of the members of a series by 
the possession of a common "property" is only a special case of 
logically possible connections in general, but it is the sole 
possibility allowed by abstraction alone.  I believe it encompasses 
what I will term “Diophantine logic” which I believe constitutes 
the essence and the focus of contemporary logic.XIV  But the 
connection of the members "is in every case produced by some 
general law of arrangement through which a thorough-going rule 
of succession is established."  This is the general and 
comprehensive case.   He argued that it is “a new form of 
consciousness”. 
He posited it –his “Concept”- at the very bottom of our 
mental world.  I saw, I understood, and I agreed.  This was my 
starting point.7  
                                                 
 
 
7      (Note: this is a very truncated version of my earlier analysis of Cassirer’s 
ideas.  There is a much fuller analysis of Cassirer’s conception which I have 
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Cassirer’s “concept” was so natural and so real that it 
affected my thinking forever after.  I believe his Concept is the 
“concept” we actually use in our thinking.  It still sits at the 
bottom of my understanding and it colored my understanding of 
the mathematics which followed it.   
My next mark was my beginning calculus course.  I was 
very fortunate in that I was exposed, (even at that level), to three 
very famous mathematicians:  Saunders MacLane, (cited earlier), 
Paul Halmos, and lastly, but most importantly for me, to Isaac 
Wirczup who was my primary instructor.  I was concurrently and 
exhaustively reading three texts on the calculus.  I spent a 
minimal of six to eight hours a night on calculus alone -but trying 
to understand it within Cassirer’s conceptual framework –my 
other classes were essentially neglected.  It was so beautiful that I 
changed my major to mathematics.  I was in love!  
Wirczup was a kind and marvelous teacher who taught 
me rigor.  But most of all, (from my current perspective), he was 
important to me because I think he was a “closet intuitionist”.  He 
defined the word “infinity” for me strictly in terms of the delta / 
epsilon relation, (the precisely defined relations of limits), and 
                                                                                                           
 
 
presented in Chapter 5.  I think it is important for a better understanding of his 
ideas, and of my subsequent expansion of them, but I  also thought it would 
have interrupted the flow of my argument here.) 
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not in terms of “size” or “magnitude”.  It made great sense to me, 
I think, because of my newly acquired Cassirerian perspective.   
For Wirczup, (at least as I understood him), “infinity” 
meant simply and solely that we could not bound the epsilon, no 
matter how small the delta –and that was the totality of the 
meaning of the word “Infinity”!  Any sentence using the word 
“infinity” became a statement purely and strictly about the 
relationships between limits, (defined logically, relationally and 
conceptually); it was not a statement about objects or sizes! 
I was able to interpret the whole of the Calculus I 
encountered at that level from my newfound 
Cassirerian/Wirzcupian perspective and it made total sense to me 
in those conceptual terms8 -whether that was ultimately to be the 
correct perspective or not.  During the following summer, I 
finished Mac Clane’s “Modern Algebra” by myself.XV  I saw the 
latter with the help of my prior acquaintance with Wilder’s 
characterization of the objects of axiom systems as “presumptive 
and permissive” onlyXVI.  That is, I saw it in purely conceptual 
terms. 
I saw MacClane’s book specifically and solely as a 
comprehensive exploration of all the possible forms of abstract 
                                                 
 
 
8 Thinking it over, I guess I always saw mathematics in terms of concepts rather 
than in terms of sets –see later. 
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mathematical ordering, (in Cassirer’s sense of the ordering of the 
concept discussed earlier), and that was certainly consistent with 
the perspective of modern structuralism which I discovered (by 
name) only recently. 
  For me, Mac Lane’s book had nothing to do with actual 
objects at all9 –it had to do with the possibilities of “ordering” 
specifically.  It had to do with the possibilities of ordering, (taken 
in Cassirer’s sense), within a concept itself.   
Benacerraf’s characterization of structuralist 
mathematical objects as “positions in a structure”, (cited earlier), 
is certainly corroborative to such an interpretation. 
Mac Lane’s book also exposed me for the first time to 
Cantor’s famous proof showing the indenumerability of the reals: 
i.e. that the real numbers cannot be set in one-to one 
correspondence with the natural numbers -or even to the rational 
numbers for that matter.  Cantor’s proof was obviously profound, 
(and ingenious), but the specific conclusion that he drew from it 
was not acceptable from my (Wirzupian?) perspective –and led to 
another critical revelation which is absolutely pertinent to my 
                                                 
 
 
9 This latter perspective seems to be the only way that the subject could be 
approached via the classical, generic concept.  Upon reflection, this seems to be 
the cusp of our difference and seems to refer directly to Shapiro’s and 
MacClane’s demand for the non-existence of “the group”, etc. mentioned earlier. 
ultimate perspective on the problem of the mind/brain whose 
examination we, together, have undertaken to understand here.. 
I conceived a fundamental objection at that point in time 
to Cantor’s “diagonal proof” which had argued against the 
commensurability of the rational numbers and the reals wherein 
he purported to show that the reals are of a larger order of 
infinity, (size), than the rationals. 
My interpretation was based specifically in my prior 
conception of Modern Algebra as being fundamentally about 
“ordering” within concepts –from what would now be called a 
structuralist perspective.  Even though it was the objection of a 
very young man, I think it has held up well over time. 
 
On Cantor’s Diagonal Argument –written 50 years ago!   
(Copied pretty much verbatim from my notes 50 years ago –this 
is just me quoting my own very old writing) 
“The uncountability of the real numbers would not seem 
to be derived from ‘size’ or ‘magnitude’ discrepancies between 
the rationals / integers –and the reals, but rather, would seem to 
boil down to a fundamental question of order – i.e. of the 
impossibility, (even in theory), of setting up a procedure, a 
continuing intellectual (ordering) procedure which would present 
each and every real number. They cannot all be presented 
serially, (even in theory), in spite of the fact that we can (in 
theory) present in a serial list any given real, and any list of reals. 
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Cantor’s proof displays a (specific but variable) real 
number (via his diagonal/slash procedure), appropriate to any 
serial list, (and continuing intellectual procedure) which is not, 
and cannot be contained in that list.  Its construction is derived 
from the specific serial nature of the particular list itself.  It is 
also, of course, related to the serial (decimal) presentation of any 
given real number itself. 
Consider this alternative visualization: (I will claim 
exactly the same kind of freedoms that Cantor was allowed in his 
diagonal proof here.)  It seems I could set up a serial presentation 
of all reals in this manner:  set up a hypothetical line segment of 
unit length one, (which, of course, is fully sufficient as this 
segment can be shown to be in one to one correspondence with 
the whole real line).10   
Select a hypothetical dart with a zero magnitude point, 
(equivalent in principal to Cantor’s hypothetical ability to write 
out the whole of a real as an infinite decimal –i.e. exactly, 
precisely).  Throw the dart at the line, (axiom of choice?), and the 
point hit is then r1.  Continue throwing the dart for r2, r3, etc.  If 
the dart hits a previously speared point, throw again for that 
                                                 
 
 
10 Simply consider the semi-circle based at the origin whose length equals 1, 
and then radiate the lines from the origin through the semi-circle to some 
horizontal line.  This yields the necessary correspondence. 
member of the list.  No point is privileged or exempt a priori!  If 
I were infinitely lucky –which is theoretically possible, (but 
infinitely improbable), it seems that I might derive such a list in 
an infinite time.  (Cantor gave himself an equivalent time in the 
writing of his list!)    
Certainly, though, this shows that the difficulty is not as 
usually thought and that such a sequence would be possible 
except, I believe, for one fundamental reason, not to do with 
‘size’ or ‘magnitude’. 
Rather, I believe it derives from the inherent impossibility 
of setting up such a procedure in the first place.  Here, -of setting 
up an intellectual procedure which will assure that every point on 
the line would definitely be accounted for –even assuming 
infinite luck and time, (because the number of the throw is always 
an integer value and submits itself to the diagonal/slash 
procedure.)11  Thus, the difficulty would seem to derive from 
fundamental differences in structure of the reals and the 
integers/rationals –i.e. of the real and the rational fields.   
You could not predetermine the placing or even if there 
actually exists a definite placing –given a particular real in the 
line –and this seems to be inherently so.  This is contrary to the 
situation of the rationals, (wherein a denumerable correspondence 
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is easily demonstrable using the “zig-zag technique”12), and, I 
think, is the essence of the difference.  
 
A reiteration of my later reflections on Cantor’s argument 
(A much more recent return to the subject): 
“Infinite sets are unique in that it is possible that they can 
be put into 1 to 1 correspondence with (some) subsets of 
themselves.  (This is not to say that some given subset may not 
qualify –e.g. the classic case of the rationals inside of the reals 
with which we are concerned here –or to the trivial subset 
{1,2,5,11,3}.)  We may even leave out huge – even infinite 
subsets.  ( e.g.: 1>2, 2->4, 3->6, … -all the odd integers are left 
out of the second set of integers), but each of these sets is still 
infinite!  “Largeness” is not the issue. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
11 i.e. You can’t sequence the correspondence between the two manifolds! 
12 Lay out the integers in two dimensions a and b, then consider the 
intersections as the ratio of a / b.  Come back and start at the origin 1/1, (which 
is the first element of the sequence), traverse in one of the two dimensions to 
the second element, then traverse the diagonal, then sideways or down, repeat 
the diagonal, etc.  This gives a unique ordering to the rationals and a one to 
one correspondence with the integers. 
Consider Cantor’s definition:  Two infinite sets “are of 
equivalent size” precisely if and only if they can be put into 1 to 
1 correspondence with each other. 
(Within the reals themselves this would correspond, for 
instance, to the possibility of the 1 to 1 correspondence between 
the unit interval into the whole of the real line.  O.K. so far- but 
suppose they cannot be, (rejecting the “precisely” in the 
definition).  Suppose we are not talking about “size”. 
Now consider Cantor’s ‘diagonal slash’ argument.  
Suppose this reveals the fact that the rationals and the reals 
cannot be put into 1 to 1 correspondence not because they are of 
different sizes, but because the reals cannot be ordered like the 
rationals.   
Suppose this is an argument about possible ordering 
rather than about size, - i.e. that the reals are incapable of a 
natural ordering!  (“Ordering” had become a big word to me by 
that time as it became the focus of my orientation of modern 
algebra which I saw as the progressive development of all the 
possible orderings of ideal and abstract mathematical objects.) 
It is certainly amazing that the whole of the rationals –and 
not just the integers- can be ordered countably as is clearly 
known and easily demonstrable, but it is an amazing fact 
nonetheless!  But consider:  between any two rationals there 
exists another rational.  Between any two rationals there exists a 
real.  But between any two reals –no matter how close-  there 
exists a rational as well!     
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Consider the open interval from x to x + ∆, (delta13), for 
any non-rational real x, and consider the limit in that interval as 
∆, (delta), approaches 0 of the truth value of the statement: 
“There exists a rational number in the interval.”  The limit is the 
constant: “true”!  It is not viable at the limit however, i.e. it is 
discontinuous, approaching from either side of x. 
Are we talking then about “size” or about something else?  
If this is, in fact, not a discussion of “size”, then there need exist 
only one “infinity” – one unbounded “quantity”-reflecting a 
statement about the delta/epsilon relationship; it is not a 
statement about magnitude!  But then ordering and structure 
become the crucial issues! 
Nowhere does Cantor’s diagonal argument have anything 
at all to do with “size” per se save in his conclusion.  Everywhere 
it does have to do with order and ordering –even in his 
specification of the problem itself.  So why take the dubious, 
more complicated conclusion over the leaner and clearly 
justifiable one?  Why not invoke Occam’s razor right here?  Why 
not recharacterize Cantor’s argument specifically as an argument 
against imposing a natural ordering on the reals and stop right 
there? 
                                                 
 
 
13 Delta spelled out for mp3 conversion  
That two finite sets are equal “in size” just in case they 
may be (“may be” = “can be”) put in one to one correspondence 
with each other is clearly justifiable.  But to make the same 
assertion for infinite sets does not seem to be anywhere near as 
plausible. 
It is trivial, (and definitional) that any infinite set may be 
set in one to one correspondence with some, (but not any 
arbitrary), proper subset of itself, (by definition).  Are they then 
of “the same size”?  Under Cantor’s definition, of course, they 
are because of the correspondence.  And yet the original set 
contains elements, (perhaps even an infinite “number” of 
elements), not in its proper subset.   
It seems to be an equivocal assertion, then, to assert the 
converse -that just because two (infinite) sets cannot be set in one 
to one correspondence that they are therefore of “different sizes”.  
The simpler, (leaner –invoking Occam’s Razor), though more 
abstract conclusion would seem to be the better one:  simply to 
assert the raw result itself: i.e. that they cannot be set in one to 
one correspondence! 
This directly converts my claim about the possibility of 
imposing an order.  It seems to me that Cantor’s proof is a 
profound revelation about “ordering” and about 
“correspondences”, not about size.  It elucidates the impossibility 
of a natural ordering of the reals.  (But whence then his 
transfinite sets? Where have the “alephs” gone?  DNE? XVII) 
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A Powerful Argument for the Structuralist Perspective 
Consider this:  Cantor could not fulfill even the very first 
natural and anticipated step after his initial conclusion –i.e. the 
proof, (or disproof), of the Continuum Hypothesis14!  Indeed 
Gödel proved it is impossible within the standard axiomatizations 
of set theory.  And yet it is accomplished merely in the addition 
of a single axiom to the axioms of the rationals: i.e. the “Least 
Upper Bound” axiom!  
This is a very powerful argument for “ordering” vs. “size” 
in our conception of numbers15 and for the actual root of that 
ordering as being in the logical connectivity, (the structure), of 
the very axioms themselves, (think “nerve connectivity”), rather 
than in the “objects” of the system.  I think it is a powerful 
argument specifically for the structuralist perspective itself and 
one of the reasons I became enmeshed in my own version of it 50 
years ago!  I had figured it out for myself. 
You see, I think the young Hilbert16 had it right in the 
first place.  The “properties”, the ordering of his “things” comes 
from the whole of the axiom system (itself) , not from just a part.  
                                                 
 
 
14 i.e. that the Reals are the “next larger size” beyond the Rationals! 
15 Or of any other abstract mathematical object 
16 Contrary to his “older brother” who was seduced by Cantor and lost his 
virginity thereby! 
Without the Least Upper Bound Axiom or its equivalent, we 
cannot attain the Real Continuum, though we may attain the 
Rationals.  To reiterate Schlick’s comments: 
These elements “acquire meaning only by virtue of the 
axiom system, and possess only the content that it 
bestows upon them. They stand for entities whose whole 
being is to be bearers of the relations laid down by the 
system."  This is not about size, this is about ordering, 
about structure, about the connectivity of the axioms 
themselves!  
 
My Conclusion: 
“Ordering”, I concluded, is a function of all the axioms of 
an abstract axiom system – of the complex rather than the 
simplistic logical connectivity of the axioms themselves; it is 
about the connectivity of meaning!  There may be “a natural 
analogy between natural numbers and strings”, (requoting 
Shapiro), but there is no natural analogy between natural numbers 
and meanings!  (Edelman’s quote is worth repeating here:  
“certain symbols do not match categories in the world … 
Individuals understand events and categories in more than one 
way and sometimes the ways are inconsistent! ” 
Ordering is not a function of the properties of its “objects” 
which are specifically virtual reflections of its underlying 
structure.  “Ordering” is not a function of these “positions in a 
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structure, it is not a function of these solely “permissive” and 
“presumptive” virtual “objects” from which it supposedly 
“arises”!   
The “rule” of the continuum, (in the sense of Cassirer’s 
usage of the “rule” of a concept), here lies in the logical interplay 
of the meaings, the mechanics and the connectivity of the axioms 
themselves.  It is a conceptual, (in Cassirer’s sense), rather than a 
reductive set-theoretical one.  It refers instead to its own 
axiomatic structure in Benacerraf’s sense  which generates its 
objects as (virtual) “positions in that structure” 
(On the level of biology, its components may be 
understood analogously to the  intentional functions in the sense 
of figure 3 early in the first chapter,.  These are strategic rather 
than informational functions.  But then again,  what else could we 
demand from a “machine”?) 17 
This is a new conception of “order” itself!  (This 
perspective will find validation in both Quine’s remarks and in 
the structuralist perspective of the very concept of “class” itself!)  
                                                 
 
 
17 Consider W.J.Freeman:  “The only knowledge that the rabbit could have of 
the world outside itself was what it had made in its own brain!”  (W.J 
Freeman, 1995) 
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To quote a prior paper of mine:  “the ‘objects’ of these 
schematic models, I propose, are manifestations of the structure; 
the structure is not a resolution of the objects.”18 
To give a bit more credence –and to dissuade you from 
the tempting conclusion that the foregoing was just an instance of 
the arrogance and ignorance of youth, let me insert a couple of 
citations from some famous contemporaries of Cantor, (I 
discovered these citations much later).  They argue the same case 
I made! 
Poincaré, a famous contemporary of Hilbert and certainly 
Hilbert’s equivalent as one of history’s most significant 
mathematicians said:   
"Actual infinity does not exist. What we call infinite is 
only the endless possibility of creating new objects no 
matter how many exist already"    
Poincaré again: “set theory is a disease from which I hope 
future generations will recover.” 
 
                                                 
 
 
18 See Chapter 4 where that argument is presented. 
Hermann Weyl, another famous name: 
 "...classical logic” [itself!] “was abstracted from the 
mathematics of finite sets and their subsets...Forgetful of 
this limited origin, one afterwards mistook that logic for 
something above and prior to all mathematics, and finally 
applied it, without justification, to the mathematics of 
infinite sets. This is the Fall and original sin of [Cantor's] 
set theory ...". 
And a more current quote:    (William P. Thurston): 
 "Set theory is based on polite lies, things we agree on 
even though we know they're not true.  In some ways, the 
foundations of mathematics has an air of unreality."  
Morris Kline: 
 "[The pure mathematicians] have followed a gleam that 
has led them out of this world...the work of the idealist 
who ignores reality will not survive." 
Cantor’s set theory, it is true, has come to lie at the core 
of contemporary mathematics –largely, I think, because of its 
easier conceptualization and fruitfulness, but it probably will not 
remain so.   
To repeat Thurston, it is based on things we agree on even 
though we know they’re not true.  Consider just the 
Banach/Tarski theorem embedded in this perspective, for 
instance.   If one were really smart, it would be possible to 
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dissect the moon to fit it into one’s pocket!  Think about that!  
Does this correspond in any sense to our reality? 
For science generally, progress goes in “fads”, (not to be 
taken in a mean sense).  Calculus was the predominant (and most 
successful), mathematical fad from Newton till about 1900 when 
it was determined to be not rigorous enough.   
It was regrounded in  set theory which was able to supply 
that logical rigor.  The problem, I feel, is that it supplied too 
much, both for mathematics and for logic –leading to the 
stalemate and the paradoxes that mathematics finds itself in 
currently.  There is a new “fad”, mathematical structuralism and 
category theory, which is taking mathematics back to function 
over set membership. 
“One of the primary perspectives offered by category 
theory is that the concept of arrow, abstracted from that 
of function or mapping, may be used instead of the set 
membership relation as the basic building block for 
developing mathematical constructions, and expressing 
properties of mathematical entities.  XVIII 
(Now can you hear the distant echo of Cassirer I foreshadowed in 
Chapter 2?) 
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The Concept of Implicit Definition19 
When I was exposed to Hilbert’s “implicit definition”20, 
either at this point or in Cassirer’s “Einstein’s Theory of 
Relativity”XIX, I had a final and completing insight –I hope you 
will find it relevant. 
If mathematics was fundamentally all about ordering as I 
had concluded that it was, (and if the root of that ordering resided 
in the infrastructure of the axioms themselves rather than as a 
consequence of the (permissive) “objects” they generated), then 
the profound plethora and the richness –and the depth- of such 
orderings already extant in mathematical axiomatic systems 
conversely suggested a radical extension of Cassirer’s rule-based 
“Functional Concept of Mathematics”. It suggested an expansion 
to a new and larger notion and rule of “concept”.  It suggested the 
expansion to what I have called “the concept of implicit 
definition”, (C.I.D.).  
This latter is based at the deepest level in the axioms 
themselves and represents what I believe to be the broadest 
                                                 
 
 
19 See Chapters 2 and 5 for an earlier presentation of this idea. 
20 Let me repeat the quote from Schlick, (cited in Cassirer):  "[Hilbert's] 
revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic or primitive concepts are to be 
defined just by the fact that they satisfy the axioms.... [They] acquire meaning 
only by virtue of the axiom system, and possess only the content that it bestows 
upon them. They stand for entities whose whole being is to be bearers of the 
relations laid down by the system." 
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possibility of the formal logical Concept.  Cassirer’s “functional 
concept” is based in a set of denumerable and essentially 
dimensional functional rules21 –in rules of series.  But axiom 
systems, as systems per se, have rules too –more complex, more 
profound constitutive rules of ordering deriving from their 
profound structural connectivity as just discussed in my 
conclusions regarding Cantor’s argument.   
They have comprehensive overall unary rules, (of the 
whole of the system of axioms itself –see Hilbert’s comments 
earlier –“since only the whole structure of axioms yields a 
complete definition. ”- and my just finished discussion above),  
The logical infrastructure of such axiom systems is not, in 
fact, itself dimensional, (in Cassirer’s sense -about properties of 
percepts or objects –f(x,y,z)  ) -but profoundly and 
interconnectedly logical instead to the structure of the axioms in 
the system itself.22  This is the import of my Cantor argument 
expressed above, and how I originally conceived the notion.  
The “rule” of the continuum, (in the sense of Cassirer’s 
usage of the “rule” of a concept), here lies in the logical interplay, 
the mechanics of the axioms themselves.  It is a new conception 
of “order” itself!  
                                                 
 
 
21 i.e. f(a,x,y,…) 
22 which is the way I interpreted the Cantor diagonal proof 
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I propose to interpret logic in the same manner that I think 
the “young Hilbert” intuitively did, and to which I have referred 
before.  I propose to interpret it within the context of “the concept 
of implicit defintion”! 
This “Concept of Implicit Definition” suggested an 
extension of Cassirer’s “functional concept of mathematics” into 
a conceptual rule, (an ordering) grounded in the unary rule23 of 
an overall axiom system.24  I ultimately related this, under 
Hilbert’s “implicit definition”, (and Cassirer’s “new
consciousness” perspective -to which I assert it is a legitimate 
heir), to a constitutive and specifically operative ordering totally 
internal to the brain. 
 form of 
                                                
  This new form of consciousness could specifically 
reflect the structure and the operationality of that brain –its own 
rules and connectednessXX, its “triggering” to use Maturana’s 
more pregnant conceptualization,XXI as well as its (virtual) 
objects.   
But within such a system the elements, (the perceptual 
“objects” themselves –as well as the conceptual “objects”), could 
be “implicitly defined” after Hilbert’s conception.  This, then, 
 
 
 
23 Recall Hilbert’s remarks that it is the whole of the axiom system which 
defines its objects! 
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was how I was able to conceive even our “percepts” themselves 
as internal to such a model.  I conceived them solely as “positions 
in a structure”, as specifically virtual objects! 
I conceived them as purely conceptual objects, implicitly 
defined by the “axioms” which embody the physical 
operationality of the brain.XXII  I conceived “percepts” 
themselves as metaphors of the brain’s own process!  I conceiv
them as virtual and operational objects!  (See Cha
ed 
pter 4) 
                                                                                                          
 
But How can we conceive of purely operational objects as 
correlating with the real world? 
But how can we possibly conceive the objects of our 
ordinary but very concrete naïve world as solely operational 
objects?  Certainly, if you call yourself a materialist, you must 
admit that “percepts” do not actually, (physically), exist as they 
seem; science already sees them quite differently.  Do we 
perceive mathematical magnitudes, (wavelengths), of light waves 
or "colors"?  Do we perceive molecular density or "hardness"?  
Do we perceive mean molecular energy or "heat"?  
Consider moreover the best of our current physical 
theories.  Consider the parallel between Penrose’s comments on 
 
 
 
24 I ultimately identified “mind” with the operative, unary rule of the brain –i.e. 
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the Schroedinger equation and the functioning I propose between 
the re-afferent brain and action into the world. 
Repeating an earlier section of this paper, quite pertinent 
here,25 consider the parallel between the most SUPERB1, 
(according to Roger Penrose- his CAPS), of modern physical 
theories, and my own conclusions: 
"There is a very precise equation, the Schroedinger 
equation, which provides a completely deterministic time-
evolution for this [quantum] state.  But there is something 
very odd about the relation between the time-evolved 
quantum state and the actual behavior of the physical 
world that is observed to take place.   
From time to time -whenever we consider that a 
'measurement' has occurred -we must discard the quantum 
state that we have been laboriously evolving, and use it 
only to compute various probabilities that the state will  
'jump' to one or another of a set of new possible states."  
(ibid, P.226, his emphases) 
                                                                                                           
 
 
with its overall rule of “structural coupling”.  See Maturana in Chapter 6. 
25 I will come back to this passage again later.  I think it is highly pertinent 
and a strong argument for my conceptions. 
In this “more optimistic” view, it is only "in relation to 
the results of 'measurements'" that concrete reality emerges -i.e. 
that a specific rendition of space-time is enabled. 
Now compare this to the re-afferent model I have already 
sketched and which I will formally present in the Freeman 
Appendix of Chapter 4, (alternatively my Figure 3 of Chapter 1 is 
a reasonable referent). wherein it finds a striking parallel.  Each 
evolves a “state” equation and then performs a “measurement”, 
(action into the world), which then causes a new state equation, 
(Schroedinger/Merleau-Ponty) ,to be formed until the next 
“measurement” is performed.  How close these conceptions are!  
 I think my perspective is legitimate and answers the basic 
biological question.  The biggest remaining problem that I have 
is the one from organism to externality and I think that Maturana 
and Varela, (see Chapter 6), have framed the essential problem 
very, very well.  
There remains one fundamental objection to my thesis 
which I have long considered, do not consider trivial, and which 
is exposed throughout this dialogue however: why then, does our 
model work so well?  I have thought this over deeply, and 
perhaps the best answer that I can make is the analogy to a “hive 
of bees” completing their hive, (cited in Chapter 12 ).  That is, I 
think good science is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The trick, 
however, is to understand it entirely relativistically –ie. to 
understand it in its entirety heterophenomenologically!  
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The Anthropic Principle    
Or, to put it in a more respectable setting, I think it may 
be the ultimate fulfillment of the concept that I first saw in 
Penrose’s book:  i.e. of the “anthropic principle”.    
But the usage I imply here is a deeper sense and meaning 
of the words.  It is not that “if the world were not as it is, then we 
would not be here to see it”, (Penrose, paraphrase), but rather in a 
sense where “our seeing it that way” allows an algorithmic 
interaction with a nameless reality.  Put more simply, we can 
only see what –and in the precise manner that we are “designed” 
= “configured” to see. 
We are, however, allowed to extend and expand that 
vision.  But our current perspective must be understood as a 
specifically biological perspective under Cassirer’s “Symbolic 
Forms” to attain the full vision. (See Chapters 8 & 9). 
We are clearly already dealing with a model even within 
rigorous science itself, and my hypothesis seems to fit very well 
with what we know so far.  I propose that the mind/brain is even 
more of a model than we suspect however -to include our 
"objects" themselves in the sense of Quine’s earlier comment!   
 
Back to Mac Lane Again: 
 Here was a brief (though negative) comment that 
Saunders Mac Lane was gracious enough to make about my 
conception: "the idea that axiomatics amounts to an 'implicit’ 
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definition is no longer generally accepted.  It fits well with class 
axiomatics (e.g. for geometry) where there is just one intended 
model.  It doesn't fit for axioms for groups or space, where there 
(sic) are many models."  That may be precisely the point.   If 
there were, in Mac Lane’s words, “just one intended model” –
then the intended model would be the physical brain itself. 
The problem arises, however as to just what sort of an 
axiom system might enable the kind of complexity found in the 
human brain. 
 In reading Gerald Edelman  a possibility suggested itself 
drawn from his theory of immune response, (for which he won 
the Nobel Prize).  He treats the whole subject of immune 
response as “an information system”.  Antibodies are originally 
and autonomously made, (i.e. before the fact), for all possible 
antigens. 
Combining this broadness of spectrum with his discussion 
of the phenomenon of “neural pruning”, (the massive destruction 
of the early connectivity of the fetal brain which he pursues in 
“Bright Air …”XXIII), it opens a useful line of thought regarding 
the “a/d converters” , (or better “hierarchical/non-hierarchical 
converters”), mentioned earlier and in Chapter 4, which I believe 
constitute our actual perceptual “objects”.    
Despite the obvious differences in conceptualization, the 
“objects” of the mind are treated somewhat similarly by me –
perhaps as the massively enabled and massively pruned a/d 
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converters of the pure process, the connectedness of the brain!  
Perhaps they follow a similar developmental path. 
This problem is huge, and I don’t claim to have fully 
solved it, but let me remind you of the raw neuronal “size” of the 
brain.  If we are dealing with axioms, or Freeman’s “equivalence 
classes”, then we may have billions of them, and that opens new 
possibilities. 
 
A final comment by Cassirer relevant to this Current 
Problem 
Consider Cassirer’s commentary on the fundamental 
nature of the percept: 
"For example, if we conceive the different perceptual 
images, which we receive from one and the same 'object' 
according to our distance from it and according to 
changing illumination, as comprehended in a series of 
perceptual images, then from the standpoint of immediate 
psychological experience, no property can be indicated at 
first by which any of these varying images should have 
preeminence over any other.   
Only the totality of these data of perception constitutes 
what we call empirical knowledge of the object; … No 
one of the successive perspective aspects can claim to be 
the only valid, absolute expression of the 'object itself; 
rather all the cognitive value of any particular perception 
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belongs to it only in connection with other contents, with 
which it combines into an empirical whole.” 
“...In this sense, the presentation of the stereometric form 
plays ‘the role of a concept'", (my emphasis), 
"'compounded from a great series of sense perceptions… 
This ordering by a concept means, however, that the 
various elements do not lie alongside of each other like 
the parts of an aggregate, but that we estimate each of 
them according to its systematic significance...."XXIV    
Please note Cassirer’s focus specifically on “the concept” 
–his reformulated “functional concept of mathematics”–at the 
very center of his percept.  My extension of Cassirer’s functional 
concept of mathematics into the concept of implicit definition 
will be the final step into an understanding of my ultimate 
perspective.   
Cassirer’s “functional concept of mathematics” and my 
newfound deeper anti-Cantorian conception of ordering, (seeing 
the latter as residing in the intrastructure of the axioms 
themselves rather than in the properties of their “permissive” 
objects), when combined with Hilbert’s “implicit definition” 
enabled a profound “logical leap” to “the concept of implicit 
definition”XXV which is a new thing.  It enabled for the first time 
an explicit conception of a “constitutive concept” in the sense of 
Kant.  
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It supplied a totally new rule of “ordering” beyond 
Cassirer’s beginning extension of the meaning of “concept”.  It 
goes from Cassirer’s internalized ordering of the series, (“the new 
form of consciousness”), to a more complexXXVI ordering: the 
Concept of Implicit Definition, itself also a “new form of 
consciousness” and consistent with the former - imposed by the 
structure of an axiomatic system under implicit definition, (and 
probably to the foundations of structuralism).26  In fact, I will go 
further –I believe it is the only possible form of consciousness!   
My conclusions from my “Cantor diagonal” paper, along 
with my (“ordering”) conclusions from my study of modern 
algebra, (all seen through the filter of Cassirer’s reformulated 
concept), supplied the genesis of this notion. 
  The question remains only whether such a leap is 
justifiable or necessary.  The thrust of my overall thesis argues 
that it is.  It suggests the first actual non-eliminative resolution of 
the mind-body problem! 
 It suggested the first possibility of a solution to the 
problem I stated at the opening of this paper:  “How can a 
biological mechanism ever know anything at all?  Answer:  it 
could if its “objects” were purely operativeXXVII –and virtual- 
                                                 
 
 
26 I would be open to input on the latter as I claim no expertise therein. 
objects like the objects of implicit definition, (or of structuralist 
mathematics).   
These “objects” could be defined internally and known to 
the organism/mechanism itself, (which would be its model) –
likened to and extending “the new form of consciousness” 
claimed by Cassirer for his “mathematical concept of function” 
but obviating his necessary external referent.  (My third and final 
thesis of “ontic indeterminism”, coupled with Maturana’s 
“structural coupling” explains and answers the obvious 
materialist epistemological objections.) 
Mac Lane category theory 
Perhaps I misunderstood Mac Lane’s book, but I believe 
it did preach the doctrine of structuralism implicitly.  
Structuralism was “implicitly defined” by the import of the whole 
of the book.  Mac lane was still working within the confines of 
“objects” and referents however, and this is where I think he went 
wrong.   
 
Listen to Quine once more: 
"One could even end up, though we ourselves shall not, 
by finding that the smoothest and most adequate overall 
account of the world does not after all accord existence to 
ordinary physical things.....Such eventual departures from 
Johnsonian usage”, (Samuel Johnson, again, is said to 
have demonstrated the reality of a rock by kicking it!), 
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“could partake of the spirit of science and even of the 
evolutionary spirit of ordinary language itself."XXVIII 
Quine, generally acknowledged as one of the leading 
logicists of the 20th century, was able to conceive of an account 
of the world that “does not after all accord existence to ordinary 
physical things”.  But how could we account for the world 
without “accord(ing) existence to ordinary physical things”, - 
without “accord(ing) existence to some-“thing” –i.e. without 
objects? 
I think the mind is about concepts –intentional concepts; 
it is not about referents.  It is not about classes or sets, 
(necessarily of “things” abstracted from dogmatically accepted 
“sense impressions”), except within a conceptual framework. 
(See Benacerraf comment shortly) 
Cassirer’s reformulated “Functional Concept of 
Mathematics” is wholly based in rules, (contrary to the case in 
Aristotelian –or in Cantor’s logic which is derived from it), so 
there does not even exist for Cassirer a “concept of all concepts” 
-as some rules would clearly contravene other rules!  
 Therefore it follows immediately that there does not exist 
even the very concept of “the class of all classes” or the very 
concept of “the set of all sets” as there are inbuilt conflicts in the 
rules of these concepts from the very beginning as the antinomies 
clearly show. An analog of Russell’s initial disjunction into 
proper classes is made at the very beginning of Cassirer’s 
Concept -by definition.   
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If the possibility of the non-existence of “objects” 
themselves that Quine asserted is, in fact, a real possibility, if it is 
truly plausible, then what could classes and sets refer to?  And 
why would we, in fact, need them at all?  I think we do need 
them, but as specialized concepts.  I think these specialized 
concepts, (i.e. classes, sets), are generated to fulfill specialized 
perspectives, (see my first hypothesis of “schematic artifacts” to 
follow in Chapter 4.27).  You might also revisit the early part of 
this paper to note Benacerraf’s and Bell’s comments.  But 
consider each within the context of Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” 
cited earlier. 
Cassirer:   
“…because physical, chemical, biological knowledge 
frame their questions each from its own particular 
standpoint and, in accordance with this standpoint, subject 
the phenomena to a special interpretation and formation” 
 –i.e. “each discipline asks its questions from its own 
perspective.”: 
“[Hilbert] argues that what constitutes an object varies 
from theory to theory, category to category, and that 
Frege failed to realize this fact… It [logic] remains the 
                                                 
 
 
27 See Chapter 4, this book 
tool applicable to all disciplines and theories, the 
difference being only that it is left to the discipline or 
theory to determine what shall count as an 'object' or 
'individual.' [Benacerraf, 288, my emphasis.] 
And Bell, (my emphasis):  
“The topos-theoretical viewpoint suggests that the 
absolute universe of sets be replaced by a plurality of 
‘toposes of discourse’, each of which may be regarded as 
a possible ‘world’ in which mathematical” [and logical] 
“activity may (figuratively) take place.”  
But the concepts of the mind are strategic concepts, I 
believe, not referential ones, (of “objects”).  
Walter J. Freeman contributes a relevant perspective here:   
“This book had its origin ... in an experimental finding....I 
was tracing the path taken by neural activity that 
accompanied and followed a sensory stimulus in brains of 
rabbits. I traced it from the sensory receptors into the 
cerebral cortex and there found that the activity vanished, 
just like the rabbit down the rabbit hole in ‘Alice in 
Wonderland’. What appeared in place of the stimulus-
evoked activity was a new pattern of cortical activity that 
was created by the rabbit brain... My students and I first 
noticed this anomaly in the olfactory system... and in 
looking elsewhere we found it in the visual, auditory, and 
somatic cortices too... the only knowledge that the rabbit 
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could have of the world outside itself was what it had 
made in its own brain.”XXIX  
What makes sense of this perspective, (i.e. its seeming 
self-contradiction) is Maturana’s stark and beautiful conception 
of “structural coupling”, itself combined with Cassirer’s other 
brilliancy: “Symbolic Forms”XXX, but the former must be taken 
in its broadest sense.  Equivalently, I have called it “onti
indeterminism”.  It allows us to act, (pragmatically), without 
knowing.
c 
                                                
28 
Reconsider Schlick’s characterization and interpret it through the 
young Hilbert’s eyes: 
"[Hilbert's] revolution lay in the stipulation that the basic 
or primitive concepts are to be defined just by the fact that they 
satisfy the axioms.... [They] acquire meaning only by virtue of 
the axiom system, and possess only the content that it bestows 
upon them. They stand for entities whose whole being is to be 
bearers of the relations laid down by the system."  This is what I 
propose the “A/D converters”, the “objects” of the cortex do. 
 
 
 
 
28 It also allows an entirely new reassessment of the problem of 
“consciousness”. 
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Back to Shapiro: 
“Frege insisted that arithmetic and geometry each have a 
specific subject matter, space in the one case and the 
realm of natural numbers in the other. And the axioms 
express (presumably self-evident) truths about this subject 
matter.  
Following a suggestion of Hellman’s, let us say that for 
Frege, the axioms of arithmetic and geometry are 
assertory; and for Hilbert, they are algebraic. Sentences 
that are assertory are meant to express propositions with 
fixed truth values. Algebraic sentences are schematic, 
applying to any system of objects defined by them -that 
meets certain given conditions”29 [ibid, my emphasis] 
“[Young] Hilbert’s Grundlagen provided consistency and 
independence proofs by finding interpretations that satisfy 
various sets of axioms. Typically, he would interpret the 
axioms of a theory in terms of constructions on real 
numbers. This approach, now as common as anything in 
mathematics, runs roughshod over Euclid’s definition of a 
                                                 
 
 
29 My disagreement with this characterization onto “systems of objects” should 
no longer need any elaboration.  Think once again about Wilder’s 
characterization of the “objects” of axiom systems “as presumptive and 
permissive only”. 
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‘point’ as ‘that which has no parts’. When we interpret a 
‘point’ as an ordered pair of real numbers, we see that 
points can indeed have parts.  
This free reinterpretation of axioms is a main strength of 
contemporary mathematical logic and a mainstay of 
mathematics generally. It drives the structuralist, 
algebraic, perspective on mathematics. And it runs 
counter to the Fregean perspective.” 
[But]“…It seems clear that for Hilbert and just about 
anyone else, consistency is itself a mathematical matter. 
His methodology indicates that in order for us to be 
assured that certain mathematical objects exist; we have 
to establish the consistency of an axiomatization.” 
I differ with both parts of this sentence –both proof of 
existence and of consistency.  The ultimate question is “how 
would it even be possible”!  I think Hilbert was speaking a 
different language –of invariants and of relativity. 
“In the Grundlagen, Hilbert discharged this burden, at 
least in part, by providing relative consistency proofs.”  
[ibid, my emphasis] 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
     But not necessarily “in part” only.  The system need 
only be consistent.  Shapiro's comment confuses human logical 
certainty with reality.  Hilbert's relative consistency proofs are of 
a different order entirely.  They elaborate the notion of invariants 
themselves and are consistent with such.   (I think relative 
consistency proofs are the only ones possible for the machine we 
call the brain!)   
Those invariants must go across the board however -i.e. 
the whole of one system must be mirrored in the other -as in the 
principle of duality.  As far as our assurance that “certain 
mathematical objects [must] exist” goes, however, this is a 
limitation in Shapiro’s own epistemology.  From Cassirer’s 
perspective, this is something we will never know. 
 
The Rosen Letter: (a Reflection on Shapiro’s Position) 
But what of the "beer mugs" conception?  Must the 
organization of one system be mirrored simply in the other?  Or 
may the translation be complex?  Here is an extract from my 
(fairly recent) letter to Robert Rosen’s daughter Judith 
RosenXXXI.  I had just learned that he had died, (sadly before I 
even “discovered” him), and I wanted to express my sympathy to 
her as well as my excitement in newly discovering his views.  
As part of my letter I discussed a theme her father had 
addressed to approach an understanding of “invariance”, (which I 
think was Hilbert’s focus).  It so happened that it was a 
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significant theme in my own work as you should be able to 
recognize by now, (and of Thomas Kuhn’s as well).  I talked of 
the mathematical equivalence of mechanical models of the 
Ptolemean and the Copernican universes, easily seen by the 
arbitrary choice of our anchor point for the respective models.  
(The following is just me quoting me!) 
“…The motions of the planets and the wildly gyrating 
stars of the one translate into the picture of the stable universe we 
are ordinarily used to! Mathematically, I hope you can appreciate 
the beauty and the inherent mechanical necessity of the absolute 
mathematical translation between these models. The version I 
had been thinking about used our own, (modern), view of the 
universe vis a vis the Ptolemaic system. (Kuhn used the 
Tychonean Model).  Conceive again of a rigid mechanical model 
of our solar system revolving about our linearly moving sun, 
embedded in the field of stars -just as we normally conceive of it 
and sitting on your (large) desktop.  
But let us reach down from some other dimension, (just to 
stay out of the way), and grasp the now moving and spinning 
earth firmly pinching it tight so that it becomes motionless, lifting 
the model off its prior base, and establishing a new "center" in the 
now unmoving earth, (with its now wildly gyrating 
extraterrestrial adjuncts).  
The point is that the two perspectives must necessarily be 
absolutely mathematically and observationally equivalent –
established by the purely mechanical, [“gear driven”] nature of 
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the model itself!  All of their relative motion is absolutely 
invariant!  From the standpoint of an observer anywhere in that 
universe, all observations and measurements would necessarily 
be the sameXXXII, [though the language expressing them would be 
radically different!]! 
These, then, are purely mathematical translations, (albeit 
complex ones), confirmed by the purely mechanical nature of the 
model.  From this standpoint no observable data whatsoever is 
gained from adopting one viewpoint over the other.XXXIII 
I think this translation of perspective, (this invariance), 
illustrates a deeper interpretation of Hilbert’s “beer mugs” 
assertion.30 
“The problem, however, lies in the ‘laws of nature’. All 
laws, (gravity, inertia, the speed of light, et al), would have to be 
rewritten to be place specific under the (Ptolemaic or, as I later 
saw from Kuhn –who used a very similar construction- using the 
Tychonean transformation insteadXXXIV).   
                                                 
 
 
30 It gives a hint to the “how” of Hilbert’s statement quoted earlier:  “If in 
speaking of my points, I think of some system of things, e.g., the system love, 
law, chimney-sweep ...and then assume all my axioms as relations between these 
things,30 then my propositions, e.g., Pythagoras’ theorem, are also valid for these 
things ... [Any] theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic 
elements. One only needs to apply a reversible one-one transformation and lay it 
down that the axioms shall be correspondingly the same for the transformed 
things.”  The current discussion is precisely about the translation of invariants, 
but more complex ones than normally considered. 
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Laws of motion that hold on the earth would not 
necessarily hold in such simple form on the moon, (in fact, as 
seen through an all powerful, earth-based telescope, they would 
not under these non-Copernican [and pre-Galilean] 
perspectives!)”XXXV    
This situation is relevant to my suggestion made in 
reference to the lack of preconceived necessity for a preservation 
of hierarchy in Hilbert’s “Pythagorean theorem” assertion.  Think 
about the purely mathematical and necessarily definitive31 nature 
of the translations involved between our models.  
 
Modern Ptolemean Physics 
Suppose, purely hypothetically of course, that some 
brilliant but esoteric mathematician of the Ptolemaic school had 
discovered the dualistic translatory laws for these (new, i.e. 
“Copernican”) laws of nature - but who conceived those 
translatory laws as mathematics only, (like Heisenberg’s matrices 
perhaps –and, in fact, as the Pope supposedly advised Copernicus 
himself to do). Mathematically this discovery would have 
involved the implicit (though not necessarily a conscious and 
                                                 
 
 
31 because they are “gear-driven” 
explicit) reorientation of the universe back to its "original" 
(Copernican) state, (a la Schrödinger?)   
He would have implicitly reformulated and discovered 
new [more easily accessible] laws and implications in that 
context, (which would have been his mathematical “scratch 
pad”), and subsequently retranslated them, (and the new laws 
directly evolving from them -perhaps in a single combined, but 
possibly “blind” compositional act), back to the original, fixed 
earth formulation, skewing but precisely reflecting even the new 
laws.  
But, (following our story just a bit further), this could 
very well have been a "blind", purely mathematical and 
compositional discovery -involving only purely mathematical 
translations and without a necessary cosmology or insight.”XXXVI  
[Heisenberg’s  concept of “Matrices” supplies a reasonable 
parallel.] 
I continued: “The point is that these are solely and 
precisely mathematical translations! All laws would be absolutely 
preserved and correct, (all motions would be exactly the same, of 
course). I think this is a very pretty idea with profound 
consequences. The biggest problem, however, would be in the 
discovery of new laws –i.e. the fecundity of the model! But, 
again, these might well be implicit in the transformations.  
What does this mean for our problem? It means that our 
central problem is not one of data, (that is a distinct problem), but 
of organization! The observational data per se holds constant, (by 
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mechanical necessity), in this example. Rather, it becomes a 
problem of organization for current understanding and for the 
organization needed for future scientific progress. It is not a 
problem of data or the necessary consistency of data as my 
example demonstrates. This data is obviously absolutely 
consistent. 
(But mine  -this present discussion -is a relative proof  in 
the very form for which Shapiro so roundly criticized Hilbert!) 
As such, it relates to some of the issues raised by Penrose 
in his criteria for theories,XXXVII but in a deeper context. It relates 
to what I will call "centrality" and "shape" [theoretical “beauty” if 
you like], which are surely intentional attributes. Rules and 
principles are normally more "central" to theories than the 
language of their data. Galilean Relativity, gravity, the speed of 
light, Kepler’s laws… are preferentially stated in their simplest 
and most intelligible mathematical form, not in skewed 
transformations.  
This is Occam's razor, but more finely honed. We 
centralize principles, (and, I argue along with Cassirer), 
intentional principles specifically as well for organization!  We 
then organize the data to fit!   
Theories have "shape" in the same sense that great music 
has "shape" -not only in its individual themes, but as an overall 
composition. Occam's razor, (least assumptions), is only the tip of 
the iceberg. 
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What does this "interlude" mean specifically for the 
problem of the brain? Does the mind do this? Is its organization 
based on aesthetic and intentional grounds as well? I propose that 
the problem of the organization of the mind is fundamentally like 
the problem of the organization of theories.  I propose that this 
was how the megacellular colossus organized its process. (But 
what then, are the "objects" of ordinary consciousness?)  
By this discussion I have tried to introduce the kind of 
complexity that I think we are dealing with, and the profundity of 
Hilbert’s approach.  This, I think, is the kind of thing that Hilbert 
was thinking about with his remark about “beer mugs” and 
“points”.  It is all about invariants. 
 
Another Look at Hilbert 
In my discussion of Chapter 2, I noted that I had 
incorporated Wilder’s interpretation of Hilbert’s “objects” in my 
earlier writings, and promised a further perspective on the issue 
in this chapter. 
In those earlier papers I had interpreted Hilbert’s 
comments in the most minimal sense -that these “objects” were, 
using Wilder’s terminology, “permissive and presumptive only”, 
that is, semantically neutral.  
“These objects, (of its domain -and "existence" terms 
generally), are assumed only, (as Wilder points out) 
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"presumptive(ly)" and "permissive(ly)" however.  We are 
told nothing about them in an objective sense.”XXXVIII 
  I began with an interpretation of Hilbert where the 
“objects” of a system are taken in a purely impartial sense. 
“... it is surely obvious that every theory is only a 
scaffolding or schema of concepts together with their 
necessary relations to one another, and that the basic 
elements can be thought of in any way one likes.  If in 
speaking of my points, I think of some system of things, 
e.g., the system love, law, chimney-sweep ...and then 
assume all my axioms as relations32 between these 
things”. 
In thinking it over, I have come to the conclusion that 
Hilbert had something much deeper in his mind.  Hilbert himself 
did not interpret “these things” as semantically neutral in this 
specific instance but gave them names and meanings!  (This is 
not the blatant contradiction it would appear to be.  It depends, as 
I have said in another of my writings “on which end of the 
telescope you look through.”)   
                                                 
 
 
32 But what kind of relations?  What is the conception of relation itself that 
Hilbert had in mind? 
Here he first assumes some “system of objects” but then 
he assumes “all my axioms as relations” [are] “correspondingly 
the same for the transformed things” –i.e.  “between these [prior] 
things”!  Here he does not begin with the axioms as the logical 
prius but rather begins with his “things”, and he then transforms 
his axioms to fit!  His axioms themselves are transformed to fit 
his “things”.  
 “..and then assume all my axioms as relations between 
these things.”   
This is not a simplistic conceptualization of “relation”.  I 
think his perspective here corresponds to that of Quine wherein 
the latter noted that “total science is like a field of force whose 
boundary conditions are experience.  A conflict with experience 
at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the 
field.  Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our 
statements.  Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation 
of others, because of their logical interconnections- the logical 
laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the 
system, certain further elements of the field.  Having reevaluated 
one statement we must reevaluate some others, which may be 
statements logically connected with the first or may be the 
statements of logical connections themselves.  But the total field 
is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, 
that there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to 
reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience.  No 
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particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in 
the interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations 
of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.......  Furthermore it 
becomes folly to see a boundary between synthetic statements… 
and analytic statements...Any statement can be held true come 
what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in 
the system...  Conversely… no statement is immune to revision… 
even the logical law of the excluded middle... and what 
difference is there in principle between such a shift and the shift 
whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or 
Darwin Aristotle?"XXXIX 
Consider Hilbert’s “one only needs to apply a reversible 
one-one transformation and lay it down that the axioms shall be 
correspondingly the same for the transformed things.”  It is his 
“correspondingly the same” which grabs my attention. 
  Remember this was the “king of invariants” speaking 
and I think his meaning was much deeper.  “Correspondingly the 
same” would have a very different significance to someone with 
that background involving complex transformations and 
invariance in the sense of my “Rosen” and “Kuhn” discussions 
above.  (You might want to think of the Lorenzian 
transformations here.) 
I believe it is the invariant core, the context-free sense of 
the relationality of his axioms that he wanted preserved in the 
sense of Kuhn’s translations of cosmologies or of Quine’s 
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relativistic perspective with which we began this journey.  This is 
a much deeper and more radical interpretation of Hilbert’s 
conception than usual, but I think it is justified.  I think this is the 
actual concept of implicit definition of the “young Hilbert”. 
I believe that Hilbert’s was a deeper conception than 
Shapiro acknowledges, relating to invariance in complex 
transformationsXL and to Hilbert’s non-simplistic and 
mathematically nurtured intuitive conception, rather than from 
his perspectives drawn from of formalistic logic.   
I think this was the actual subject of his initial debate with 
Frege.  Hilbert’s conception of implicit definition is 
reinterpretation in its deepest sense, deriving from the larger 
scope of the principle of duality33 and complex transformations, 
and from Hilbert’s native, rather than from his formal logic.  I 
believe it has an affinity to Cassirer’s perspective in his 
“Symbolic Forms”, (and to Bell’s “local mathematics”?).  I 
believe that it is invariance itself that was Hilbert’s subject.34  
His was, I think, the very first  structuralist perspective!     
                                                 
 
 
33 The algebraic “Principle of Duality” says that if we merely change the 
reference of each instance of any non-explicitly defined term in an axiom 
system, that the conclusions drawn from that system apply to and actually 
define the latter.  It is a very deep and profound idea and is the genesis of 
Hilbert’s “implicit definition”  
34 See “Rosen” discussion above 
Hilbert’s original conception was not grounded, as it later 
came to be, in the formalistic “Byzantian” implementations of 
logicism and Cantor’s set theory.  
Shapiro, Mac Lane, and even Hilbert himself became 
trapped in the abstractive contextXLI implicit in classical logic -
e.g. in Shapiro’s definition of "an algebraist" and their joint 
conception of structures as being necessarily “about” some 
ontological things.   
As I read it, Hilbert’s original conception, (of the “young 
Hilbert”), was not about ontology: it was not about proof theory; 
it was about invariance itself.  Hilbert’s is a world of 
mathematical conditionalityXLII per se, and it “floats”!  It is 
neither a world of philosophical idealism nor one of Fregean 
pragmatism.  These are the “ladders”XLIII we must kick away! 
 
Logic as Biology: 
Now let us take a radical but, I think, decisive turn, and 
consider this mathematics from the standpoint of biology.  From 
a purely physicalist and evolutionary standpoint, logic must itself 
be considered as a highly sophisticated but purely reactiveXLIV 
system for the survival of the entity.  (Maturana is surely relevant 
here.)   
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As such logic becomes pure biology35, and the “concepts” 
and “percepts” within that logic, (even those of human 
mathematics), become biological objects.  Hence logic becomes 
“bio-logic”!  I suggest that this insight might solve many of the 
deepest issues in the underlying mathematics.   
George Lakoff’s ICMs, (to be examined later –See 
Appendix B), are biologically based –on the human organism.  
Human cognition and human reason consists, for Lakoff, in the 
application of the best fit of these inbuilt ICM’s, (and their 
respective categories), to a given problem or situation.  They 
constitute an “embodied logic” deriving from the nature of the 
human organism itself. There is an obvious parallel between 
Lakoff’s “embodied logic” and the more general case I have 
argued.  I have argued that logic is indeed embodied, but at the 
primitive level of cellular process!  (See Chapter 4  -“The 
Specific Case of Biology”).  This more general characterization 
allows the crucial epistemological move,36 (which Lakoff’s does 
not), beyond the “God’s eye view” he disclaims. 
The distinction is important because at the cellular level 
of phenomenology biology becomes a pure form very much in 
                                                 
 
 
35 See my “embodied logic” comment in the Lakoff appendix. 
36 Through what Maturana and Varela call “structural coupling” 
the sense that I will argue that Maturana’s is in Cassirer's sense of 
a “Symbolic Form” and thus compatible with Cassirer's Hertzian 
premise.  This is especially transparent in Maturana and Varela's 
book, for instance, (see chapter 6), i.e. in its explicit 
constructiveness and the subsequent purity of its phenomenology. 
I think it is relevant to Hilbert’s relative consistency 
proofs, Shapiro’s problem with “necessarily assertive 
statements”, MacClane’s “existence problems”, and the 
difficulties of Platonism, et al.  If logic is actually bio-logic, then 
we have an actual model in the human brain itself,XLV and as 
such, we can accept its reality and legitimacy in all these 
perspectives.   
Here is  another quote from a very recent contemporary 
source which might make you think. 
 
Raichle: 
Compare Raichle:  
“Of the virtually unlimited information available in the 
world around us, the equivalent of 10 billion bits per 
second arrives on the retina at the back of the eye.  
Because the optic nerve attached to the retina has only a 
million output connections, just six million bits per 
second can leave the retina, and only 10,000 bits per 
second make it to the visual cortex. 
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…After further processing, visual information feeds into 
the brain regions responsible for forming our conscious 
perception.  Surprisingly, the amount of information 
constituting that conscious perception is less than 100 bits 
per second.  Such a thin stream of data probably could not 
produce a perception if that were all the brain took into 
account; the intrinsic activity must play a role. 
 
…Yet another indication of the brain’s intrinsic 
processing power comes from counting the number of 
synapses, the contact points between neurons.  In the 
visual cortex, the number of synapses devoted to 
incoming visual information is less than 10 percent of 
those present.  Thus, the vast majority must represent 
internal connections among neurons in that brain region.”  
(This is very much in accord with both Maturana’s and 
W.J. Freeman’s conceptions.) 
…. Although six million bits are transmitted through the 
optic nerve, for instance, only 10,000 bits make it to the 
brain’s visual processing area, and only a few hundred are 
involved in formulating a conscious perception –too little 
to generate a meaningful perception on their own.  The 
finding suggested that the brain probably makes constant 
predictions about the outside environment in anticipation 
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of paltry sensory inputs reaching it from the outside 
world.”37  (My emphasis) 
 
How very similar to Maturana’s, W.J.Freeman’s and mine 
is his perspective.  But Raichle does not draw the obvious 
conclusions, as indeed, it seems nobody else seems to.  His 
conclusions are confounded by the epistemological paradox of 
his own arguments –his is a brain also and subject to the same 
limitations.  His picture of the world too is built on that same thin  
data stream of a few hundred bits per second, (DIV 8 ~= bytes 
per second), imposed on the underlying structure for as many 
seconds as he has been alive.  This stream that we would never 
allow for even the crudest dial-up connection on our computer 
modem, (which would normally be about 64 thousand bytes per 
second), consists, according to Raichle of a mere few hundreds of 
bits per second in which to download reality.  And yet he seems 
to think he has a definite and explicit conception of the world.  
Whence, then, “the virtually unlimited information available in 
the world around us, the equivalent of 10 billion bits per second 
                                                 
 
 
37 Scientific American March 2010 “The Brain’s Dark Energy”  Marcus 
Raichle, Washington University School of Medicine in Saint Louis 
 
[which] arrives on the retina at the back of the eye.”  How did he 
arrive at this world picture? 
How much closer is the fit to Maturana’s “triggering” of 
an underlying process than to Raichle’s own “informational 
model” which lies at the bottom of his worldview?  His explicit 
answer has a definite and clear affinity to my own model of an 
optimization of underlying blind process –to an optimization of 
strategy rather than of information –or to William James’ 
pragmatism which we will look at in Chapter 12.  His implicit 
and always underlying answer, however, is that of informational 
naïve realism! 
 
His formal conclusion does it better: 
The finding suggested that the brain probably makes 
constant predictions about the outside environment in 
anticipation of paltry sensory inputs reaching it from the 
outside world.”  (My emphasis) 
 The ultimate answers he seeks lie, rather, in the 
relativism of epistemology I will propose in Chapter 8.  
Philosophy does have a role in science, and most especially in 
this particular problem –but in support of science, not in 
pontificating on it.  It provides us with new conceptions of 
possibility!  Repeating a relevant quote from Chapter 1 by 
Cassirer: 
"A glance at the history of physics shows that precisely its 
most weighty and fundamental achievements stand in 
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closest connection with considerations of a general 
epistemological nature.  Galileo's 'Dialogues on the Two 
Systems of the World' are filled with such considerations 
and his Aristotelian opponents could urge against Gallilei 
that he had devoted more years to the study of philosophy 
than months to the study of physics.  Kepler lays the 
foundation for his work on the motion of Mars and for his 
chief work on the harmony of the world in his 'Apology 
for Tycho', in which he gives a complete methodological 
account of hypotheses and their various fundamental 
forms; an account by which he really created the modern 
concept of physical theory and gave it a definite concrete 
content.  Newton also, in the midst of his considerations 
on the structure of the world, comes back to the most 
general norms of physical knowledge, to the regulae 
philosophandi 
… But all these great historical examples of the real inner 
connection between epistemological problems and 
physical problems are almost outdone by the way in 
which this connection has been verified in the foundations 
of the theory of relativity.... Einstein...appeals primarily to 
an epistemological motive, to which he grants...a decisive 
significance."  (Cassirer: "Einstein's Theory of 
Relativity",P.353-354)  
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In short, Raichle’s is a clear problem within a framework 
of epistemological relativity!  Cassirer provided a definite picture 
of such. 
 
Addressing Shapiro again: 
Do we really need “assertatory metamathematical 
statements”, or is it only necessary to accept relative consistency 
proofs.  Taking the brain as a machine, then within the bio-logic, 
I think the latter is the only option. These are strategies, not 
ontologies! 
To answer Mac Lane’s pointed question in his 
“Mathematics: Form and Function”, (paraphrasing): Why and 
how does mathematics then work for us?  Why and how is it so 
useful in our pragmatic world?   
My answer is that the foundations of mathematics are 
necessarily just the same as the organizational foundations of 
brain process.  They work just to the best possible extent that the 
brains of these highly sophisticated organisms are capable of 
continuing their existence.  They exist and they work, to use 
Maturana’s pregnant terminology, just to the extent that these 
organisms are capable of preserving autopoiesis.  But no 
more!XLVI 
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The  Remainder of this Book Constitutes my proposed  
Specific Solution to the Mind-Brain Problem.  
(Chapters 4 through 13) 
  The Initial Part was to Enable You to Understand It. 
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Chapter 4: My First Hypothesis in Detail: (Biology Part One) 
1. Representation: the perspective from biology 
Sometimes we tentatively adopt a seemingly absurd or 
even outrageous hypothesis in the attempt to solve an impossible 
problem -and see where it leads. Sometimes we discover that its 
consequences are not so outrageous after all. I agree with 
Chalmers that the problem of consciousness is, in fact, “the hard 
problem”. I think it is considerably harder than even he seems to 
think it is however. 
I think its solution requires new heuristic principles as 
deep and as profound as, (though different from), the 
“uncertainty”, “complementarity” and (physical) “relativity” that 
were necessary for the successful advance of physics in the early 
part of the 20th century. From the preceding chapters, I think you 
will have some idea of my thoughts on the subject.  I think it 
involves an extension of logic as well. Consideration of those 
deep cognitive principles: “cognitive closure”, (Kant and 
Maturana), “epistemological relativity”, (Cassirer and Quine), 
and of the extension of logic, (Cassirer, Lakoff, Iglowitz), must 
await other chapters however.  
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Sometimes it is necessary to walk around a mountain in 
order to climb the hill beyond. It is the mountain of 
“representation”, and the cliff, (notion), of “presentation”1 
embedded on its very face, which blocks the way to a solution of 
the problem of consciousness. This hypothesis points out the path 
around the mountain. 
Maturana and Varela’s “Tree of Knowledge”I is a 
compelling argument based in the mechanics of physical science 
and biology against even the very possibility of a biological 
organism’s possession of a representative model of its 
environment. They and other respected biologists, (Freeman, 
Edelman), argue against even “information” itself. They maintain 
that information never passes between the environment and 
organisms; there is only the “triggering” of structurally 
determinate organic forms. I believe theirs is the inescapable 
conclusion of modern science. 
I will now present a specific and constructive 
counterproposal for another kind of model however: i.e. what I 
will call the “Schematic Operative Model”. Contrary to the case 
of the representative model, it does remain viable within the 
critical context of modern science. I believe that we, as human 
                                                 
 
 
1 For we would surely, then, require some homunculus for it to be presented 
to! 
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organisms, do in fact embody a model. I believe it is the stuff of 
mind! 
 
2. “The Schematic Model”: Definition and Examples.  
(Defining What It Means To Be “An Object”) 
Normally, when we think of “models”, we mean reductive 
or at least parallel models. In the first we think of a structure that 
contains just some of the properties of what is to be mirrored. 
When we normally use the term “schematic model”, we talk 
about the preservation of the “schema”, or “sense” of what is 
mirrored. Again it is reductive, however- it is logically reductive. 
It is, as has been claimed, “just a level of abstraction”2. There are 
other uses for models, however, -those that involve superior 
organizations! This is the new sense of “schematic model” that I 
propose to identify.  
2.1 The Simplest Case: A Definition by Example 
Even our most simplistic models, the models of even our 
most simplistic and mundane training seminars, suggest the 
possibility of another usage for models very different than as 
representative schemas. They demonstrate the possibility of a 
                                                 
 
 
2 As a JCS reviewer once tried to characterize my conception 
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wholly different paradigm whose primary function is 
organization instead. 
Look first at the very simplest of models. Consider the 
models of simplistic training seminars -seminars in a sales 
organization –even the primitive training seminars of 
AMWAY©!- for instance. “’Motivation’ plus ‘technique’ yields 
‘sales’.”, we might hear at their sales meeting. Or, (escalating and 
shifting our ground just a little bit), “’Self-awareness of the 
masses’ informed by ‘Marxist-dialectic’ produces ‘revolution’!”, 
we might hear from our local revolutionary at a Saturday night 
cell meeting. Visual aids, (models), and diagrams are ubiquitous 
in these presentations.  
A lecturer stands at his chalkboard and asks us to accept 
drawings of triangles, squares, cookies, horseshoes... as 
meaningful objects -with a “calculus” of relations, (viz: an 
“arithmetic” of signs),3 between them, (arrows, squiggles, et al). 
The icons, (objects), of those graphics are stand-ins for concepts 
or processes as diverse, (escalating and shifting ground just a bit 
more), as “motivation”, “the nuclear threat”, “sexuality”, 
“productivity”, and “evolution”.  
                                                 
 
 
3 Webster’s defines “calculus”: “(math) a method of calculation, any process of 
reasoning by use of symbols”. I am using it here in contradistinction to “the 
calculus”, i.e. differential and integral calculus. 
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Those icons need not stand in place of entities in objective 
reality, however. What is the object which is “a productivity” or 
“a sexuality”, for instance? What things are these? 
Consider this: two different lecturers might invoke 
different symbols, (“objects”), and a different “calculus” to 
explicate the same topic. In analyzing the French Revolution in a 
history classroom,4 let us say, (a classroom is a kind of training 
seminar after all!) , a fascist, a royalist, a democrat might 
alternatively invoke “the Nietzschean superman”, “the divine 
right of kings”, “freedom”, ... as actual “objects” on his 
blackboard, (with appropriate symbols).  
He will redistribute certain of the explanatory aspects, 
(and properties), of a Marxist’s entities, (figures) -or reject them 
as entities altogether.II  That which is unmistakably explanatory, 
(“wealth”, let us say), in the Marxist’s entities, (and so which 
must be accounted for by all of them), might be embodied instead 
solely within the fascist’s “calculus” or in an interaction between 
his “objects” and his “calculus”.  
 
Thus and conversely the Marxist would, (and ordinarily 
does), reinterpret the royalist’s “God”-figure, (and his –the 
                                                 
 
 
4 I actually attended such a class which dealt with alternative explanations of the 
French Revolution at the University of Chicago.  It was a good school. 
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Marxist’s- admitted function of that “God” in social interaction5), 
as “a self-serving invention of the ruling class”.  
It becomes an expression solely of his “calculus” and is 
not embodied as a distinct symbol, (i.e. object). Their “objects” - 
as objects - need not be compatible! As Edelman noted: “certain 
symbols do not match categories in the world. ... Individuals 
understand events and categories in more than one way and 
sometimes the ways are inconsistent.”III 
                                                 
 
 
5 Dennett’s term “heterophenomenological” -i.e. with neutral ontological import 
-is apt here. 
Figure 8, (Madeline’s Chalkboard) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9, (Marx’s Chalkboard)
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 What is important is that a viable calculus-plus-objects, (a 
given model), must explain or predict “history” -that is, it must 
be compatible with the phenomena, (in this particular example 
the historical phenomena). But the argument applies to a much 
broader scope. I have argued elsewhere,IV (following the strong 
case of Hertz and Cassirer –see Chapter 7), that the same 
accounting may be given of competing scientific theories, 
philosophies, and, indeed, of any alternatively viable 
explanations. 
 
Consider Heinrich Hertz:  
“The [scientific] images of which we are speaking are our 
ideas of things; they have with things the one essential 
agreement which lies in the fulfillment of the stated 
requirement, [of successful consequences], but further 
agreement with things is not necessary to their purpose. 
Actually we do not know and have no means of finding 
out whether our ideas of things accord with them in any 
other respect than in this one fundamental relation.” 
(Hertz, “Die Prinzipien der Mechanik”)  
The existence of a multiplicity of alternately viable 
“calculuses”, (sic), and the allowable incommensurability of their 
“objects”V suggests an interpretation of those objects contrary to 
representation or denotation however. It suggests the converse 
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possibility that the function and the motivation of the objects of 
those models, specifically as entities per se, (in what I will call 
these “schematic models”), is instead to illustrate, to enable, -to 
crystallize and simplify the very calculus of relation proposed 
between them!VI The "objects" of these models, I propose, are 
manifestations of their structure; their structure is not a resolution 
of the objects. 
2.1.1 Reversing our perspective: 
I propose and will argue the actual possibility that the 
boundaries -the demarcations and definitions of these schematic 
objects, (their “contiguity” if you will) -are formed specifically to 
meet the needs of the operations. I propose that they exist to 
serve structure- not the converse.VII  
The objects of those structures –specifically as objects per 
se - serve to organize process, (i.e. analysis or response). They 
are not representations of actual objects or actual entities in 
reality.VIII This, I propose, is why they are “things”.6  These 
                                                 
 
 
6 Compare the Benacerraf passage cited earlier:  “[Hilbert] argues that what 
constitutes an object varies from theory to theory, category to category, and that 
Frege failed to realize this fact….’It [logic]6 remains the tool applicable to all 
disciplines and theories, the difference being only that it is left to the discipline 
or theory to determine what shall count as an 'object' or 'individual.'” 
[Benacerraf, 288] 
 
“objects” functionally bridge reality in a way that physical 
objects do not and I suggest that they are, in fact, metaphors of 
analysis or response. The rationale for using them, (as any good 
“seminarian” would tell you), is clarity, organization and 
efficiency. 
Though set in a plebian context, the “training seminar”, 
(as minimally presented), illustrates and defines the most general 
and abstract case of schematic non-representative models in that 
it presumes no particular agenda. It is easily generalized: it 
might as well be a classroom in nuclear physics or mathematics, 
the boardroom of a multinational corporation, -or a student 
organizing his love life on a scratchpad! 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
2.2 A Case for Schematism More Specific to Our Special 
Problem: Narrowing the Focus.  
(The Engineering Argument) 
Engineers’ instrumentation and control systems provide 
an example of the organizational, non-representational use of 
models and “entities” in another setting. These entities, and the 
context in which they exist, provide another kind of 
“chalkboard”.7  Their “objects” need not mirror objective reality 
either. A gauge, a readout display, a control device, (the “objects” 
designed for such systems), need not mimic a single parameter -
or an actual physical entity. Indeed, in the monitoring of a 
                                                 
 
 
7 Their designers are the “lecturers”, and the instruments they design are the 
“objects” of their schematic models 
complex or dangerous process, it should not. Rather, the readout 
for instance should represent an efficacious synthesis of just 
those aspects of the process which are relevant to effective 
response, -and be crystallized around those relevant responses!  
A warning light or a status indicator, for instance, need 
not refer to just one parameter. It may refer to electrical overload 
and/or excessive pressure and/or... Or it may refer to an optimal 
relationship, (perhaps a complexly functional relationship), 
between many parameters -to a relationship between temperature, 
volume, mass, etc. in a chemical process, for instance, or the 
urgency of immediate response by a battlefield commander. 
The exactly parallel case holds for its control devices. A 
single control may orchestrate a multiplicity of (possibly disjoint) 
objective responses. The accelerator pedal in a modern 
automobile, as a simple example, may integrate fuel injection 
volumes; spark timing, transmission gearing... 
Ideally, (given urgent constraints), instrumentation and 
control might unify in the selfsame “object”. We could then 
manipulate the very object of the display and it in itself could be 
the control device as well. Consider the advantages of 
manipulating a graphic or tactile object which is simultaneously 
both a readout and a control mechanism under urgent or 
dangerous circumstances.  
Now think about this same possibility in relation to our 
ordinary objects of perception -in relation to the sensory-motor 
coordination of the brain and the objects of naive realism in the 
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real world! The brain is a control system, after all, so what should 
it’s “objects” be? The brain is an organ of control and its 
mechanics must be considered in that perspective. Its function is 
exceedingly complex and the very continuation of life itself is at 
stake.IX It is indeed a complex and dangerous world. Might not 
our naïve world itself be such a combined schematic control 
system? 
 
2.3 The “G.U.I.”, the Most Pertinent and Sophisticated 
Example of a Schematic Model: the Special Case)  
The “object” in the graphic user interface, (G.U.I.), of a 
computer is perhaps the best example of a purely schematic usage 
currently available. In my simplistic manipulation of the 
schematic objects of my computer’s G.U.I., I am, in fact, 
effecting and coordinating quite diverse, disparate and 
unbelievably complex operations at the physical level of the 
computer. These are operations impossible, (in a practical sense), 
to accomplish directly.  
What a computer object, (icon), represents and what its 
manipulation does, at the physical level, can be exceedingly 
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complex and disjoint.8 The disparate voltages and physical 
locations, (or operations), represented by a single “object”, and 
the (possibly different) ones effected by manipulating it, correlate 
to a metaphysical object only in this “schematic” sense. Its 
efficacy lies precisely in the simplicity of the “calculus” it 
enables!  (It is specifically the interface that must be simple!)9 
Contemporary usage is admittedly primitive. Software 
designers have limiting preconceptions of the “entities” to be 
manipulated, of a necessary preservation of hierarchy, and of the 
operations to be accomplished in the physical computer by their 
icons and interface. But I assert that G.U.I.’s and their “objects”, 
(icons), have a deeper potentiality of “free formation”. They have 
the potential to link to any selection across a substrate, i.e. they 
could “cross party lines”.10  They could cross categories of 
“things in the world”, (Lakoff’s “objectivist categories”X), and 
acquire thereby the possibility of organizing on a different and 
the most pressing issue: i.e. urgency / risk. They need preserve 
neither parallelism nor hierarchy. 
Biology supplies fortuitous examples of the sort of thing I 
am suggesting for G.U.I.’s –e.g. in the brain’s “global mapping” 
                                                 
 
 
8 In fact, it is totally arbitrary and at the will of the programmer(s) –and any, 
possibly conflicting, organizational schemes they may have in mind. 
9 This is clearly related to intentionality, to the facility of implementation. 
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noted by EdelmanXI, (I will present Walter Freeman’s more 
explicit case in detail shortly). The non-topological connectivity 
Edelman notes from the brain’s “topobiological” maps,11 and 
specifically the connectivity, (the “global mapping”), from the 
objects of those maps to the non-mapped areas of the brain 
supplies a concrete illustration the kind of potential I wish to urge 
for a G.U.I..  
Ultimately I will urge it as the rationale for the brain 
itself. This global mapping allows “... selectional events”, [and, I 
suggest, their “objects” as well], “occurring in its local maps ... 
to be connected to the animal’s motor behavior, to new sensory 
samplings of the world, and to further successive reentry events.” 
But this is explicitly a non-topological mapping. This particular 
mapping, (the global mapping), does not preserve contiguity. Nor 
need it preserve hierarchy. 
Here is an actual biological model demonstrating the 
more abstract possibility of a connection of localized “objects”12, 
(i.e. in a G.U.I.), to non-topological (distributed) process -to 
“non-objectivist categories “, using Lakoff’s terminology. As 
such, it illustrates the possibility of “schematism” in its broadest 
                                                                                                           
 
 
10 See Freeman Figure 2 in section 2.4.1 for a physical demonstration. 
11 The multiple, topological maps in the cortex 
12 in the brain’s spatial maps 
sense. Edelman’s fundamental rationale is “Neural Darwinism”, 
the ex post facto adaptation of process, not “information”, and is 
thus consistent with such an interpretation. It does not require 
“information”. Nor does it require “representation”.  
Edelman, (unfortunately), correlates his topobiological 
maps, (as sensory maps), directly and representatively, (i.e. 
hierarchically), with “the world”. This is a clear inconsistency in 
his epistemology. It is in direct conflict with his early and 
continual repudiation of “the God’s eye view” upon which he 
grounds his biologic epistemology. 
 
A Graphic Rendering of Edelman’s Epistemology:  Figure 12: 
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(Note: hierarchy and contiguity are implicit in his model!) 
 
 
But what if we turn Edelman’s perspective around 
however? What if we blink the “God’s eye” he has himself so 
strongly and continually objected to, and step back from the 
prejudice of our human (animal) cognition. What if the maps and 
their objects both were taken as existing to serve blind primitive 
process instead of information? (Figure 13) What if they are 
organizational rather than representative? 
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 Figure 13: 
 A More Consistent Rendering of Edelman’s 
Epistemology Suggesting a New Paradigm for G.U.I.’s.  (Note: 
Neither hierarchy nor contiguity are implicit in this model!)  
This is the case I wish to suggest as an illustration of the 
most abstract sense of the G.U.I., (and which I will argue shortly) 
–i.e. a non-topological correlation! It opens a further fascinating 
possibility moreover. It suggests that evolution’s “good trick”, 
(after P.S. Churchland’s usage), was not representation, but was, 
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rather, the organization of primitive process in a topological 
context. It suggests that the “good trick” was evolution’s creation 
of the cortex itself! 
2.4 Towards a Better Biological Model 
Figure 14 
 
2.4.1 Biology, The Real Thing: Freeman’s Model 
What is needed now is a more explicit model, and a 
specific research problem to embody the proposal. Edelman’s 
“global mapping” is all very well and good, but it doesn’t really 
do what it has to. It is “too philosophical”, too vague, and as 
Popper would have predictably urged, not falsifiable. A more 
detailed and quite specific model comes from the work of the 
noted neurophysiologist, Walter J. Freeman.  
 
Walter J. Freeman 
Based on extensive experimental research first with the 
olfactory cortex, (arguably evolution’s first cortex), and then with 
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the visual and other cortices, Freeman argues that the brain does 
not process information at all –it does other things!  
He has approached the problem directly and addressed the 
crux of the issue: what is the correlation between sensory input 
and resultant brain states? Is there one? This is explicitly 
empirical research clearly pertinent to the problems of parallelism 
and hierarchy and, if its conclusions are viable, is totally relevant 
to my argument. It is falsifiable! But, conversely, it is capable of 
falsifying the very premise of the standard paradigm -i.e. that of 
“representation” itself. 
First, however, please look at Freeman’s model, and note 
the striking similarity to my own Figure 13 just above.13 
Strikingly similar, that is, if we interpret his “topographic 
projections” as following behind Edelman’s “topobiological 
maps”. (Feature detectors?) 
    
 
                                                 
 
 
13 Please note that figure 13 and figure 15 were generated by myself and 
W.J.Freeman in total mutual ignorance of the other and in different contexts.  It 
was only later that I discovered this paper –to me it was a blinding coincidence. 
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 Figure 15, (Freeman’s Figure 2)   
“Fig. 2. The input path from receptors to the bulb has 
some topographic specificity.” [but] “The output path to 
the prepyriform has broad axonal divergence, which 
provides a basis for spatial integration14, (please see 
important footnote below), of bulbar output and extraction 
of the “carrier” wave. (From Freeman 1983, reproduced 
by permission.) 
“It is based on a striking difference between two types of 
central path, one that provides topographic mapping from 
an array of transmitting neurons to an array of receiving 
neurons, the other having divergence of axons that 
provides for spatial 15integration of the transmitted 
activity.” (Freeman, 1994, my emphasis).  
 
Now compare Freeman’s Figure 2 with my Figure 13 
shortly before it. This is an explicit case, truly drawn from 
biology, illustrating the non-topological potential of virtual 
                                                 
 
 
14 Understand that Freeman is talking within a context and here “spatial 
integration” relates to the geometry, (physical space), of the brain, and not about 
the structure of the data itself. 
 
15 Again, see usage above. 
systems and of models.  It is not a topological mapping, does not 
preserve hierarchy, and it does not preserve information.  
This is an actual case demonstrating the ultimate potential 
of schematic G.U.I.’s for distributing, (or conversely, for 
centralizing), function into operative “objects” which I had 
sought. Freeman’s model exposes a new paradigm for models. It 
demonstrates an organizational potential of models beyond 
representation. (See overview model in Freeman Appendix in this 
chapter. 
 
Freeman begins:  
“This book had its origin ... in an experimental finding....I 
was tracing the path taken by neural activity that 
accompanied and followed a sensory stimulus in brains of 
rabbits. I traced it from the sensory receptors into the 
cerebral cortex and there found that the activity vanished, 
just like the rabbit down the rabbit hole in ‘Alice in 
Wonderland’.  
 
What appeared in place of the stimulus-evoked activity 
was a new pattern of cortical activity that was created by 
the rabbit brain... My students and I first noticed this 
anomaly in the olfactory system... and in looking 
elsewhere we found it in the visual, auditory, and somatic 
cortices too...  
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In all the systems the traces of stimuli seemed to be 
replaced by constructions of neural activity, which lacked 
invariance with respect to the stimuli that triggered them. 
The conclusion seemed compelling. The only knowledge 
that the rabbit could have of the world outside itself was 
what it had made in its own brain.” (Freeman, 1995, my 
emphasis.) 
What does this mean? What does it mean that the new 
pattern “lacked invariance” in regard to the stimuli? The 
“invariance” demanded correlates precisely to the “passage of 
information” -and it could not be found! “The visual, auditory, 
somatic and olfactory cortices generate... waves [that] reveal 
macroscopic activity ... from millions of neurons. ... These spatial 
AM patterns are unique to each subject, are not invariant with 
respect to stimuli, and cannot be derived from the stimuli by 
logical operations!” (Freeman, 1994) 
In this paper, (“Chaotic Oscillations...”), Freeman actually 
makes two cases –one structural and one functional. The 
structural case is purely physiological and, I think, very strong. It 
deals with the actual connectivity of nerve tissue and argues 
against the possibility of maintaining topological integrity, (of the 
“data”), within the cortex. (The other case is for “Chaos theory” 
as an explanation of function which I will refer to later.)  
The former is the case I want to emphasize here as I think 
it supplies an exact and explicit example of my argument for the 
non-topological possibilities of schematic models. This model as 
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an ultimate possibility of GUI’s is what I believe evolution did 
and how it did it. 
The Peripheral Code: 
1. Freeman divides nerve physiology into two categories: 
Those which preserve topological integrity: this is the case for the 
sensory nerves for instance. 
“Sensory neurons exist in large arrays in the skin, inner 
ear, retina...so that a stimulus is expressed as a spatial16 
pattern...carried in parallel along sensory nerves. 
Typically only a small fraction of the axons in a nerve is 
activated...with the others remaining silent” [for isolation] 
“...so that the ‘signal’ of the stimulus is said to be 
‘encoded’ in the frequencies of firing of that subset of 
axons subserving ...the activated...receptors.”  
 
“The code of sensory, motor and autonomic parts of the 
peripheral nervous system is the spatial”XII, [topological], 
“pattern of temporal pulse rates. The same code appears 
to hold...for the ascending and descending pathways and 
relays in the brainstem and spinal cord. ...Serious efforts 
                                                 
 
 
16 i.e. in “real=informational space” –see my third thesis for a rationale for this 
seeming paradox. 
have been made to extend this model to the cerebral 
cortex with considerable success in characterizing the 
receptive fields and ‘feature detector’ properties of 
cortical neurons in primary sensory areas.” (Freeman, 
1994) 
 
(But he argues that ‘feature detection” occurs only early 
in cortical process.)  
Points on the retina, for instance, are mapped onto the 
cortex in a way that preserves the topology of the source and, 
apparently, feeds the feature detectors which are just the very 
beginning of cortical input. 
Cortical Mapping is Very Different, However: 
(2) Within the cortex, however, it is a different story. 
Cortical neurons typically have short dendritic trees on the order 
of ½ millimeter. They are not, however, typically connected to 
the neurons physically adjacent to them! 
“The main neurons in cortex ...intertwine at unimaginable 
density, so that each neuron makes contact with 5,000 to 
10,000 other neurons within its dendritic and axonal 
arbors, but those neighbors so contacted are less than one 
percent of the neurons lying within the radius of contact. 
The chance of any one pair of cortical neurons being in 
mutual contact is less than one in a million.” (Freeman, 
1995) 
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“Peripheral neurons”, [on the other hand], “seldom 
interact with other neurons, but offer each a private path from the 
receptor to the central nervous system. In contrast, each cortical 
neuron is embedded in a milieu of millions of neurons, and it 
continually transmits to a subset of several thousand other 
neurons sparsely distributed among those millions and receives 
from several thousand others in a different subset.” (Freeman, 
1994) 
 
This is reminiscent of Maturana’s comment: 
“It is enough to contemplate this structure of the nervous 
system... to be convinced that the effect of projecting an 
image on the retina is not like an incoming telephone line. 
Rather, it is like a voice (perturbation) added to many 
voices during a hectic family discussion (relations of 
activity among all incoming convergent connections) in 
which the consensus of actions reached will not depend 
on what any particular member of the family says.” 
Maturana, (1987), 163-4. 
And Edelman’s:  
“… To make matters even more complicated, neurons 
generally send branches of their axons out in diverging 
arbors that overlap with those of other neurons, and the 
same is true of processes called dendrites on recipient 
neurons …. To put it figuratively, if we ‘asked’ a neuron 
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which input came from which other neuron contributing 
to the overlapping set of its dendritic connections, it could 
not ‘know’.” (Edelman, 1992, p.27) 
Peripheral neurons are relatively isolated, (“private”), 
within nerve bundles and support a topological case to the point 
of ‘feature detection’ at cortex. Within the cortices, however, we 
are dealing with a different sort of connective process. We are no 
longer dealing with parallel or hierarchical, (i.e. information 
preserving), mappings. Because each cortical neuron is 
embedded in a milieu of millions of neurons, it “continually 
transmits and receives from several thousand others” and 
therefore has “continual [non-topological] background activity 
owing to its synaptic interactions with its neighbors”. This is a 
characteristic property of cortical neural populations not shared 
by peripheral neuron arrays.17  Cortical process disburses 
                                                 
 
 
17 Compare Reichle: “Of the virtually unlimited information available in the 
world around us, the equivalent of 10 billion bits per second arrives on the 
retina at the back of the eye.  Because the optic nerve attached to the retina has 
only a million output connections, just six million bits per second can leave 
the retina, and only 10,000 bits per second make it to the visual cortex. 
 
…After further processing, visual information feeds into the brain regions 
responsible for forming our conscious perception.  Surprisingly, the amount of 
information constituting that conscious perception is less than 100 bits per 
second.  Such a thin stream of data probably could not produce a perception if 
that were all the brain took into account; the intrinsic activity must play a role. 
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function spatially through the physical space of the brain, (“with 
strong axonal divergence”), through intertwined nerve process -
not topologically. It connects point-to-point fitfully within the 
volumetric space of the brain, not topologically. These cell 
assemblages act as units which “provide for spatial integration 
[projection] of the transmitted activity.” The cortices generate 
dendritic potentials…arising from synaptic interactions of 
millions of neurons. They share “a spatially coherent 
oscillation… by which spatial patterns of amplitude modulation 
                                                                                                           
 
 
…Yet another indication of the brain’s intrinsic processing power comes from 
counting the number of synapses, the contact points between neurons.  In the 
visual cortex, the number of synapses devoted to incoming visual information 
is less than 10 percent of those present.  Thus, the vast majority must represent 
internal connections among neurons in that brain region.”  (This is very much 
in accord with both Maturana’s and W.J. Freeman’s conceptions.) 
…. Although six million bits are transmitted through the optic nerve, for 
instance, only 10,000 bits make it to the brain’s visual processing area, and 
only a few hundred are involved in formulating a conscious perception –too 
little to generate a meaningful perception on their own.  The finding suggested 
that the brain probably makes constant predictions about the outside 
environment in anticipation of paltry sensory inputs reaching it from the 
outside world.”  (My emphasis) 
From Scientific American March 2010 “The Brain’s Dark Energy” 
 Marcus Reichle, Washington University School of Medicine in Saint Louis 
 
How very similar to Maturana’s, W.J.Freeman’s and mine is his perspective.  
But Reichle does not draw the obvious conclusions, as indeed, nobody else 
does.  His conclusions are confounded by the epistemological paradox of his 
own arguments –his is a brain also and subject to the same limitations.  Those 
answers lie in the relativism of epistemology I propose.  Philosophy does have 
a role in science, and especially in this particular problem –but in support of 
science, not in criticism of it. 
 
are transmitted in distinctive configurations… The neurons 
sharing the macroscopic, aperiodic oscillations comprise a local 
neighborhood that can be viewed as an equivalence class.” 
(Freeman, 1994, my emphasis)  
These “equivalence classes” thereby provide a non-
contiguous spatial distribution onto the physical space of the 
brain. These spatially extensive and intertwined complexes of 
cells throughout the cortex achieve the connectivity that mere 
parallelism, (or hierarchy), cannot.  Freeman shows us how a 
topological mathematical space can be mapped onto the 
specifically physical space of the brain.  But that particular 
physical space, I argue, is determined by its specific connectivity 
-by evolution and ontogeny, not by representation.  Determined 
by genetics and learning, (ontogeny), it has the ability to connect 
specific process “ad hoc”.  It has the ability to self-organize on 
principles other than topological ones. 
“The local neighborhoods corresponding to cortical 
columns and hypercolumns seldom have anatomical 
boundaries of their internal synaptic connections, so that 
an area of cortex composed of hundreds and even 
thousands of neighborhoods can act as a coherent element 
of function in generating a spatially coherent carrier 
wave. These distributed neural populations are 
dynamically unstable and are capable of very rapid global 
state transitions [which can] easily fulfill the most 
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stringent timing requirements encountered in object 
recognition.” (ibid). 
(Think of the possibility of these “equivalence classes” 
functioning as evolutionary “axioms” as I have suggested 
earlier!) 
Freeman concludes:  
“The transform effected by the output path defines the 
self-organized macroscopic activity as the cortical 
‘signal’…In brief, the central code cannot be the same as 
the peripheral code.”(Freeman, 1994, my emphasis)  He 
argues ultimately that the brain is a self-organizing entity, 
specifically obeying the laws of Chaos theory, (“Chaos 
can make as well as destroy information!”). 
I am frankly unqualified to judge this aspect of his 
argument, nor do I think it is necessary.  His physiological case is 
an actual physical demonstration of the full possibilities and an 
actual physiological example of my thesis of schematism and of 
G.U.I.’s that is the thesis of this chapter.   
That physiological case: i.e. the connectivity of the CNS, 
is entirely sufficient in itself to demonstrate the kind of mapping, 
the broadest logical potential of “schematic G.U.I.’s” and their 
explicit relevance to cognition.  This model actually does “cross 
party lines”!  
That the brain is, in fact, “self-organized” is exactly the 
case I am making. I argue that it is self-organized specifically for 
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optimal efficiency, (i.e. urgency / risk), not for reference. 
Freeman’s case, I believe, constitutes an actual instance 
demonstrating the deepest possibilities of the “schematic models” 
argued earlier. It demonstrates the possibility of a truly useful 
model organized on non-topological principles, and, as such, 
demonstrates the deepest capabilities-previously suggested-  of a 
schematic G.U.I.. This is not just “a level of abstraction.”  
But where, accepting Freeman’s description of the actual 
brain, do these cell assemblages, (these “equivalence classes”), 
come from, and what is their function? How do these particular 
entangled arrays of cells, interconnecting and overarching “the 
less than one percent of the neurons lying within the radius of 
contact” arise?  I propose that they arise evolutionarily –as 
internal, organizations of blind function.  This is exactly what we 
would expect the organizing principle of a “self-organizing” 
metacellular entity to be.XIII  It is also how a machine, in the 
sense of my figure 3 in Chapter one could arise! 
Representation is neither required, nor, accepting 
Freeman, is it possible in cortex. This is what we would expect if 
neural organization were modeled on efficiency over “truth” -and 
how. Our “percepts”, moreover, are what we would expect if we 
joined the loop of output to input! (See graphic immediately 
following.) 
 
 “In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in "The 
Phenomenology of Perception" [2] conceived of 
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perception”, [itself], as the outcome of the "intentional 
arc", by which experience derives from the intentional 
actions of individuals that control sensory input and 
perception. Action into the world with reaction that 
changes the self is indivisible in reality, and must be 
analyzed in terms of ‘circular causality’ as distinct from 
the linear causality of events as commonly perceived and 
analyzed in the physical world." XIV  W.J. Freeman, 1997 
2.4.2 An Explicit Model of the Mind: 
  If we turn our perspective around and think of our 
(input) topographic maps as the looping, re-entrant extension of 
our output, then we can clearly see them, (and their “objects”), in 
their specific role as organizing artifacts of cortical function 
itself.  Our “percepts” are just the combined-in-one icons 
previously described in the “engineering” argument!  They are 
the “A-D”, (“analog/digital”, or, better yet, the 
hierarchical/chaotic), converters, so to speak, of the reentrant 
loop of process.18  
 This is what we would expect taking “percepts” as 
expressly schematic objects of process. That is, these are what we 
                                                 
 
 
18 This is, at best, a crude metaphor –but it crystallizes the idea nicely.  A more 
apt characterization would be “topological / non-topological” converters. 
would expect to see!  (See Figure 16)  I propose that our 
cognitive interface lays precisely in the topobiological models 
themselves, mediating between an unknowable externality and 
the optimized functionality of the cortex.  I claim that this 
constitutes an explicit and non-representational model for the 
mind. XV   (See graphic model immediately following.)  
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Figure 16  
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 GOD’S EYE? 
(Edelman -to Freeman -to Edelman!) 
Freeman’s model exposes a new paradigm for models. It 
also exposes the possibility of a new correspondence with reality. 
We want to believe that our knowledge of reality is direct –or at 
least parallels that reality. How could it be otherwise? How could 
a model be other than “an abstraction” and still be useful? 
Moreover, what is the evolutionary rationale for all of this? 
Modern science says that what truly is, absolute reality, 
(or “ontology” to use an old but precise word), consists of some 
ultimate particles: atoms or subatomic particles, quarks, etc.  
We are allowed to retain our normal view of reality within 
this view however because we envision our ordinary objects, 
(baseballs, you, me, the sun, etc.), as spatial containers, (and 
logical, theoretical hierarchies), in the new absolute reality we are 
forced to believe in. We may still preserve the sense of our 
ordinary objects as physical and logical clusters, (hierarchies), of 
those deeper existences. I can think of myself as a cluster of 
atomic particles and fields shaped like me, doing all the things I 
do, and positioned in ontic reality next to other things and 
persons just as I ordinarily see myself.  
There is a necessary belief in a continuity, and a 
contiguity, (“next-to-ness”), in this belief system. This is the 
“hierarchy” or “logical containment” implicit in the Newtonian 
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World and it is mirrored in the hierarchies of contemporary 
mathematics and of logic. Truly modern science says otherwise, 
however. Quantum theory and Relativity say that the world, 
(reality), is an even stranger place. Freeman’s conclusions, 
moreover do not allow it at all. If we live anywhere, we live in 
cortex. 
 
On P.S.Churchland: 
“At some point in evolutionary history, nature performed 
a “good trick”. It allowed for an internal representation of 
environment…. and this allowed competence in the larger 
world.” (P.S. Churchland, paraphrase) 
I suggest that the “good trick” was evolution’s invention 
of the schematic model, and specifically in the GUI enabled in 
cortex! 
Unless, of course, we were to posit a “pre-established 
harmony”.  This, however, would be mysticism, not science.  
This is our world, not God’s. We do not and cannot have a God’s 
eye view. 
 
3. The formal and abstract problem: 
3.1 The formal argument 
Consider, finally, the formal and abstract problem. 
Consider the actual problem that evolution was faced with. 
Consider the problem of designing instrumentation for the 
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efficient control of both especially complex and especially 
dangerous processes. In the general case, (imagining yourself the 
“evolutionary engineer”), what kind of information would you 
want to pass along and how would you best represent it? How 
would you design your display and control system? 
It would be impossible, obviously, to represent all 
information about the objective physical reality of a, (any), 
process or its physical components, (objects). Where would you 
stop? Is the color of the building in which it is housed, the 
specific materials of which it is fabricated, that it is effected with 
gears rather than levers, -or its location in the galaxy- necessarily 
relevant information? (Contrarily, even its designer’s middle 
name might be relevant if it involved a computer program and 
you were considering the possibility of a hacker’s “back door”!) 
It would be counterproductive even if you could as relevant data 
would be overwhelmed and the consequent “calculus”, (having to 
process all that information),XVI would become too complex and 
inefficient for rapid and effective response.  
Even the use of realistic abstractions could produce 
enormous difficulties in that you might be interested in many 
differing, (and, typically, conflicting), significant abstractions 
and/or their interrelations.XVII This would produce severe 
difficulties in generating an intuitive and efficient “calculus” 
geared towards optimal response. 
For such a complex and dangerous process, the “entities” 
you create must, (1) necessarily, of course, be viable in relation to 
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both data and control -i.e. they must be adequate in their 
function.XVIII   
But they would also, (2) need to be constructed with a 
primary intent towards efficiency of response, (rather than 
realism), as well -the process is, by stipulation, dangerous! The 
entities you create would need to be specifically fashioned to 
optimize the “calculus” while still fulfilling their (perhaps 
consequently distributed) operative role! 
Quoting from my arguments in Chapter 12:   In the 
terminology of computer languages, “danger” may necessitate a 
“Go To” command which can absolutely violate the 
“structure”/hierarchy of a program to go elsewhere –even outside 
the program itself by reason of urgent necessity! 
But your “entities” would need to be primarily fabricated 
in such a way as to intrinsically define a simplistic operative 
calculus of relationality between them -analogous to the situation 
in our generic training seminar. Maximal efficiency, (and safety), 
therefore, would demand crystallization into schematic virtual 
“entities” -a “G.U.I.”- which would resolve both demands at a 
single stroke.  (This, I think, is the ultimate import of Freeman’s 
discoveries.) 
Your objects could then distribute function, (in a “global / 
cortical mapping”), so as to concentrate and simplify control, 
(operation), via an elementary, intuitive calculus.  I think they 
serve the intentional functions of the brain.  
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These virtual entities need not necessarily be in a simple 
(or hierarchical -i.e. via abstraction) correlation with the objects 
of physical reality however.XIX   
But they would most definitely need to allow rapid and 
effective control of a process which, considered objectively, 
might not be simple at all. It is clearly the optimization of the 
process of response itself –i.e. a simplistic “calculus”- that is 
crucial here, not literal representation. We, in fact, do not care 
that the operator knows what function(s) he is actually fulfilling, 
only that he does it (them) well! 
3.2 The Specific Case of Biology 
Biological survival is exactly such a problem! It is both 
especially complex and especially dangerous. It is the 
penultimate case of complexity and embodies a moment-by-
moment confrontation with disaster. It is therefore a schematic 
model in just this sense that I argue evolution constructed, and I 
propose it is the basis for both the “percept” and the “mind”. 
Turning our Perspective Around  
But it is just the converse of the argument made above 
that I propose for evolution however. It is not the distribution of 
function, but rather the centralization of disparate atomic 
biological function into efficacious schematic -and virtual- 
objects that evolution effected while compositing the complex 
 201
metacellular organism. (These are clearly just the complementary 
perspectives on the same issue.)XX 
But let’s talk about the “atomic” in the “atomic biological 
function” of the previous statement. There is another step in the 
argument to be taken at the level of biology. The “engineering” 
argument, (made above), deals specifically with the schematic 
manipulation of “data”.  
At the level of primitive evolution, however, it is modular 
(reactive) process that is significant to an organism, not data 
functions. A given genetic accident corresponds to the addition or 
modification of a given (behavioral/reactive) process which, for a 
primitive organism, is clearly and simply merely beneficial or 
not. The process itself is informationally indeterminate to the 
organism however -i.e. it is a modular whole.19  
No one can presume that a particular, genetically 
determined response is informationally, (rather than reactively), 
significant to a Paramecium or an Escherichia coli, for example, 
(though we may consider it so). It is significant, rather, solely as a 
modular unit which either increases survivability or not.  
Let me therefore extend the prior argument to deal with 
the schematic organization of atomic, (modular), process, rather 
than of primitive, (i.e. absolute), data. It is my contention that the 
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cognitive model, and cognition itself, is solely constituted as an 
organization of that atomic modular process, designed for 
computational and operational efficiency. The atomic processes 
themselves remain, and will forever remain, informationally 
indeterminate to the organism. 
The evolutionary purpose of the model was 
computational simplicity itself! The calculational facility 
potentiated by a schematic and virtual object constitutes a clear 
and powerful evolutionary rationale for dealing with a 
multifarious environment. Such a model, (the “objects” and their 
“calculus”), allows rapid and efficient response to what cannot be 
assumed, a priori, to be a simplistic environment. 
 From the viewpoint of the seventy trillion or so 
individual cells that constitute the human cooperative enterprise, 
that assumption, (environmental simplicity), is implausible in the 
extreme! 
But theirs, (i.e. that perspective), is the most natural 
perspective from which to consider the problem. For five-sixths 
of evolutionary history, (three billion years), it was the one- 
celled organism which ruled alone. As Stephen Gould puts it, 
metacellular organisms represent only occasional and unstable 
                                                                                                           
 
 
19 See Maturana’s “structural coupling” in Chapter 6 for a rationale. 
spikes from the stable “left wall”, (the unicellulars), of 
evolutionary history. 
“Progress does not rule, (and is not even a primary thrust 
of) the evolutionary process. For reasons of chemistry and 
physics, life arises next to the ‘left wall’ of its simplest 
conceivable and preservable complexity. This style of life 
(bacterial) has remained most common and most 
successful. A few creatures occasionally move to the 
right... “ 
“Therefore, to understand the events and generalities of 
life’s pathway, we must go beyond principles of 
evolutionary theory to a paleontological examination of 
the contingent pattern of life’s history on our planet. 
...Such a view of life’s history is highly contrary both to 
conventional deterministic models of Western science and 
to the deepest social traditions and psychological hopes of 
Western culture for a history culminating in humans as 
life’s highest expression and intended planetary 
steward.”(Gould, 1994) 
3.3 Retrodictive Confirmation  
Do you not find it strange that the fundamental laws of 
the sciences, (or of logic), are so few? Or that our (purportedly) 
accidentally and evolutionarily acquired logic works so well to 
manipulate the objects of our environment?  
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A Profound Teleological Consequence 
From the standpoint of contemporary science, this is a 
subject of wonder -or at least it should be. (cf contra: Minsky, 
1985) It is, in fact, a miracle!XXI From the standpoint of the 
schematic model, however, it is a trivial, (obvious), and 
necessary consequence. It is precisely the purpose of the model 
itself! This is a profound teleological simplification! 
3.4 Conclusion, (section 3) 
Evolution, in constructing a profoundly complex 
metacellular organism such as ours, was confronted with the 
problem of coordinating the physical structure of its thousands of 
billions of individual cells. It also faced the problem of 
coordinating the response of this colossus, this “Aunt Hillary”, 
(Hofstadter’s “sentient” ant colony).20 It had to coordinate their 
functional interaction with their environment, raising an 
organizational problem of profound proportions. 
Evolution was forced to deal with exactly the problem 
detailed above. The brain, moreover, is universally accepted as an 
evolutionary organ of response, (taken broadlyXXII). I propose 
                                                 
 
 
20 cf Hofstadter, 1979. His is a very nice metaphor for picturing metacellular 
existence. 
that a schematic entity, (and its corresponding schematic model), 
is by far the most credible possibility here.  
It can efficiently orchestrate the coordination of the ten 
million sensory neurons with the one million motor neurons,XXIII 
-and with the profound milieu beyond. A realistic, (i.e. 
representational /informational), “entity”, on the other hand, 
would demand a concomitant “calculus” embodying the very 
complexity of the objective reality in which the organism exists, 
and this, I argue, is overwhelmingly implausible.XXIV  
 
Figure 17: “Lovelife”? 
 
4. The Concordance: Biology’s Proper Conclusion 
Now I will move to what I think is the most important 
purely scientific implication of the combination of this and the 
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“implicit definition” briefly expounded in chapter 1, and treated 
again in Chapter 5, (to follow), where will I formally state it as 
my second hypothesis.21.  I call it “the concordance”.  
In those chapters I have argued that the objects of mind 
are solely virtual. I argued that they are logically and implicitly 
defined by the “axioms” of brain function. I believe this line is 
profoundly explanatory for the deepest dilemmas of mind as we 
normally conceive it.  
In this chapter, I have argued another course -that the 
objects of mind are biological schematic artifacts. They are 
optimizing metaphors, artifacts integrating primitive brain 
process. 
Now I propose the biological argument which relates the 
two themes. By identifying the “rule” of the brain, (which, 
accepting Cassirer’s conclusions of Chapters 3 and 5 specifies a 
distinct logical conceptXXV), with the rule of “structural 
coupling” of the human organism, (after Maturana and Varela’s 
profound characterization of biological response –see Chapter
then “mind” may now reasonably be defined as the “concept”, 
(/rule), of the brain.  This is a highly significant conclu
 6), 
sion!  
                                                 
 
 
21 I have always had a problem deciding which of these two hypotheses should 
be stated first.  After long consideration, I think this is the way it should be. 
Given that the rule is of the specific structure of my 
extended concept however, (i.e. the concept of implicit definition 
- my second hypothesis-see Chapters 3 and 5), then mind 
becomes the specifically constitutive concept of the brain in the 
sense of Immanuel Kant, and not an ordinary concept. It is a 
concept necessary to -inbuilt into- our cognition, (in the exact 
sense that Kant used the word), not one imposed upon it.  
It is not something with which we conceive; it is, rather, 
the “we” which conceives!  Following the arguments of the 
earlier chapters, it implicitly defines and therefore knows its 
“objects”.  
Combining the results of the two perspectives, I now 
assert a concordance. I claim that their conclusions are 
commensurable. The earlier chapters made the case that it is only 
by considering our mental objects as operative logical objects, as 
objects implicitly defined by the system, that the wholeness and 
the logical autonomy of sentiency becomes possible. Referential 
objects do not convey the same possibility.  
The present chapter has made the case that it is only as 
virtual and metaphorical objects, artifacts of the system of 
control, that the profound difficulties of the integration of 
megacellular response may be overcome. Again, referential 
objects do not convey the same possibility. The “objects” of each 
thesis are thus solely objects of their systems! The objects of the 
earlier, purely logical and cognitive thesis are thus 
commensurable with the objects of the second, purely biological 
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and operative thesis. The discovery of such correspondences has 
always been crucial in the history of science. 
 But biology affirms the correlation. Modern day biology 
necessarily must reduce logic itself!   From an evolutionary 
perspective, human logic must itself be taken as a strictly 
biological, evolutionarily derived rule of response, (broadly 
conceivedXXVI).  
So too must the “concepts” and “categories” embodied 
within it. Logic per se can no longer be taken as “God-given”, or 
“God-knowledgeable”. Such mysticism is not compatible with 
the perspective of modern science.  
It is more than plausible, therefore, for biology to identify 
that human “logic”, (that bio -logic -and the “implicit definition” 
resident within it), with the rules governing the “objects” of the 
cognitive G.U.I. of this chapter. “Mind”, as the constitutive 
concept of that bio-logic, (in Kant’s and Cassirer’s sense), then, 
is the biological interface: the constitutive, holistic, and logical, 
(i.e. bio -logical), expression of the human organism’s 
organization of response.  
This conclusion restores “mind” as we normally conceive 
it to biology and enables a science of mind.  This, the biological 
perspective of the concordance, I maintain, is the logical and 
proper biological perspective on the whole of the mind-brain 
problem. It is where biology must ultimately come to stand.  
The special significance of the “concordance” for 
neuroscience is that it finally enables a viable perspective within 
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which biological and specifically neural process might be 
scientifically correlated with the actual specifics of the mind 
under evolutionary and operational paradigms. The latter, 
however, remain the most productive heuristic principles in 
contemporary biology. It opens, moreover, the prospect of a 
physical description of mind itself! 
Our perceptual objects are not objects in reality; they are 
the implicitly defined logical objects, (alternatively, clearly now, 
operative objects), of this constitutive logic. They are objects of 
process. 
 
5. Plain Talk: 
Let’s talk loosely for a bit. We do not start with absolutes 
anywhere in our logical and scientific endeavors. Somewhere we 
start with beliefs. I, for one, believe that I have a mind and a 
consciousness in the naïve senses of those words. I think most of 
you believe that you do too.  
By this we do not just mean that our bodies mechanically 
and robotically produce words and actions which “cover the 
territory” -which merely simulate, (substitute for), sentiency in 
our naive sense of it, but that there is some universal and unified 
existence which is aware. But how?  
The solution I propose lies in the combination of the 
concepts of implicit definition, virtual existence -and logic as 
biology. This is the only model within our intellectual horizons 
that seems to hold even any promise for sentiency in our ordinary 
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sense of it. It suggests the only scientifically plausible solution to 
“the mind’s eye” and the “Cartesian theatre” and the only non-
eliminativist answer, (for “mind” as such), to the homunculus 
problem. But these are answers which must exist if mind in our 
ordinary sense is to be real. The “Implicit definition” of my 
second hypothesis permits knowing, (as a whole), what are, in 
some real sense, our distinct and separate parts precisely because 
those parts, (objects), are in fact non-localized and virtual 
(logical) expressions of the whole. It opens the first genuine 
possibility, therefore, for a resolution of this essential 
requirement of “naive” consciousness. 
But that pathway, (implicit definition), does not make 
sense from the standpoint of representation! Implicit definition 
solves the problem logically -from the standpoint of constitutive 
logic -and speaks to nothing other than its own internal structure. 
“Objects”, (under this thesis), are known to a system, (i.e. 
universally/globally), only because they are specifically 
expressions of the system.  
It becomes a viable and natural solution to the problem of 
awareness, therefore, only when the objects of consciousness 
themselves are conceived operationally and schematically, (and 
specifically, logically), rather than representatively. When our 
objects are taken as specifically schematic representations of 
process however, (as per the present chapter), the solution 
becomes both natural and plausible. The logical problem of 
sentiency is resolved. 
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How could evolution organize -as it had to organize- the 
reactive function of this colossus of seventy trillion cells? Even 
this formulation of the question disregards the yet more profound 
complexity of the reactivity of the individual cells -also 
organisms- themselves! It was the overwhelmingly crucial issue 
in the evolution of complex metacellulars.  
My thesis of schematism is both viable and plausible in 
this context.  But what does this evolutionary development and 
organization of the reactive process of complex metacellulars 
have to do with “information”?  
That the progressive evolutionary reactivity of this 
megacollosus occurred under the bounds of real necessity is, of 
course, a given. It is the basic axiom of Darwinian “survival”. 
But that it could match that possibility22 -i.e. that it could achieve 
a (reactive) parallelism to that bound -i.e. “information!” -is a 
hypothesis of quite another order and teleologically distinct. It is, 
I assert moreover, mathematically immature.  
Objective reality is a bound to the evolutionary possibility 
of organisms,  (in Quine’s words of my Preface: “the boundary 
condition”), but under that bound infinitely diverse possibilities 
remain. I may, as a crude metaphor for instance, posit an infinity 
                                                 
 
 
22 See Chapter 6:  Maturana and the specific issue of “congruent structural 
coupling”. 
of functions under the arbitrary bound Y = 64,000,000. I may cite 
semi-circles, many of the trigonometric functions, curves, lines ... 
ad infinitum. Only one of these matches the bound, and only a 
specific subset, (the horizontal lines Y = a, a <= 64,000,000), 
parallels it. It is a question of the distinction between a bound and 
a limit. (See Figure 18 following shortly.)  
The reactive evolutionary actuality of an organism 
certainly exists within, (and embodies), a lower bound of 
biologically possibility. But that some such, (any such), 
organism, (–to include the human organism!), embodies a 
greatest lower bound -i.e. that it, (or its reactivity), matches and 
meets, (or parallels, i.e. knows!), the real world does not follow.  
It is incommensurate with the fundamental premise of 
“natural selection” and stands as the “parallel postulate” of 
evolutionary theory. Organisms do not know; organisms do! 
Organisms survive! 
How much more plausible, is it not, that the primary and 
crucial thrust of evolution was coordination, and specifically a 
coordination of allowable or appropriate, (rather than 
“informed”), reactive response? I submit that from a biological 
perspective the schematic object is far more plausible than the 
representative one. It involves no “magic”, and is totally 
consistent with our deepest conceptions of biology. 
I submit that no other viable, (i.e. non-eliminative or non-
dualistic), explanation, -an actual explanation rather than a 
prevarication, has ever even been offered for mind and 
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consciousness as understood in our ordinary sense. The 
argument, then, is one of demonstration. If no truly viable 
alternative can be offered, then this one must be considered 
seriously. 
The operational process of brain, (and its evolutionarily 
determined structural optimization), I argue, implicitly defines its 
“objects”, its “entities” in the same sense and in the same manner 
that the “process” of an axiom system implicitly defines its 
“objects”. The “objects of perception” are “intellectual objects”. 
They are (constitutive) conceptual objects. But those, in turn, are 
schematic objects, (alternatively, “operational objects”), only, in 
no necessarily simple correspondence with objective reality. 
They are metaphors of response. 
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Bounds and Limits 
 
F igure 18 –an Illustration of Bounds and Limits: 
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  (1) and (3) represent the best and the least possible 
performance for an organism over the domain of its 
behavior in absolute (ontic) reality. Less than (3) results 
in lessened survivability or death; greater than (1) is 
impossible as it is envisioned as perfect performance with 
perfect knowledge in actual reality. Between the two 
bounds, “adequate performance” , (… (2), (2’), (2”), ...) 
need not match, nor even parallel these outer bounds. 
[Note: 2’ and 2” parallel 1, but 2 does not!] Any curve 
within them is consistent with evolution.  
Edelman, for instance, talks about the multiple, non-
derivative antibody responses to a given antigen. The same must 
surely apply to cognition itself, another “recognition system”, 
(using Edelman’s terminology). Cognition and response must be 
adequate, but it is not obvious that there is only one way -a 
mirroring way. Nor is it inherent that all ways be commensurate! 
An organism’s performance in its environment is measured, 
fundamentally, not in perfection or in rationality, but in simple 
adequacy. It is very easy to envision multiple, noncommensurate, 
blind-though-adequate responses to a given situation. It is not 
easy to envision rational responses informed by information! 
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Appendix, (Freeman & Automorphism) 
An aside: a fascinating quote from Freeman, (it rings 
strong “bells” in my head)!  
 
“Some people turn to chemicals as a way to deepen the 
privacy within solipsistic chasms, and in order to retreat 
from social stress into inner space. A few have induced 
these states so as to peer through the solipsistic bars and 
dirty windows in order to see what is ‘really there’, 
although, as minds disintegrate, what comes are swirls 
and tinglings, and ultimately the points of receptor inputs 
like stars, flies or grains of sand.” (Freeman, 1995, my 
emphasis) 
Freeman and I have the same problem -in our innate 
resistance to the consequences of our own 
nonrepresentationalism. I too have wrestled with the “points” of 
sensory input -“like stars, flies or grains of sand”. The conclusion 
I have reached however is that our “points” are, in fact, primitive, 
atomic, (unspecified) process, not information. From the simpler 
perspective of ordinary biology, this is more obvious. These 
processes, (i.e. pragmatic and adequate, but not informational 
processes), are the necessary basic building blocks of biological 
cognition. These are our “points’. The difficulty lies in the 
automorphism we presume in cognition itself, and this is not an 
easy problem. 
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How can science continue to make new, profound 
discoveries?  How can the level of verifiable intricacy continue to 
multiply, seemingly without bounds within the legitimate 
confines of science?  How can the various branches of science 
continue to integrate and resolve themselves within one 
comprehensive picture?  How could, and why does statistics in 
fact work?  These are the real and crucial questions that a non-
representational conception of mind must address. 
The fact that the overall picture is getting better –that it is 
completing itself- does not in itself invalidate the hypothesis that 
it is non-representational however.  Nor does its overwhelming 
level of intricacy.   
To answer the objection, let me reiterate a counter 
question: Is it not possible that we, like a swarm of bees, are 
merely building, (completing), a “hive”, (our worldview)?  
 We may be completing our interface with externality, but 
it does not follow at all that that interface is representational.  
What does follow is that it is the most efficient one possible 
within our context.  This, I believe, is a system with 
(mathematical) closure –it never escapes itself. 
We presume that our science maps back, 
(automorphically), onto the very model we visualize.  But the 
path of the automorphism we seek, I propose, lies through the 
very “gears and levers” of the original evolutionarily derived 
topobiological cognitive model itself, (re-using its "objects") -
through another iteration –in another re-entrant mapping which 
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supplies the mechanics and the transformation (back into 
Freeman's non-topological dispersive mapping into the overall 
brain) that we seek.  
I propose that reafferance within the loop of brain 
function combines with input from outside the loop, (passing 
through the environment), to yield a consistent, compound map 
which either does, or does not confirm our theoretical constructs.  
Nowhere does this conception demand the absolute (ontic) reality 
of the objects of those constructs, however.  It is a reuse of our 
evolutionarily pragmatic (cortical) objects, (like Rosch's 
prototypes??), saying nothing whatsoever about the real 
(external) world in which we live.   
Why is this an important advance in our perspective?  
Because it allows the use of my second hypothesis of "implicit 
definition" in a legitimate scientific context.  (See Chapter 5).  
That second thesis enables, for the very first time, legitimate 
scientific conceptions of the most fundamental aspects we 
demand for "mind" itself:  i.e. a "Cartesian Theatre", the 
elimination of the problem of the "homunculus", and "knowing" 
per se.  These are not trivial consequences. 
Thus microscopy, anatomy, biology, physics … is fed 
through the same interface to yield an image --of the body of 
another being or of our own, for instance, or the nature of our 
environment.  But the "objects" are functions of the interface 
itself, not of an external ontology.  This, I believe, is the 
mechanics of the automorphism we seek –i.e. the one processed 
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by the brain, using its own transformation and mapping back onto 
its own map reusing the "objects" of that map. It is Edelman plus 
Freeman plus Merleau-Ponty and back to Edelman.  It already 
exists.  (The automorphism can be skewed by the intent of the 
model however –i.e. it can be processed to a different purpose.) 
 (The whole of this discussion is nonsense, of course, in 
the absolute form within which it is stated.)  Does our feedback 
really preserve parallelism in the absolute form I have proposed?  
It is a valid statement within a context, but in an absolute 
ontological sense these are things we can never truly know.  A 
proper formulation must await the introduction of a completely 
new philosophical perspective -i.e. that of Cassirer's Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms which I will detail in Chapter 7.  This 
supplies the rigorous, (and biologically necessary), scientific 
epistemological relativism required by the parameters of the 
problem. 
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Figure 19: GOD’S EYE? 
Edelman to Freeman to EdelmanXXVII 
----------DIV--------------    = Epistemological   
           Relativism! 
(DIV Merleau-Ponty) 
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Quoting Freeman: 
“To explain how stimuli cause consciousness, we have to 
explain causality.  [But] We can’t trace linear causal 
chains from receptors after the first cortical synapse, so 
we use circular causality to explain neural pattern 
formation by self-organizing dynamics.  But an aspect [a 
key aspect] of intentional action is causality, which we 
extrapolate to material objects in the world.  Thus 
causality [as far as humans are concerned] is a property of 
mind, not matter.” (Freeman, 1999) 
Where is the world outside? What is the world outside? 
Freeman describes his stance as “epistemological solipsism”. I 
understand his rationale, but let me suggest something else. As 
realists, we necessarily accept the actual existence of an external 
reality, (as does Freeman), but the fact is we can never know it. 
Instead of epistemological solipsism, (which is circular 
ontological language at best), let me suggest another 
characterization: i.e. ontic indeterminism.  (I think Maturana 
came closest to a realization of this characterization: See Chapter 
6). 
 We must accept the existence of externality, but, as 
biological organisms, there is not even a possibility that we may 
ever know it. We can never attain a “God’s eye view”.  
There is a good side to this, however. If we accept the 
existence of other beings as well, (as I think both you and I do as 
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intentional belief), then we are not limited to enclosing them 
hierarchically. We are not obliged to limit them to their 
“properties”. Who is old or young? Who is white or black? Who 
is crippled or sound? Who is beautiful or ugly?  What is the 
possibility and the “soul” of man? 
I have made a point earlier that I think is worth repeating 
here. I argued that it is not important that the “operator” of such a 
complicated process knows what it is, (specifically), that he is 
doing.   It is important only that he does it well. It is crucially 
important that he does it diligently, however. It is imperative that 
he be locked into the loop of his virtual reality -that he “pay 
attention”.  
This introduces the necessity of an inbuilt realistic 
imperative -i.e. a mechanical guarantee of his dedication.XXVIII. 
The universal and dogmatic belief in the simple reality of our 
natural world is thus itself a consequence of my thesis -and the 
greatest obstacle to its acceptance! 
Speaking of falsifyability, consider Dennett’s “Color Phi” 
from our new perspective. Here is a case where the mental 
content is falsifiable under the standard interpretation. And yet it 
exists -it has been confirmed repeatedly. What else follows? 
Phantom limbs, blindsight? Are these not clear examples, 
falsifying the standard paradigm, (i.e. representationalism), and 
easily incorporated into the converse picture of a virtual mind? 
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Chapter Conclusions: 
This (specific) chapter, by itself, does not answer the 
questions of consciousness.  I do claim it as a valid, but 
specifically biological perspective and part of the solution 
however.  It is important at this early stage because it enables my 
other crucial hypothesis:  i.e. that of "implicit definition".  That 
second hypothesis finally offers an explanation of the 
profoundest problems of mind, per se.  It finally elucidates 
Leibniz' profound problem:  "How is it possible for the one to 
know the many?"  It answers it by finding that "the many" are, in 
fact, part of "the one".  The logic of brain implicitly defines our 
objects because they are operational objects as seen under my 
previously presented “concept of implicit definition”.  This is 
how we are able to know them!  This is the ground of the 
"Cartesian Theatre" and finally lays the "homunculus" to rest.   
But implicit definition as a solution to these problems makes 
sense only in an operational system, not an informational one. 
But still we are not at the end of our quest.  There still 
remain two more critical steps.  The first is an examination of 
what any kind of knowledge per se could possibly be.  Ernst 
Cassirer proposed that all knowledge is axiomatic.  Otherwise 
stated, it is all hypothesis and organization, (commensurate, of 
course, with experience).  
 His brilliant conclusion was to realize that there could be 
many beginnings, many organizations, and that the 
comprehensiveness of a one given theory did not preclude the 
 224
comprehensiveness of another.  What it leads to is a conclusion 
of the indeterminacy of our absolute understanding of the world 
around us, (ontic indeterminacy).  But this is just what we would 
expect of the biological organisms we both understand ourselves 
to be. 
This frustrating conclusion actually leads to the proper 
ground for an understanding of "mind" however.  That ground 
lies in the realization of our basic realist posture itself – in our 
belief system itself.  It is what we, as realists, absolutely refuse to 
give up and which is innately incorporated in any theory we will 
countenance.    
Putnam, Lakoff and Edelman, (and Kant 
himself), propose three basic tenets of scientific realism.  They 
are: 
 (1) “A commitment to the existence of a real world 
external to human beings 
(2) a link between conceptual schemes and the world via 
real human experience; experience is not purely internal, but is 
constrained at every instant by the real world of which we are an 
inextricable part. A concept of truth that is based not only on 
internal coherence and “rational acceptability”, but, most 
important, on coherence with our constant real experience 
(3) a commitment to the possibility of real human 
knowledge of the world.”  (I differ with this last postulate for 
what should now be obvious reasons.) 
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(Note: Points 1 through 3 might almost be a restatement 
of my claims regarding and framing the “interface: in Chapters 9 
and 10!)  
But I propose a further postulate, (elaborating on the  
sense of postulate two above).  I propose the actual ontic 
existence of an "interface" between the "real world" and 
"experience" however–consistent with Freeman’s conclusions, 
for instance.   
It is the existence of the actual substance of this 
“interface” that I will propose is the substance of the mind.  
(Cassirer will place strong limitations on our description of this 
interface however –it will have to be a context-free description.)   
My third hypothesis, (foreshadowing a bit), will be to 
assume that this “interface” is structured in the same way as I 
have postulated for the brain and experience, (my first and 
second hypotheses).   All the other substantive problems are 
answered in my first and second hypotheses.  Thus it will follow 
that we are, (this interface is), “live”, we are, (this interface 
is) “conscious”, and we, (as minds), do exist! 
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Chapter 5: my Second Hypothesis –a Short Sketch 
Note: This second thesis is already better rendered at your 
level of preliminary understanding in the beginning stages: 
chapters 1, 2 & 3 of the present paper so here I will only sketch 
an overview and then proceed to an elaboration as a “snippet” 
drawn from the first edition of my book which corresponds to 
that opening material.  That original chapter of the first edition 
elaborates further the philosophical argument regarding the 
“concept of implicit definition” and I have added to it a bit.  It 
was mostly original with me, contrary to the case with Chapters 1 
and 2 of this current writing, but with which it is totally 
consistent.  It derived from my early understanding of 
mathematics.   
I always hated High school mathematics and had an 
extremely difficult time with it.  The reason lay in the fact that on 
days 1 and 2 of most of these courses, the beginnings were both 
plausible and highly interesting to me.  But then on day 3 –and it 
was universally so- the instructors began their dialogue with the 
words “and therefore”, and jumped to conclusions which totally 
confounded me, and which, it turns out, were totally 
unwarranted.   
It was only in my autodidactic digestion of MacClane’s 
book that I realized that there were months of intense work 
between days 2 and 3, and it made me furious for being so 
deceived.  I never forgave them.  Even the simplest of 
mathematical operations involved laborious computations and 
intermediate theorems derived from the axioms and definitions, 
(which primed me for Hilbert’s “Implicit Definition”), and had 
absolutely nothing to do with the “permissive” and totally blind, 
(and never specified), “objects” themselves.  
2.  Contrary to Dennett, Hofstadter, Churchland, et al, 
this, my second hypothesis, asserts that the problems of sentiency 
–of consciousness: the "homunculus" problem, the "mind's eye", 
"the Cartesian theatre", ... actually are capable of solution within 
the physical world, (and I have proposed an explicit solution).I  
Indeed they must be solvable if mind in our ordinary sense of the 
term is to exist at all.  (Dualism is a non-answer.  It is a 
philosophical “cop-out”!)  But these problems are not solvable 
within the confines of classical Aristotelian logic or its modern 
embodiments.  Current logic, still based essentially in the 
Aristotelian, (i.e. "generic" and hierarchical, set-theoretic), formal 
concept, is inadequate, I maintain, for the specifically logical 
problems implicit in the mind-brain problem. 
 
An Aside for Clarification: 
Let me introduce two diagrams which I will replicate 
again in Chapter 12.  These are fundamentally just input-output 
loops, (sensors/motor nerves), with feedback. 
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 Figure 20:  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Any physical description of a mind, (or of a community 
of such minds), as mechanisms/organisms, must meet the 
minimal necessities of these diagrams.  They must embody action 
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into the world and self-correcting feedback in the sense of 
Merleau-Ponty.  Repeating the Freeman quote yet again:1 
 “In particular, Maurice Merleau-Ponty in "The 
Phenomenology of Perception" [2] conceived of 
perception”, [itself], as the outcome of the "intentional 
arc", by which experience derives from the intentional 
actions of individuals that control sensory input and 
perception. Action into the world with reaction that 
changes the self is indivisible in reality, and must be 
analyzed in terms of ‘circular causality’ as distinct from 
the linear causality of events as commonly perceived and 
analyzed in the physical world." II  W.J. Freeman, 1997 
                                                 
 
 
1 I cannot expect that every reader will read this book in context.  I will 
therefore repeat the critical citations  where I think it is necessary. 
Figure 21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the “space” that a machine per se must 
necessarily live in?  It is a space of total unknowns.  It is a space 
of ontic indeterminacy and the machine really doesn’t “care” or 
“know”.  Machines only “do”.  They do it on the surface of the 
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Moon, or in the Pope’s living room.  It is simply a question of 
whether or not it works and survives intact! 
 A machine/mechanism cannot “know”; it can only react.  
How then could there be “knowing” other than in its 
contemporaneous physically reductive sense, (Dennett), as mere 
pertinent mechanical reaction?  How could there be a Cartesian 
theatre, and what of the homunculus?  How could a whole know 
its parts in Leibniz’s sense?  These questions, moreover, embody 
pretty much the whole of the very essence of our demands for 
“mind” in our intuitive sense of the word. 
This was the first formulation of the mind-brain problem I 
conceived about 50 years ago and I think it was precisely on 
target.  The sole possibility of a solution I saw then, and still the 
only one I can see now lay in an adaptation and incorporation of 
something very strange.  It was Hilbert’s “concept of implicit 
definition” which seemed to offer the only conceivable answer to 
the dilemma other than a circumvention.  Hilbert’s conception, 
taken operatively, wherein the “axioms” are re-interpreted as the 
physical building blocks of the brain, allowed “live”, (but 
specifically virtual), objects to physically exist even within the 
sense of a pure mechanism.  
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To repeat the quote by Schlick: 
“The [Hilbert’s] revolution lay in the stipulation that the 
basic or primitive concepts are to be defined2 just by the 
fact that they satisfy the axioms. 
[They] "acquire meaning only by virtue of the axiom 
system, and possess only the content that it bestows upon 
them.  They stand for entities whose whole being is to be 
bearers of the relations laid down by the system.", (my 
emphasis)3 
 The hard conclusion followed, however, that those 
“objects” would necessarily have to be “implicitly defined” 
within the very mechanics of the system itself –i.e. they would 
have to be operative, internal and logical objects and not 
referential ones except to the system itself.  And how could this 
be? 
                                                 
 
 
     2  It is crucial to understand that "defined" is used in a very different sense in 
mathematics than in the sense of ordinary "dictionary definition".  It specifies the 
actual, the whole and exclusive existence -for mathematics- of the entity 
defined.  Mathematics students are ingrained in this as the very first step towards 
"mathematical maturity". 
     3 Please note the close parallel to the argument I made in the "training 
seminar" of Chapter 4 
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This route led me through the development of my first 
thesis, and eventually through my third thesis which answer these 
profound difficulties. 
Building on Ernst Cassirer's innovative rule-based, (rather 
than property-based), reformulation of the classical concept itself, 
(his "functional concept of mathematics"), and a new application 
of David Hilbert's brilliant logical reorientation of mathematics 
onto purely axiomatic grounds: "implicit definition", [as strongly 
distinguished from his later "Formalism"4 –the current paper 
probably explains the foundations for this thesis best].   I propose 
a further extension of Cassirer's formal and technical “Concept”, 
(and its subsequent logic), to a new and largest formal 
“Concept”: i.e. “The Concept of Implicit Definition”, (C.I.D.), 
which is largely equivalent to the complex rule of an axiom 
system.5   
 
The Concept of Implicit Definition 
Following and extending Cassirer's cogent arguments, 
(see Chapter 3 and especially the “snippet”to follow), dualism 
and opposition, (innate in classical logic and themselves the basis 
of the “homunculus”, I argue), are then, (after Hilbert), no longer 
                                                 
 
 
4 Which some still persist in confusing –See Shapiro discussion of Chapter 3. 
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innate in this new Concept.  Just as Cassirer argued for his own 
“Functional Concept of Mathematics”, I argue that CID no longer 
derives from presentation vs. attention and abstraction in 
cognition- which latter is generally accepted as the theoretical 
basis of the classical Concept, but rather is unary6 and internally, 
(i.e. logically), resolving of its objects in the sense of Hilbert and 
modern mathematics.   
The extended Concept, (CID), is no longer confined to 
intellectual cognition, (i.e. logic and concepts), however, but is 
adequate to perceptual cognition, (i.e. "objects"), as well.  (From 
the physical perspective7, I argue that our primitive perceptual 
“objects” are evolutionary optimizations of process.)  CID is a 
constitutive logic in the sense envisaged by Kant –or it may  itself 
actually be that constitutive logic that he envisioned!   In concert 
with the first hypothesis, (non-representation = "not 
presentation"), it allows a solution of the logical problem by 
permitting cognition and "objects" without presentation and 
without the latter's implicit oppositional "cognator" -i.e. without a 
homunculus.  Reconceiving brain function as organization rather 
                                                                                                           
 
 
5 See Chapter 3 for a full elaboration of this whole concept. 
6 In the sense of Hilbert’s “from the whole of the axiom system” quoted earlier 
7 Itself taken as a legitimate though relativized  “symbolic form” in the sense of 
Chapter 8 
than representation, (Chapter 4), allows mind and cognition in 
our ordinary, unified sense. 
A significant corollary of this hypothesis is that it allows 
mind to be productively defined as the biologically logical, i.e.  
the operative "concept" of the brain.  It allows it to be seen as an 
expression of the behavioral rule  of the brain, (taken in 
Cassirer’s sense of “the rule of the Concept”).  (But here 
"logical" itself and "concept" itself are expressed in a reductively 
materialist sense.  My third thesis, to be developed shortly in 
Chapters 7 through 9 will rectify this.)  This present, however, is 
an important result since I have argued that it is only in taking 
our objects as specifically logical objects that the homunculus 
problem can be solved, and it shows the relevance of that 
conclusion to the specifically biological problem.  But the "logic" 
just mentioned is biological logic in the sense of the first 
hypothesis.  It is the “calculus” of our biological “schematic 
model”. 
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From Appendix C: Cassirer Again 
(An extract from Iglowitz 1998: Chapter 2 to Expand the 
Cassirer and Concept of Implicit Definition Dialogues 
Incorporated Hertofore.) 8  
                                                 
 
 
8 Note: This is an exerpt from my original Chapter 2 from my initial MS.  It is 
an expansion of my compacted versions rendered earlier in this book as I 
thought it might have interrupted the flow of the argument.  I think it is a 
reasonably good overall presentation of Cassirer’s perspective and of my 
expansion of it so I incorporate it here.  I think it is worth reading for depth.)  
Please forgive the repetition of parts of this text, but I want to present it as a 
whole and completed body.  You might want to examine the orginal book.  
Note: this was written prior to my acquaintence with the modern 
“structuralism” / “category theory” dialogue. 
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How?  The Logical Problem of Consciousness 
(Cassirer- Hilbert- Maturana: an Archimedean Fulcrum) 
 
"... Every attempt to transform logic must concentrate above all 
upon this one point: all criticism of formal logic is comprised in 
criticism of the general doctrine of the construction of concepts." 
(Ernst Cassirer)9 10 
                                                 
 
 
 9 Compare also Lakoff: 1987, p.353.  “Most of the subject matter of classical 
logic is categorization.” 
  10  Cassirer 1923 pps.3-4 
   He continues: "The Aristotelian logic, in its general principles, is a true 
expression and mirror of the Aristotelian metaphysics.  Only in connection with 
the belief upon which the latter rests, can it be understood in its peculiar motives.  
The conception of the nature and divisions of being predetermines the 
conception of the fundamental forms of thought.  In the further development of 
logic, however, its connections with the Aristotelian ontology in its special form 
begin to loosen; still its connection with the basic doctrine of the latter persists, 
and clearly reappears at definite turning points of historical evolution.  Indeed, 
the basic significance, which is ascribed to the theory of the concept in the 
structure of logic, points to this connection. ..." 
 
   [But] "... The work of centuries in the formulation of fundamental doctrines 
seems more and more to crumble away; while on the other hand, great new 
groups of problems, resulting from the general mathematical theory of the 
manifold, now press to the foreground.  This theory appears increasingly as the 
common goal toward which the various logical problems, that were formerly 
investigated separately, tend and through which they receive their ideal unity." 
 
  It is just this "general mathematical theory of the manifold" to which he refers 
at the end which, I will argue, forces an even further extension of Cassirer's own 
arguments. 
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 The problem of "consciousness" and the profoundest 
paradoxes of the mind-body problem: the "Cartesian theater", the 
"mind's eye", and the "homunculus" are logical problems.  They 
are problems of logical possibility!  
How could cognition, how could mind, ordinarily taken, 
even exist?  It is not so much a problem of what it is that they 
actually are, but rather a problem of how is it even possible that 
they could be!   
How, as Leibniz framed it, could "the many be expressed 
in the one"?  How could we know?  In the context of realism, 
ordinary logic allows not even a possibility -other than an 
eliminative reduction, (a denial), of the problem -and of sentiency 
itself. 
The "schematic model" of my first hypothesis cuts to the 
core of these problems.  Coupled with Ernst Cassirer's extension 
of traditional logic, (his "Functional Concept of Mathematics"), 
itself extended again in light of the expansion of logical 
possibility innate in David Hilbert's "implicit definition"11 for the 
axiom systems of pure mathematics, it illuminates them and 
demonstrates a specific "how" for the first time. 
                                                 
 
 
     11  as strongly distinguished from his "Formalism" which is quite a different 
issue 
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The answer turns on an extension of the formal logical 
Concept12 and with it, of logic itself.  Surprisingly that answer 
will allow us to retain our normal, ("folk"), conception of mind as 
well. 
 
Cassirer and Classical Logic: 
2.  Cassirer argued that “the object” of modern 
mathematics, and “the object of mathematical physics”13 as well, 
(their "ideal" objects), are conceptual objects (only).  He 
maintained that the Concept they actually embody in modern 
science is not the classical (Aristotelian) "generic Concept" 
however, but is rather a new "Functional Concept of 
Mathematics", (Cassirer’s reformulated “Concept”).  He argued 
that modern mathematics and modern physics have already 
reconceived the formal logical "Concept" itself, albeit tacitly.14 
 
[Repeating just a bit:] 
 
                                                 
 
 
12   I will be employing a convention of capitalizing the word “concept” when it 
denotes the formal, technical notion of the concept to avoid such verbiage as 
“the concept of the concept”, etc. 
13 See the Heinrich Hertz citation in Chapter 8. 
14 ibid.  Also see his "Einstein's Theory of Relativity" 
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Concept vs. Presentation: 
Cassirer's new formal Concept is no longer logically 
derivable from its extension however: 
"The meaning of the law that connects the individual 
members is not to be exhausted by the enumeration of any 
number of instances of the law; for such enumeration 
lacks the generating principle that enables us to connect 
the individual members into a functional whole."15  
If we know the relation by which a b c . . . are ordered, we 
can deduce them by reflection and isolate them as objects of 
thought.  "It is impossible, on the other hand, to discover the 
special character of the connecting relation from the mere 
juxtaposition of a,b,c in presentation."16 17 
"That which binds the elements of the series a,b,c,... 
together is not itself a new element, that was factually 
blended with them, but it is the rule of progression, which 
remains the same, no matter in which member it is 
represented.  The function F(a,b), F(b,c),..., which 
determines the sort of dependence between the successive 
                                                 
 
 
    15  ibid P.26 
     16  ibid P.26, my emphasis 
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members, is obviously not to be pointed out as itself a 
member of the series, which exists and develops 
according to it."18  
This latter is the definitive argument against “abstraction” 
as the general case and  “presentation” as an ultimate foundation 
for logic.  The association of the members of a series by the 
possession of a common "property" is only a special case of 
logically possible connections in general.  But the connection of 
the members "is in every case produced by some general law of 
arrangement [order] through which a thorough-going rule of 
succession is established."19 
 
Contra the Theory of Attention:    
The "theory of attention"20 therefore "loses all application 
in a deeper phenomenology of the pure thought processes", (i.e. 
cognition).  The similarity of certain elements, (under the 
classical view), can only be (conceptually) meaningful when a 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     17  cf. Stewart, 1995, "Fibonacci Forgeries".  Stewart's article illustrates the 
case.  The "insufficiency of small numbers" leads to an indeterminability of any 
finite series. 
     18  ibid P.17 
     19  ibid P.17, my emphasis 
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certain point of view has already been established21 from which 
the elements can be distinguished as like or unlike.  This identity 
of reference under which the comparison takes place is, however, 
"something distinctive and new as regards the compared contents 
themselves."22 
 The distinction between the concept and its extension, 
therefore, is categorical23 and "belongs to the 'form of 
consciousness'".24  It is "a new expression of the characteristic 
contrast between the member of the series and the form of the 
series".25 
Cassirer argued that it is the equivalent of his "Functional 
Concept of Mathematics", rather than the generic concept, that is 
the actual "Concept" which has been employed throughout the 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     20  It is "presentation" vs. "attention" which is at the basis of the oppositional 
orientation of classical logic, and which is ultimately, I will argue, the origin of 
the problem of the homunculus. 
     21  Compare Lakoff: “Category cue validity defined for such psychological 
(or interactional) attributes might correlate“, (his emphasis), “with basic-level 
categorization, but it would not pick out  basic-level categories; they would 
already have to have been picked out in order to apply the definition of category 
of category cue validity so that there was such a correlation.” (Lakoff: P.54, my 
emphasis)  See Afterword: Lakoff / Edelman.  This is surely directly relevant to 
the context problem as well, (i.e. "the frame problem), in Artificial Intelligence 
research. (cf. Dreyfus, 1992) 
     22  ibid p.25 
     23  But see my discussion later. 
     24  op. cit P.25 
     25  ibid p.26 
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history of modern science.26  He offered a convincing co-thesis, 
furthermore, that the objects of mathematics and science are 
"implicitly defined", (in Hilbert's sense), specifically.27  The 
"functional concepts", (their primitive laws), implicitly define 
their conceptual "objects" -and these are the actual working 
objects of science.28 
 
Major Consequences: 
Cassirer's "Functional Concept" marks a profound 
advance to understanding, (and our specific problem), in two 
respects:  
(1) it redefines the formal Concept, fundamentally, as a 
"functional rule" and,  
(2), it isolates the concept as (logically) separate from, -as 
from a "different world" than -the "objects" it "orders".  The 
concept is no longer inherent in the elements it orders, (e.g. of 
“perception”), nor is it (logically) derived from them.  
                                                 
 
 
     26  "...the concept of function constitutes the general schema and model 
according to which the modern concept of nature has been molded in its 
progressive historical development." (ibid, P.21)  See also especially: Einstein's 
Theory of Relativity, Cassirer 1923 
     27  Discussing Hilbert, Cassirer says: "The procedure of mathematics here", 
(implicit definition), "points to the analogous procedure of theoretical natural 
science, for which it contains the key and justification."  ibid p.94 
28 Heinrich Hertz is relevant here: 
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It is: 
"a new 'object' ... whose total content is expressed in the 
relations established between the individual elements by the act 
of unification."29 
 
Re Presentation: 
The Concept is a purely intellectual -and original- entity, 
a "peculiar form of consciousness, such as cannot be reduced to 
the consciousness of sensation or perception."30  It is neither a 
copy of nor an abstraction from its extension.  It is an 
independent and "mathematically" functional "ordering" –an act 
of unification!  It is a rule not logically derivable31 from 
presentation.  That rule, I will argue, is provided by biology, not 
by revelation.32 
Cassirer has removed logic, (in his critique of the formal 
Concept), from the simple abstraction of perceptual objects, (i.e. 
from presentation).  It becomes instead an internal function of the 
mind, (and hence, I will argue, of biology) –he calls it “a new 
form of consciousness”. 
                                                 
 
 
 29  ibid P.24 
     30  ibid p.25, my emphasis 
     31 i.e. under classical logic 
     32  i.e. it is not transcendent –nor does it provide a “God’s eye view”! 
I will now proceed to argue a very natural extension (and, 
I think, a completion) of Cassirer’s thesis:   “the Concept of 
Implicit Definition”.  This Concept, part of that same “new form 
of consciousness” is also internal and logically independent from 
perceptual presentation as well.  I will argue, in fact, that it 
creates its very “objects” – its “extension” -within the same free 
act of unification.  Even our very “perceptual objects”, (as well as 
our “intellectual objects”), I will argue, are resolved within the 
same internal (biological) act.  
 This will remove, (in agreement with Maturana, Walter 
Freeman, and Edelman), the need for “presentation”, 
(metaphysically taken), altogether.  It is the (presented) 
“perceptual object”, I will argue in specific disagreement with 
Cassirer however, which has been hypostasized!  This further 
reformulation of the Concept and its subsequent logic will allow 
the resolution of the logical paradoxes of sentiency. 
 Cassirer’s Concept, (the Functional Concept of 
Mathematics), is unique in that its arguments show that the 
fundamental logical Concept is not derived from presentation or 
perception.  It is a free and independent act (of unification).  It is 
a “new form of consciousness” according to Cassirer and not 
dependent on them.   
But if his arguments are believed, (and I think they are 
very strong), then there is a very natural extension of Cassirer’s 
Concept wherein the rule, (which determines the concept), can be 
likened to the conjunction of the axioms in an axiom system and 
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its objects, therefore, to the objects of implicit definition.  This is 
the import of my prior arguments in Chapter 3 regarding the 
Cantor diagonal argument and its implications for structuralism.  
Putting this conception within the framework of biology, it opens 
a new possibility –it potentiates the possibility that objects as 
well, (and not just intellectual concepts), can be free creations, 
acts of unification of that same new consciousness and not 
dependent on presentation or perception either!  
It is clearly in “presentation” itself that the paradoxes of 
the homunculus and the Cartesian Theatre arise, after all, and 
these are specifically paradoxes of presentation.   If our 
perceptions were presented to us,33 -if mind, consciousness and 
perception were presentational and dualistic, (which is implicit in 
the presentation/attention ? abstraction of classical logic) -then 
the paradoxes of sentiency would be innate and irresolvable.   
But if those perceptions arose within us, and if 
consciousness arose as a whole, (as the unified rule of "ontogenic 
coupling", after Maturana, as I will argue), then sufficient 
grounds for a complete resolution of the problem would be 
established.  This is not an answer from solipsism, dualism or 
idealism however, but from realism sans information and 
presentation. 
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The Concept of Implicit Definition: 
 (a natural extension of Cassirer's "Functional Concept of 
Mathematics") 
3.  Cassirer's "Functional Concept of Mathematics" does 
not exhaust the possibilities however -not even for mathematics.  
The "implicit definition" of axiomatic mathematics has specific 
and converse consequences for the formal Concept.  Since, 
(following Cassirer), an actual concept is now defined by any 
(definite and consistent) conceptual rule, I propose that the rule 
of a mathematical axiom system, [in the sense of structuralism], 
itself generates a perfectly good Concept in Cassirer's sense.  
Axiom systems embody more profound rules than Cassirer 
considered however, and I propose that they define the ultimate 
concepts.   
Here it is a logically complex, (and typically non-serial), 
rule which defines the concept, (i.e. the conjunction of the 
axioms34), and conversely.  Significantly, following Hilbert and 
modern mathematics, it is a definite, logically precise and 
consistent rule of generation of its “extension” -i.e., of its 
                                                                                                           
 
 
33 as is assumed under the classical view 
34 see chapter 3 
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implicitly defined “elements” as well.35  But axiom systems are 
not logically "dimensional", (strictly implied in Cassirer's 
F(x,y,z...)), nor do they normally define a "series"; they define 
the raw (broadest) manifold itself.”36  [Note 2010: That is, they 
define the permissive and virtual “objects” implicitly defined by 
its axioms.] 
There is no a priori presumption of dimensionality in the 
domain of an abstract axiom system.  Nor can the elements of the 
mathematical manifold be characterized a priori, (dimensionally), 
as functional values of the individual axioms.  Their "objects" are 
not "objects" of the sort: (a1(x), a2(y), a3(z), ...).   
Axioms do not interact dimensionally, they interact 
operationally [at the fundamental level of meaning!]  The 
combination of axioms, and their rule of generation, 
(corresponding to Cassirer's "continuous transformation"), is 
purely, profoundly and complexly logical.  A mathematical 
axiom system need not characterize a "series" or a "series of 
                                                 
 
 
35  I am concerned here with the object of implicit definition only insofar as it is 
a logical object, only insofar as it is a mathematical object.  This is the actual 
object of implicit definition.  I am not concerned with the (different) objects of 
models with which it may be made to correspond, i.e. with the objects of its 
possible realizations.  This is quite a different case and quite a different object.  
It is the logical object per se, I will argue, that solves the homonculus.  This is 
the significance of my objection to Shapiro’s critique of Hilbert in Chapters 2 
and 3. 
 36 I.e. the abstract set taken in its broadest, most general mathematical sense 
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series" moreover.37  Indeed, this is the exception rather than the 
rule.  What it must and does embody, however, is the raw 
manifold itself, (its domain).38  It embodies the "logical 
continuum" generated by its axioms [which is the lesson we learn 
from my Cantor argument and from modern structuralism.].  It 
embodies an "order" of a higher degree of freedom. 
The instances of Cassirer's "Functional Concept", (the 
objects of its extension), are the continuous generation of its rule.  
The instances of the implicit definition of mathematical axiom 
systems, the implicitly defined "elements" of their manifolds, are 
logically continuous as well -they are the continuous generation 
                                                 
 
 
37  Cassirer, like Kant before him, considered the "series", (or a series of series), 
as the ultimate possible mode of logical and conceptual organization.  He saw it 
as the ultimate expression, and only possible principle, (rule), for a logical 
function, (i.e. a logical principle which specifies its extension), other than 
identity.  He based his new formal concept, ("the Functional Concept of 
Mathematics"), upon that belief. 
But that conception is inadequate and inaccurate for the case of modern 
mathematics which was forced to deal with the continuum.  Axiom systems 
exactly describe, (specify), elements, (their extension), that are not generally, 
(i.e. not a priori), organizable on a series principle.  Axiom systems embody a 
larger and broader logical principle, (a rule which specifies its instances), and a 
broader logical concept, (as demonstrated, I suspect, by Gödel).  The elements of 
a mathematical domain are fully prescribed, ("functionally" in Cassirer's sense), 
by their axioms, (their rule), but this rule is not "series".  It is a complex logical 
rule -not referring to, but internally generating its extension as a virtual 
expression of its own innate ordering.  It is the rule of implicit definition.  This 
rule, following Cassirer, (I will argue), defines a new concept, the "Concept of 
Implicit Definition". 
     38  which is not, a priori, implicitly dimensional. 
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of a more profound rule which, by definition, exhausts, (and 
defines), its extension.   
The "elements" of the mathematical domain are precisely 
all and only those "values" implicitly defined by, (logically 
generated by), a particular system of axioms -in a sense precisely 
parallel to Cassirer's.   
They are the pure embodiment, (crystallization), of the 
"order" of its rule.  Its elements are virtual elements expressing 
its innate order.  The whole of their meaning and the whole of 
their being, (mathematically), is solely such.”  [Note 2010 –see 
Hilbert, Chapter 2]  “The manifold, (domain), represents the 
functional and conceptual "values" of its system of "generating 
relations".  Its elements are logical elements. 
The "elements", (mathematically conceived), of axiom 
systems are not "objects" upon which a system of "generating 
relations" acts, however, or to which it relates.  They are products 
of it.  There is no a priori presumption of their distinct and 
separate existence.  Wilder, pertinently, characterizes the 
"existence" terms of axiom systems as "presumptive" and 
"permissive" only.39  Axiomatic "existence" is an operative term 
only.   
                                                 
 
 
     39  Wilder, 1967, P.18 
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The elements -the objects- of axiom systems are logical 
"invariants" of their generating relations and internal to the rule 
itself.40  Neither "presentation", (nor reference), is implicit in 
them.  They are "entities whose whole being is to be bearers of 
the relations laid down by the system." 
I urge that this -the Concept of Implicit Definition- is the 
ultimate logical rule, and the ultimate "ordering".  It captures the 
ultimate functionality, (in Cassirer's sense), of a logical system 
and generates its extension, (its abstract "domain"), as a virtual 
embodiment of its own (logical) "ordering" -its rule.  An axiom 
system, (conceived mathematically), is a  rule which wholly 
specifies its "elements" -by definition.41  [Note 2010 –in Hilbert’s 
sense.] 
I propose, therefore, a new and largest formal "Concept": 
the Concept of Implicit Definition.  I propose it in strict analogy 
to the case of the mathematical axiom system and in strict 
extension of Cassirer's Concept.  It is the natural extension of 
Cassirer's Functional Concept of Mathematics, and embodies, I 
propose, the ultimate rule, (in Cassirer’s sense), of order.   
                                                 
 
 
     40  Contrary to this view, Resnik,(Resnik, 1992), criticized an example of 
such a "structuralist" conception of mathematics in terms of the theory of 
reference.  Under my hypothesis, however, the theory of reference itself 
becomes highly problematic. (cf Quine, 1953, pps.139-159, "Reference and 
Modality")  Also see Chapter 5. 
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But it is a generalization of Cassirer's formal concept, not 
an instance of it.  Conceptual "dimensionality", (a "series of 
series"), implicit in Cassirer's linear function of functions: 
F(x,y,z..), is a special case of the "rule" -and of the formal 
Concept. 
The concept of an axiom system, its "rule" of implicit 
definition, embodies something absolutely new and unique 
amongst concepts however.  Its extension is precisely its own 
analycity.  The "being", (and the "meaning"42), of its elements 
are, by definition, identical with the purely logical "singularities" 
of the (complex) rule -and the concept- itself.  They "are ... 
defined just by the fact that they satisfy the axioms."43 
 
Implicit Definition vis a vis Presentation: 
Like Cassirer's Concept, (its conceptual progenitor), the 
Concept of Implicit Definition is not oppositional: i.e. it does not 
(logically) presuppose "abstraction" or "attention" either.  It too is 
a "peculiar form of consciousness", an "act of unification ... not 
reducible to the consciousness of sensation or perception".  But 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     41   See prior "Elaboration" discussion 
     42  see above --Schlick 
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this particular "act", (unlike Cassirer's), does not presuppose 
"presentation" either.   
It does not just logically specify its extension; it logically 
encompasses it!  The rule of "implicit definition" itself then, 
following Cassirer, is logical exhaustion and its "objects" are 
purely logical objects.  They are "crystallizations" - i.e. logical 
"invariants"44 of and internal to the rule itself.45  This Concept, I 
suggest, does not entail "extension" at all -it is a (complex) unity. 
 Cassirer’s Concept, (the Functional Concept of 
Mathematics), is unique in that its arguments show that the 
fundamental logical Concept is not derived from presentation or 
perception but is a free and independent act of unification.  It is a 
“new form of consciousness” not dependent on them.  The 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     43  Wilder quotes Nagel: "Indeed, if geometry is to be deductive ... only the 
relations specified in the propositions and definitions employed may 
legitimately be taken into account." (Wilder, 1967, p.7) 
    44  cf Cassirer, 1923 pps.36-41 
     45  Implicit definition is important when something significant is actually 
defined.  The "objects" of abstract mathematics, (integers, for instance), are, (in 
opposition to Mill),"concrete", viable and fruitful.  Its element specifies a 
particular kind of object, and that object is specifically a "crystallization" of a 
peculiar kind of "ordering"!  It embodies the logical and relational essence of 
that ordering -and that's all!  Its "objects" are "crystallizations" of its rule -just 
like the objects of the training seminar.  The rules here, (and there), I argue, 
define the object, not the converse.  But here the actual mechanism of that 
"crystallization" is transparent.  The "calculus" defines the object, and the 
definitional mechanism is implicit definition. 
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Concept of Implicit Definition, (an extension of Cassirer's thesis), 
opens a further possibility, however.   
It potentiates the possibility that objects as well can be 
free creations, acts of unification of that same new consciousness, 
(and biological organism I argue), and not derived from 
presentation or perception either.  This is a radical idea 
admittedly.  Though somewhat repugnant and somewhat 
astounding to our preconceptions, it is certainly consistent with 
the biological conclusions of Maturana, Edelman, and Freeman 
wherein perception and consciousness, (whatever those may or 
may not be for these authors –more generally, the internal 
biological function), of an organism do not derive information 
from the world.  But that is just what perceptual presentation 
would imply.   
The positive and the immediate consequence of this new 
rendering of the Concept, (C.I.D.46), is that we now have the 
tools to understand –completely resolve in fact- the problems o
the “homunculus” and the Cartesian theatre
f 
.   
The virtual objects of implicit definition are known to the 
system as a whole.  For it is only as implicitly defined resolutions 
of the system as a whole that they exist at all!   
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This is a major advance on the problem and enables the 
only realist solution of the problem yet proposed other than a 
denial of the problem itself.  It was in “presentation” itself that 
the irresolvable paradoxes arose after all.  To repeat myself 
however, the denial of (metaphysical) “presentation” does not 
result in solipsism, but in realism sans information and 
presentation. 
 
Why is this relevant to mind? 
4.  Why is this significant to the problem at hand?  It is 
because this Concept, (C.I.D.), seems "tailor-made" to the logical 
problem of mind: It is capable of solving the homunculus 
problem and that of the Cartesian theatre.  It can resolve objects 
without presentation, (without “the homunculus”), and in itself 
supplies the “theatre”!  It supplies an autonomous theory of 
meaning as well!. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
    46 my “Concept of Implicit Definition” 
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Cassirer has established the equivalence of "concept" and 
"rule".  
If, (1) following the arguments of chapter 4,47 we are no 
longer concerned with representation, (nor, with it, of 
"presentation"),48  
and (2) if, tentatively, mind were taken as the unified rule, 
(the "act of unification"), of brain response,49 -if it were taken as 
the unified rule of the "structural coupling"50 of the brain  
-then  (3), (following Cassirer), "mind" might reasonably 
be identified with the "concept", (in the larger constitutive sense), 
of the brain.   
If that particular concept were analogous to the "Concept 
of Implicit Definition" in mathematical axiom systems 
furthermore,51 then it would not just "take account" of the 
elements of its "extension", it would know them!52  Their 
                                                 
 
 
47  and of Chapter 4, and of Maturana and Varela, Edelman and Freeman 
48 See the Raichle citations in Chapter 3, for instance. 
49  I.E. As an organizational rather than a representative model as I argued in 
chapter 4 
 50  See Chapter 4: Maturana and Varela 
 51  This is consistent, certainly, with the "schematic object" presented earlier.  
How could evolution crystallize its (schematic) objects?  The implicit definition 
of process -of "rule"- provides an explicit mechanism and rationale!   
 52  If there is a tendency to characterize my thesis as a variation of 
functionalism, then it should be noted that it involves a totally different notion of 
"function", (and "relation"). 
"meaning" and their "being" would be logically manifest internal 
to that concept, (and rule), itself.   
They would be resolved as virtual expressions of that 
very rule.  They would "acquire meaning ... and possess only the 
content that it bestow[ed] upon them."  They would be logical 
entities "whose whole being [was] to be bearers of the relations 
laid down by the system."   
I argue that the "logic" just mentioned is a constitutive 
logic53.  I will argue presently that it is the schematic calculus of 
Chapter 4! 
But these particular entities -as cognitive and perceptual 
entities- no longer (metaphysically) presuppose attention or 
abstraction -nor do they presuppose presentation.  Therefore, 
they do not presuppose that which it would be presented to -i.e. a 
"seer"!  The logical problems of "the object" -the problem of the 
homunculus, the problem of "the mind's eye", the “Cartesian 
theatre”, (which are the principal enigmas of consciousness) -are 
thereby solved in principle.   
The fundamental duality, implicit in classical logic, 
between "seer" and "seen", "thinker" and "object of thought", 
"perceiver" and "perceived", or, more fundamentally, between 
cognition and presentation, is bridged.  The unity, and the very 
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possibility of cognition of "the object" -the global perspective of 
the many in the one- is explained in the unity of its existence as a 
virtual object of implicit definition.  For it is only globally that 
such a virtual object even exists as an object.   
In our rational universe, then, the Concept of Implicit 
Definition seems the most appropriate,54 as a model, to the 
logical problem of "consciousness".  There is no categorical 
disjunction between the "form of the series" -i.e. the "rule" of 
implicit definition- and its "elements".  They are unified in the 
concept itself. 
 
Contra Cassirer: 
Cassirer "bent" the focus, however: 
"there is no danger of hypostasizing the pure concept, of 
giving it an independent reality along with the particular 
things. ... Its 'being' consists exclusively in the logical 
determination by which it is clearly differentiated from 
other possible serial forms ...  and this determination can 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     53  after Kant's usage 
     54  the only appropriate yet suggested! 
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only be expressed by a synthetic act of definition, and not 
by a simple sensuous intuition."55 
There are two crucial flaws in his argument, however: 
 (1):  In the axiom systems of pure mathematics, the 
elements are also expressed by an "act of definition", (albeit an 
analytical one) -i.e. that of "implicit definition".  They are 
themselves manifestations of that "peculiar form of 
consciousness, such as cannot be reduced to the consciousness of 
sensation or perception." 
 (2):  While he states that the application of the Functional 
Concept is embodied in the concept itself,56 he argues that 
concepts are different in kind from their extension.  These are 
"objects" of a different world from that of the "particular things" -
the objects of "simple sensuous intuition".  
 I argue, (in concert with my first thesis), that the 
"objects" of "simple sensuous intuition" are themselves ultimately 
objects of "implicit definition" and part of that same "peculiar 
form of consciousness".   
It follows, then, (given my hypothesis), that there is, (in 
concert with W.J. Freeman, for instance), no simple sensuous 
                                                 
 
 
     55  Cassirer, 1923, P.26 
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intuition at all -it does not exist.  It is the perceptual object which 
has been hypostasized!  His dichotomy of the "being" of the pure 
concept and the "being" of the "particular things" need not stand 
on either leg. 
Cassirer did not generalize the "Functional Concept of 
Mathematics" into "the Concept of Implicit Definition".  The 
"new consciousness", furthermore, stopped short of "sensuous 
impressions" themselves.  For him, the latter were absolute and 
unknowable.  They were, in effect, the focal point upon which the 
various forms of knowledge, his "Symbolic Forms",57 were 
oriented, but could never reach.  They were the rock upon which 
he erected, in Swabey's characterization, his "epistemological 
theory of relativity".58   
His "object of knowledge" was a purely conceptual 
object, implicitly defined by the fundamental laws of the 
sciences, -their "generating relations".  The "objects of 
perception", the "particular things", were of a different and 
untouchable world, the rock splitting the intellect in two. 
 
                                                                                                           
 
 
     56  "if I know the relation according to which a b c ... are ordered, I can 
deduce them by reflection and isolate them as objects of thought"  ibid p.26 
     57  cf Cassirer 1953 and Chapter 5 
     58  Op. cit P.v.  I will have much more to say about "Symbolic Forms" in 
Chapter 5. 
The Crux of the Issue: Presentation  
Cassirer did Promethean work, however.  He 
demonstrated the fundamental inadequacies of the classical 
Concept, both in its scope and specifically as regards 
"perception".  He illuminated the profound and expressly logical 
chasm between the Concept and the perceptual realm, (the 
"material" with which it purportedly deals!), and hence the 
pervasive duality which "perception", i.e. "sensuous 
impressions", necessitates for mind and logic.  
 Even Cassirer's "Functional Concept of Mathematics" 
was insufficient to the fundamental problem, however, and he 
remained inside the "magic circle" of perception.  The opposition 
of "Concept" and "percept", (e.g. "attention/abstraction" and 
"presentation" or still even the opposition of Cassirer's 
"Functional Concept" and presentation -"sensuous intuition"), 
and the dualism which is still implicit in it, is the essence of the 
issue.  It is a genuine antinomy and the actual genesis of the 
problem.   
Already contained in "abstraction", already implicit in 
"attention", already embodied in "presentation" is the dualistic 
homunculus: i.e. that to which "presentation" is offered.  There 
was no way heretofore that we could even conceive of an answer 
to this problem because it was the formal Concept itself which 
generated it.  This was the retort in which the "homunculus" was 
conjured! 
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"Implicit definition", however, belongs totally to the "new 
form of consciousness" -as do the "objects" which it "orders".  
But here, (beyond Cassirer), there is no longer the assumption of 
a presentation of "elements", (psychological impressions or 
otherwise), from one world to an intellectualizing, (cognitive), 
faculty in another.  There remains, therefore, no implicit need for 
the dualistic homunculus in cognition.  This explains why the two 
worlds are compatible.  There are not two worlds, but one.  This 
"peculiar form of consciousness", this "new consciousness" I 
maintain, is the only form of consciousness!” 
[ End snip] 
 
The whole of that chapter is reasonably cohesive, but now 
you have seen most of it.  I began it with a presentation of 
Hilbert’s thesis, (not incorporated here), but I think I have done 
that better in this present book.  There was always an indecision 
in me as to whether to start from Cassirer or from Hilbert, they 
are linked so tightly. 
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Chapter 6: Maturana & Varela & Kant Biology-
Part II 
Towards the Where and the What? 
Biology & Epistemology, (Maturana and Varela and Kant)1 
"If in a new science which is wholly isolated and unique 
in its kind, we started with the prejudice that we can judge 
of things by means of alleged knowledge previously 
acquired -though this is precisely what has first to be 
called in question -we should only fancy we saw 
everywhere what we had already known, because the 
expressions have a similar sound. 
  But everything would appear utterly metamorphosed, 
senseless, and unintelligible, because we should have as a 
foundation our own thoughts, made by long habit a 
second nature, instead of the author's."I 
From our ordinary way of looking at things, my third and 
final thesis, (which will be formally stated in Chapter 11), will 
appear convoluted, esoteric and disturbing.  When the inverting 
glasses of habit are removed and a proper perspective is attained, 
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however, it will become considerably simpler2, more plausible 
and profoundly more compatible with modern science than any 
proposed alternative.  To reach that perspective and before I can 
even begin to properly state this thesis however, I must deal with 
several seemingly divergent, (but actually closely related), issues.  
This chapter will discuss the first of them.  I must begin to 
address the epistemological dilemma created by the conclusion of 
the first two theses. 
Nobody writing meaningfully about the mind-body 
problem today appears to take Immanuel Kant as seriously and as 
literally as I do, and yet he seems to be the thinker most pertinent 
to it.3  (I think he must be informed and corrected by Maturana 
however.)  The problem of mind-body is, in one profound 
respect, the problem of knowing, (epistemology), itself.  The 
questions of what we, as organisms, do know, or even can know -
and how!- reflect back on the very knowledge by which we judge 
the problem itself. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 I will begin this Chapter with my original version of it and then come back to 
make more recent comments.  Original MS Numbered Chapter 3 in Iglowitz, 
1995. 
2  in a mathematical sense of the term 
3  "This is an advantage no other science", [than epistemology/metaphysics], 
"has or can have, because there is none so fully isolated and independent of 
others and so exclusively concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and 
simple".  Kant, "Prolegomena", Lewis Beck translation, Bobs-Merrill, 1950, 
p.131, my emphasis 
In an ancillary and important respect, moreover, the 
problem Kant faced in attempting to communicate his ideas is 
very similar to the one Maturana and I face as well.  (I referred to 
this in the introduction.)  Both theses totally contravene the 
common wisdom, and (therefore) make sense only as a whole 
and not in their parts.   
Like Kant’s problem "of pure reason", (which is clearly a 
part of my own problem), my problem: 
"is a sphere so separate and self-contained that we cannot 
touch a part without affecting all the rest.  We can do 
nothing without first determining the position of each part 
and its relation to the rest; for, as our judgment within this 
sphere cannot be corrected by anything without, the 
validity and use of every part depends upon the relation in 
which it stands to all the rest within the domain [of 
reason].   
As in the structure of an organized body, the end of each 
member can only be deduced from the full conception of 
the whole.  It may, then, be said of such [a critique] that it 
is never trustworthy except it be perfectly complete, down 
to the minute elements [of pure reason].  In the sphere of 
this faculty you can determine and define either 
everything or nothing."II 
The combination of my first two theses provides radical 
and powerful simplifications to the mind-body problem.  But it 
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raises a new and seemingly overwhelming difficulty however.  If 
it is true, then what do we know, and what can we know of the 
reality in which we exist?  Since my very arguments depend, 
moreover, on accepted knowledge4 of that world, have I not 
reduced my own case to absurdity?  The path to my third thesis 
will answer these questions and supply, (at its conclusion), the 
single remaining part of my promised complete solution to the 
mind-body problem.  The latter is the answer to the problem of 
the "substance" of the mind.  What is "mind" and where is it?  
How could it even be?    
Before I can formally state my third thesis which will 
answer these questions, (in Chapters10 and 11), however, we 
must look at the problem of knowing, (epistemology), and at the 
broader problem of cognition generally, to include perception.  It 
demarcates the problem of "substance".  It sets the bounds and 
defines the very context within which we must consider it.  The 
pivotal issue will be "closure"!5 
 
                                                 
 
 
4  e.g. Darwinian evolution 
5  This is, as an emotional issue, the most difficult of my theses and I must 
expect to lose my credibility with many of you here.  It is a strange and esoteric 
idea, but, I believe, true.  It must, on my part, be presented with the utmost 
delicacy.  On your part, I must ask for a very careful reading as it may not be as 
it seems at first. 
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Closure: 
A mathematical domain D is called "closed" under 
operations "*" and "#", (let us say), if for every x and y in D, 
"x*y" and "x#y" are necessarily in D as well.  The result of all 
such operations on the domain, no matter how far concatenated, 
will always remain again within the domain.  It never "escapes" 
itself!   
I will argue that our human cognitive domain is itself 
likewise closed, (though bounded),6 under its operations.  This 
was Kant's, (and Maturana's), essential conclusion as well.  
Surprisingly it will simplify the problem of "substance" and 
resolve the intolerable dilemma I (so innocently) raised as well.  
It is not that the problem of substance is itself so difficult; it is the 
demands that we make on the answer.  
Kant was the earliest scientific, (I might equally say 
"mathematical" –in the sense of modern mathematics), thinker on 
this problem, and he is confirmed more recently, from the logical 
side by Quine,III and, from the side of biology, by Maturana and 
Varela.  Though Kant's arguments belong to another era, his 
                                                 
 
 
6  A simple mathematical example of a closed and bounded domain would be 
the domain of the open interval -1 < x,y < 1 under the operation of 
multiplication.  Another would be the open domain bounded by unit circle: for 
all (x,y): -1 < x,y < 1 with the operation #: (x,y)#(u,v) = (x*u,y*v).  The integers 
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fundamental  conclusions and his rigorous identification of the 
basic and necessary assumptions remains intact.   
Sanity and plausibility depend on just two, (by definition 
"metaphysical"), postulates of absolute existence: "externality" 
and "experience", ("intuition").  Without them, there is no reason 
for reason!  But those postulates operate solely within the closed 
domain of reason: "our judgment within this sphere cannot be 
corrected by anything without."IV 
While fully affirming the existence of our external world, 
(“substantia phenomena”), as a necessary prerequisite to reason, 
Kant concluded that we are inherently incapable of knowing any 
of its independent properties, (to include time, space, extension, 
tactility, impenetrability …), that is, we are incapable of knowing 
them independently of their revelation in, and in combination 
with, human cognitive forms.  
 Kant argued, (in quite a modern vein), that it is 
impossible to separate our "instrument", (the peculiarities of 
biological human cognition), from what it "measures", i.e. the 
world it cognates.  His genuinely relativistic conclusion gains 
modern physical credence from the theories of relativity and 
quantum mechanics, and logical credence, (though it contravenes 
                                                                                                           
 
 
are, of course, closed under addition and multiplication, the rationals under 
addition, multiplication, and division, ... 
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certain of his own, dated, arguments), from the axiomatic 
foundation of mathematics.  He arrived at a position which I will 
rename as "ontic indeterminism"7, (i.e. an indeterminism as to 
properties, but not as to the existence of the “something” –or 
rather of the “somewhat”- we call “external reality”.8 
 More recently, Quine9 has argued that our "system of 
knowledge and beliefs" is logically closed, and Maturana and 
VarelaV have argued that biological organisms are, (by 
definition!), operationally and cognitively closed. 
I will argue that our knowledge and, even more broadly, 
cognition generally10, (to include perception!), is a closed, (i.e. 
self-referential), domain whose "boundary conditions"VI are:  
 1.  the most general, (i.e. the weakest and most abstract), 
possible assumption of "externality" itself, and 
                                                 
 
 
7  Kant himself was never satisfied with "critical idealism" but was forced to 
retain it for historical reasons.  "This being the state of the case, I could wish, in 
order to avoid all misunderstanding, to have named this conception of mine 
otherwise, but to alter it altogether is probably impossible.  It may be permitted 
me however, in future, as has been above intimated, to term it 'formal' or, better 
still, 'critical' idealism, to distinguish it from the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley 
and from the skeptical idealism of Descartes." -"Prolegomena", Pps.124-125   
8 See a more thorough analysis of Kant’s “Critical Idealism “later in this 
chapter. 
9  W.V.O. Quine, 1960.  I will elaborate Quine's position in Chapter 7. 
10  Cognition has two aspects.  Repeating the definition cited earlier, (Webster’s:  
"cognition: the act or process of knowing, including both awareness and 
judgment".  Also, "Perception: (4a) direct or intuitive cognition.") 
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2. "experience" as an uninterpreted primitive, i.e. not the 
interpretation or organization of that "experience" -not, for 
example, its interpretation as "sense impressions"11. 
  The connection between these two assumptions is not 
necessarily simplistic.  This chapter elaborates the first of them.  
In this chapter, I will examine Maturana and Varela's arguments 
as set forth in "The Tree of Knowledge".VII   
They consummate the viewpoint of modern biology on 
the issue of closure.  This penetrating work, very much the 
biological complement of Kant's "Prolegomena" I feel, defines 
the secure biological context in which they develop a single 
heuristic principle, (i.e. "structural coupling"), crucial to the 
mind-body problem.   
I will differ strongly with the conclusions they draw from 
it, however, as they were unwilling to accept the devastating 
consequences of their own arguments.  I do. 
Maturana and Varela characterize their book as an 
argument against a representative model of environment in the 
                                                 
 
 
11  But if our perceptual objects are cognitions, then how can they be a boundary 
condition of cognition as well?  How can our perceptual objects and the things 
they do be "experience" themselves?  I will argue that they are not!  
"Experience" is their invariant relationality across all orientations including 
even those which might distribute the "objects" themselves!  Does perceptual 
cognition equate with "experience"?  No, it is a particular (evolutionarily derived 
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brain, against the existence of a current "map" which we use to 
compute behavior appropriate for survival in our 
contemporaneous world.   
Their argument propounds, instead, a closed, (and 
evolutionarily determined), reactive parallelism to environment -
i.e. "congruent structural coupling".12  They argue that organisms 
do not behave as they do because of the nature of their current 
surroundings; they behave alongside of it!13   
Organisms, as reactive physical systems, are 
"operationally closed".  Their closed ontogenic state is only 
"triggered" by their environment.  Environment is a "boundary 
condition" of survival, not a motivation for action. (See my 
illustration “Bounds and Limits” in Chapter 4 which illustrates 
the lack of need for a parallelism between environment and the 
organism.)  Maturana and Varela conclude there is no current 
model because there is no flow of current "information".   
They develop their fundamental thesis, "structural 
coupling", at the ground level of primitive evolution.  It is a 
                                                                                                           
 
 
and "pictorial") orientation of that relationality!  See Chap.7 and the "King of 
Petrolia". 
12 Thinking it over, February, 2010, there is a way that their usage of 
“congruence” could be re-interpreted so as to correspond with my later 
criticism of their employment of it.  It could be re-interpreted as “simple, non-
destructive co-existence”! 
13  Their argument is considerably subtler than this as I will detail below. 
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principle of purely mechanistic coexistence between "organism" 
and "environment" which preserves "autopoiesis", (reproduction).  
It is, I will argue however, weaker than the strict parallelism, 
("congruence"), they demand of it.   
Their argument, examined more deeply, is against 
"information" between an organism and its environment at any 
stage -to include that of natural selection!  "Congruence"14, 
however, would clearly be evolutionary information!15  
"Structural coupling" and the "conservation of autopoiesis", (and 
Darwin's principle of "natural selection" itself), are all 
quintessentially principles of raw appropriateness alone 
however.16  They are not informational.   
These principles say: "This works!"  They do not say: 
"This is what is!"  (They do not exhaust or mirror the whole of 
possibility).  Neither parallelism, ("congruence"), nor 
embodiment are legitimate consequences of these principles, I 
will argue, even at the evolutionary level. 
There are correlations between domains other than 
"isomorphism" or "congruence" which preserve pertinency.  The 
                                                 
 
 
14  as in "congruent structural coupling" 
15  cf Edelman, 1992.  He argues that the human genome is simply too small for 
the purposes of information 
16  i.e. they are boundary conditions, not limits! 
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mappings and transformations of abstract algebra are obvious 
counterexamples disproving the inference.17   
It is only necessary that (some) feature(s) compatible with 
the milieu of the domain be preserved.  I will argue that the 
presumed necessity of "evolutionary congruence" is a human 
precept and part of the closed and specifically human cognitive 
model. 
I will now attempt to summarize Maturana and Varela's 
thesis. Their arguments are profound, subtle, and more concise 
than any paraphrase.  I believe they are, up to a certain point, 
conclusive. 
 
Maturana and Varela: 
Maturana and Varela,VIII make a profound and 
phenomenologically pure18 argument proceeding from first 
principles.  It leads to severe epistemological consequences.  
They begin by outlining minimal and necessary biological 
specifications for "living organisms".  Those then become an 
entirely sufficient rationale for the whole of metacellular 
                                                 
 
 
17 Think about Hilbert’s “beer mugs” in Chapter 2, for instance. 
18  i.e. they do not mix their contexts or the origins of their presumptions 
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organisms and their (nervous) behavior.19  The argument is 
wholly operational and constructive.20  Please forgive the length 
of the following quotes, but they make their case better than I 
could.  Echoing my comment about one of Cassirer’s arguments, 
I believe that it, too, is Mirabile dictu.  It is not my purpose to 
make their case here, but rather to build upon it! 
"Our intention, therefore, is to proceed scientifically: if 
we cannot provide a list that characterizes a living being, 
why not propose a system that generates all the 
phenomena proper to a living being?  
The evidence that an autopoietic unity has exactly all 
these features becomes evident in the light of what we 
know about the interdependence between metabolism and 
cellular structure."IX  
                                                 
 
 
19  "And how can we tell when we have reached a satisfactory explanation of the 
phenomenon of knowing? ...when we have set forth a conceptual system that can 
generate the cognitive phenomenon as a result of the action of a living being, 
and when we have shown that this process can produce living beings like 
ourselves, able to generate descriptions and reflect on them as a result of their 
fulfillment as living beings operating effectively in their fields of existence."   
Please note their use of the operative word “conceptual” in “conceptual system” 
–theirs indeed is a conceptual and a Hertzian “axiomatic” foundation. (op.cit 
P.30) 
20   Please come back and review Maturana's preamble when you have gotten 
through Chapter 7, particularly Hertz's reflections on the nature of science.  I 
think the connection is important. 
Plausibly, they characterize a "living organism" as an 
"autopoietic unity", i.e. a replicating (cellular) physical entity.  In 
so doing, they clarify the inherent nature of biological 
phenomenology itself, (i.e. its innate categories and operative 
principles). 
"the potential diversification and plasticity in the family 
of organic molecules has made possible the formation of 
networks of molecular reactions that produce the same 
types of molecules that they embody, while at the same 
time they set the boundaries of the space in which they 
are formed.  These molecular networks and interactions 
that produce themselves and specify their own limits are 
... living beings."X 
 
"Autopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as 
the phenomenology proper of those unities", (my 
emphasis), "with features distinct from physical 
phenomenology... because the phenomena they generate 
in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their 
organization and the way this organization comes about, 
and not on the physical nature of their components."XI 
The legitimate and minimal principles appropriate to 
biological process are operational closure and operational 
independence. 
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"Ontogeny is the history of structural changes in a 
particular living being.  In this history each living being 
begins with an initial structure.  This structure conditions 
the course of its interactions and restricts the structural 
changes that the interactions may trigger in it", (my 
emphasis).  "At the same time, it is born in a particular 
place, in a medium that constitutes the ambience in which 
it emerges and in which it interacts.   
This ambience appears to have a structural dynamics of 
its own, operationally distinct from the living being.   
This is a crucial point.  As observers, we have 
distinguished the living system as a unity from its 
background and have characterized it as a definite 
organization.   
We have thus distinguished two structures that are going 
to be considered operationally independent of each other, 
"living being and environment." XII (my emphasis), 
Physical science's primal principle of "mechanism", 
however, leads to a distinct point of view on the interactions of 
the "autopoietic unity" with its environment: "triggering", 
"perturbation", and "structural coupling".  Organism and 
environment are coincident, not operationally dependent! 
"Every ontogeny occurs within an environment; we, as 
observers, can describe both as having a particular 
structure such as diffusion, secretion, temperature.  In 
 278
describing autopoietic unity as having a particular 
structure, it will become clear to us that the interactions 
(as long as they are recurrent) between unity and 
environment will consist of reciprocal perturbations.  In 
these interactions, the structure of the environment only 
triggers structural changes in the autopoietic unities (it 
does not specify or direct them)", (my emphasis), "and 
vice versa for the environment.  The result will be a 
history of mutual congruent structural changes as long as 
the autopoietic unity and its containing environment do 
not disintegrate: there will be a structural coupling."XIII 
(I argue that their phenomenology applies to genetic 
modification as well as ontogenic modification.  A genetic 
change -randomly and not causally obtained- is retained simply if 
it is a benefit to the functioning of the organism -i.e. solely on the 
basis of appropriateness.  It, and the summation of such genetic 
changes, therefore, do not actually imply "congruence", [in the 
sense of parallelism],  but rather some pertinent, (beneficial or at 
least non-destructive), correlation between domains.  "Structural 
coupling" and "conservation of autopoiesis" are not determinate.  
They are not "specified or directed" by the environment either; 
they are bounded by it.  Structural coupling is therefore a weaker 
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and more abstract condition than they presume –at least under my 
understanding of their usage of “congruent”.)21 
 Between the living being and the environment there is a 
"necessary structural congruence", [but see my comment above], 
"(or the unity disappears)."  But organisms must, (in the innate 
phenomenology of biology), be considered as independently 
reactive to, rather than determinately, (i.e. informationally), 
guided by their environment.  The conclusion is grounded in the 
structure of science itself: 
"In the interactions between the living being and the 
environment within this structural congruence, the 
perturbations of the environment do not determine what 
happens to the living being; rather, it is the structure of 
the living being that determines what change occurs in it.  
This interaction is not instructive",22 (my emphasis), "for 
it does not determine what its effects are going to be.   
 
                                                 
 
 
21  Cognition as a coordination of atomic primitives, (as argued in Chapter 4), 
makes a great deal of sense in this context.  The organization is not itself 
correlative to externality, but is an operative device working on ultimately 
indeterminate primitives. 
    22  i.e. informational 
“Triggering” vs “Causation”: 
Therefore, we have used the expression 'to trigger' an 
effect.  In this way we refer to the fact that the changes 
that result from the environment are brought about by the 
disturbing agent but determined by the structure of the 
disturbed system.  The same holds true for the 
environment: the living being is a source of perturbations 
and not of instructions."XIV 
 
"The key to understanding all this is indeed simple: as 
scientists, we can deal only with unities that are 
structurally determined.  That is, we can deal only with 
systems in which all their changes are determined by their 
structure, whatever it may be, and in which those 
structural changes are a result of their own dynamics or 
triggered by their interactions."XV 
Organisms react!  They react, moreover, in the 
operational closure of their current (physical) structure.  The 
latter is determined by their "ontogeny", (i.e. on their summed 
history of structural change as individuals), which has modified 
the original phenotypic structure: 
"This ongoing structural change occurs in the unity from 
moment to moment, either as a change triggered by 
interactions coming from the environment in which it 
exists or as a result of its internal dynamics.  As regards 
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its continuous interactions with the environment, the cell 
unity classifies them and sees them in accordance with its 
structure at every instant. 
  That structure, in turn continuously changes because of 
its internal dynamics.  The overall result is that the 
ontogenic transformation of a unity ceases only with its 
disintegration."XVI 
Maturana goes on to define "second order" and "third 
order structural coupling" as the structural coupling of the 
multicellular organism with its environment, and the coupling of 
intraspecies' behavioral interaction, (e.g. linguistic behavior), 
with environment respectively.  But these are always dependent 
upon the necessary conservation of the autopoiesis of the germ 
cell.   
The scope of the subsequent development, (the 
operational range), of the metacellular organism23 is determinate 
from its unicellular stage, and subject to its phenomenology.  
 "The life of a multicellular individual as a unity goes on 
through the operation of its components, but it is not 
determined by their properties.  Each one of these 
pluricellular individuals...results from the division and 
                                                 
 
 
     23  i.e. the phenotype 
segregation of a lineage of cells that originate ... (from) a 
single cell or zygote. ...It is as simple as this: the logic of 
the constitution of each metacellular organism demands 
that it be part of a cycle in which there is a necessary 
unicellular stage."XVII 
 
The Conservation of Autopoiesis: 
The conservation of the autopoiesis of that unicellular 
stage is the necessary boundary condition of the (independent and 
coincident) function of any organism, unicellular or multicellular. 
"Living beings are not unique in their determination nor 
in their structural coupling.  What is proper to them, 
however, is that structural determination and coupling in 
them take place within the framework of ongoing 
conservation of the autopoiesis that defines them, whether 
of the first or second order, and that everything in them is 
subordinate to that conservation.   
 
Thus, even the autopoiesis of the cells that make up a 
metacellular system is subordinate to its autopoiesis as a 
second-order autopoietic system.  Therefore, every 
structural change occurs in a living being necessarily 
limited by the conservation of its autopoiesis; and those 
interactions that trigger in it structural changes 
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compatible with that conservation are perturbations, 
whereas those that do not are destructive interactions.   
Ongoing structural change of living beings with 
conservation of their autopoiesis is occurring at every 
moment, continuously, in many ways at the same time. It 
is the throbbing of all life."XVIII 
 
Behavior as an Aspect of Structural Coupling: 
Behavior, from the biochemical behavior of the amoeba 
to the nervous behavior of man, is simply an aspect of 
primary structural coupling.  It is the correlation of 
sensory surfaces with motor surfaces: "...the sequence of 
movements of the amoeba is therefore produced through 
the maintenance of an internal correlation between the 
degree of change of its membrane and those protoplasmic 
changes we see as pseudopods.   
That is, a recurrent or invariable correlation is established 
between a perturbed or sensory surface of the organism 
and an area capable of producing movement (motor 
surface), which maintains unchanged a set of internal 
relations in the amoeba."XIX  
"This basic architecture of the nervous system is universal 
and valid not only for the hydra, but also for higher 
vertebrates, including human beings. ... the basic 
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organization of this immensely complicated human 
nervous system follows essentially the same logic as in 
the humble hydra ...the nervous tissue understood as a 
network of neurons has been separated like a 
compartment inside the animal, with nerves along which 
pass connections that come and go from the sensory 
surfaces and motor surfaces.   
The sole difference lies not in the fundamental 
organization of the network that generates sensorimotor 
correlations, but in the form in which this network is 
embodied through neurons and connections that vary 
from one animal species to the other. ...  
But we emphasize:  ... this is the key mechanism whereby 
the nervous system expands the realm of interactions of 
an organism: it couples the sensory and motor surfaces 
through a network of neurons whose pattern can be quite 
varied.  Once established, however, it permits many 
different realms of behavior in the phylogeny of metazoa.  
In fact, the nervous systems of varied species essentially 
differ only in the specific patterns of their interneuronal 
networks."XX 
Brain cells do not connect only to motor and receptor 
cells, however, most of them connect to other brain cells: 
"in humans, some 1011 (one hundred billion) interneurons 
interconnect some 106 (one million) motoneurons that 
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activate a few thousand muscles, with some 107 (ten 
million) sensory cellsXXI distributed as receptor surfaces 
throughout the body.  Between motor and sensory 
neurons lies the brain, like a gigantic mass of interneurons 
that interconnects them (at a ratio 10:100,000:1) in an 
ever changing dynamic."XXII 
The sensory surface includes, however, not only those 
cells that we see externally as receptors capable of being 
perturbed by the environment, "but also those cells capable of 
being perturbed by the organism itself, including the neuronal 
network."  
"Thus the nervous system participates in the operation of 
a metacellular as a mechanism that maintains within 
certain limits the structural changes of the organism.  This 
occurs through multiple circuits of neuronal activity 
structurally coupled to the medium.  
Operational Closure:  
In this sense, the nervous system can be characterized as 
having operational closure", (my emphasis).  "In other 
words, the nervous system's organization is a network of 
active components in which every change of relations of 
activity leads to further changes of relations of activity.  
Some of these relationships remain invariant through 
continuous perturbation both due to the nervous system's 
own dynamics and due to the interactions of the organism 
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it integrates.  In other words, the nervous system 
functions as a closed network of changes in relations of 
activity between its components."XXIII 
External perturbations only modulate the constant 
interplay of internal balances of sensorimotor correlations:  
 "It is enough to contemplate this structure of the nervous 
system... to be convinced that the effect of projecting an 
image on the retina is not like an incoming telephone line.  
Rather, it is like a voice (perturbation) added to many 
voices during a hectic family discussion (relations of 
activity among all incoming convergent connections) in 
which the consensus of actions reached will not depend 
on what any particular member of the family says."24 
"a nervous system...as part of an organism, will have to 
function in it by contributing to its structural 
determination from moment to moment.  This 
contribution will be due both to its very structure and to 
the fact that the result of its operation (e.g., language) 
                                                 
 
 
24  ibid Pps. 161-163.  Also consider Edelman’s comment on this same issue:  
“…  To make matters even more complicated, neurons generally send branches 
of their axons out in diverging arbors that overlap with those of other neurons, 
and the same is true of processes called dendrites on recipient neurons ….  To 
put it figuratively, if we ‘asked’ a neuron which input came from which other 
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forms part of the environment which, from instant to 
instant, will operate as a selector in the structural drift of 
the organism with conservation of adaptation. 
 
The Structural Present: 
Living beings (with or without a nervous system), 
therefore, function always in their structural present.  The 
past as a reference to interactions gone by and the future 
as a reference to interactions yet to come are valuable 
dimensions for us to communicate...however, they do not 
operate in the structural determinism of the organism at 
every moment.  With or without a nervous system, all 
organisms (ourselves included) function as they function 
and are where they are at each instant, because of their 
structural coupling."XXIV 
Maturana presents a sufficient and scientifically necessary 
rationale for the whole of "living organisms" -to include their 
"behavior".  It is convincing because of the purity and the 
correctness of his phenomenology as biology.  At each step of 
evolution, on each fundamental aspect of the functioning of an 
                                                                                                           
 
 
neuron contributing to the overlapping set of its dendritic connections, it could 
not ‘know’.”  Edelman, 1992, p.27 
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"organism", on the reconciliation of the metacellular, (in all its 
functions), with the germ cell, these are the biologically definitive 
categories and principles proper to a "living being".   
Its "purity" lies in the fact that he never, (and never has 
to), step outside this phenomenology -this particular context- to 
complete his thesis.  It is necessary and sufficient, -and 
legitimate, (in the legal sense),- to the whole of "living beings".  
It is, therefore, completely plausible.25 
Nowhere does his mechanics involve "representation", 
however!  Indeed, "representation" is inconsistent with the 
mechanics itself.  He concludes as a necessary consequence of 
scientific principle that neither organisms, nor their brains, 
operate with representations of their surroundings.   
"Representation" is inconsistent with the necessary 
phenomenology of organisms -and extrinsic, (and inessential), to 
the "mechanism" of science.  The principle of parsimony, (i.e. 
least cause), dictates his conclusion.  Organisms are structurally 
closed systems, only "perturbed" by their environment, never "in 
knowledge" of it. 
"The most popular and current view of the nervous 
system considers it an instrument whereby the organism 
                                                 
 
 
25 Compare this to Hertz’s axiomatic characterization of “the object” of 
science. 
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gets information from the environment which it then uses 
to build a representation of the world that it uses to 
compute behavior adequate for its survival in the world.   
This view requires that the environment imprint in the 
nervous system the characteristics proper to it and that the 
nervous system use them to generate behavior, much the 
same as we use a map to plot a route.  We know, 
however, that the nervous system as part of an organism 
operates with structural determination.  Therefore, the 
structure of the environment cannot specify its changes, 
but can only trigger them.  ... 
Our first tendency to describe what happens .." (is in) "... 
some form of the metaphor of 'getting information' from 
the environment represented 'within'.  Our course of 
reasoning, however, has made it clear that to use this type 
of metaphor contradicts everything we know about living 
beings."XXV 
His argument is not against models in general, however, 
but, rather, against representative models, and in this I think it is 
conclusive.26  It leaves very little room for objection.  It is 
                                                 
 
 
26   I have proposed a very different, and plausible, alternative model in Chapter 
4.  I proposed that organisms do use models, but that those models are 
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consistent, convincing and in the mainstream of science.  It leads, 
perplexingly, to a disastrous paradox:  
 
Maturana’s Paradox 
"We are faced with a formidable snag because it seems 
that the only alternative to a view of the nervous system 
as operating with representations is to deny the 
surrounding reality"! 
"Indeed, if the nervous system does not operate -and 
cannot operate -with a representation of the surrounding 
world, what brings about the extraordinary functional 
effectiveness of man and animal and their enormous 
capacity to learn and manipulate the world?  If we deny 
the objectivity of a knowable world, are we not in the 
chaos of total arbitrariness because everything is 
possible?   
                                                                                                           
 
 
schematic; their "objects" schematic objects only, aspects of operationally closed 
process.  The "objects" of that model are not "entities" in reality; they are 
optimizing loci of process itself. 
I propose that models do, in fact, exist in the human brain, but they are 
schematic models.  Their virtual "objects", (in no necessarily simple correlation 
with externality), are evolutionarily derived schematic artifacts of process like 
the "objects" of the training seminar of chapter 4.  They effectively coordinate 
the sensory and motor faculties of the brain! 
This is like walking on the razor's edge.  On one side 
there is a trap: the impossibility of understanding 
cognitive phenomena if we assume a world of objects that 
informs us because there is no mechanism that makes that 
'information' possible", (my emphasis).  On the other side, 
there is another trap: the chaos and arbitrariness of 
nonobjectivity, where everything seems possible."XXVI 
 
"In fact, on the one hand there is the trap of assuming that 
the nervous system operates with representations of the 
world.  And it is a trap, because it blinds us to the 
possibility of realizing how the nervous system functions 
from moment to moment as a definite system with 
operational closure. ... On the other hand, there is the 
other trap: denying the surrounding environment on the 
assumption that the nervous system functions completely 
in a vacuum, where everything is valid and everything is 
possible.  This is the other extreme: absolute cognitive 
solitude or solipsism. ... And it is a trap because it does 
not allow us to explain how there is a due proportion or 
commensurability between the operation of the organism 
and its world."XXVII 
Maturana and Varela have honed their "razor's edge" with 
the same care and meticulous skill with which, as biologists, they 
would undoubtedly hone a microtome.  I suggest they are 
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proposing that we stand, therefore, not on a razor's edge, but on a 
microtome's!  That, as any biologist should surely know, is an 
invitation to suicide.  It is likely to result, depending on the angle 
of fall, in decapitation or, as seems to have happened here, in a 
severing of the corpus callosum.  [ ;-) ] 
They have created a full-blown antinomy.  The usual 
method of dealing with antinomies is to examine the 
presuppositions. 
Wait though, you must surely be thinking!  Couldn't we 
just deny "mind" in its ordinary sense, then?  Isn't this the 
simplest solution to the difficulty?  Why not just abandon 
(organic) "cognition" entirely, and "experience" and 
"externality", (in our normal meanings of them), right along with 
it- and go back solely to parallel and congruent behavior itself -
i.e. to parallel reactivity, predetermined by evolution?  Why not 
just deal with the reactivity and the (reductionist) process of the 
brain as part of the world, (as most current Naturalists, in fact, 
actually do), accepting the arguments for the inadequacy and the 
inconsistency of organic cognition as a final reductio ad 
absurdum of "mental states" and deal only with organisms' 
(behavioral) function? 
Maturana and Varela have, you might correctly continue, 
specified a phenomenology specific to organisms, but they have 
specified it within the context of an actual physical world.  
Couldn't we, therefore, just deny the "figment"XXVIII of the mind, 
(the "consciousness", the "awareness" of the brain -or organism), 
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as "folk psychology" and myth?XXIX   Couldn't we consider 
"mind" as just a linguistic and behavioral phenomenon?  Sure we 
could, and it is a necessary consequence of ordinary Naturalism.  
But then we are right back, (necessarily), in Maturana's dilemma, 
(and Quine's and Kant's which are themselves the children of an 
ancient line of legitimate skepticism), but invoked at a deeper 
level!   
For how then does even the behavioral, and especially the 
linguistic27 function, (our descriptive language), of (human) 
organisms, as behavior, come to be specifically, (i.e. 
informationally), relevant to the world?  Is this not linguistic 
idealism?28  Maturana's whole primary argument -and Darwin's 
as well - is instead one of simple appropriateness.  It is "survival" 
and "structural coupling", not "information".   
This Naturalist argument presumes that organisms' 
reactivity -third order coupling, (language), and behavior- 
determined from the beginning by evolution for the phenotype 
and operationally closed thereafter, is categorical29!   This is an 
astounding conclusion and more than the principles, (and 
                                                 
 
 
27  for behavioral "knowledge" 
28 As I will suggest in Appendix A later it is also the case with Dennett’s thesis 
29  i.e. any two models are isomorphic 
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Occam's razor), will bear!  At best it is petitio principii, 
(assuming what you have to prove); at worst it is magic!  
This, however, is the only plausible course left to 
ordinary30 Naturalism after Maturana, but it is a difficult one.  It 
assumes that whatever evolution determines, (whatever 
"parallelism" or "congruency" or "adaptability" that evolution 
gets for an organism), is embodied in the genotype -and 
subsequently in the phenotype.  From that point on, the argument 
is necessarily entrapped in the operational closure of the 
organism.  That closed system must determine its reactivity, (its 
supposed "parallel reactivity"), forever after throughout its 
subsequent ontogenic history.31 
But if even the weather is not determinate from a fixed set 
of principles and starting point, then how are we to believe that 
evolution has embodied the complexity of day to day, week to 
week, or year to year physical reality in such a fixed beginning?  
What model does evolution, (as embodied in the genotype), itself 
have that it is trying to parallel?  If a butterfly in Australia can 
cause a hurricane in Florida then how are we to believe that 
                                                 
 
 
30  cf Chapter 7 for my distinction of "ordinary Naturalism" from "relativized 
Naturalism". 
31  February, 2010.  Another possibility occurs to me at this time.  It is that 
genes for a communicating entity might serve.  I.e. a “linguistic” entity in the 
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evolution has a model at all, much less that it can embody such in 
closed (behavioral or linguistic) principles and laws of reactivity 
for the phenotype. 
The argument assumes that evolution launched a closed 
operational system, (the phenotype), out into the world.  But 
evolution could not know what that phenotype must be functional 
with -i.e. evolution has no model itself!32  Evolution cannot 
predict the world -especially in its human-scale features.  It 
cannot predict the weather, the pattern of rocks, foliage, water 
and heat -i.e. "the facts"- in an ecosystem, and, if not them, then 
it surely cannot predict the more complex reactivity of the 
organism's fellow biological creatures -pinching claws, a stalking 
tiger, or an infection by vibrio comma, (cholera).   
"Chaos theory", (for instance), argues that while cyclical 
processes, (e.g. the large-scale motions of the planets and stars), 
produce regular and predictable results, non-linear processes do 
not.  But physical process, (the ongoing world), especially at the 
human scale, is, in fact, dynamic and non-linear.  Moreover it is, 
by and large, not cyclical.  It is, therefore, not predictable in a 
determinate model. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
broad sense of any passage of “memes” for instance –by whatever route.  This 
does not invalidate my central thesis in any sense however. 
32 February, 2010.  Note: See “other minds” discussion and graphic in Chapter 
1.  It gives a clue to this problem, consistent with my just prior footnote.    
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To assume that such a correspondence to the physical 
world can be implemented throughout the lifespan of an 
organism in a fixed and determinate, and specifically a parallel 
operative model, (an informational model), is a difficult premise.  
For the specifically biological world, the biological ecosystem, it 
is more than difficult.  More plausible is that evolution works by 
the creation of dynamic and operative local, (primitive) -and not 
informational -functions that are intimately and locally connected 
to changing process –[that affect it “at the system level”]!33 
The creation of a multitude of these atomic functions that 
track, (i.e. trigger from), incremental change in the physical 
world is a more plausible evolutionary scenario than the 
representationist one.  But this is exactly my first hypothesis: that 
evolution created local functions like this at the cellular level.  
The organization of these atomic processes then becomes the real 
problem for the "evolutionary engineer", and it is this 
organization which, I propose, was accomplished incrementally 
by the schematic model.   
Our primitive (biological) "objects" are organizers, I 
argue, organizing loci of these atomic processes and not 
                                                 
 
 
33 February 2010.   It gives rise not to an “informational” model, but rather to 
an ongoing refinement of a strategic model which is perfectly consistent with 
my thesis. 
informational representations.  The schematic object is an 
organization of atomic processes, which latter track we-know-
not-what. 
For how could even evolution know what that "what" 
might be?    Evolution produces the operationally closed 
structural coupling of the phenotype, but that structural coupling 
must be specifically dynamic rather than informational.  What 
evolution can deal with are such processes, not information.  It 
can deal with processes that work on the local, tactical level. 
The representationalist schema, (of ordinary Naturalism), 
is not plausible.  No, that is not quite true; it is plausible inside of 
our own human cognitive model.  It is plausible because it 
happens that way!  My argument is that it happens that way 
because it is inside of our model! 
To quote Dennett, (a surprising passage for me): 
"it is not the point of our sensory systems that they should 
detect 'basic' or 'natural' properties of the environment, 
but just that they should serve our 'narcissistic' purposes 
in staying alive; nature doesn't build epistemic engines." 
XXX  I find this a very curious statement –coming from 
Dennett. 
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This is an antinomy.  No, more accurately, it is a specific 
and pointed reductio ad absurdum of the (ordinary) Naturalist 
premise!34  What Bertrand Russell says of naive realism applies 
to ordinary Naturalism, its (natural) child: 
"We all start from 'naive realism'.  We think that grass is 
green, that stones are hard, and that snow is cold.  But 
physics assures us that the greenness of grass, the 
hardness of stones, and the coldness of snow are not the 
greenness, hardness, and coldness that we know in our 
own experience, but something very different.   
The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a 
stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the 
effects of the stone upon himself.  Thus science seems to 
be at war with itself: when it most means to be objective, 
it finds itself plunged into subjectivity against its will.  
Naive realism leads to physics, and physics, if true, shows 
that naive realism is false.  Therefore naive realism, if 
true, is false; therefore it is false."XXXI   
To paraphrase Russell, if we know, then we can't know.  
Therefore we do not know. 
                                                 
 
 
34  but not of relativized Naturalism!  cf Chapter 7 
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Maturana and Varela characterized the dilemma 
incorrectly, however.  They specified a necessary choice between 
solipsism on the one hand, and representationalism/realism on the 
other, and this is not the case. 
The Axiom of Externality 
 
We needn't deny reality based on their arguments, just our 
specific knowledge of it!  Nor need we deny "mind".  It is the 
acceptance of an "Axiom of Externality", in its most abstract 
form, taken axiomatically, that is demanded here,35 and that is 
not denied by their arguments.  It is the improper extension of 
that demand, and its confusion with the particulars of our 
specifically human organic process, (to include cognition), that 
generates the difficulty. 
As realists we must grant the presumption of 
"externality": i.e. we must grant the simple posit of an ontic 
existence.  It is fundamental to sanity and to plausibility.  The 
posit of our world: men and baseballs and trees and planets as 
necessary ontic entities, however, is not!  Even our perceptual 
world is a part of our closed cognitive process.  I have argued, (in 
Chapter 4), that it is an operative, (and dynamic), artifact. 
                                                 
 
 
35  both here and in the foundations of physics 
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But, you surely object once again, we cannot deny the 
"objects of our experience" and their apparent relationality!  I 
agree, it is these objects which provide the stability of our life 
experience and ground the very essence of sanity, (my thesis is 
not solipsism).  In the next chapter, I will show why we need not. 
We all want our naive world to be real: trucks, men, 
planets and baseballs, and all our normal relations between them 
-i.e. all the things they do.  It is a necessary component of 
"sanity", and distinguishes it from dreams, fantasies, and, baldly, 
insanity.  If a rock hits me on the head, it will hurt! 
But, contrarily, our best science says that our naive world is not 
real!  What is real for science are atoms, forces, photons, 
quarks,... all embedded in some mathematically esoteric spatial 
context.   
For it, myself and the man in front of me are, in fact, 
biological pluralities, or, deeper still, atomic amalgams... down to 
the deepest levels of physical conception.  Naturalism, (the 
scientifically extended36 form of our naive conception and the 
verity Maturana is loathe to lose), allows this heresy only because 
it says that our natural world is hierarchically,37 (and 
                                                 
 
 
36  to whatever level of sophistication! 
37 See the discussion in the Preamble to this work for a detailed discussion of 
hierarchy.  The reduction of scientific theories, (and theoretic reduction in 
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isomorphically), embedded in that primitive existence which 
science posits, and that those hierarchical entities, (our normal 
"objects"), act as units.  It maintains that this reduction is 
                                                                                                           
 
 
general), is subject to a fundamental logical limitation under the classical, (pre-
Cassirerian), concept.  In Chapter 3, I exhibited Cassirer's arguments that the 
whole root of the classical formal concept is set-theoretical.  Concepts, or 
concepts of "things", (to include, for instance, our ordinary objects), were 
reducible only in a set-theoretic sense, i.e. by abstraction, (intersection), of 
common properties.  They are, therefore, subject to Russell's "theory of types".  
At the bottom level, and there must be a bottom level according to the theory of 
types, there are atomic primitives.  Each of the levels above that must be 
hierarchically oriented, each containing the one above it, (i.e. the "things" of the 
next higher level are abstractions -intersections-  of the ones below).  This theory 
of types was the logically necessary result of the antinomies discovered in the 
roots of set theory.  The most famous is, of course, Russell's paradox. 
Cassirer's fundamental advance on the classical formal concept, "the 
mathematical concept of function" however, provides an escape.  There is no 
"Cassirer's paradox" in the universal formation of concepts.  There is no 
"concept of all concepts", because concepts are now constituted as an 
assemblage of (consistent) generative rules, not as a (set-theoretic) abstraction 
(intersection) of properties -which currently stands for the process of scientific 
reduction.  There is clearly no "rule of all rules" as some rules obviously 
contravene others.  At the level of my "concept of implicit definition", concepts 
are assemblages of rules, of "axioms", (i.e. fundamental and consistent 
generative rules), and the same situation obtains.  But, just as is the well 
demonstrated case for mathematical axiom systems, it is possible to exchange an 
appropriate subset of theorems for the pre-existing axioms, (while still 
absolutely preserving the integrity -the interior relationality- of the mathematical 
subject), so is it possible to "cross-reduce" theories.  We do not have one single 
preferred perspective. 
    This is the relativism of Cassirer's "symbolic forms".  What remains is the 
"web" of relationality, the "invariants" of experience that must be preserved 
under all comprehensive perspectives.  But that web, those invariants must be 
viewed, in Van Fraassen's term, in a "coordinate-free" sense, i.e. they must be 
viewed in their abstract relationality, not from any particular orientation.  cf. 
Chapter 5 and Afterword: Lakoff / Edelman.  See also the “mathematical ideals” 
discussion in Chapter 9. 
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specifically a hierarchical38 one which maintains all the spatial 
and material relationships down through each and all of the 
depths of scale -hence their reality!   
Modern science has not confirmed, but rather has 
seriously questioned, that assertion.  What are we to embed them 
in?  At the bottom level of physics, "matter", "space", even 
"existence", in the sense in which naive realism uses them, are 
anomalous terms.  Even "cardinality" as such -the "how many of 
it"- is dubious!39 
Even ordinary Naturalism40 does not, therefore, maintain 
the integrity of our naive objects!  But is its insistence on the 
maintenance of the hierarchical integrity of those objects a 
necessary, or even a plausible presupposition at this juncture in 
our intellectual history? 
My hypothesis of the schematic object, contrarily, says 
that our naive world -to include its relationality, (its laws and 
happenings),-is more probably unhierarchically, (but rather 
transformationally), correspondent with absolute externality, 
whatever and however the latter may be.   
                                                 
 
 
38 Please consider Bell’s comments in Chapter 3 on hierarchy 
39 Cf Penrose on the twin-slit experiment, for instance 
40  i.e. scientific naturalism = "scientific realism" 
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Ultimately it says that our naive world is in 
correspondence to "points" of atomic biological process,41 and 
not to "points" of ontology.  It is a metaphor of response.  It says 
that the further correspondence between those atomic processes 
themselves and ontology is completely indeterminate to us as 
biological and cognitive entities! 
The acceptance of this,  the bare, raw existence42 of such 
a correlation, however, constitutes a necessary requirement for 
any sane or plausible argument -to include my own.  This is 
assertion, the "Axiom of Externality" in its most abstract and 
precise form, and constitutes the first of the two necessary, 
(apodictic), premises for realist reason.
my 
                                                
43  (The other is the 
"Axiom of Experience" which I will treat in the following 
chapter.) 
The "realism" Maturana impeaches is, in fact, (ordinary) 
"Naturalism".  Nor has he really made a case that solipsism is the 
only other alternative.44  While his case against 
 
 
 
41  It is an optimizing organization of primitive, organic process -i.e. of primitive 
operational process. 
42  which assumes, therefore, both the axiom of existence and the reality of 
experience 
43  Is the "axiom of externality" the same as the "realistic imperative" of Hume?  
Is it an emotional imperative?  It orients world-views. 
44  Theirs is a structured isolation.  It does not support the implication that 
"everything is valid and everything is possible"! 
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representationalism does destroy the claims of ordinary 
Naturalism,45 a realistic case is still possible -but it must be a 
theoretically mature one.  Einstein's realism46 is more plausible.   
That brand of realism involves simply that "theory be 
organized around a [some] conceptual model of an observer-
independent realm".XXXII  My thesis takes this "some" in its most 
abstract form, as the (pure) limit of reason.  This "realism" is 
certainly more credible in light of today's physics.  Realism is 
more robust than Maturana assumes, and is capable of greater 
sophistication than a mere linear extension of the naive world-
view.  In Fine's words, it is an "attitude".  In disagreement with 
Fine however, I believe it is a robust attitude. 
Maturana came very close to the answer I propose 
however.  His "object" of cognition47 is an object of process: 
"cognition does not concern" [external] "objects, for cognition is 
effective action."  He relapses, however, into [the language of] 
                                                 
 
 
45  Since it assumes the premise of naturalism and ends in a contradiction, it is, 
in fact, a reductio ad absurdum. 
46  "It is existence and reality that one wishes to comprehend. ... When we strip 
the (this) statement of its mystical elements we mean that we are seeking for the 
simplest possible system of thought which will bind together the observed facts." 
(Einstein 1934, Pps. 112-113) 
47  In fact, they do not actually allow an "object" of cognition, as the following 
citation shows.  I am referring here to that aspect of brain process -the effective 
action- which corresponds to their object of linguistic coupling -which latter is 
the only "object" they will explicitly allow. 
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the "objects" of the Naturalistic context in which he framed the 
problem: 
"Thus, human cognition as effective action pertains to the 
biological domain, but it is always lived in a cultural 
tradition.  The explanation of cognitive phenomena that 
we have presented in this book is based on the tradition of 
science and is valid insofar as it satisfies scientific 
criteria.  It is singular within that tradition, however, in 
that it brings forth a basic conceptual change:  cognition 
does not concern objects, for cognition is effective 
action..."48 
"At the same time, as a phenomenon of languaging in the 
network of social and linguistic coupling, the mind is not 
something that is within my brain.49   
Consciousness and mind belong to the realm of social 
coupling.50  That is the locus of their 
dynamics....Language was never invented by anyone only 
to take in an outside world.  Therefore, it cannot be used 
                                                 
 
 
48 How close this is to my suggestion that “objects” are the a/d converters of the 
brain. 
49 See prior reference to “other minds” 
50 To repeat a prior reference, they display here a problem that is ubiquitous 
amongst epistemologists, (to include even Kant himself), who always posit “a 
God’s Eye View”.    
as a tool to reveal that world.  Rather, it is by languaging 
that the act of knowing, in the behavioral coordination 
which is language, brings forth a world.” 
No, I think it brings forth a common intentional strategy 
towards “a world”! 
  “...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling, not 
as a preexisting reference nor in reference to an origin, 
but as an ongoing transformation in the becoming of the 
linguistic world that we build with other human beings", 
(metacellular organisms).XXXIII 
 But "language ... cannot be used as a tool to reveal [the] 
world."  Hence, (accepting his own conclusion), all his primitives 
at the final telling are "entities" solely of linguistic (and 
ontogenic) coupling, and, as such, have no absolute referent!  He 
maintains that we are wrong in characterizing the actual world "in 
reference to an origin".  
 Yet he does exactly that himself.  He frames his 
primitives: structural coupling, metacellular coupling, 
intraspecies' coupling, ("third order coupling"), and linguistic 
coupling as interactions of "autopoietic [biological] unities"!   
What "autopoietic unities"?  And where?  Where do these 
linguistic domains exist -and between what and whom?  Where 
does his book exist?  Does it, and, if so, how is it relevant to 
anything at all?  What "history of evolution"?   
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These linguistic terms supposedly do not "reveal the 
world"! 
He is, in fact, committed to a Naturalist ground, and it 
contains real organisms, i.e. "objects".  His "object" is ambiguous 
however.  On the one hand it is solely a product of linguistic 
coupling, (the object of language), but, on the other hand, (in his 
presupposition of objects/biological unities which are coupled), it 
is also the basis of his ontology.  This is an explicit and fatal self-
contradiction.   
Either the object, i.e. the organism, actually exists -
providing the ground of this linguistic coupling, -or it does not -
in which case "linguistic coupling" is vacuous! 
Does my own thesis make our objects not real, then?51  
Does it mean that there is no connection between them and the 
"externality" we must assume?  The answer is emphatically 
"No!"  The connection is in the interface itself, ("structural 
coupling") and "experience".  But the latter must be understood 
in terms of the former.  We are not justified in assigning a 
particular ontic interpretation to "experience".52 
                                                 
 
 
51 I will make this case in greater detail in the next chapter. 
52  Naturalism's mistake is in trying to assign an ontic reference to our whole 
cognitive domain.  As I have argued, we are justified in making only two 
primitive ontic, (metaphysical), assertions: "externality" and "experience".  
These are the minimal and the maximal legitimate ontic posits. Maturana will 
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In my next chapter I will "slice" this problem from 
another side, (citing Quine and Cassirer), and argue that 
"experience", as an ontic posit -and a cognitive primitive -while 
absolutely justified as such, can be legitimately described only as 
that which remains invariant under all possible (viable) 
interpretations, (and I will argue there is always more than one 
interpretation).  But "invariants" are in themselves a very 
concrete form: they stand, for instance, as the foundation of the 
Theory of Relativity.   
Our human cognitive world, and specifically our 
perceptual world: people and baseballs and the things they do, 
are real, but they are real in the most general interpretation of 
their relationality, (them and the things they do).  This is not so 
strange a conception -it is implicit in the reductions of science 
already.  But the latter's requirements of hierarchy and 
isomorphism are not inherent; they constitute the crux of the 
problem.  It is those requirements which lead to the disastrous 
end of Maturana's noble and profound enterprise.   
Beneficial connection, pertinent connection between 
domains, (i.e. "structural coupling"), does not require 
"parallelism", it does not imply "congruence", it does not require 
                                                                                                           
 
 
contribute a third: i.e. “structural coupling” which I will identify with 
“interface”!  See Chapters 9 and 10. 
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"hierarchy".53  Virtual embodiment demonstrates another, non-
hierarchical yet exhaustive possibility of compatibility, and it is 
this that I have argued in my first thesis. 
Maturana's thesis of "structural coupling" is of profound 
importance.  It is an epistemological principle of the highest 
significance.54  It is a necessary consequence of his Naturalist 
beginnings -and impeaches them!  It precedes and supersedes 
even its biological origin in its relation to the fundamental 
problem of knowledge.  
 Biology, therefore, must integrate into a new and larger 
frame, a new orientation of the whole context of our world and 
our reality.  But the Copernican center of that frame must be 
structural coupling itself.  (Think of the connection between 
“structural coupling” and Kant’s  brilliant vision!)  It is 
"structural coupling" which must ground biology; it is not 
biology which must ground "structural coupling"!55  (This 
                                                 
 
 
53  Could there be a congruent correspondence, (though admittedly not 
apodictic), however?  Sure, but would be "magic" of a high order-  "and then a 
miracle occurs"!  Churchland, 1986) 
54  It is, in fact, a biological and epistemological principle of relativity.  This 
does not imply that it is a frivolous relativity, (i.e. solipsism), however, no more 
than did Einstein's Relativity imply a lawlessness in physics! 
55  It is not an unusual, (nor inconsistent), practice in mathematics to begin by 
constructing a new mathematical discipline from one set of premises, and then to 
start all over with what were originally derivative consequences as the new, (and 
more appropriate), primitives. 
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possibility will be argued in the next chapter within the context of 
Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms”.)  
I propose to accept absolutely the consequences of 
"structural coupling": that the "object" of biological cognition is a 
function of brain process itself –it is “an object of effective 
action”!  It is not an embodiment of its environment.56  But this 
must necessarily translate into a Copernican revolution in our 
very world-view: if we are biological organisms, then the objects 
of our own human world-view are objects of process, of response 
as well.  They are "objects" of "effective action"! 
Maturana and Varela's profound heuristic principle 
reduces their premise to absurdity -i.e. the metaphysical certitude 
of the ordinary Naturalist world-view from which they started.  
The naive-realistic world, (the represented "naturalist" world), 
can have no internal relevance to the organism, as organism.  But 
this does not impeach the science, (evolution and biology), which 
is their ground -no more than did Einstein's Relativity impeach 
the physics which was his ground!  The viable relationality, (the 
viable system of predictivity), of biology and evolution, (and of 
science generally), can be, (must be!), preserved, (as was the 
observed relationality of Ptolemean astronomy -times and angles 
                                                 
 
 
56  Though this might still seem self-contradictory, please bear with me.  I will 
explain myself fully in the next chapter. 
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and relative positions- in the Copernican system which replaced 
it), but they must be  interpreted as transformations rather than as 
reductions. 
Are we to throw away the whole of our human enterprise 
then -to include its science?  Of course not -that would be 
preposterous!  But the most profound and most radical advances 
in human thought, its "Copernican revolutions" and 
"SUPERBXXXIV theories", have always, (by necessity), subsumed 
the viable parts of pre-existing knowledge.  In the present case, 
the subsumption of the preponderance of naive realism and the 
preponderance of naturalist science stand as necessities.  They 
work, after all, with a power and effectiveness which is awesome.   
My proposal does not suggest or imply that they be 
considered any less important.  It subsumes the whole of those 
vistas, but it subsumes them in their viable relationality,57 and 
not in their specific ontic (metaphysical) reference!  Their 
connection to externality is operational, and not referential.  In 
their whole, they constitute a profoundly effective and complex 
algorithm of unparalleled significance whose link to externality i
"structural c
s 
oupling". 
                                                 
 
 
57  i.e. their predictivity! I will clarify this point in my next chapter. 
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Relativized Materialsm 
  The latter, however, is referentially indeterminate, (i.e. 
metaphysically so)  Science turns recursively back on itself in 
biology and finds that there is a limitation to knowledge itself.  
Structural coupling is the antinomy which forces the absolute 
relativization of all knowing -to include "biology" and 
"evolution" -and even "perception" - themselves.  These are 
"creatures" of human knowledge, of cognition.  They are 
organizers, not primitives.58   
Our true primitive is "experience", (under the necessary 
premise of "externality"), not any particular interpretation -or 
organization of it.  My hypothesis implies, then, a relativization 
of epistemology precisely equivalent to Einstein's relativization 
of physics.  This is what Cassirer concluded as well.XXXV 
 
An Answer to the New Dilemma: 
At last I can give a preliminary answer, (which I will 
complete in the next chapter), to the disturbing question raised at 
the beginning of the chapter.  How can I presume the naturalistic 
                                                 
 
 
58  It is explicit in Maturana's argument, (as we have seen), that "structural 
coupling" and "the conservation of autopoiesis", (and "congruence" itself), are 
specifically part of the closed, human (biological) cognitive process. 
world -with its "evolution"- to prove a hypothesis which severely 
questions them?XXXVI  How can I use a (Darwinian) biological 
argument, (which presumes a simple correspondence between our 
cognitions and the real physical world), against that very 
simplicity -and embodiment- itself?   
If my thesis is true, then our ultimate external reality, 
(ontology), is not necessarily, (nor even probably), like the reality 
of our cognitive model!  The answer is that "evolution" is as 
much an organizing principle as is "causation".  It, (and the 
objects it treats), is part of the (closed) model itself.  It is not a 
necessary, (or proper!), metaphysical presumption, but is, in 
Kant's words, a “synthetic a priori” proposition.  It is not a 
necessary part of reality; it is a necessary (plausible), part of our 
cognition of reality.  As such, I can use it with perfect legitimacy 
within that closed domain.  But I use it, (modifying but keeping 
the sense of Dennett's word), "heterophenomenologically", i.e. 
with a neutral ontic reference! 
My epistemological and metaphysical position, therefore, 
corresponds very much to Kant's, and ultimately, to Cassirer's.  It 
is neither idealism nor solipsism, but a genuine, (and realistic), 
ontic indeterminism. 
 
Kant’s Critical Idealism:   
"Idealism consists in the assertion that there are none but 
thinking beings, all other things which we think are 
perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations 
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in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them 
in fact corresponds.  I, on the contrary, say that things as 
objects of our senses existing outside us are", (my 
emphasis), "given, but we know nothing of what they may 
be in themselves, knowing only their appearances, that is, 
the representations which they cause in us by affecting 
our senses.   
Consequently I grant by all means that there are bodies 
without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to 
us as to what they are in themselves, we yet know by the 
representations which their influence on our sensibility 
procures us.  These representations we call 'bodies', a term 
signifying merely the appearance of the thing which is 
unknown to us, but not therefore less actual.  Can this be 
termed idealism?” 
  Is he an idealist, then?  I think his recharacterization of 
himself as a “critical idealist” was a profound and misleading 
mistake –probably his greatest! 
   “Long before Locke's time, but assuredly since him, it 
has generally assumed and granted without detriment to 
the actual existence of external things that many of their 
predicates may be said to belong, not to the things in 
themselves, but to their appearances, and to have no 
proper existence outside of our representation.   
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Heat, color and taste, for instance, are of this kind.  Now, 
if I go farther and, for weighty reasons, rank as mere 
appearances the remaining qualities of bodies also, which 
are called primary -such as extension, place, and, in 
general, space... with all that which belongs to it 
(impenetrability or materiality, shape, etc.)",  (my 
emphasis), "-no  one in the least can adduce the reason of 
its being inadmissible.   
As little as the man who admits colors not to be properties 
of the object in itself, but only as modifications of the 
sense of sight, should on that account be called an idealist, 
so little can my thesis be named idealistic merely because 
I find that more, nay, all the properties which constitute 
the intuition of a body belong merely to its appearance.”  
[His emphasis]. 
 It is on such points that I claim that Kant is in no way an 
“idealist”, but was rather, in my own terminology, an “ontic 
indeterminist” which I think is a more accurate description.. 
“The existence of the thing that appears is thereby not 
destroyed as in genuine idealism, but it is only shown that 
we cannot possibly know it by the senses as it is in 
itself."XXXVII    
The “world” as ontic reality certainly does exist for Kant, 
and he acknowledges it as “substantia phenomenon”.  My 
knowledge of the world however is necessarily indeterminate.  
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His is a world of ontic indeterminism, but not a denial of the 
ontic existence of “the world” itself.  The ontic world, for Kant, 
is most certainly not “his idea”. 
The term "indeterminism" refers to the impossibility of 
knowing the nature of that ontic reality independent of our 
cognition.  It does not, however, assert a doubt as to, but rather 
affirms, its existence. 
"Matter is substantia phaenomenon.  Whatever is intrinsic 
to it I seek in all parts of the space that it occupies and in 
all effects that it exerts, which, after all, can never be 
anything but phenomena of the outer sense.   
Thus I have nothing absolute but merely something 
comparatively internal which, in its turn consists only of 
external relationships.  But what appears to the mere 
understanding as the absolute essence of matter is again 
simply a fancy, for matter is never an object of pure 
understanding; but the transcendental object that may be 
the ground of this appearance called matter is a bare 
Something,” [Note: I would use the term ‘somewhat’ 
instead!], “whose nature we should never be able to 
understand even though someone could tell us about it. ...  
The observation and analysis of phenomena press toward 
a knowledge of the secrets of nature and there is no 
knowing how far they may penetrate in time.  But for all 
that we shall never succeed in answering those 
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transcendental questions that reach out beyond nature, 
though all nature were to be revealed to our gaze."XXXVIII 
I will, (in chapters 6 through 10), however, make the 
limiting step that Kant did not.  I will posit our cognitive 
interface, (whatever that may ontically be”!59), as itself a 
metaphysical entity.  It is a part of the minimal (realistic) ontic 
posit.  It is the synthesis of "externality" and "experience".XXXIX  
It is the generalization of “structural coupling”! 
Knowledge is cognitively closed.  It is an organizational 
system that works.  It is Quine's "body of statements and beliefs", 
(see Preface or Chapter 5), constrained only by its "boundary 
conditions", ("experience").  But it exists always within the 
human (biological) cognitive frame.  It can never achieve a 
"God's eye view"! 
"It is by languaging that the act of knowing, in the 
behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a 
world.  ...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling, 
not as a preexisting reference nor in reference to an 
origin, but as an ongoing transformation in the becoming 
of the linguistic world that we build with other human 
beings."XL 
                                                 
 
 
59 i.e. “heterophenomenologically” 
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A New and More Recent Perspective on Maturana: 
I said at the beginning of this chapter that though I have 
not changed my conclusions on its original essence, I had a 
significant and clarifying insight on it as seen within the context 
of this current writing.  What is it that is substantially new in 
Maturana’s perspective that is different from Kant’s?  And what 
was wrong with Kant’s?   
To review: I think there was a lot still wrong with Kant’s 
vision.  For instance, he still maintained that there was a logical 
necessity of ontological “things” -of “objects” per se  “out there”, 
(“substantia phenomenon”).  This conception was inherited, 
though modified by Cassirer -and I think they were both wrong.  
Maturana and VarelaXLI exposed the crucial factor in dealing 
with this part of the problem, i.e. “structural coupling”.  
 
Hear Kant: 
“...though we cannot know these objects as things in 
themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think 
them as things in themselves”, [“ding an sich”], 
“otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion 
that there can be appearance without anything that 
appears."XLII 
[Note: And why not?  My thesis argues that this is 
precisely the case, -that “appearance” is an organizational 
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property rather than a referential one, which is no way inherently 
“absurd”.] 
This passage distinguishes Kant’s position from my own:  
-from Maturana’s “structural coupling”60, from my “concept of 
implicit definition”, and from my “schematic GUI”.  Maturana’s 
“structural coupling” connects two absolutely distinct operative 
domains in the most abstract conceptual manner.  My “concept of 
implicit definition” as combined with the “schematic GUI” shows 
how there can be appearance “without anything”, (ontological 
interpreted, e.g. –“ding an sich”), “that appears”, and how that 
“appearance” can, in fact, be efficacious and pragmatic without 
requiring representation in whatever guise.61 
I don’t think Maturana and Varela finished their task 
however.  They made mistakes,62 but they actually did the 
essential work, and it is profoundly brilliant and important.  They 
showed that the basic (conceptual)  operational domains: 
“environment” and “organism” are distinct and separate, lacking 
any possible transfer of “information”! 
                                                 
 
 
60 sans “congruent” 
61 We might correct Kant’s citation above by substituting “anywhat” for 
“anything”. 
62 in their progression to “congruent” structural coupling which I argue is 
unnecessary  to their perspective. 
"The key to understanding all this is indeed simple: as 
scientists, we can deal only with unities that are 
structurally determined.  That is, we can deal only with 
systems in which all their changes are determined by their 
structure, whatever it may be, and in which those 
structural changes are a result of their own dynamics or 
triggered by their interactions."XLIII   
But then comes the crucial point: 
This is a crucial point.  As observers, we have 
distinguished the living system as a unity from its 
background and have characterized it as a definite 
organization.  We have thus distinguished two structures 
that are going to be considered operationally independent 
of each other, (my emphasis): "living being and 
environment…  
Therefore, we have used the expression 'to trigger' an 
effect.  In this way we refer to the fact that the changes 
that result from the environment are brought about by the 
disturbing agent but determined by the structure of the 
disturbed system.  The same holds true for the 
environment: the living being is a source of perturbations 
and not of instructions."XLIV 
They describe the structural coupling of two domains, two 
absolutely isolated operative domains, and this allows a total 
disassociation of the brain’s, (organism’s), “things”, -of its 
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“objects” from what was thought to be the bare logical 
necessities of “externality”. 
"In the interactions between the living being and the 
environment within this structural congruence63, the 
perturbations of the environment do not determine what 
happens to the living being; rather, it is the structure of 
the living being that determines what change occurs in it. 
I consider Maturana’s writing to be as profound as Kant’s.  
I consider it to be an extension and a logical consequence of 
Kant’s profound biological insight. 
Maturana’s absolute primitives, “living being”, 
(“autopoietic entity”) and “environment” are defined as pure 
concepts, not as classes, (or “objects”), however.  Nowhere in his 
development has Maturana been forced to specify referents 
across these domains.  He deals, at least as far as the interaction 
goes, always with the pure concepts, as concepts, themselves.   
But Cassirer has forced us to a new understanding of 
“concepts”!.  Even Cassirer’s concept, his “functional concept of 
mathematics” is defined, at bottom however, referentially like 
Kant’s.  It is the “concept of implicit definition” which makes 
sense of this situation.  It allows a non-referential view of the 
                                                 
 
 
63 See my comment on “congruence” 
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concept itself by incorporating Hilbert’s perspective.  It allows 
the notion of a purely operational concept! 
  It is not logically required, (after Maturana), that we 
have ontological “things”, nor do we need to have “something”.  
What we do require, (as realists), is a somewhat, some unknown,  
input and output domains64 –i.e. a concept of “externality” in 
Maturana’s sense!  This is my assertion of an “axiom of 
externality”, which stands as the first of three axioms that I argue 
constitute the minimal and necessary requirements of realist 
reason. 
We require a domain of “externality” that is somehow 
related to the domain of the brain.   My concept of implicit 
definition does not require a functional, set-theoretic correlation 
but instead allows any beneficial correlation of domains.65  
Chaos theory, complexity theory, Freeman’s dispersive mapping, 
Bell’s “local mathematics” … suggest just some of the 
possibi
s own 
at 
                                                
lities.  
But Maturana did not accept the consequences of hi
profound paradigm shift, and he proceeded to develop his 
conception of “congruent structural coupling”. I have argued th
 
 
 
64 and, I argue from our beginning pages, that it is inherently unknowable at 
all from the materialistic perspective of “brain as machine”! 
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he went too far.  Structural coupling alone, but not “congruent 
structural coupling” is the actual consequence of his arguments,
as “congruence” presumes, but does not justify, an out and out 
parallelism. I think that “structural coupling” and “triggering” 
contradict the conception of “parallel structural coupling”
latter assumes that we, as metacellular enti
 
 as the 
ties can have 
knowledge of what is on “the other side”! 
The Pa
l 
atically.  We too must “kick away the ladder”. 
(See Figure 22) 
                                                                                                          
 
rallel Postulate  
I have called “parallel structural coupling” the “paralle
postulate” of biology in analogy to the famous mathematical 
problem.  Evolutionary theory teaches us otherwise.  What we 
require is mere appropriateness pure and simple –i.e. anything 
that works pragm
 
 
 
65 Consider category theory’s “morphisms” for instance –see footnote in 
Chapter 7. 
 Figure 22 
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 To repeat myself, this is a fault with just about all of the 
epistemological philosophers, (to include even Kant himself –and 
Edelman, and W.J. Freeman, the Churchlands, et al…).  They 
always posit “a God’s eye view” and accept their own basic 
terms as referential in some real sense.   
The only plausible –and truly scientific alternative to it 
that I can see is a relativism, (albeit a rigid relativism), of 
epistemology itself.  Cassirer supplied just such a relativism in 
his “Theory of Symbolic Forms”, and mathematics, in its 
conception of “mathematical ideals” confirms its essence.  But 
Cassirer’s thesis at its bottom is conceptual as well66; it is not 
based in classes or “objects”.  It deals with perspectives.  It is a 
conceptual scheme.  Consider Hertz: 
"The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of 
things; they have with things the one essential agreement 
which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, [of 
successful consequences], but further agreement with 
things is not necessary to their purpose.  Actually we do 
not know and have no means of finding out whether our 
ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than 
in this one fundamental relation."XLV 
                                                 
 
 
66 As is Maturana’s 
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It is just Cassirer’s theme67 –as modified with 
Maturana’s- which I pursued en route to my third hypothesis.  It 
is the only philosophical perspective that allows us to use 
ordinary descriptive language “heterophenomenologically”, 
(using Dennett’s term), i.e. without an absolute ontic 
commitment.  This is the conception that allowed my idea of a 
“relativized naturalism”, (equivalently “relativized matter”), 
stated earlier. 
The trick here is to understand Cassirer’s “Theory of 
Symbolic Forms” in terms of Swabey‘s characterization of him 
as having created an honest-to-god epistemological theory of 
relativity.  The keys words here are “epistemological” and 
“relativity”.   
“Relativity” in a scientific sense means a rigid translation 
of invariants.  “Epistemological” means how we describe the 
world.  The key to understanding Cassirer is that he asserts that 
we have some kind of a constant set of invariants across all 
viable epistemological descriptions of reality.  This is where we 
are coming to and it is the crucial point.   
This is the theme that we will revisit in the summation at 
the end of the chapters 9 and 10:  -in the characterization of “the 
                                                 
 
 
67 The passage  above from Hertz is cited in Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” as 
part of its rationale. 
interface” and the “contemplate your navel” sections of it.  It 
leads into Swabey’s characterization.  Cassirer asserts that there 
is, in fact, a set of invariants, but those invariants cannot be 
definitively described from any particular perspective.  That is, 
they cannot be exclusively described from any single particular 
epistemological perspective –not even from mathematical 
physics!  This is the “contemplate your navel” part of my answer.  
(See also the “Where Cassirer and I Fundamentally Differ” 
heading in Chapter 12). 
In the next chapter I will explore the other axiom of 
reason, the Axiom of Experience, and conclude my answer to the 
epistemological problem I have raised.  Quine and Cassirer show 
the way.  This will then allow a brief and succinct statement of 
my third and final thesis in Chapter 11. 
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Chapter 7: Cognition and Experience 
Quine and Cassirer 
(The Epistemological Problem: What do we know?) 
Let me begin this crucial chapter by repeating my quote 
from W.V.O. Quine in the preface in its entirety: 
 
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from 
the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges.  Or, to 
change the figure, total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience.   
A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions 
readjustments in the interior of the field.  Truth values 
have to be redistributed over some of our statements.  
Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of 
others, because of their logical interconnections- the 
logical laws being in turn simply certain further 
statements of the system, certain further elements of the 
field.  Having reevaluated one statement we must 
reevaluate some others, which may be statements 
logically connected with the first or may be the statements 
of logical connections themselves.   
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of 
choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of 
any single contrary experience.  No particular experiences 
are linked with any particular statements in the interior of 
the field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.......   
Furthermore it becomes folly to see a boundary between 
synthetic statements.. and analytic statements...Any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make 
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system...  
Conversely... no statement is immune to revision... even 
the logical law of the excluded middle... and what 
difference is there in principle between such a shift and 
the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein 
Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?"I 
"Experience"!  I have argued it as an axiom of sanity, and 
a minimal realist assumption.  But what is it and what does it 
mean?  Is it the same as "sensuous impressions"?  Does the posit 
of absolute experience demand an immediate further commitment 
to reference?  
In this chapter I will examine these questions in the light 
of Quine's and Cassirer's ideas, (and, of course, of Maturana’s), 
and conclude that the answer to each is "no".  I will propose an 
answer of rigorous and scientific epistemological relativism, (an 
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extension of Cassirer's), which preserves both the phenomena 
and the validity of the whole dialogue of Naturalism, (including, 
therefore, that of my first two theses), -but as organization!   
It will preserve them without a commitment to 
metaphysical reference however.  "Experience", I will argue, is 
identifiable with  exactly that which remains (relativistically) 
invariant under all consistent and comprehensive worldviews.1   
Experience is the phenomena we must preserve and 
account for, but it is not the specific organization by which we do 
so.  The primitives of a given organization are not legitimized, 
therefore, on the basis of reference, but on a (relativistic) basis of 
empirical adequacy. 
In the previous chapter, I began a discussion of cognitive 
closure and asserted an "Axiom of Externality".  In this chapter I 
will continue with the issue of closure and confirm the other 
necessary, (apodictic), realist prerequisite of cognition, i.e. the 
"Axiom of Experience".  Quine's epigram illuminates both.  It 
validates an absolute and ineradicable multiplicity of 
interpretations for both scientific experiment and experience. 
To start, let me propose a fantasy which I think, clarifies 
the relationship between knowledge, cognition generally, and 
                                                 
 
 
1 Which is essentially a restatement of Quine’s position in the preface 
"experience".  It will suggest a viable working definition of the 
latter. 
 
A Fantasy: 
The remote and newly discovered atoll of Petrolia, deep 
in the south pacific islands and never before touched by modern 
civilization, was visited by a geological survey party.  It was 
found to lie above enormous undersea oil reserves.  Its king and 
high priest, a primitive but highly intelligent man, asked to see 
our "magic".2  Seeking to humor him, (and, I am ashamed to tell, 
selfishly induce him to assign drilling rights to an American 
company at a ridiculously low price), he was given a "red carpet" 
tour of the Supercollider Accelerator, our greatest scientific 
marvel.II   
The king was mightily impressed.  He saw "magical 
worms", (traces on oscilloscopes), "dancing arrows", (pointers on 
analog gauges), and tiny "animal tracks", (particle tracks under a 
microscope), in this "cavern of the gods".  He was convinced that 
the whim of our gods provided the "magic", (the "physical 
laws"), of his experience there, as it, (they), seemed quite 
different from his own!   
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He subsequently engaged in a long and heated debate 
with one of the technicians over the significance of it all, ending, 
sad to say, with his casting a set of boar's knuckles and a 
shrunken head, (hidden in a bag under his robe), onto the cable-
strewn floor with disastrous consequences! 
Though whimsical, this little fable helps to clarify the 
purest, (weakest), and the minimum, (necessary), assumption of 
"experience".  There are clearly aspects of the situation that the 
king may have considered significant, (i.e. explanatory), that the 
scientist did not, (and conversely).  The color or shape of an 
instrument, or the particular way the technician cleaned his 
glasses before initiating the experiment, for instance, are things 
that the king might have considered as ritual, (or physical), 
necessities, essential to the result.   
Even the number of floors of the facility, the time of day, 
or the route by which he entered might actually be relevant.  The 
technician, of course, considered the king's multicolored ritual 
headdress, and his pouch of magic bones totally irrelevant, (the 
king was doing his best to be of help).  
 What I will call the "abstract frame" of the experiment he 
witnessed, however, was absolutely the same for him as for the 
                                                                                                           
 
 
2  He was awed when watching reruns of "Gilligan's Island" on the exploratory 
party's television. 
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scientist conducting it.  The abstract frame, (the total data and the 
"boundary condition"), for both the scientist and for the King of 
Petrolia was identical with the abstract, (from interpretation),3 of 
the whole of the actual experiment itself, (i.e. the whole of the 
experimental situation).   "Experiment" is clearly an extension, 
albeit a refined and defined one, of "experience" itself. 
  The "abstract frame" must include the "background 
situation" however, i.e. all the details -to include the observers!  
We do not know, a priori, which of these or what of these is 
relevant.  This is one reason why, (other than the issues of 
personal integrity or error), experiments must the reproducible.   
It is to eliminate unique factors deriving from the 
particular experimental context, (e.g. a magnetic field from the 
coffee-maker, a power surge from the factory down the block, the 
crumb from an assistant's lunch contaminating a culture), and to 
isolate the essentials through a multiplicitous duplication, 
hopefully random regarding what is (unknowably) extraneous.   
We are never on certain ground in that process however.  
We are never sure that our historically dictated -and contextually 
limited- design of an experiment does not implicitly incorporate 
such factors, or that there are not broader, (or different), frames, 
isolating, (or incorporating), other factors as incidental and 
                                                 
 
 
3  alternatively, the experiential invariant 
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irrelevant, (or pertinent and important), in which it could be 
implemented.4  5 
Following Quine, we are in a process of dynamic 
reorientation only bounded by the abstract frame!  Any theoretical 
description really compatible with the overall experimental 
situation6, however, is clearly a legitimate, (i.e. logical), 
interpretation in Quine's broad sense! 
Consider: was the King of Petrolia's interpretation of the 
data of the experiment into his theoretical scheme, (worldview), 
patently false?  Not necessarily, according to Quine.  Was the 
scientist's translation into "laws of physics", "particles of matter” 
-or as an expression of the "primitive building blocks of reality" 
inherently, (i.e. logically), better?  Also not necessarily!   
Each could use the data to integrate, reinforce or modify 
his theoretical basis -his world-view.  Even the cumulative body 
of scientific experiment can be accounted for by the King.  Given 
an unending stream of counterexamples, he can, via Quine, 
incrementally account for each.   The presumption that this 
                                                 
 
 
4  The lack of free ferrous iron in ordinary differential bacteriology plates when 
looking for Legionnaire's Disease was an example of a too limited context and 
was the reason for its long mystery. 
5 Penrose’s “Anthropic Principle” cites the extreme case. 
6  including one which might dissolve -i.e. redistribute- but exhaustively account 
for- the apparent relationality of our primitives.  Virtual systems clearly suggest 
a new logical possibility. 
cumulative body rules out any other consistent world-view, that 
eventually he will be backed into a contradiction is not justified. 
   This is not to say that any consistent theory is just as 
good as any other consistent theory.  The king's theory, spirits 
and witchcraft, let us say, while it may very well be consistent 
and capable of accounting for any given fact, clearly falls far 
short in many aspects, perhaps the most important of which is 
predictability.   
The scientist will make strong and definite projections 
into the future which, by and large, will be clearly and precisely 
confirmed.  He will be able to predict wide ranges of phenomena 
correctly and efficiently.  There are other criteria of good theories 
as well.  Roger Penrose, in his "Emperor's New Mind" has 
outlined a reasonable standard very concisely.III 
   The issue, which I will postpone for a little, is whether 
there cannot be, under the thesis of epistemological relativism 
which I will assert shortly, multiple, equipotent and 
comprehensive "SUPERB" theories of reality, (using Penrose's 
classification).  The proven equivalence, for example, between 
Heisenberg's and Schrödinger’s (widely divergent) theories of 
quantum mechanics seems to imply that this may be the case.   
 The fable, (in concert with Quine I maintain), helps us to 
see that "experience" as such is not, (a priori or a posteriori), 
identifiable with any of its organizations or orientations.  (Hilbert 
claimed as much!)  Rather, it must be identified with the 
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invariant relationality -i.e. with that which remains fixed- under 
all global, comprehensive and consistent orientations.   
The Axiom of Experience: 
"Experience", (tentative working definition), is “that”, 
(elephants, atomic bombs,...), for which both the king and the 
technician must account in some manner!7  It is not itself an 
orientation, however.  It is, rather, that ("thing") which must 
remain fixed, and I argue that it is a primitive of reason.   
Scientific experiment extends, (generates), experience and 
thereby bounds (and shapes) the scope of consistent theories.  It 
adds new invariant relationality to the abstract frame, (and the 
history of abstract frames).  Following Quine however, it never 
determines them. 
 
The Epistemological Problem: 
At the conclusion of Chapter 4, I asserted the definition: 
The mind is the "bio-logical", (i.e. materially reduced), "concept" 
of the brain. (Alternatively, mind is the rule8 of the brain.)  This 
scientific conclusion, (and the schematic model), of my first 
                                                 
 
 
7 This identifies, I propose, a viable and legitimate -and theory independent- 
working definition of experience. 
8 –following Cassirer’s reformulation of the formal “concept” –see Chapter 3 
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chapters, however, raises profound philosophical and 
epistemological difficulties, seemingly contradicting itself.   
It raises questions, moreover, which offend the very 
foundations of our rational sensibilities.  This, however, is not so 
unusual a circumstance but has always been the case, historically, 
at the major turning points of science.   Deep progress has always 
necessitated radical, (and often distasteful), reorientations, (rather 
than mere polishings), of our fundamental worldview -often with 
the loss of our cherished convictions.9   
                                                 
 
 
9 Here was a negative reaction from a 16th century non-astronomer to 
Copernicus’ revelation cited by Kuhn: 
 
“Those clerks who think (think how absurd a jest) 
That neither heav’ns nor stars do turn at all, 
Nor dance about this great round earthly ball; 
But th’earth itself, this massy globe of ours, 
Turns round-about once every twice-twelve hours; 
… So should the fowls that take their nimble flight 
From western marches towards morning’s light, … 
And bullets thundered from the cannon’s throat 
(Whose roaring drowns the heav’nly thunder’s note) 
Should seem recoil; since the quick career, 
That our round earth should daily gallop here, 
Must needs exceed a hundred-fold, for swift, 
Birds, bullets, winds; their wings, their force, their drift, 
 Arm’d with these reasons, ‘twere superfluous 
T’assail the reasons of Copernicus; 
Who, to save better of the stars th’appearance, 
Unto the earth a three-fold motion warrants” 
 
Kuhn, Thomas “The Copernican Revolution”  Harvard Press, 1957 
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Most recently, this is seen very clearly at the invocations 
of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics in modern physics which, 
incidentally, raise much the same sorts of questions as does my 
thesis, i.e. "realism vs. empiricism/algorithmic" questions.  I urge 
that the problems raised by my thesis are not inherently more 
difficult -or of a radically new and different type- than have been 
raised, (and answered), before in the cause of science.   
The real issue is productivity -to whose ultimate judgment 
I hereby submit my thesis.  It is to legitimize and justify my 
conclusions, however, that I am forced to philosophy and a study 
of the metaphysical and epistemological presumptions of science 
itself -and there are such! 
Though admittedly painful, how are the epistemological 
implications of my thesis so much more difficult than those of 
modern physics, for instance?  At the scale of the very small and 
at the scale of the very large, physics says that our physical world 
is profoundly strange and, at the small scale at least, that the 
picture of science is essentially algorithmic.   
My thesis proposes that our human scale world is very 
much the same -but that it is itself a biological and organic 
algorithm.  It is an internally (and virtually "tactile" algorithm 
                                                                                                           
 
 
–pps 189-190  Originally from Francis R. Johnson : “Thought in Renaissance 
England”  
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wherein the "data" we receive and the instrument we manipulate 
to control it are one and the same.IV  Its elements, however, are 
purely and abstractly logical, (alternatively "operational"), 
elements!   
This is a very different and radical way to look at our 
"objects", (to include perceptual objects), to be sure. 
It is, I believe however, far more compatible with the outlook of 
modern physics than is ordinary Naturalism.  I maintain that our 
"tactile", "spatial", "extensive" et al. “objects” are logical, 
(alternatively "operational"), rather than representative.  But the 
"logical" here is that of a (Kantian) "constitutive logic" via the 
“concept of implicit definition” rather than one of ordinary 
classical abstractive logic, (i.e. one of an “associationist logic” –
following Dreyfus’ term). 
There are really two problems involved with the mind-
brain problem. There is a scientific and empirical one, and there 
is a philosophical and metaphysical one.  The combination of my 
first two theses actually solves the scientific problem I argue, and 
my third thesis will explicate the metaphysical and philosophical 
problems.  This chapter will resolve just the apparent paradox 
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created by the first two hypotheses, i.e. the epistemological 
problem. 
I shall now propose a specific answer to the problems 
which I have raised.  My philosophic answer will lead, (in 
Chapters 8 through 10), to a plausible and pointed answer to the 
question of the actual substance of mind.   
 Let me emphasize, however, that my real and central 
claim remains the scientific one, i.e. the result of the combination 
of my first two theses; -my philosophic answer is solely its 
rationale. 
Suppose that my scientific conclusion were true, (and I 
believe the concordance of my first two theses, amongst 
numerous other reasons, strongly suggests it is), then there seems 
to be an inherent paradox in knowledge itself, -and in my 
(Naturalist) premises themselves!  If both our perceptual and 
intellectual objects are solely artifacts of biological coordination, 
then on what ground can knowledge, (and my own argument 
itself), stand?  If the very language, (to include the very 
"biological coordination" and "evolution" of my argument),10 in 
                                                 
 
 
10 I will repeat a footnote I inserted much earlier in book:  I think it would be 
wise to explicitly state that in any discussion such as this, where the very 
meanings of all the common terms are questioned, that you must assume just 
about every term as being in quotes.  In Dennett’s terminology, every term must 
be interpreted heterophenomenologically. 
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which I describe the problem, (being part of that self-same 
human reality), is only internally organizational and not 
referential, -then what is it that am I describing.  How can I even 
discuss the problem itself?   
Doesn't my theory actually eat itself?  How, then, could 
there be science at all?  Notwithstanding the apparent paradox, 
(which is not unique to my thesis11 and to which I will here 
propose a solution), I maintain that mine is a very strong and a 
very pure Naturalist argument and that its conclusion, as such, is 
valid.12 
Chapters 1 through 5 might be considered as a 
constructive reductio ad absurdum of the absolutist Naturalist 
premise, (though not of its relativized equivalent).  Chapter 6 is a 
direct argument to the same effect, building on Kant and 
Maturana.  Less kindly, they might be considered as constituting 
a "straw man".  Combined, however, they are much more 
                                                 
 
 
11 This problem is inherent in pretty much the same terms in the whole of 
Kantian and Neo-Kantian philosophy of science, and in the philosophical 
dilemmas of modern physics as well.  I urge that my solution, in a form very 
close to that offered by Cassirer, fits with the whole of modern science in a way 
that none other does.  Dogmatic materialism, on the other hand, leads to a 
linguistic idealism, I believe –that somehow our automaton-generated language 
leads to truth. But then what is truth? Is it then transformed to the automaton 
pragmatic truth of William James? (See Chapter 12)  Is it only the ”cash value of 
an idea”? 
12 See the Anthropic Principle discussion in of Chapter 12! 
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powerful than that as they actually do resolve the whole of the 
Naturalist dilemma, (other than the epistemological one I just 
raised), and explicate the actual mind-brain problem in absolutely 
legitimate, (and empirically promising), Naturalist terms.  
Clearly, there might be something wrong with the Naturalist 
program, but need it be fatal? 
My argument turns now then, not to argue against the 
whole sense of Naturalism, but against the part of it I believe is 
flawed.  I base those arguments in an extension of Kant's,13 and, 
ultimately, of Cassirer's Neo-Kantian position, i.e. his "Theory of 
Symbolic Forms".  The thrust is to split Naturalism from its over-
strong metaphysical presumptions. 
 
Cassirer Revisited: 
My prior arguments do not, however, reduce the system 
of Naturalist organization, (i.e. its predictive schema), to 
absurdity, (nor, therefore, the corresponding organizational, i.e. 
Naturalist, validity of my own first two theses which are framed 
within it), but only its claim of absolute, (i.e. metaphysical), 
                                                 
 
 
13   Kant's work was concerned primarily with the problem of cognition and 
therefore has a special relevance here.   
   "This is an advantage no other science", [than epistemology], "has or can have, 
because there is none so fully isolated and independent of others and so 
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reference.14 Nor do they question the profound effectiveness of 
Naturalist science.15  
Cassirer suggests a way to preserve that overwhelmingly 
successful relationality, (i.e. the predictive efficacy), of 
Naturalism in a relativized sense, not as reference, but as 
organization, i.e. in his thesis of rigorous and scientific 
epistemological relativism.16 He proposes Naturalism, (and 
materialism),17 as just one (among several) of the possible -and 
equipotent- "Symbolic Forms" comprehensively organizing the 
whole of experience.   
                                                                                                           
 
 
exclusively concerned with the faculty of cognition pure and simple."  
Prolegomena, P.131 
14 again, at whatever level of sophistication the latter is postulated 
15 The Naturalist organization can be taken within contemporary anti-realism, 
(i.e. anti "scientific-realism" -the position that scientific theories do not directly 
describe ultimate, metaphysical reality).  I am making a distinction between 
naturalist organization and naturalist metaphysics.   Cassirer I believe, like Van 
Fraassen, is essentially an antirealist.  This is not so surprising, given the fact 
that they both have Kantian roots, (cf., for instance, Van Fraassen's "Laws and 
Symmetry".)   I will most definitely not argue in favor of Naturalism, (i.e. 
metaphysical naturalism ==scientific realism), but will argue for the (relativized 
and equipotent) naturalist organization.  I will argue, therefore, for the structure, 
but not the reference of that organization. I call it my conclusion a “relativized 
naturalism”.  But isn’t this just “structuralism” again? 
16 Cassirer's is clearly a mathematical perspective, with its roots in modern 
algebra. 
17 as embodied in mathematical physics 
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It is only experience itself,18 (the phenomena), that is 
preserved as a known metaphysical absolute and to which 
(relativized) reference can be made.  Under Cassirer’s “Symbolic 
Forms”, "experience", (Naturalist connotations notwithstanding), 
must not be confused and identified with its characterization 
under any particular one of the possible symbolic forms 
however. 
It is the confusion of a particular "frame of reference", 
i.e. form, (and the assumption that there is only one 
comprehensive frame possible19), with the invariant relationality 
of experience in the abstract, (i.e. under all consistent frames), 
that is the heart of the issue.  It results in a confusion of a specific 
organization (of experience) with the experience itself, (to 
include scientific experiment as an extension of ordinary 
experience), which is organized.   
It results in an improper assignment of unique 
metaphysical reference rather than a legitimate judgment of 
empirical, (i.e. experiential), adequacy for the primitives of the 
theory.  Cassirer's reformulation of the formal logical concept, 
(and the “new form of consciousness” based in ordering within 
                                                 
 
 
18 Experience is not necessarily, therefore, the same as its ordinary 
organizational Naturalist interpretation, as "sense impressions".  Nor, under my 
thesis, does experience refer to externality.  It is an expression of process. 
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it), allows a new logical possibility and an escape from the 
dilemma. 
Just as Einstein relativized measurement and disembodied 
the ether, so did Cassirer argue for a relativization of knowledge 
itself, and a disembodiment of direct reference.   
But Cassirer's is not a frivolous, laissez-faire relativism, 
(nor is it solipsism); it is an explicit and technical epistemological 
relativity rigorously grounded in the phenomenology of 
science.20  What, exactly, is the length of a rod to a physicist?  It 
depends on the measurements, the frames of reference and the
(absolute) equations of the theory of relativity relatin
 
g them.   
                                                                                                          
What is the relevance of a theory, (including a scientific 
one)?  It depends on the experience, the "form", (e.g. 
physics/Naturalist science), and the (absolute/invariant) relations, 
("equations" -i.e. the web of implication), which must be 
preserved in it.  (See the Rosen letter of Chapter 3, or the notion 
of “mathematical ideals” elaborated in Chapter 9 for examples.) 
 
 
 
19 i.e. Naturalism = scientific realism 
20 Why is Einstein not saying that any measurements, (at all!), are valid?  Why 
is Einstein's itself not a laissez-faire physical relativism?  It is because there is a 
rigid structure at the core of his assertion -i.e. the specific, (and precise), 
invariant equations of relativity.  It is the rigid and invariant "equations", 
(alternatively "the topology"), of experience that structure valid theories.  These 
"equations", this "topology", must be retained as invariant(s) under all viable 
theories.  This is why neither mine, nor Cassirer's, is an irenic relativism. 
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The Axiom of Experience 
What is constant, under all frames, are the invariants, (in a 
mathematical sense), which must be preserved in them, i.e. 
"experience" –which I have identified with that “somewhat” 
which must remain fixed.  I argue that it is a primitive of reason.   
"Experience", I claim, is that for which both the king and 
the technician must account in some manner!  It is not itself an 
orientation per se, however.  Scientific experiment extends, 
(generates), experience and thereby bounds and shapes the scope 
of consistent theories.  It adds new invariant relationality to the 
abstract frame, (and the history of abstract frames).  Following 
Quine however, it never determines them. 
I argue therefore for a working (and non-referential) 
definition of "experience": as that which must be maintained 
under all comprehensive worldviews.21 
But what exactly could a materialist’s relativized 
“substance” be then?  What could Naturalism's “material” be 
under such a conception?  It would be an implicitly defined term, 
(alternatively a "symbol"), under a particular interpretation -i.e. it 
                                                 
 
 
21 Though this is clearly somewhat circular, it is perfectly consistent with my 
assertion that "experience" is, in fact, an epistemic primitive.  Afterthought:  
look again at Bell’s “local mathematics” and “invariants”. 
would itself be an "object" implicitly defined by the "generating 
relations" of the science which specifies it.   
Even materialism need not, therefore, necessarily carry a 
metaphysical commitment.  It is, rather, an organization of 
experience using the (implicitly defined) terms of "substance". 
 
Cassirer's Theory of Symbolic Forms, an Analysis: 
Cassirer suggests a new way to look at the relation 
between theory and experience.  He proposes a rigorous 
epistemological relativism innate in the phenomenology of 
modern science. 
"Mathematicians and physicists were first to gain a clear 
awareness of this [the] symbolic character of their basic 
implements.  The new ideal of knowledge, to which this 
whole development points, was brilliantly formulated by 
Heinrich Hertz in the introduction to his 'Principles of 
Mechanics'.  He declares that the most pressing and 
important function of our natural science is” [simply] “to 
enable us to foresee future experience"V 
It is the method by which it derives the future from the 
past which is significant, however.  We make "inner fictions or 
symbols" of outward objects, and these symbols are "so 
constituted that the necessary logical consequences, [my 
emphasis], of the images are always images of the necessary 
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natural consequences of the imaged objects".VI  But this analysis 
-and "image"- must be interpreted carefully: 
“... [though] still couched in the language of the copy 
theory of knowledge -... the concept of the 'image' [itself] 
had undergone an inner change.  In place of the vague 
demand for a similarity of content between image and 
thing, we now find expressed a highly complex logical 
relation, [my emphasis], a general intellectual condition, 
which the basic concepts of physical knowledge must 
satisfy."VII 
Its value lies "not in the reflection of a given existence, 
but in what it accomplishes as an instrument of knowledge,"VIII 
[my emphasis], "in a unity of phenomena, which the phenomena 
must produce out of themselves."  
 
 Heinrich Hertz formulated the distinction very 
succinctly: 
 
"The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of 
things; they have with things the one essential agreement 
which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, [of 
successful consequences], but further agreement with 
things is not necessary to their purpose.  Actually we do 
not know and have no means of finding out whether our 
ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than 
in this one fundamental relation."IX 
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A system of physical concepts must reflect the relations 
between objective things and their mutual dependency, but, 
Cassirer argues, this is only possible "in so far as these concepts 
pertain from the very outset to a definite, homogeneous 
intellectual orientation",X “[my emphasis].  “It is only within a 
distinct logical framework that these "images" are significant at 
all.22 The object cannot be regarded as a "naked thing in itself", 
independent of the essential categories, (and framework), of 
natural science: "for only within these categories which are 
required to constitute its form can it be described at all." 
This change of perspective, (and it is a genuine 
"Copernican Revolution" in Kant's sense), necessitates and 
validates Cassirer's conclusion of the innate symmetry and a 
relativity of interpretations for phenomena.  "With this critical 
insight ... science renounces its aspiration and its claim to an 
'immediate' grasp and communication of reality."XI 
“It realizes that the only objectivization of which it is 
capable is, and must remain, mediation,” [my emphasis].  
“And in this insight, another highly significant” [critical] 
                                                 
 
 
22 Please note the similarity of this situation, as formulated by Hertz and 
Cassirer, with that I laid out in Chapter 4 for the training seminar.  The objects, 
("images"), in a very real sense, are a function of the calculus.  Insofar as they 
are justified, it is on the conjoint basis of utility. 
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“idealistic23 consequence is implicit.  If the object of 
knowledge can be defined only through the medium of a 
particular logical and conceptual structure, we are forced 
to conclude that a variety of media”, [my emphasis], “will 
correspond to various structures of the object, to various 
meanings for 'objective' relations.”XII 24 
This is the assertion of symmetry and the foundation for 
his thesis of "Symbolic Forms". 
“… Even in 'nature',25” [my emphasis], “the physical 
object will not coincide absolutely with the chemical 
object, nor the chemical with the biological -because 
physical, chemical, biological knowledge frame their 
questions each from its own particular standpoint and, in 
accordance with this standpoint, subject the phenomena to 
a special interpretation and formation.26 It might also 
                                                 
 
 
23 Everywhere, where Cassirer uses "idealism", it must be understood as "critical 
idealism" in the sense that Kant used it.  This is very different from ordinary 
idealism, and, as I discussed in Chapter 4, is a real misnomer.  I have suggested 
"ontic indeterminism" as a more appropriate alternative, and one I think both 
Kant and Cassirer would have been happy with.  Also compare the "mere X", 
(below), with my discussion earlier. 
24 Think about Hilbert’s “beer mugs” and the “Pythagorean Theorem” 
discussion in the opening chapters! 
25 i.e., "science" as opposed to the "cultural forms" -see discussion later. 
26 But even within Cassirer's primary "natural forms" -in physics, for instance, I 
argue -beyond Cassirer- that the exact parallel obtains.  There are arguably 
alternative Hertzian formulations of the problem.  Alternative objects and 
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seem that this consequence in the development of” 
[critical] “idealistic thought27 had conclusively frustrated 
the expectation in which it began.  The end of this 
development seems to negate its beginning -the unity of 
being, for which it strove, threatens once more to 
disintegrate into a mere diversity of existing things.  The 
One Being, to which thought holds fast and which it 
seems unable to relinquish without destroying its own 
form, eludes cognition.”XIII 
It is the phenomena, (experience), not reference, however, 
that is the fulcrum of, (and reunifies), this relativity of 
perspectives.  The forms do not refer to (metaphysical) reality, 
(their objects are not “images” of reality), instead they organize 
experience.   
Metaphysical reality becomes "a mere X"!  "The more its 
metaphysical unity as a 'thing in itself' is asserted, the more it 
evades all possibility of knowledge, until at last it is relegated 
entirely to the sphere of the unknowable and becomes a28 mere 
'X'", [my emphasis].XIV “It is the realm of phenomena, "the true 
                                                                                                           
 
 
alternative calculi are possible.  Fine suggests that Relativity and Quantum 
Mechanics may represent such alternatives, and certainly Schroedinger's and 
Heisenberg's conceptions of quantum theory illustrate the plausibility. 
27 See prior definitional footnote re: “critical idealism” 
28 (Kantian) 
sphere of the knowable with its enduring multiplicity, finiteness 
and relativity", on which we stand.   
It is the (multiplicitous and relativized) organizations of 
the phenomena, not reference to a metaphysical origin, which lies 
at the basis of knowledge. 
"And to this rigid metaphysical absolute is juxtaposed the 
realm of phenomena, the true sphere of the knowableXV 
with its enduring multiplicity, finiteness and 
relativity.”XVI 
But this reorientation does not destroy either the unity or 
the coherence of knowledge.  
"But upon closer scrutiny the fundamental postulate of 
unity is not discredited by this irreducible diversity”, [my 
emphasis], “of the methods and objects of knowledge; it 
merely assumes a new form.  True, the unity of 
knowledge can no longer be made certain and secure by 
referring knowledge in all its forms to a 'simple' common 
object which is related to all these forms as the 
transcendent prototype to the empirical copies." [my 
emphasis]XVII 
(This latter demand is, of course, the rationale of the 
dogmatic Naturalist claim of reference.) 
 
"But instead, a new task arises: to gather the various 
branches of science with their diverse methodologies - 
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with all their recognized specificity and independence - 
into one system, whose separate parts precisely through 
their necessary diversity will complement and further one 
another.  This postulate of a purely functional unity 
replaces the postulate of a unity of substance and origin, 
which lay at the core of the ancient concept of being."XVIII 
This is an expansion of the concept of relativization far 
beyond any other ever proposed!  I will shortly propose yet 
another expansion to a still wider conception. 
  Cassirer conceives his "symbolic forms" functionally, 
(and serially), i.e. in terms of the "mathematical concept of 
function". 
"And this creates a new task for the philosophical critique 
of knowledge.  It must follow the special sciences and 
survey them as a whole.  It must ask whether the 
intellectual symbols by means of which the specialized 
disciplines reflect on and describe reality exist merely 
side by side or whether they are not diverse 
manifestations of the same basic human function.  And if 
the latter hypothesis should be confirmed, a philosophical 
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critique must formulate the universal conditions of this 
function and define the principle underlying it.XIX 29 
Instead of dogmatic metaphysics, "which seeks absolute 
unity in a substance to which all the particulars of existence are 
reducible", he seeks after "a rule governing the concrete diversity 
of the functions of cognition, a rule which, without negating and 
destroying them, will gather them into a unity of deed, the unity 
of a self-contained human endeavor."XX [my emphasis]30 
Perhaps the most succinct overall statement of Cassirer's 
thesis is found in his "Einstein's Theory of Relativity".XXI  Each 
of the perspectives of scientific knowledge: physics, chemistry, 
biology, ... (the "cognitive forms"), - and ultimately myth, 
religion and art, ... (the "cultural forms" which I may perhaps 
question),31 are taken as alternative and equipotent 
(organizational) perspectives on the phenomena.  They are in a 
way like the Hilbertian “beer mugs” and “pythagorean 
theorems”, or like the alternative models of the universe of the 
Rosen letter discussed much earler.  
                                                 
 
 
29 This is one of the explicit purposes of the present book. 
30 Cassirer extends his theory of symbolic forms beyond "nature", (i.e. beyond 
the sciences), into the "cultural forms": art, myth, religion, etc. -i.e. beyond 
cognition itself.  I will deal with this aspect of his thesis presently, taking a 
neutral perspective, but first I would like to extend and modify this, his core and 
scientifically grounded position somewhat. 
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"Each of the original directions of knowledge, each 
interpretation, which it makes of phenomena to combine 
them into the unity of a theoretical connection or into a 
definite unity of meaning, involves a special 
understanding and formulation of the concept of 
reality."XXII 
Ordinary Naturalism confuses a particular organization, 
(mathematical physics), with the phenomena themselves which 
are organized.  That is the basis of its assertion of reference -and 
its "scientific realism"32.  "The "objects", (the organizational 
primitives -i.e. "images"), of one particular form are assumed, 
(incorrectly), to reference ontology -to relate to "an ultimate 
metaphysical unity". 
"Where there exist such diversities in fundamental 
direction of consideration, the results of consideration 
cannot be directly compared and measured with each 
other.  The naive realism of the ordinary view of the 
world, like the realism of dogmatic metaphysics, falls into 
this error, ever again.  It separates out of the totality of 
possible concepts of reality a single one and sets it up as a 
norm and pattern for all the others.  Thus certain 
                                                                                                           
 
 
31 I will question the eventual scope of his vision presently 
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necessary formal points of view, from which we seek to 
judge and understand the world of phenomena, are made 
into things, into absolute beings”.[my emphasis]XXIII 33 
  What these "formal points of view" do, instead, he 
argues is organize phenomena.  What is consistent under all 
forms, however, are the phenomena themselves.   
Naturalism confuses a particular "frame of reference", i.e. 
“form”,34 with the invariant relationality of experience in the 
abstract -i.e. under all consistent frames.35 It confuses a specific 
organization, (and a specific characterization), of experience with 
the experience itself36 which is organized.  It results, (and I repeat 
myself), in an improper assignment of unique metaphysical 
reference rather than a legitimate judgment of empirical, (i.e. 
experiential), adequacy for the primitives of its theories. 
 "Only when we resist the temptation to compress the 
totality of forms, which here result, into an ultimate 
metaphysical unity, into the unity and simplicity of an 
                                                                                                           
 
 
32 another misnomer 
33 Naturalism, at whatever level of sophistication, clearly falls under this 
injunction. 
34 and assumes that there is only one comprehensive frame possible –i.e. that of 
Naturalism 
35 compare Van Fraassen's "co-ordinate-free descriptions". "Quantum 
Mechanics: an Empiricist's View" 
36 to include scientific experiment as an extension of ordinary experience 
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absolute 'world ground' and to deduce it from the latter, 
do we grasp its true concrete import and fullness.  No 
individual form can indeed claim to grasp absolute 
'reality' as such and to give it complete and adequate 
expression.[my emphasis]"XXIV  37 
This is his claim of epistemological relativism!  Cassirer's 
denial of "completeness", and "adequacy", (i.e. epistemological 
completeness and epistemological adequacy), however, is not the 
same as denying that any individual form can grasp the whole of 
the phenomena comprehensively for a form can be both 
comprehensive and adequate without being unique!  This is one 
of the lessons we got from Hilbert.  Nor does Cassirer speak 
definitively on the issue of reduction!  I will address both of these 
issues shortly.38 
"It is the task of systematic philosophy, which extends far 
beyond the theory of knowledge, to free the idea of the 
world from this one-sidedness.  It has to grasp the whole 
                                                 
 
 
37 Please see my mathematical ideals discussion of Chapter 9 for a petty lucid 
explanation of this idea. 
38 If a given form were, in fact, capable of reducing all other theories, and no 
other could, it would obviously cut against equipotency and "relativization" -i.e. 
against the whole sense of his thesis!  This is the current rationale for dogmatic 
Naturalism as grounded, (problematically, I believe), in mathematical physics.  
A likely candidate would be the biologist Maturana’s alternative perspective. 
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system of symbolic forms, the application of which 
produces for us the concept of an ordered reality, and by 
virtue of which subject and object, ego and world are 
separated and opposed to each other in definite form, and 
it must refer each individual in this totality to its fixed 
place. 
  If we assume this problem solved, then the rights would 
be assured, and the limits fixed, of each of the particular 
forms of the concept and of knowledge as well of the 
general forms of the theoretical, ethical, aesthetic and 
religious understanding of the world.  Each particular 
form would be 'relativized' with regard to the others, but 
since this 'relativization' is throughout reciprocal and 
since no single form but only the systematic totality can 
serve as the expression of 'truth' and 'reality'39”, [my 
emphasis], “the limit that results appears as a thoroughly 
immanent limit, as one that is removed as soon as we 
again relate the individual to the system of the whole." 
XXV 
                                                 
 
 
39 This is the rationale for my later claim that no single form may adequately 
describe “the interface”. 
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(At this point I would definitely refer you once again to 
my discusssion of “mathematical ideals” which is a much simpler 
way of understanding this idea!) 
Cassirer's “Symbolic Forms” is not a capricious 
relativism however; it is a relativism as rigorous in concept as is 
Einstein's –or as is Hilbert’s.  Just as Einstein characterized his 
theory as having removed "the last remainder of physical 
objectivity from space and time", Cassirer's conclusion removes 
the last remainder of metaphysical, (i.e. absolute), reference from 
knowledge.   
It is based in the essential methodology of science: in its 
(Hertzian) theorizing function!  It is the nature of science to 
construct a form, complete and interdependent between symbols, 
("images"), and a “calculus” which acts as a whole.40 
Under all the forms, (of "nature", at least), Cassirer 
maintains that what must be maintained are the "invariants" -i.e. 
that which must be preserved under any consistent form.  These 
are not "things" or "images", but rather, (mathematically), that 
which remains constant under all epistemologically legitimate 
forms.  In the sense which I will expand the notion, I argue that it 
corresponds to my prior (relativized) definition of "experience". 
                                                 
 
 
40 cf. the "training seminar" of Chapter 4 
 
"But above all it is the general form of natural law which 
we have to recognize as the real invariant and thus as the 
real logical framework of nature in general......No sort of 
things are truly invariant, but always only certain 
fundamental relations and functional dependencies 
retained in the symbolic language of our mathematics and 
physics, in certain equations." XXVI  (I will qualify this 
assertion slightly in Chapter 12.) 
I will postpone my critique of Cassirer's thesis for a little.  
Though I think there are problems and questions which need to 
be resolved, I would like to make the connection to my own 
thesis before going into those.  In its essence, i.e. the essential 
relativism of knowledge, and his case against reference, I think 
his argument is very strong and very fundamental.  There are 
very strong questions and delimitations that I will raise when I 
return to Cassirer's broader thesis later.  They will not, however, 
question this, his core position. 
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Chapter 8: Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms”  
 
(The Solution to My OWN epistemological Dilemma –and a 
Profound Change in Perspective!) 
Nowhere does Cassirer question the profound 
effectiveness of modern science, however.  His orientation is 
wholly and profoundly scientific.  Rather, he preserves the 
various sciences as perspectives, as organizations of phenomena.  
He has, moreover, provided the very tools necessary to resolve 
the epistemological dilemma created by the combination of my 
first and second theses. 
I therefore propose a fundamental, (and final), 
"Copernican Revolution" -a profound change in perspective- 
contrary to that of the Naturalist perspective which I 
conditionally adopted at the end of Chapter 61, (but with perfect 
legitimacy, I now maintain -as a relative stance), and to the 
stance I now ultimately proclaim.   
This stance "reduces" the materialist position itself to 
organization and not to reference.  I argue against ordinary 
Naturalism, and for a more sophisticated realism, (essentially a 
                                                 
 
 
1 And in the very first chapter  of the present MS –in the “Nutshell précis “ 
 364
biologically Kantian-Cassirerian-Maturanian-Freemanian one), 
consistent with the results of the first two theses. 1    By this, 
(once again), I do not mean to say that the relationality of 
Naturalism, (or of Naturalist science), is faulty, (on the contrary it 
is superb), but that its metaphysical reference as reference per se 
is faulty.   
My thesis, though built with Naturalist "bricks", does not 
therefore entail the further and unnecessary Naturalist 
"foundation" of reference.  Though it assumes the validity of the 
Naturalist organization, (at least on the human scale), it does not 
assume the metaphysical reality of Naturalism's primitive 
“material”, ie. of its “substance”. (I have called this “relativized 
Naturalism”).    
In questioning our actual, (referential), cognition of 
metaphysical reality, it is not, therefore, innately self-
contradictory!  Though stated in Naturalist terms, my thesis can 
legitimately question the actual (metaphysical) existence, (or 
                                                 
 
 
1 Kant's thesis is profoundly difficult to accept admittedly, both intellectually 
and intuitively -but so was Einstein's.  Where Einstein relativized the physical 
world, Kant sought to relativize the epistemological one.    His lapses can be 
assigned to his deprivation of the examples of modern mathematics and modern 
science -which subjects were always his primary focus -and which could have 
corrected him.  That he was two hundred years before his time is surely not an 
argument against his credibility. 
 365
even the possibility of knowledge), of the referents of those 
terms! 
Ordinary Naturalism, though it will not say so, is through 
and through grounded in a specifically metaphysical dogma, i.e. 
absolute reference, (however sophisticated), to absolute, (rather 
than relativized), "material" which it equates with "substance".  
This is the "material" in "materialism",1 and was the specific 
target of Kant's and Cassirer's profound arguments.  
As realists, on the other hand, (and I speak to no one 
else), we must posit the existence of an absolute, external reality.  
It is, I have argued, an axiom of realist reason.  But, I further 
argue based on Kant, on Cassirer, on the advances of modern 
physics, on Maturana's penetrating analysis and on the results, 
(and natural concordance), of my first two theses, that human 
cognition does not know, and can never know that absolute 
reality!  (There is still “nobody home” in the materialist sense.)  I 
argue we cannot know that metaphysical world in itself, even in 
"sophisticated" reference!  
 I propose that we stand, even at the human scale,2 in the 
same relation to ontology that current physics does, (at least as I 
                                                 
 
 
1 as usually conceived -i.e. not in a Cassirerian sense 
2 more properly "domain" than "scale", as I do not think this is a size issue.  I 
will expand this momentarily. 
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understand, let's say, Bohr's or Heisenberg's position to be.)  I 
propose that our human scale cognitive world is as much -and as 
solely- a pure algorithm as is the worldview of quantum physics.  
I argue that it is utilitarian and not referential.  But it is an 
organic, "tactile" algorithm, (a "GUI"), that evolution 
constructed.1 This sentence, however, is no longer paradoxical.  
It must itself now be understood in my larger context, as the very
"evolution" in it is itself relativized, (i.e. it is a relative assertion 
within the particular and relativized Naturalist form). 
 
                                                
The results of my first two theses are therefore consistent 
under this epistemological rationale.  The resolution lies in the 
scientifically and mathematically, (but most certainly not 
arbitrarily), conceived relativization of knowledge itself!   
Relational implications, predictive systems, (to include 
scientific theories), are not, (with Quine), epistemologically 
determinate.  Rather, their essence, (which is their predictivity), 
can be isolated, (following Cassirer), as relational invariants, (in a 
mathematical sense), over the field of consistent hypotheses in a 
sense parallel to that in which Einstein's equations of special 
 
 
 
1 This is the implication of my remark in Iglowitz 1995.  Let me repeat it here: 
Ideally instrumentation and control would unify in the same "object".  We would 
manipulate "the object" of the display itself and it would be the control device.  
Think about this in relation to our ordinary "objects of perception" -in relation to 
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relativity were isolated as invariants from the "ether" in which 
they were originally grounded by Lorentz.   
Or, rather, relational implications are invariant, but 
predictive organizations, (i.e. theories and epistemologies), even 
comprehensive ones, are not!  They are the (better or worse), 
"SUPERB" or "MISGUIDED"1 "forms" which organize those 
implications. 
 
Whence Cassirer's Thesis: 
There is, interestingly, a very real similarity of intent at 
least, (if not in scope or rationale), between Bas Van Fraassen's 
"co-ordinate free" and "semantic" approach to modern physics 
and Cassirer's "symbolic forms". 
"To formulate a view on the aim of science, I gave a 
partial answer to the question of what a scientific theory 
is. ...  It does not follow that a theory is something 
essentially linguistic.   
That we cannot convey information, or say what a theory 
entails, without using language does not imply that -after 
all, we cannot say what anything is without using 
                                                                                                           
 
 
the sensory-motor coordination of the brain and the problem of naive realism!  
We do not use our biological algorithm, we live in it! 
1 cf Penrose "The Emperor's New Mind" (his CAPS!).  
language.  We are here at another parting of the ways in 
philosophy of science.  Again I shall advocate one 
particular view, the semantic view of theories.  Despite its 
name, it is the view which de-emphasizes language."I 
"Words are like coordinates.  If I present a theory in 
English, there is a transformation which produces an 
equivalent description in German.  There are also 
transformations which produce distinct but equivalent 
English descriptions.  This would be easiest to see if I 
were so conscientious as to present the theory in 
axiomatic form; for then it could be rewritten so that the 
body of theorems remains the same, but a different subset 
of those theorems is designated as the axioms, from which 
all the rest follow.   
Translation is thus analogous to coordinate transformation 
-is there a coordinate-free", [invariant?], "format as 
well?' [my emphasis]  “The answer is yes (though the 
banal point that I can describe it only in words obviously 
remains)."II 
Though Van Fraassen ultimately rejects axiomatics, and 
confines himself to the domain of physical science, his position 
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has a very definite resemblance to that of Cassirer, at least insofar 
as the latter is confined to "nature".  Each is epistemologically 
relativistic,1 and each is grounded in invariants.  Van Fraassen 
rejects axiomatics, (which I believe is the most cogent formula-
tion of the problem), however, on the basis of a need for meaning 
and interpretation, i.e. reference.2  
  
He goes on: 
                                                 
 
 
1 "There are a number of reasons why I advocate an alternative to scientific 
realism ...  One concerns the difference between acceptance and belief; reasons 
for acceptance include many which ceteris paribus, detract from the likelihood 
of truth.  This point was made very graphically by William James; it is part of 
the legacy of pragmatism.  The reason is that, in constructing and evaluating 
theories, we follow our desires for information as well as our desire for truth.  
We want theories with great powers of empirical prediction.  For belief itself, 
however, all but the desire for truth must be 'ulterior motives'."  (ibid p.3)  Please 
note the connection to the essential Hertzian perspective.  "Information" is 
concerned with predicting future events; "truth" is something else altogether. 
2 Hilbert’s “concept of implicit definition”, combined with Cassirer’s “Symbolic 
Forms” is my answer to his objection.  See the Schlick quote re: “meanings”. 
"To show this, we should look back a little for contrast.  
Around the turn of the century, foundations of 
mathematics progressed by increased formalization.  
Hilbert found many gaps in Euclid's axiomatization of 
geometry because he rewrote the proofs in a way that did 
not rely at all on the meaning of the terms (point, line, 
plane,...).  This presented philosophers with the ideal: a 
pure theory is written in a language devoid of meaning (a 
pure syntax) plus something that imparts meaning and so 
connects it with our real concerns."III 
My thesis of the "schematic object” and the first three 
chapters of this book are directed precisely to that point and deny 
it.  It is precisely my point, (and Hilbert’s as well), that 
"meaning" be taken in its mathematical sense for such a system.  
A mathematician understands the meaning of a term to be 
precisely that which is implied by the syntax, i.e. it is a virtual 
term "ordering" the whole of the system in which it is defined.   
If the mind and perception specifically, (the phenomena), 
is taken in this sense, as ordering process- if it is taken as an 
organization, and its terms as metaphors of its own organizational 
process then there is no longer the metaphysical question of 
meaning or of reference –“structural coupling” does not allow it.  
The terms, instead, mean precisely what the syntax implies -i.e. 
they are virtual terms only!  I maintain these are our actual “real 
concerns”!   
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The deeper problem is the one that Cassirer defined: that 
of "experience" itself and how theoretical science relates to it,1 -
and that involves a total reevaluation of the problem of reference.  
Cassirer's epistemology, of course, is firmly grounded in 
axiomatics.  Discussing Hilbert, Cassirer says: 
"The procedure of mathematics here", (implicit 
definition), "points to the analogous procedure of 
theoretical natural science, for which it contains the key 
and justification."IV 
Contra Cassirer: (What are the real parameters?) 
Though I accept, (and argue), Cassirer's core position of 
epistemological relativism, (I believe it is absolutely warranted 
on the very pure and very strong phenomenological grounds 
                                                 
 
 
1 Theory, (seen as a Hertzian, free construct -as developed in the last chapter), 
must match, (in some sense), the "topology", so to speak,  of temporal and 
spatial consequence in experience.  As stated thus far, this idea is, of course, 
Kantian.  Russell however, (in his "Foundations of Geometry"), argued to extend 
the Kantian frame to projective geometry.  I feel it must be broadened again past 
that -past even topology and into the mathematics of abstract transformations.  
What is required is that the predicted results of the theoretical system (through 
some transformation!) must match the results of naive (?) experience, -and 
conversely!  That is, the results of naive experience -through some 
(mathematical) transformation - should match the retrodictive predictions of the 
theory.  But this transformation, (since it is past topology), need not preserve 
objects, and therefore, not reference!  What its Hertzian premise demands that it 
must preserve is the web of relationality in its most abstract sense.  It must 
preserve the “abstract frame”. 
wherein he evolved it), I will now question his extension of its 
scope and its applicability.  What are the legitimate forms? 
Cassirer's thesis goes beyond "cognition" and science, 
("nature") into a symmetry of cultural forms, (to include science 
as a special case), as well.  Van Fraassen does not, nor did Kant, 
(who remained entirely within "nature" in his core thesis), but 
this is a question of scope.  There is also a question of the 
identification of the legitimate (primitive) forms -even within 
"nature" itself. 
Before addressing these questions, however, let me first 
complete my examination of the broadest formulation of 
Cassirer's thesis.   
Going beyond the "natural forms", (physics, biology, 
chemistry, etc), he extends his thesis into ground which I must at 
least question.  He proposes that the forms of "nature", of 
"cognition", are only part of the innate symmetry of perspectives 
across the phenomena.  They, (the natural forms), represent those 
forms which relate phenomena directly to a metaphysical, 
(cognitive), framework.  Phenomena can however, (he asserts), 
be organized on other grounds: art, myth, religion, etc., “but they 
achieve this universal validity by methods entirely different from 
the logical concept and logical law”.  (Note: it is his “entirely 
different” that I will question.) 
“But again our perspectives widen,” [i.e. beyond "nature" 
and into the purely cultural forms], “if we consider that 
cognition,” [itself], “however universally and 
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comprehensively we may define it, is only one of the 
many forms in which the mind can apprehend and 
interpret being.  In giving form to multiplicity it is 
governed by a specific, hence sharply delimited principle.   
All cognition, much as it may vary in method and 
orientation, aims ultimately to subject the multiplicity of 
phenomena to the unity of a 'fundamental proposition.'  
The particular must not be left to stand alone, but must be 
made to take its place in a context, where it appears as 
part of a logical structure, whether of a teleological, 
logical, or causal character.  1Essentially cognition is 
always oriented toward this essential aim, the articulation 
of the particular into a universal law and order.”V 
(I disagree with his distinction -so too do the "cultural 
forms" embody law.  The difference, I believe, is in the 
orientation -i.e. to cognition -to "externality" as world-ground.  
Any form, even the "cultural forms", will have, (by definition), 
its own sense of law and logical structure. It is a question of the 
meaning of "logical structure".) 
                                                 
 
 
1 Note: this is a reiteration of his “mathematical concept of function and a 
reference to its necessary “rule”. 
"But beside this intellectual synthesis, which operates and 
expresses itself within a system of scientific concepts, the 
life of the human spirit as a whole knows other forms.  
They too can be designated as modes of ‘objectivization’: 
i.e., as means of raising the particular to the level of the 
universally valid; but they achieve this universal validity 
by methods entirely different from the logical concept and 
logical law.   
Every authentic function of the human spirit has this 
decisive characteristic in common with cognition: it does 
not merely copy but rather embodies an original, 
formative power.  It does not express passively the mere 
fact that something is present but contains an independent 
energy of the human spirit through which the simple 
presence of the phenomenon assumes a definite 'meaning', 
a particular ideational content."VI 
But please note carefully that all of Cassirer's "functions 
of the human spirit" -even his "cultural forms" specifically 
articulate phenomena -i.e. they are not free, "idealistic" 
constructs, (i.e. of philosophical idealism)! ("...an independent 
energy of the human spirit through which the simple presence of 
the phenomenon assumes a definite 'meaning', a particular 
ideational content"), but rather are objects of the mind!) 
"This is as true of art as it is of cognition; it is as true of 
myth as of religion.  All live in particular image-worlds, 
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which do not merely reflect the empirically given, but 
which rather produce it in accordance with an 
independent principle.” [Note: That is, in accordance with 
“a rule”.]   
Each of these functions creates its own symbolic forms 
which, if not similar to the intellectual symbols, enjoy 
equal rank as products of the human spirit.   
None of these forms can simply be reduced to, or derived 
from, the others; each of them designates a particular 
approach, in which and through which it constitutes its 
own aspect of 'reality'.  They are not different modes in 
which an independent reality manifests itself to the human 
spirit, but roads by which the spirit proceeds towards its 
objectivization, i.e. its self-revelation."VII 
I will repeat a paragraph from the previous chapter here.  
The paragraphs above are his claim of epistemological 
relativism!  But Cassirer's denial of "completeness", and 
"adequacy" are correctly to be understood as denials of  
epistemological completeness and of epistemological adequacy.  
To deny epistemological  completeness or epistemological 
adequacy for any given form is not the same as denying that any 
individual form can grasp the whole of the phenomena 
comprehensively for a form can be both comprehensive and 
adequate without being unique!  This is one of the lessons we got 
from Hilbert, from complex transformations, and which comes 
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from the cross-reductions ubiquitous in modern mathematics.  
Nor does Cassirer speak definitively on the issue of reduction!  I 
will address both of these issues shortly.1 
That he claims that "none of these epistemological forms 
can simply be reduced to, or derived from, the others" seems to 
provide an essential argument to dogmatic Naturalism.2  
Conversely, I will argue that it suggests and delimits a more 
correct extension of Cassirer's solution to the overall problem.  I 
will address these very large problems shortly. 
 
His meaning must be examined very closely”: 
"If we consider art and language, myth and cognition in 
this light, they present a common problem which opens 
up new access to a universal philosophy of the cultural 
sciences.VIII 
"The 'revolution in method' which Kant brought to 
theoretical philosophy rests on the fundamental idea that 
                                                 
 
 
1 If a given form were, in fact, capable of reducing all other theories, and no 
other could, it would obviously cut against equipotency and "relativization" -i.e. 
against the whole sense of his thesis!  This is the current rationale for dogmatic 
Naturalism as grounded, (problematically, I believe), in mathematical physics.  
A likely candidate would be the biologist Maturana’s alternative perspective. 
2 But you must understand that he is talking about the epistemological forms 
themselves here, not their content. 
the relation between cognition and its object, generally 
accepted until then, must be radically modified.   
Instead of starting from the object", [my emphasis]," as 
the known and given, we must begin with the law of 
cognition, which alone is truly accessible and certain in a 
primary sense; instead of defining the universal qualities 
of being, like ontological metaphysics, we must, by an 
analysis of reason, ascertain the fundamental form of 
judgment and define it in all its numerous ramifications; 
only if this is done, can objectivity become conceivable.   
According to Kant, only such an analysis can disclose the 
conditions on which all knowledge of being and the pure 
concept of being depend.  But the object which 
transcendental analytics thus places before us is the 
correlate of the synthetic unity of the understanding, an 
object determined by purely logical attributes.  
 Hence it does not characterize all objectivity as such, but 
only that form of objective necessity which can be 
apprehended by the basic concepts of science, particularly 
the concepts and principles of mathematical physics. ..."IX 
Cassirer asserts, beyond this, an absolute "spiritual" 
relativism, (but always articulating the phenomena), -i.e. an 
absolute symmetry across the whole of the "cultural forms", (the 
"spirit"), of man. 
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"There result here not only the characteristic differences 
of meaning in the objects of science, the distinction of the 
'mathematical' object from the 'physical' object, the 
'physical' from the 'chemical', the 'chemical' from the 
'biological', but there occur also, over against the whole of 
theoretical scientific knowledge, other forms and 
meanings of independent type and laws, such as the 
ethical, the aesthetic 'form'.   
It appears as the task of a truly universal criticism of 
knowledge not to level this manifold, this wealth and 
variety of forms of knowledge and understanding of the 
world and compress them into a purely abstract unity, but 
to leave them standing as such."X  
Though starting from very stable ground, I think that 
Cassirer ended up in a somewhat ambiguous position.  He, like 
Kant, used words with great precision,1 so he must be read very 
carefully -even technically.  "Nature", and "the forms of nature", 
for Cassirer, are technical words. 
He defines the "forms of nature" for us -e.g. physics, 
biology, chemistry.  These are some of the "values" of his 
specific function, (his "purely functional unity"), of the human 
                                                 
 
 
1 I think it is a necessary concomitant of the very abstract nature of their ideas 
spirit, (here specifically the cognitive forms).  A philosophical 
critique "must formulate the universal conditions of this function 
and define the principle underlying it." 
We must place this passage in the context of Cassirer's 
redefinition of the formal concept however.  We must see it in the 
context of "the mathematical concept of function" to understand 
it. The various forms are functional "values" -in a technical 
mathematical sense -of a definite, and, for Cassirer, serial 
ordering, (and principle).  They are the alternative orderings of 
the phenomena, (defined by a serial function), -and constitute a 
series of series.   
The phenomena, however, remain always the orientation 
-the focus -of all the forms, (even the "cultural forms").  There is 
in this no assertion of comprehensiveness, (and even a seeming 
denial of it), for any given form however.  He seems to argue 
against reduction,1 (and therefore comprehensiveness), as well 
-but against "reduction" and "comprehensiveness" in what 
senses?   
It is against epistemological reduction and 
epistemological comprehensiveness, but it is not against the 
comprehensive adequacy of a given perspective as regards the 
phenomena. 
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Compare:  
(1) "none of these” [epistemological] “forms can simply 
be reduced to, or derived from, the others",XI  
(2) "no individual”, [epistemological], “form can indeed 
claim to grasp absolute 'reality' as such and to give it complete 
and adequate expression."XII, and  
(3) "each particular form would be 'relativized' with 
regard to the others, but since this 'relativization' is throughout 
reciprocal and since no single form but only the systematic 
totality can serve as the expression of 'truth' and 'reality', the limit 
that results appears as a thoroughly immanent limit, as one that is 
removed as soon as we again relate the individual to the system 
of the whole."XIII 
What is the sense of Cassirer's "cannot be simply reduced 
to or derived from"?  That no individual form can give "complete 
and adequate expression to reality" and that no form can be 
"simply reduced" does not necessarily imply that reduction, (i.e. 
translation / transformation), in a non-simple sense, or that 
comprehensiveness, (as a complete accounting for phenomena), 
is impossible within any given form. (3), moreover, seems to 
contradict (1) and (2). 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 "None of these forms can simply be reduced to, or derived  from, the others" 
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Consider, moreover, his "invariants of nature": though 
"no sort of things [his emphasis] are truly invariant, but [it is 
the]...fundamental relations and functional dependencies retained 
... in certain equations... [which are truly invariant]".   
He proposes these, (the functional invariants of these 
forms), as "the real logical framework of nature in general" [my 
emphasis].  But "nature" is a pluralistic word for Cassirer -the 
"natural forms" are all the forms of science!  
We have, therefore, an assertion of invariance1 across all 
the forms of science -and cross-reduction, (i.e. morphisms), 
across the invariants.2  Indeed, this is the only sense in which 
"invariance" makes any sense at all, (i.e. it is a "coordinate-free" 
perspective).  
"Invariance", therefore, means invariance across different, 
(all the different), perspectives of nature -and epistemologic 
relativity.  For what other interpretation of the "relativization" of 
(3) is there except as alternative orientations of the same 
phenomena? 
Consider also his seeming denial of comprehensiveness.  
"The 'relativization' [of forms]  is throughout reciprocal".  "No 
single form but only the systematic totality can serve as the 
                                                 
 
 
1 of functional dependency but not of "things" 
2 See my “Rosen letter” of Chapter 3 for a beginning on this perspective 
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expression of 'truth' and 'reality'."  What he is actually asserting, I 
argue, is that although multiple forms are legitimate, no single 
one of them can describe the structure as abstracted from an 
orientation!1  What Cassirer is portraying here is exactly a 
"coordinate free" perspective!  It is not, therefore, a denial of 
comprehensiveness2 that he is arguing, but a denial of the 
                                                 
 
 
1 This corresponds to the concept of a “mathematical ideal” which I will present 
shortly. 
2 Comprehensiveness is, of course, a highly pertinent issue because of the very 
definite, (and very powerful), claim by ordinary Naturalism for just such an 
ultimate comprehensiveness for mathematical physics .  (I will address this issue 
presently).  This is a very strong claim, and one I think we all actually do accept 
-at least in principle.   
 However, if one particular form, (e.g. Naturalism), is actually capable of such 
comprehensiveness, (even in principle), and no other were, then this would 
constitute a very definite objection to his thesis.  The question lies in the “no 
other were” part of the premise.  Certainly Quine would argue otherwise. 
Cassirer believed that the only salvation for the symmetry and relativism he 
envisaged lay in his extension across the cultural forms: 
"As long as philosophical thought limits itself to analysis of pure cognition, [his 
emphasis], the naive-realistic view of the world cannot be wholly discredited, [I 
will disagree with this],.  The object of cognition is no doubt determined and 
formed in some way by cognition and through its original law -but it must 
nevertheless, so it would seem, also be present and given as something 
independent outside of this relation to the fundamental categories of 
knowledge.**  If, however, we take as our starting point not the general concept 
of the world, but rather the general concept of culture, the question assumes a 
different form.  For the content of the concept of culture cannot be detached 
from the fundamental forms and directions of human activity: here 'being can be 
apprehended only in 'action'." 
 I believe the actual salvation of his thesis and the guide to its extension lies in 
the idea of converse  -i.e. mutual reduction.  If his basic conception is right, and I 
think it is, (on phenomenological grounds), then multiple cross-reductions and a 
true relativism will be possible.  The possibility is founded in the conception of 
alternative axiom systems, (and orientations), in formal mathematics, in the 
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(metaphysical) adequacy and the sole truth of any particular 
epistemological orientation, [symbolic form].    
It is only in their multiplicity that he believes that they 
express "'truth' and 'reality'".  "The limit that results appears as a 
thoroughly immanent limit, as one that is removed as soon as we 
again relate the individual [form] to the system of the whole."XIV 
(Again, see my discussion of “mathematical ideals”” in Chapter 
9.) 
    If these are "the real logical framework of nature", i.e. of 
the natural sciences and they are invariant across all the forms of 
nature, then all the forms of nature are, by implication, cross 
reductive and comprehensive!  That these forms themselves 
cannot be “simply.”, (epistemologically), “reduced to, or derived 
from the others", does not mean, therefore, that their “objects” 
cannot be reduced or derived at all!1  This is what “invariants” 
are all about. 
It is cross-reduction and relativistic invariance which tie 
the forms together and it is only in their totality that they express 
reality -and experience.  The mathematical axiom system will 
                                                                                                           
 
 
developments in the foundations of mathematics presented at the outset of this 
paper, and in my extension of Cassirer's reformulation of the formal logical 
concept. 
1 Think about Hilbert’s “beer mugs” and “Pythagorean theorem” comments of 
Chapter one. 
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serve to illustrate the case again.  That any (adequate) axiom 
system for a given discipline will be comprehensive is, of course, 
clear by definition.  But to confuse the discipline itself with any 
one of the particular, (of many possible), adequate axiom 
systems, is incorrect.  Peano's system per se is not the same as the 
positive integers.1   (A more specific and perhaps a more elegant 
tool for illustrating Cassirer’s conception, lies the mathematical 
notion of “ideals” in abstract algebra, (when properly considered 
in this light).  (I have referred to this a couple of times and will 
present it shortly, with illustrations,  in Chapter 9.) 
Cassirer is asserting alternative functional orientations 
across the phenomena in his thesis of "Symbolic Forms".  Each 
draws different functional, (and serial), perspectives, "diverse 
manifestations of the same basic human function".2     This is an 
explicit invocation of his "mathematical concept of function".   
I suggest, instead, an extension of it: that the objects of 
knowledge are constituted in different, (and alternative), "axiom 
systems"1 which "crystallize" the phenomena as virtual, but 
probably here as virtual intentional  objects, (of the feedback 
loop), under the "concept of implicit definition".  (This is 
                                                 
 
 
1 See the prior quote from Van Fraassen 
2 Also: "A philosophical critique must formulate the universal conditions of this 
function and define the principle underlying it." 
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certainly consistent with the Hertzian perspective, more so, I 
believe, than even Cassirer's interpretation.)   
But I suggest that it is the phenomena themselves which 
are the actual invariants!2 It is a solution based, not in the 
mathematics of functions but, as Cassirer suggested often as the 
true focus of modern thought, -in that of the manifold itself.  
What results is a true epistemological relativity, (in a 
mathematical sense), and the possibility of multiple, 
each-truly-comprehensive and cross-reductive independent 
perspectives.3  
I will leave the problem of the definition of the actual 
(valid) forms without reaching a definite conclusion.  Cassirer's 
solution is seductive, to be sure -and may very well be correct, 
but it is outside of the needs for my thesis.  What is 
unquestionable, I think, is his "coordinate-free" orientation to 
phenomena.  Such a perspective on Cassirer's Hertzian stance, 
narrowed to Van Fraassen's smaller physical perspective, and his 
case for the "forms of nature" in general, (biology, chemistry, …), 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1  Alternatively, “generators of an Ideal” 
2 Are the phenomena themselves, then, invariant equations?  No, they are what 
the equations embody. 
3  See the discussion of mathematical “ideals” shortly for a further elaboration of 
these ideas. 
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will adequately serve my case.  But, as Cassirer himself explicitly 
states, beyond that we leave the arena of "cognition" altogether.  
 But cognition is precisely our area of interest here.  Our 
context here is precisely that of cognition and metaphysics! 
  If my area of interest were to change -if I chose to look at 
"the phenomena" artistically, let's say, then this would no longer 
be my orientation, and his broader case might be argued.  But 
then, conversely, I would no longer be able to express it in a 
cognitive context!1 
Cassirer's is a profoundly beautiful and elegant 
conception, to be sure.  I am not sure that I can accept the 
broadest symmetry that Cassirer asserts however, a symmetry, 
(and a still further Copernican Revolution), that extends beyond 
cognition and science itself into the cultural forms: language, 
religion, myth. But I believe the symmetry within cognition and 
science itself is wholly justified. 
 
                                                 
 
 
1 An interesting and important point comes up here, however.  If his broader 
thesis is correct, and my extension of it as well -i.e. mutual cross-reductions and 
comprehensiveness - then the "invariants", (if there should be such), of those 
other forms will be (reductively) retained as invariants even in the sciences!  
Thus, if there be absolutes, (invariants), in art, in music, in religion, then they 
will be retained as invariants even in the sciences, (in psychology, for instance).  
I consider this a very significant scientific conclusion, and running contrary to 
current social relativism.  There may be an ultimate scientific decision possible 
between, let's say, John Cage and Beethoven! -Or between Zoroaster and Jesus! 
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The Power of Naturalism: 
Naturalism, however, is a profoundly comprehensive 
theory!  Not only mathematical physics, but its reductive 
incorporation of the other disciplines, from biology and 
chemistry through (purportedly) psychology, philosophy, ethics, 
religion,1 presents a purportedly complete (comprehensive) 
theory of all the phenomena.  Quine demonstrates, however, that 
there are always other interpretations of the phenomena, no 
matter the level of detail.  Can there be other comprehensive 
forms then?  I think the answer is necessarily yes!  Need they be 
physical forms?   
The possibility of alternative, and comprehensive, 
physical forms, certainly seems quite believable.  Heisenberg vs. 
Schroedinger illustrates the plausibility.  Based on the sense of 
this current writing, I believe that Cassirer's other "natural 
forms": biology, chemistry, etc. are capable of such a legitimate 
extension to comprehensiveness2 as well.  I believe it is 
absolutely sound as demonstrated in Chapters 1 through 5 of this 
book. 
                                                 
 
 
1 The primitives of some of these forms are distributed and derivative under the 
reduction, however.  Think about “beer mugs” and Rosen again. 
2 with equivalent distributions and derivativeness of primitives 
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Cassirer wrote in another era,1 but this does not, in itself, 
invalidate his conclusions or their possible extension to a broader 
relativism.  On the subject of biology, for instance, he dealt with 
the issues of vitalism.  In modern times, however, there is a much 
stronger case made on much more rigorous grounds which 
supports the same, independent case for biology.  It is that of 
Maturana and Varela as presented in Chapter 6.  To appreciate it, 
it is necessary, of course, to effect the same "Copernican 
Revolution" which Cassirer suggested.   
Maturana and Varela's case is made on very pure 
phenomenological grounds.  The biology they propound is not 
grounded upon mathematical physics.  Its primitives are not those 
of the latter, but rather, physics, (and human knowledge) is 
derived as a function of linguistic coupling, (third order structural 
coupling) -i.e. it is contained as a (non-centralized) theoretical 
derivative of biology's own epistemological primitives: 
"It is by languaging that the act of knowing, in the 
behavioral coordination which is language, brings forth a 
world.  ...We find ourselves in this co-ontogenic coupling, 
not as a preexisting reference nor in reference to an 
origin, [my emphasis], but as an ongoing transformation 
                                                 
 
 
1 though not that long ago! 
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in the becoming of the linguistic world that we build with 
other human beings."XV 
Maturana and Varela's thesis does not find its 
epistemological roots in substance, but drives past its materialist 
beginnings to find its new epistemological center in "autopoietic 
unities" and "structural coupling".  It ends up questioning the 
very physical ground from which it began. 
  In many ways it represents the "Heisenberg" case of 
biology.  It represents an alternative theoretical perspective on 
experience and on science.  It works because of the purity of its 
phenomenology.  Can other "natural forms" be asserted in this 
same sense?1 Could chemistry, for instance, be stated with the 
phenomenological purity with which Maturana and Varela stated 
biology?  That is the only real issue.  This is Hertz' problem, after 
all, pure and simple.  It is also the case I made for the training 
seminar in Chapter 4. 
                                                 
 
 
1 Maturana and Varela reveal such an alternative orientation in "structural 
coupling" and "autopoietic unities".  That these other "symbolic forms" must 
encompass the whole of experience, (i.e. the whole of past and future experience 
-to include scientific experiment), I think is incontrovertible.  But they need not 
encompass it in the same way as does physics, for example.  They need not 
encompass it as the primitive and hierarchical ground of their science, (think of 
Bell’s perspective in Chapter 2), but may weave and distribute its relationality 
into a much less central, (i.e. that particular relationality removed from 
"axiomatic" status), much less concentrated position in its theoretical structure a 
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I will not profess an absolute conclusion on these 
questions other than in the case of the “natural forms”, (physics, 
biology, chemistry …), where I conclude, (on Quinean grounds), 
that there must be, indeed, multiple possible comprehensive 
forms.  But my conclusion in its essence, and beyond Cassirer's, 
is a fully relativistic one.  
 The truly fundamental forms are (necessarily) 
comprehensive forms -i.e. they are fully functional "axiom 
systems"1 capable of exhausting the phenomena.  (Alternatively, 
"the phenomena" is that which remains constant -i.e. invariant- 
under all such exhaustive perspectives.)  These forms "slice" the 
phenomena, (all the phenomena), from different perspectives.  To 
be fully relativistic, each form must be complete.  Though 
Cassirer seemed to drive towards this complete relativism, I don’t 
think he ever completed it.2 
But must not a comprehensive organization be 
categorical, i.e. must there not be only one?  (If we could achieve 
                                                                                                           
 
 
la Quine.  They need not adopt the primitives of another orientation as their own 
primitives as the latter may become "theorems"! 
1 again see later discussion of mathematical "ideals" 
2 I believe because of the limitation in his formal concept 
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the Laplacean ideal, would it not be unique?)1 Or, rather, might 
there not be alternative yet still comprehensive predictive 
organizations with different perspectives and different utilities2?  
Under the Aristotelian logic, and assuming comprehensiveness, 
(i.e. assuming the possibility of a single and complete accounting 
                                                 
 
 
1 The Laplacean ideal is not realist by definition.  
"In the introduction to his "Theorie analytique des probabilites" Laplace 
envisages an all-embracing spirit possessing complete knowledge of the state of 
the universe at a given moment, for whom the whole universe in every detail of 
its existence and development would thus be completely determined.  Such a 
spirit, knowing all forces operative in nature and exact positions of all the 
particles that make up the universe, would only have to subject these data to 
mathematical analysis in order to arrive at a cosmic formula that would 
incorporate the movements both of the largest bodies and of the lightest atoms.  
Nothing would be uncertain for it; future and past would lie before its gaze with 
the same clarity. ...Du Bois-Reymond elevated scientific knowledge far above 
all accidental, merely empirical bounds...If it were possible for human 
understanding to raise itself to the ideal of the Laplacean spirit, the universe in 
every single detail past and future would be completely transparent.  'For such a 
spirit the hairs on our head would be numbered and no sparrow would fall to the 
ground without his knowledge.  He would be a prophet facing forward and 
backward for whom the universe would be a single fact, one great truth'."  
Cassirer, "Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics", pps.3-4  
   Under a functional logic, (i.e. one not based in the generic concept), there is 
the possibility of alternative "axiom systems", (organizational perspectives), 
exposing alternative utilities, (e.g. biology, psychology, etc. -or alternative 
physical theories).  The Laplacean ideal does not, therefore, presuppose a unique 
theory, (Newtonian, for instance), and reference. 
   If we were, in fact, to achieve a science, (theory), such that "the hairs on our 
head would be numbered and no sparrow would fall to the ground without his 
[our] knowledge", i.e., comprehensiveness, I maintain that it still not need be 
unique.  The Laplacean ideal is not tied necessarily to Newtonian or any other 
particular theory, but constitutes the basis of determinism and could apply 
generally.  (ibid) 
2 I.e satisfying different intentional goals 
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of all phenomena), there would have to be a linear reduction of 
all true theories to a single substratum of primitives.1 
Hierarchy, (set-theoretic, type ordered inclusion), is an 
essential component of the existing Naturalist perspective: i.e. 
that there is a necessary hierarchy of spatial scale.  It argues that 
that hierarchy is mirrored in the process of the reduction of 
scientific theories: e.g. biology is a subset of chemistry, and 
chemistry of physics.  (Thus psychology and all the phenomena 
of experience, of knowledge, and of the "spirit" as well, are 
embedded in that hierarchical ordering -as biological subsets.)   
It presumes that our naive world, (or at least most of it), is 
hierarchically mirrored in the primitives of any true theory, (i.e. 
that the objects of naive realism are objects of that true theory as 
well).  It presumes that they can be represented as legitimate and 
necessary groupings of those primitives.  Thus our ordinary 
objects and the ordinary things they do are, in fact, real and 
necessary metaphysical objects and happenings.  This argument 
is crucial to the strength of Naturalism and its metaphysical 
claim! 
But scale is not a priori inherent or the only way to 
preserve the phenomena, i.e. it need not necessarily "cut reality at 
                                                 
 
 
1 See Appendix B: Lakoff and Edelman for a further discussion of classical logic 
and science 
the joints".  If other organizations, more effective, (i.e. other 
schematic organizations), are found, then they are legitimate as 
well.  Our naive objects, as objects, are not necessarily 
metaphysical objects. 
Science, until very recently has supported such a spatial, 
(and theoretical), hierarchy -from the macroscopic to the human 
scale to the microscopic to the atomic, (which, of course, 
theoretical reduction generally supports -i.e. biology -> chemistry 
-> physics), -or from cosmology right down through the human 
scale to the atomic. 
At the smallest level of scale, of course, (and at the largest 
scale as well -EPR), the case for hierarchy has broken down in 
this twentieth century.  As an example, let me once more cite 
Penrose's "most optimistic" view of quantum mechanics, (most 
optimistic for scientific realism, that is): 
"I shall follow the more positive line which attributes 
objective physical reality to the quantum description: the 
quantum state.  .” 
"I have been taking the view that the 'objectively real' 
state of an individual particle is indeed described by its 
wave function psi.  It seems that many people find this a 
difficult position to adhere to in a serious way.  One 
reason for this appears to be that it involves our regarding 
individual particles being spread out spatially, rather than 
always being concentrated at single points.  For a 
momentum state, this spread is at its most extreme, since 
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psi is distributed equally all over the whole of space, (my 
emphasis),...It would seem that we must indeed come to 
terms with this picture of a particle which can be spread 
out over large regions of space, and which is likely to 
remain spread out until the next position measurement is 
carried out...." 
The particle -this smallest part of our "object"- is not 
included, (spatially, reductively), within the spatiality of the atom 
or within the molecule -or even within the human scale object of 
which it is the theoretical (and supposed material) foundation.  
Naturalism can no longer support, therefore, a consistent 
hierarchy of scale!   
At the human level, of course, it is a very useful tool, and 
that is just what I propose it is -constructed by evolution!  
Schematism, (and "Symbolic Forms" as well), suggests other, 
non-scaled and non-hierarchical organizations -i.e. they support 
any other truly efficacious organization.  It is a simple matter of 
utility. 
Naturalism's primitive substratum, (the primitives of 
mathematical physics), is deemed unique and "true of" == "refers 
(isomorphically) to" ontology.  It is Naturalism's epistemological 
basis for a claim of reference.  But under a functional logic, (i.e. a 
logic not based in the generic concept), there is the possibility of 
alternative "axiom systems", (different functional logical 
concepts/theories, -not as class abstractions from phenomena or 
as hierarchical spatial perspectives into the phenomena, but as 
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lines drawn across phenomena -as connective functional rules), 
and a different sort of "reduction", or, rather instead, translation, 
exposing alternative utilities, (e.g. biology, psychology, etc. -or 
even alternative purely physical conceptions).   
So may we consider the new possibility that the 
relationality of experience, (and experiment), can be entirely 
preserved under varying (comprehensive) functional 
perspectives, no one of which stands as the canonical revelation 
of ontology/experience.  The assertion of comprehensiveness for 
a given reducing theory would not then imply that it would 
necessarily, therefore, be the sole and unique organizational 
primitive -i.e. that would be the only one. 
This is the sense of my extension of Cassirer's "symbolic 
forms".  I argue, with Cassirer, for a relativism of forms which 
organize the phenomena, but, (disagreeing with him),  against 
reference.  I do not argue for his particular specification, 
(choices), of these forms, nor do I assert my own specific 
alternatives to these forms, but I do argue for his overall 
conclusion.  
It is in Cassirer's sense of the organizational, rather than 
the referential relevance of theories that I propose that the 
relations of ordinary Naturalism -and my own thesis as well- can 
be, (must be), retained in a deeper realism.  "Experience", our 
true primitive, (and, I have argued, the other axiom of reason), is 
not the same as any particular organization of it.  It is not 
identical with its (legitimate but particular) characterization as 
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"sense impressions" under the Naturalist form, for instance.  I 
have argued a broader -and truly relativistic definition of 
"experience" as that which remains invariant under all consistent 
and comprehensive worldviews.1 
What must be preserved is the web of implication of 
experience in our world, but hierarchy as such2 need not be 
maintained.  A comprehensive theory, ("form"), e.g. Naturalism, 
stands as an "axiom system" to generate the field of experience.  
But if other theories, (forms), and other "axiom systems" are 
found, (and Quine definitely implies their existence), also 
comprehensive, then the preference is no longer epistemological 
but utilitarian.  Each, however, must fully preserve "experience" -
to include the whole body of past (and future) scientific 
experiment.3 
                                                 
 
 
1 But does "experience" itself absolutely, (i.e. metaphysically), refer to 
something else?  My thesis proposes that it does not.  I propose, rather, that it is 
an organization of atomic, (and indeterminate), process.  It is, therefore, real and 
ontic, but irreducible and non-referential. 
2 Remember the work of W.J. Freeman in Chapter 4 
3 This is the point on which I question, (but do not necessarily deny), Cassirer's 
suggestions of the particular comprehensive "symbolic forms" -i.e. in that I 
believe that they must each embody the whole as past and future scientific 
experiment.  In defense of his choice, however, that relationality of experiment 
need not necessarily be maintained as "central" to the organization of a particular 
form.  That is, it need not lie close to its "axiomatic" base, but need only be 
maintained somewhere and somehow within the form as a whole.  Thus biology 
could stand as such a "form" in Maturana's conception, for instance, wherein the 
experimental results of science would be maintained within third order structural 
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Chapter Conclusions: 
I have proposed that our ordinary perceptual world -our 
innate and functional organic naive realism- is such an 
organization itself, constructed by evolution for efficient 
viability, (as stated in relative -but legitimate- Naturalist terms, 
i.e. within a “relativized Naturalism).  At the human scale, 
Naturalism is an extension of that existing organization -i.e. of 
that which evolution has given us.  But there is clearly no 
paradox remaining in these statements in light of the prior 
discussion.  My thesis is, therefore, self-consistent and non-
contradictory.  The epistemological dilemma is resolved! 
My thesis is, I believe however, more than consistent.  
Even from a purely Naturalistic perspective, I maintain that it is 
the only complete and consistent explanation yet offered of what 
it is we have set out to understand -i.e. the whole of cognition!  
This is how “a machine” could know its “objects”.  This is how a 
                                                                                                           
 
 
coupling, for example.  But how would science be retained in a mythical form, 
for instance?  Or language?  And yet he has touched something very powerful in 
both of these.  That I am, as yet, unable to see the specific relevance of these 
suggestions does not convince me that they are, therefore, wrong!  In the specific 
case of religion, for instance, however, I believe that Cassirer has misconstrued 
the problem.  Let me make a counter suggestion:  that religion, identified not 
with its ordinary practice, but with its incarnations in the religious mystics - 
exhibits an alternative biological form corresponding to the rational form 
suggested by Quine, i.e., one in which "ordinary objects" are no longer the 
organizing rationale. (cf. William James "Varieties of Religious Experience"). 
 
“Cartesian theatre” could exist.  This is how there could be 
“meaning”! 
The problem of the "Cartesian theatre", (sentiency), for 
instance, has heretofore either been trivialized and eliminated by 
ordinary Naturalism, (leading to a sort of linguistic or 
materialistic "idealism"), or it has been referred, for instance, to 
epiphenomenalism or emergence.  But the latter are little more 
than an invocation of magic, (they do not vivify the ghosts they 
summon). 
On its own grounds, I believe my scientific thesis stands 
well vis a vis its competition -it is biologically, psychologically, 
logically and teleologically cogent.  It is, moreover, far more 
compatible with the epistemology of modern physics than is any 
other alternative -it speaks the same language.  It "covers the 
territory", (of mind and mind-brain), for the first time and 
assumes no "magic", (also for the first time).   
But our "ordinary objects", (the objects of naive realism), 
need not be, (and in fact, are not), preserved as metaphysical 
primitives -i.e. as necessary unities.  Quine acknowledged the 
possibility: 
  "One could even end up, though we ourselves shall not, 
by finding that the smoothest and most adequate overall 
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account of the world does not after all accord existence to 
ordinary physical things.....Such eventual departures from 
Johnsonian usage1 could partake of the spirit of science 
and even of the evolutionary spirit of ordinary language 
itself."XVI  
This is exactly the case I have made.  I argue that the 
"smoothest and most adequate overall account of the world" does 
not, indeed, accord existence to ordinary physical things.  My 
departure from Johnsonian usage does "partake of the spirit of 
science and the evolutionary spirit of ordinary language itself".  
                                                 
 
 
1 Johnson, once again, demonstrated the reality of a stone by kicking it! 
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Chapter 9: A Simpler Alternative Approach to 
Cassirer’s Symbolic Forms: “Mathematical Ideals”: 
 There is an easier and more intuitive approach to 
Cassirer’s ideas and to my own, especially concerning my 
characterization of “the interface”, (which I will define soon 
explicitly in a dedicated short chapter).  That route is by 
employing the purely mathematical notion of an “ideal”.  The 
example given in Birkhoff and Mac Lane’s, (“A Survey of 
Modern Algebra”), is clearly directly applicable, (by its 
substance), to the immediate problem and should make Cassirer’s 
ideas much clearer and more immediate.   
The subject of mathematical ideals illustrates a very 
different and very concrete notion of "relativism".  While actually 
encompassing a scope much wider than simple geometry, this 
simple example provides a very clear illustration of what it means 
to be a truly scientifically relativistic concept.   
The point is that the very same object, (in this particular 
example “the mathematical circle”, (taken as an illustrative token 
for the just about any mathematical “thing”), and, in general, for I 
want you to consider it as a standin for phenomena themselves -
baseballs, elephants (and all the things these things do).  It will 
show how these phenomena can be preserved in a context-free 
setting.  Try to envision “the circle C” itself throughout the 
following discussion as though it were an actual object of 
perception –an “elephant” perhaps -and consider the profound 
philosophical consequences of this conception! 
 
An Alternative Approach to Cassirer's and My Ideas: 
“Mathematical Ideals”: 
 
   Figure 23 
“The circle C of radius 2”, [standing in place of our 
“object” –my italics], “lying in the plane parallel to the 
(x,y) plane and two units above it in space is usually 
described analytically as the set of points (x,y,z) in space 
satisfying the simultaneous equations: 
(16)   x2 + y2 –4 = 0,    z – 2 = 0.  
These describe the curve C as the intersection of a circular 
cylinder and a plane.     
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  Figure 24 
But C can be described with equal accuracy”, (as well), 
“as the intersection of a sphere”, (my emphasis), “with 
the plane z = 2, by the equivalent simultaneous equations:  
 (17)   x2 + y2 + z2 – 8 = 0,     z – 2 = 0. 
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    Figure 25 
Still another description", (my emphasis), “is possible, by 
the equations 
 
(18)  x2 + y2 – 4 = 0,    x2 + y2 – 2z = 0. 
  
These describe C as the intersection of a circular cylinder 
with the paraboloid of rotation: 
                             x2 + y2 = 2z.  
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Therefore the only impartial way to describe C”, (my 
emphasis), “is in terms of all the polynomial equations 
which its points satisfy." 
 
  Figure 26 
The descriptions above represent just a few of the ways to 
represent “the circle C" however.    But in fact there are an 
infinity of ways to do so! 
 
"But if f(x,y,z) and g(x,y,z) are any two polynomials 
whose values are identically zero on C, then their sum and 
difference also vanish identically on C.  So, likewise, does 
any multiple a(x,y,z)f(x,y,z) of f(x,y,z) by any polynomial 
a(x,y,z) whatsoever.”, (my emphasis).  “This means that 
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the set of all polynomials whose values are identically 
zero on C is an ideal.1  This ideal then, and not any 
special pair of its elements, is the ultimate description of 
C.  In the light of this observation the special pairs of 
polynomials occurring in equations (16)-(18) appear 
simply as generators of the ideal of all polynomials which 
vanish identically on C. ...”, (my emphases).  
"The polynomial ideal determined by this curve thus has 
various", [actually an infinity of2], "bases, 
(20) (x2 + y2 – 4, z – 2) = (x2 + y2 + z2 – 8, z – 2) =  
(x2 + y2 – 2z, z – 2)…, ......, ......, ......, ......., 
.........................”  
 
       An understanding of this concept of mathematical “ideals” 
opens a door to a better understanding of Cassirer’s arguments, 
and a simpler understanding of my third thesis. It illustrates the 
conception of a rigid invariance –and not a mere, unstructured or 
trivial relativism!  (In no respect is it anything like the conception 
of “cultural relativism”, for instance).  None of these generators 
                                                 
 
 
1 My emphasis 
2 Simply concatenate the operations! 
stands prior to any other, nor does it create the figure 
comprehended, but each is comprehensive and exhaustive!  
Each stands, rather, as an equipotent and relativistic 
“logical”, (i.e. explanatory), basis fully exhausting the actuality 
of the figure: “The circle C of radius 2” which we may consider 
as a stand-in for a phenomenon –e.g. the elephant.  No one of 
these organizations replaces the reality, the “ideal” of the figure 
itself!   
What this says is that the particular perspective we begin 
with in our explanation is not the ultimate determining factor.  To 
quote Cassirer in his “Symbolic Forms”:  “each asks its own 
questions” and constitutes a different perspective, but the 
“object” which is described is the invariant “ideal”.  Descriptions, 
explanations are not the same thing as the actual “object” 
described.  Ultimately it remains “a mere X”!  This will relate 
later to my Chapters 9 and 10 and my conception of “interface”! 
We start with the phenomena themselves, not with 
theories and explanations, (orientations, organizations).  Theories 
must validate the phenomena, not the converse.  (But we must 
incorporate Merleau-Ponty's input-output loop -his "intentional 
arc"- to truly understand the relationship).   
"The circle" cited here would stand in place of Cassirer's 
"phenomena", (sic), for my "percept" or for the perceptual 
elephant! It is the invariant component of perception that we 
must needs preserve. It is focused as an invariant under varying 
perspectives relativistically but rigidly. This is how we can 
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preserve the actuality of our phenomena, (evolutionarily fixed, I 
argue), as relativistic invariants of our symbolic forms and gain 
an understanding of the rationale of those forms themselves! 
Percepts are not created by, nor are they dependent upon any 
particular frame of reference. If they reference ontology, then 
they do it as a composite ideal, and not in their particular frames. 
This was the sense of Galileo’s profound insight long, long ago.  
 But we must consider the "ideal" within the larger 
context of mathematics.  Not only can such descriptions be 
relativized in relation to a fixed coordinate system, but the very 
coordinate systems themselves stand in like case.  Axes need not 
be orthogonal, nor need they be rectilinear, (e.g. polar 
coordinates are possible).  Nor need they be fixed.   
They may be in translation –e.g. relative motion, (which 
correlates to conditions of special relativity for instance), and 
they need not be Euclidean, (nor Hyperbolic nor Spherical).   
Bertrand Russell, for instance, argued that our descriptions of 
phenomena might even be based in projective geometry.   
But need they be even spatial?  Can we not conceive of 
such explanations being framed as abstract transformations,3 
which latter are not defined on spaces, but on raw and 
unstructured abstract domains as suggested in my illustration for 
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brain function in my first hypothesis, and the “externality” of 
Maturana’s “structural coupling.4  Abstract domains, however, 
fall naturally within the scope of axiomatics which ground 
Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” and Hilbert’s “Implicit Definition”. 
 
Cassirer’s Theory of Symbolic Forms: 
Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” is the broadest, and, I think, 
the deepest conception of truly scientific relativism yet 
expounded as it is grounded in invariants themselves.  Cassirer 
concludes that the actual metaphysical “object” is a mere “x”, 
which can be interpreted from a myriad of perspectives, but 
always preserving the relations of phenomenology.  This is a 
perspective analogous and similar to the effect of combining my 
prior citations from Benacerraf and Bell: 
’It [logic] remains the tool applicable to all disciplines 
and theories, the difference being only that it is left to the 
discipline or theory to determine what shall count as an 
'object' or 'individual.' [Benacerraf, 288] 
                                                                                                           
 
 
3 Morphisms? 
4 Let me repeat Bell’s comment from our Structuralism discussion –it is very 
pertinent here:  “...it becomes natural, indeed mandatory, to seek for the set 
concept a formulation that takes account of its underdetermined character, that 
is, one that does not  bind it so tightly to the absolute universe of sets with its 
rigid hierarchical structure.” 
  “There is an evident analogy between mathematical 
frameworks and the local coordinate systems of relativity: 
each serve as the appropriate reference frames for fixing 
the meaning of mathematical or physical concepts 
respectively. [Bell] 
But Cassirer’s conception confirms that there is no 
canonical context in which to view reality.  Repeating myself 
once again, it is the confusion of (the "objects" of) a particular 
form, (e.g. mathematical physics), with the invariant relationality 
of the phenomena which it organizes, he argued, which leads to 
an unwarranted assertion of metaphysical reference for its 
objects.  His genuine "epistemological theory of relativity" is, I 
argue, “coordinate free", (and non-referential), in Van Fraassen's 
and Bell’s sense as well. 
My third and final hypothesis, (in Chapter 12), will be  
epistemological, an extension of Kant's, and ultimately of 
Cassirer's epistemology.  Its purpose will be to supply a plausible 
answer to the "what" of mind.  
I have argued an essentially Kantian position –greatly 
deepened by Maturana’s insights and consistent with Cassirer's to 
reduce the de facto metaphysical presumptions of naturalism to 
their legitimate and necessary minimum.   
This, surprisingly, leaves room for the actual existence of 
a "substance" of mind for which I propose a specific and 
plausible answer.  Ultimately I argue that our mental reality 
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comes down to intentional strategies that work, and not to certain 
knowledge.  But this is all we will ever need! 
  There remain, of course, significant problems -the most 
obvious of which still remains "reference".  But I argue that there 
is a categorical difference between metaphysical reference and 
the internal, model/model automorphisms, (transformations), of 
what I maintain is our logically closed human cognitive world.  
(cf Quine).  It is the latter which constitute the problem of 
science, and I have suggested a particular kind of automorphism 
between the brain and the world.5 
The Substance of Mind: 
Here is another excerpt from my earlier book. Hopefully 
you can now understand it in the mathematical context of the 
current paper:6 
“Though I have argued against the "material" and the 
"substance" of Naturalism as metaphysical existences, there is a 
deeper -and truly metaphysical sense of substance that I do wish 
to maintain. It is embodied in our’s, (and Kant's), minimal realist 
assumptions -in the axioms of externality and of experience,  
[stated formally in Chapters 3,4 and 6]  
                                                 
 
 
5 See Iglowitz, 2005 
6 from Iglowitz, 1995, Chapter 5 on “the substance of mind” 
Though Cassirer argues for a broad range of symbolic 
forms, there is another form implicit in his thesis, (roughly 
equivalent to the whole of the natural forms), -and innate in 
Kant's as well. It is the metaphysical form, i.e. the whole of the 
metaphysical context of the problem itself. (It was as a 
"Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics" that Kant himself 
characterized his work, after all.)   
This metaphysical form is the proper context for any 
conception of cognition, (and realism), but, precisely because of 
Kant, Cassirer and Maturana, it is necessarily severely restricted 
and analytic. 
Inside of the form of metaphysics, (wherein we are now 
framing the problem), we are constrained by Kantian parameters 
-i.e. the fundamental, (rather than the historically limited), 
parameters discussed earlier. These abstract limits, the axioms of 
externality, and of experience, and the relativity of perception to 
the (human) instrument whereby it is effected, dictate a 
necessarily general, relativized and abstract solution to the 
problem. 
Always implicit in Kant, however, was the assumption of 
some connection between our cognition, and the reality which is 
perceived, (metaphysical reality), -and that connection was 
assumed to be reflected in experience, ("intuition").   
Always implicit in Kant is the relationship between the 
absolute external existence which he affirms and the modifying, 
coupling relationship of cognition itself. Kant's is very much a 
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modern mathematical conception. He argues that we cannot 
separate the facts of our "instrument", (our cognition), from that 
which it "measures", (cognates).  
The relationship between that cognating entity and its 
object, however, is understood in a very profound and 
sophisticated sense –very much in the sense of modern algebra. 
[e.g. “structuralism”] His concept of intuition, (experience), is a 
relativistic one. The connection is seen as a limit concept -as the 
most abstract possibility- conceived relativistically to the 
complete “X" of metaphysical reality. 
Alternatively, we might today characterize this 
connection as the most abstract reinterpretation of Maturana and 
Varela's "structural coupling", (which I addressed in Chapter 6), 
but removed from its strict Naturalistic (metaphysical) 
formulation. I think the most natural characterization of it is, 
simply and abstractly, "interface"!  
This concludes the epistemological argument.  In the next 
chapter, I will complete my solution of the mind-body problem 
with a statement of my third thesis which will supply the "what", 
the "matter of mind".  All the hard work has already been done, 
however, so the chapter will be brief.  The problem is not so 
hard; it was our presuppositions which made it seem so! 
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Chapter 10: “The Interface” 
This “interface”, this connectivity, (or, rather, the 
mathematically conceived “ideal” of the same - I think Dennett 
would use the words “heterophenomenologically conceived”1), 
between cognator and that which is cognated, is assumed in any 
realist conception of reality, (most definitely to include Kant's 
itself).  
It is implicit in materialism, in dualism ...; it is implicit in 
behaviorism, and identicism ..., in "memes" and in neural 
process. I mean it to be the minimum intersection, (the limit, i.e. 
the most abstract mathematical conception), of all of these 
realist, (i.e. non-idealistic –taking that word in its historic 
philosophical meaning here), possibilities. It is the invariant 
commonality, the “mathematical ideal” of all materialistic 
interpretations of the sensory boundary, and it is therefore a 
necessary and legitimate realist ontological existence postulate in 
itself! 
I mean it to be taken in the sense of a “mathematical 
ideal”, (see Chapter 9) -in the sense of a mathematical relativism- 
as in the sense we take the equations of Special Relativity.  This 
minimum conception of interface is then, (by definition), 
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necessary and apodictic to any realist position –to mine, and to 
yours as well.  Realistically, (i.e. -therefore Realists must so 
believe), it does metaphysically exist, (-whatever it “is”!)  
 
 Here follows my Personal Metaphysical Assertion! 
This “interface” is the metaphysical reality that Kant does 
not name, but which is implicit in his and any other realist 
position. As a realist, I claim it therefore to truly metaphysically 
exist, and I call it "substance".  
This is not the "substance" of materialism however, but an 
analytic conception -i.e. it is the metaphysically and 
mathematically minimal logical necessity of realist cognition.  It 
is a some-what; not a some-thing! 
That there is something more, some other "substance", 
some externality other than the interface, is also apodictic to 
realism -it is presumed in the “axiom of externality”I -and I 
confirm it as well. Kant and Maturana have stripped the latter of 
all knowable determinate form, (but not of existence), but it is the 
former, (“interface”), with which I wish to concern myself here. 
[Note: I also believe in “other minds”.  My problem, 
however, is that I have no idea what they might “look like”!  If 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 Or “co-ordinate-free” as I understand Van Fraassen 
my perspective is valid, then it opens a whole new perspective on 
my fellow man.  One may have the attribute, (under some 
viewpoint), of blackness, or whiteness or beauty or oldness, or 
ugliness, or “crippled-ness”, without being that!  What I am left 
with is humanity, not bigotry or zealotry.  “Is” is the trap of 
limited minds.] 
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Chapter 11: The Last Hurdle 
There remains one last difficulty with my (Naturalist) 
hypothesis of Chapter 4. From the standpoint of my original 
claim of a complete solution to the mind-body problem, "mind", 
(at the stage of Chapter 6 -and even at the stage of Chapter 9), 
remained conceivable only in a reductively materialist, 
(alternatively: an organizational), sense. It remained only process 
and without "awareness" except as the latter was itself considered 
reductively. 
What is "mind" and where is it? How could it be? The 
answer is that it is!  It must "be"! 
 For it is the apodictic metaphysical realist  "substance"1 
of the interface itself, (as just affirmed as an innate realist posit 
in the previous brief chapter), that I propose is the substance of 
mind. The reality, the metaphysical presence of this interface is 
the immediate and necessary consequence of the synthesis of our 
two realist intentional fundamentals: externality and experience. 
It is the relativistic equation between a cognitive entity and 
externality, (and you may correctly interpret this from 
Maturana’s perspective). This necessary presumption of the 
actual existence of connective "substance" supplies the last 
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remaining element for the complete solution of the mind-body 
problem. 
 
The Third Hypothesis: a formal statement: 
Please spend the time to truly contemplate the import and 
meaning of this very brief section.  It is a very deep idea, though 
you may not think so at first.  It is like “the sound of one hand 
clapping”, and to understand it you must contemplate your navel 
for a reasonable amount of time for a true understanding of 
Cassirer’s and of my perspective.  This, I believe, is the deepest 
possible conception of a scientific relativism, and it needs some 
“quiet time” to enable comprehension.   
Swabey described Cassirer’s “Theory of Symbolic 
Forms” as a genuine epistemological theory of relativity.  Take 
awhile to digest this characterization.   It characterizes a 
relativism of epistemologies themselves and proposes that there is 
more than one totally legitimate way of viewing the world.   
But to describe it as “a genuine epistemological theory of 
relativity”, says something more.  I am forced to interpret it, (and 
I think the nature of Cassirer’s own history of thought forces this 
conclusion), as a truly scientific relativism in the sense of 
                                                                                                           
 
 
1 Taken “heterophenomenologically” 
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Einstein, rather than in the trivial senses of social relativism,  ..., 
et al.  The “genuine relativism” of Swabey’s characterization 
reflects the necessary incorporation of invariants, (in the sense of 
mathematical invariants),2 across all the viable epistemological 
forms, and it is these invariants themselves, (as distinct from any 
particular -necessarily “localized”3- description of them), which 
allows us to define the “interface”, (a la Maturana’s “structural 
coupling”), in an abstract sense, but which prohibit us, in that 
very same sense, from definitively grounding it within any single 
one of the particular forms of knowledge.   
To repeat an earlier reflection: With Cassirer, I argue that 
the essential flaw in the referential conception of knowledge, 
("scientific realism"), lies in its confusion of a particular "frame 
of reference", i.e. "symbolic form", (and its assumption that there 
is only one comprehensive frame possible).  It is confused with 
the invariant relationality of experience in the abstract, (i.e. 
under all consistent frames). 
  This, Cassirer and I both argue, is the heart of the issue.  
It results in scientific realism’s confusion of a specific 
                                                 
 
 
2 See my Rosen discussion Chapter 3 for a partial idea of the kind of perspective 
I intend. 
3 Please review Bell’s perspectives on “local mathematics” in Chapter 2. 
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organization of experience4 with the experience itself, which is 
organized. 
 
A formal statement of my third hypothesis: 
Given that the interface, (as just defined –whatever-it-is), 
(1) metaphysically exists, (“heterophenomenologically”, to use 
Dennett’s term again), and given further (2) that it is structured 
as postulated in my first and second hypotheses, (and this is the 
formal statement of my third hypothesis), then (3) it internally 
and necessarily defines our objects and what they do -and they 
too exist! And, as demonstrated by my arguments in Chapters 
one through eight, it knows them!  
 All the problems of structure, all the problems of logic 
have been dealt with in the previous hypotheses, and a plausible 
Naturalist rationale is in place. All that remained was existence. It 
is the sole further assumption of the metaphysical existence of the 
interface itself which supplies the reality and the existence of 
sentiency!  
Mind is the “unified concept”, (the rule), of this interface, 
(and of the brain) –seeing it from Cassirer’s5, (via Hilbert’s), and 
                                                 
 
 
4 I.e. mathematical physics 
5 as a “rule” in the sense of  Cassirer’s reformulated “concept”, and further, in 
the sense of the “ordering” of my “concept of implicit definition” 
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Maturana’s perspective.  Under the combination of my three 
hypotheses, then, mind becomes quickened, becomes “aware”, 
becomes "live".  
We do know, we are aware, we are real.   What we are 
sentient and aware about however, is not metaphysical 
externality. Rather, it is the metaphorical organization of 
primitive process with which we deal with the latter.  But that is 
quite good enough.  It works!  And it is a genuine miracle in all 
its glory!   
In the next chapter, I will answer two relatively modern 
critiques of my conception.  Hopefully it will answer some of 
your questions and objections as well. 
A (crude) Graphic Overview follow: (see technical 
footnote! 6 
                                                 
 
 
6 Note:  Freeman’s use of the words “spatial integration” is somewhat confusing 
and misleading.  His use of  “spatial integration” refers to integration over the 
physical space of the brain but which actually accomplishes a divergence in the 
mapping of the “data” itself.  (Please note the diagram itself which illustrates the 
mapping of parallel data distributively!)  An afterthought:  Both sides of the 
feedback loops pictured here, considered together, seem to furnish a fairly lucid 
rendition of Merleau-Ponty’s “intentional arc” –“by which experience derives 
from the intentional actions of individuals that control sensory input and 
perception”.[W.J. Freeman 1994] 
A (crude) Graphic Overview:I 
 
 
 Figure 27      (See technical footnote)
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Chapter 12: Two (Relatively) Contemporary Realist 
Criticisms of My Conclusions 
In this chapter, I am just going to present two different 
(negative) viewpoints on my perspective.  One of them is Will 
Durant’s –who was actually criticizing Kant’s huge idea, but, by 
implication, my own as well as they are quite similar in the 
aspects he addresses.  The other one is from a “Journal of 
Consciousness Studies” anonymous reviewer commenting on a 
submission of a piece of my own work some years ago.  
Hopefully they will raise and answer some of your own problems 
with this very radical interpretation of reality.  
I’ll start with Durant.  He does a pretty nice description of 
Kant’s conception but he doesn’t “buy” it however, (in the sense 
of William James’ “cash value of an idea”).  He prefers to accept 
James’ very specialized perspective (which is a psychologist’s 
perspective, and which, in fact, makes a great deal of sense as 
such –purely as a psychologist’s perspective).  I frankly don’t 
think any biologist would ever accept it however1.   But then 
Durant inherits James’ problem: i.e. of conversely legitimizing 
his own perspective to a biologist.  
                                                 
 
 
1 (In Durant’s words, conversely, it would have no “cash value” to a biologist!) 
Durant instead adopted James’ specifically psychological 
perspective: i.e. that we get relations right along with our objects 
as epistemological primitives.  I think any biologist would ask the 
question “how?” But Durant never answers that and neither does 
James.  They just assume it exists as a primitive and build their 
worlds from there. 
 
Durant on Kant: 
“[Kant’s] Critique becomes a detailed biology of thought, 
an examination of the origin and evolution of concepts, an 
analysis of the inherited structure of the mind.  This, as Kant 
believes, is the entire problem of metaphysics”, (my 
emphasis)….”I   
This is my “take” on Kant as well –I think Kant saw the 
problem just as a biologist would see it, and as I still see it myself 
as well!  When I was a very young man, I was a student in a 
biology laboratory.  An idea had occurred to me from my own 
ruminations and I wanted to run it by the lab supervisor, (a Ph.D 
candidate, I think).  I asked the question: “Is it possible to view a 
multicellular organism merely as an assemblage of unicellulars?”  
Without a moment’s hesitation, (and I have had the highest 
respect for the philosophical abilities of biologists ever since), he 
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replied: “Sure.  There are sponges which can be forced through a 
sieve and dispersed into individual cells, but which then come 
back together to become a metacellular once again all by 
themselves.”2   
This has always been my perspective on multicellulars, 
and you and I both, (you must surely admit), fit that 
characterization –we are metacellular organisms.  Mine is a 
biological perspective, and I think it is clear that it is Kant’s 
perspective as well. 
 
“… it [the brain] is an active organ which moulds and 
coordinates sensations into ideas, an organ which 
transforms the chaotic multiplicity of experience into the 
ordered unit of thought.II   …. But let these various 
sensations group themselves about an object in space and 
time –say this apple; let the odor in the nostrils, and the 
taste on the tongue, the light on the retina…unite and 
group themselves about this ‘thing’; and there is now an 
                                                 
 
 
2 He asked me my major and when I replied “philosophy, he said he thought I 
would be good at it. 
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awareness not so much of a stimulus as of a specific 
object…”III 3 
 
“But again, was this passage, this grouping, automatic?  
Did the sensations of themselves, spontaneously and 
naturally, fall into a cluster and an order, and so become 
perception? 
Yes, said Locke and Hume; not at all, says Kant.”  
“For these varied sensations come to us through varied 
channels of sense, through a thousand ‘afferent nerves’ 
that pass from skin and eye and ear and tongue into the 
brain; what a medley of messengers they must be as they 
crowd into the chambers of the mind, calling for 
attention!”   
This is very reminiscent of Maturana’s comment4 that the 
input to the brain is “like an animated family discussion with all 
the members talking at once!”IV   
                                                 
 
 
3 My emphasis.  Note: this is my interpretation of the function of the cortex, and 
its “a/d converters” 
4 cited in Chapter 6 
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“And left to themselves, they remain rabble, a chaotic 
‘manifold’, pitifully impotent, waiting to be ordered into 
meaning and purpose and power...” 
“Observe, first, that not all of the messages are 
accepted…a storm of stimuli beats down upon the nerve-
endings which, amoebalike,5 you put forth to experience 
the external world: but not all that call are chosen; only 
those sensations are selected that can be molded into 
perceptions suited to your present purpose, or that bring 
those imperious messages of danger which are always 
relevant.”V   
Please note the connection of this passage with the issue 
of the intentionality of the brain –and to its organizational 
prioritization of danger explicitly.  This was my focus also in my 
first thesis –it lies at the roots of my “schematic model”, 
“interface”, and at the root of my argument for a necessary 
violation of “hierarchy” to preserve urgent priorities in reaction 
as well.   
In the terminology of computer languages, “danger” may 
necessitate a “Go To” command which can absolutely violate the 
                                                 
 
 
5 This is relevant to my conception of the multicellular as an assemblage, a 
“society” of unicellular organisms. 
“structure”/hierarchy of a program to go elsewhere –even outside 
the program itself by reason of urgent necessity! VI 
 
And finally, one last quote: 
“Consider a system of thought like Aristotle’s; is it 
conceivable that this almost cosmic ordering of data 
should have come by the automatic, anarchistic 
spontaneity of the data themselves?  See this magnificent 
card-catalogue in the library, intelligently ordered into 
sequence by human purpose.   
Then picture all these card-cases thrown upon the floor, 
all these cards scattered pell-mell into riotous disorder.  
Can you now conceive these scattered cards pulling 
themselves up, Munchausen-like, from their disarray, 
passing quietly into their alphabetical and topical places 
in their proper boxes, and each box into its fit place in the 
rack, -until all should be order and sense and purpose 
again?  What a miracle-story these skeptics have given us 
after all!”  
What a wonderful metaphor.  It represents beautifully the 
most succinct argument for Kant’s thesis.  Durant thinks that 
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William James supplies the answer to Kant’s objections in his 
“Radical Empiricism” however.6   
Durant’s brief coverage of James’ perspective is quite 
different.  James’ is a psychologist’s viewpoint, and, lacking 
Cassirer’s insight of “Symbolic Forms”, James rejected Kant’s 
fundamental conclusions out of hand.  (I think Kant would have 
rejected his as well.) 
First of all, let me say that I have a harder time in dealing 
with William James’ philosophy than I do with Durant’s criticism 
of Kant because I think, under a certain perspective, it makes 
some sense.  I think that James proposed an almost pure 
epistemology, (form), grounded in a psychological perspective 
and very much equivalent to the sense in which Maturana, (as we 
saw in Chapter 6),  proposed a biological epistemological form.  
As such, James’ is a real candidate for incorporation within 
Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms.7   
The relationship of these alternative worldviews is again 
roughly equivalent to Hilbert’s “beer mugs and Pythagorean 
theorem” interpretation of the mathematics we examined earlier.  
This is what Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” is all about! 
                                                 
 
 
6 It will take Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” to mediate between their conceptions, 
and which will eventually reconcile them. 
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Now let us turn to Durant’s brief summary of William 
James’s ideas.  He sees James’ as a more rational alternative in 
the modern world and as providing an escape from Kant’s 
fundamental “error”: 
 
“… and if he”, (James), “begins with psychology it is not 
as a metaphysician who loves to lose himself in ethereal 
obscurities, but as a realist to whom thought, however 
distinct it may be from matter, is essentially a mirror of 
external and physical reality.VII 
 
…And it is a better mirror than some have believed; it 
perceives and reflects not merely separate things… but 
their relations too; it sees everything in a context; and the 
context is as immediately given in perception as the shape 
and touch and odor of the thing.  Hence the 
meaninglessness of Kant’s ‘problem of knowledge’, (how 
do we put sense and order into our sensations?) –the sense 
and the order, in outline at least, are already there.” VIII 
                                                                                                           
 
 
7 Paraphrasing Cassirer: “each asks its questions each from a particular 
perspective…” 
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I think that Kant, as a biologist, would ask the legitimate 
question “How is it ‘already there’?  Give me a biological 
rationale!” Within my own (biological) perspective, “things” and 
“relations”  would be specifically “already accounted for” under 
the rationale of the  “schematic model” whose facile relations, 
“the calculus”, I have proposed, was the very purpose of the 
model itself. 
James’ assumed his personal perspective, I believe, under 
the “realist imperative” mentioned earlier8, and, since we all 
possess it, we are inclined to agree from the beginning.  This 
inclination in itself guarantees nothing logically however. 
 “Consciousness is not an entity, not a thing, but a flux 
and system of relations; it is a point at which the sequence 
and relationship of thoughts coincide illuminatingly with 
the sequence of events and the relationship of things.  In 
such moments it is reality itself, and no mere 
‘phenomenon’ that flashes into thought; for beyond 
phenomena and ‘appearances’ there is nothing. ,,, the 
‘noumenon’ is simply the total of all phenomena, and the 
‘Absolute’ [is] the web of relationships of the world.”   
                                                 
 
 
8 see Chapter 4 
(It would have been interesting to have asked James for 
his own specific meaning of the word “relationships”.) 
Shifting perspective somewhat, Durant now goes on to 
develop James’ notion of “radical empiricism”: 
“To find the meaning of an idea, said Peirce, we must 
examine the consequences to which it leads in action; 
otherwise dispute about it may be without end and will 
surely be without fruit.   
[James] tried the problems and ideas of the old 
metaphysics by this test, and they fell to pieces at its 
touch…”  [Pierce’s] “simple…test led James on to a new 
definition of truth.  Truth had been conceived as an 
objective relation, … now what if truth” [itself] “ … were  
… relative to human judgment and human needs, (i.e. 
productivity)?” 
“ … ‘Natural laws’ had been taken as ‘objective’ truths, 
eternal and unchangeable …and yet what were these 
truths but formulations of experience, convenient and 
successful in practice; not copies of an object, but correct 
calculations of specific consequences?  Truth is the ‘cash-
value’ of an idea.”   
(This might almost be a paraphrase of my arguments for 
my “schematic model”, but lacking its implicit biological 
rationale.) 
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 “…The true … is only the expedient in the way of our 
thinking … The true is the name of whatever proves itself 
to be good in the way of belief”, (productivity, 
consequences). “…Truth is a process and ‘happens to an 
idea’; verity is verification.  
 Instead of asking whence an idea is derived, or what are 
its premises, pragmatism examines its results; it ‘shifts the 
emphasis and looks forward’; it is the ‘attitude of looking 
away from first things, principles, ‘categories’, supposed 
necessities, and of looking towards last things, fruits, 
consequences, facts’.” 
“Scholasticism asked, What is the the thing, -and lost 
itself in ‘quiddities’; Darwinism asked, What is its origin? 
–and lost itself in nebulas; pragmatism asks What are its 
consequences? –and turns the face of thought to action 
and the future.” 
“…Men accept or reject philosophies, then, according to 
their needs and their temperaments, not according to 
‘objective truth’; they do not ask, Is this logical? –they 
ask, What will the actual practice of this philosophy mean 
for our lives and our interests?  Arguments for and against 
may serve to illuminate, but they never prove.” 
As an independent symbolic form I think James’ 
perspective makes sense.  And it’s a perfectly legitimate form, I 
believe.  I think it’s capable of being just as rigorous for 
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psychology as Maturana’s was for biology, for instance, (see 
Chapter 6), but it’s a totally different worldview.  It does not, 
however, fill the needs of a biological perspective.  
Durant ends up accepting James’ generalist rejection of 
Kant and then basically falls down to an argument “ad populum” 
which is fundamentally just an appeal to everybody else’s 
prejudices.  It’s not a very good refutation.   
 
Durant Critiques Kant: 
Cutting to the chase, here is what I believe constitutes the 
core and the essence of Durant’s criticism of Kant’s conception. 
It is a (naïve) realist’s simplistic and absolute dismissal! 
“the annual elliptical circuit of sun by earth [is] 
independent of any perception whatever; the deep and 
dark blue ocean rolled on before Byron told it to, and after 
he had ceased to be…[or] when we see an insect moving 
across a still background…”   “a tree will age, wither and 
decay, whether or not the lapse of time is measured or 
perceived.” IX  
The problem, as I see it, is that Durant was unwilling to 
consider the deepest implications of the existance and of the 
possibility of the mutual agreement of “other minds”, “other 
brains”, (which I think both he and I accept), and which has deep 
implications to this problem.   
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If another mind, another brain sees and acknowledges the 
same “facts of reality” that I do, could it not merely mean that it 
too has processed these in the same way that I would, that our 
naïve worlds are similar precisely because our brains9 are so –
irrespective of the character of the underlying “substantia 
phenomena”?10  Durant’s argument, a simple appeal to popular 
agreement11 does not really address the substance of the issue.  
That “a tree will age, wither and decay, whether or not the lapse 
of time is measured or perceived” is a certainty within our 
worlds, but the very substance of the assertion must be taken 
heterophenomenologically!  
                                                 
 
 
9 But what then are “brains”?  I will repeat my very early injunction that in any 
theory of deep metaphysics all terms should be assumed to be in quotes –i.e. 
they should be taken heterophenomenologically – at least until the final 
conclusions.  This allows a “context-free” discussion in the sense of Van 
Fraassen.  I have supplied an actual answer to this problem in my third thesis. 
10 Think about the possibility of two minds with alternate primitive conceptions 
of physical reality, (just as, for instance, Benacerraf conceives of two minds with 
alternate conceptions of set theory).  Each might see “the deep and dark blue 
ocean [that] rolled on before Byron told it to”. 
11 an example of an “argumentum ad populum” 
 Figure 28 
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The viewpoint embodied in Figure 28 is the picture I 
suggest as an alternative and whose substance will be clarified 
shortly.  I believe in other minds, (I get to have beliefs too), but 
these minds, I believe, see through the exact same “gears and 
levers” that I do.   
That our conclusions about reality should agree does not 
surprise me.  We all see with the same indeterminacy that my 
later figure of chap 11, (reproduced above), shows but through 
the same parameters!  This is our human linguistic and cognitive 
world: we speak the same language! 
That there is something more, (i.e. somewhat), that is real 
is Kant’s assertion of “substantia phenomena”, but the “what” of 
it is precisely at issue, and Durant did not debate the substance of 
Kant’s claim against knowledge other than in a casual reference 
to James’ “Radical Empiricism”X which I think is a poor answer.  
He went on against Kant’s categories, ethics, et al.  I have 
definite problems with these latter as well, but I think that Kant 
had the basic problem precisely right. 
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The JCS Review 12 
The JCS reviewer did a much better job of critiquing my 
own conceptions, I think, than Durant did of Kant’s.  He raises 
some fairly substantial issues, but I think they’re answerable.  But 
to repeat once again, mine, like Kant’s, is a biologist’s 
perspective.  
The JCS reviewer raises two questions.  There are two 
fundamental problems that he’s looking at -but he mixes them 
together.  One of them is his “my world”.  He provisionally 
accepts my viewpoint and then he asks the question “what is my 
world?”  Well what does that mean? 
 “No dent has yet been made, however, on the problems 
of consciousness as they are likely to be perceived by the 
readers of JCS (including myself).  The adoption of a 
non-representational position shifts the locus of these 
problems.  Given that I have a world consisting of 
perceptual and conceptual objects (i.e. operational 
constructs) which I denote by terms such as 'trees', 
'despair', 'redness', 'brains' etc, is it possible to envisage 
how [the] last mentioned of these constructs", [the brain], 
                                                 
 
 
12 This is an anonymous reviewer’s commentary on a submission to JCS which 
encompassed essentially just my first hypothesis as presented in Chapter 4 of the 
current writing. 
"could itself embody a world analogous to that of my 
own?”  (Please note that his primary problem is that of 
envisioning even the possibility of an answer: 
“how…could… ‘the brain’ …embody a world analogous 
to my own?”   
My answer lies in Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” –i.e. it 
lies in the conception of an epistemological automorphism.) 
 “If, however, it is admitted that what I call a 'brain' might 
itself form operational constructs and this might thereby 
explain what I am myself doing all the time, then are we 
not back in almost exactly the same place as we started?”   
“Namely, we have to explain how it is that a pattern of 
neuronal firing can have the attributes that I designate by 
the word 'tree'.”  
(The attributes would be “implicitly defined” in just 
Hilbert’s sense of chapters 1 and 2 by the operative process of the 
brain.  This again is a problem of envisioning possibility.)   
“The only gain is that we no longer have the additional 
problem of hooking it onto a postulated external "real" 
tree, and this gain may in fact be a loss for those who hold 
that the real tree may play a role in establishing the qualia 
of our percepts.”  
Before answering his objections more fully, let me note 
emphatically that something very new has slipped apparently 
unnoticed into his equation, (besides his “only gain”): i.e. an 
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explicit and constructive biological rationale for 
“consciousness” itself!  And this is not a small thing.  It was the 
very purpose of the dialogue. 
His first question, (stated last):  the reviewer’s “real 
world” and the possibility of the “real tree’s supplying qualia.  
That part of it I think is addressed in Maturana and Varela’s 
“structural coupling” which is a coupling between the autopoietic 
organism and externality.  It’s a very general thing, defined 
conceptually at the outset and I think it is best understood within 
the context of the “mappings” or “morphisms” as I understand 
they are conceived within category theory - between the 
unspecified realms “domain” and “codomain”.   
I think this is about as far as a Darwinian analysis can go.  
It’s very, very general.  What we’re talking about here is some 
kind of a mapping that only preserves “adequacy”.13  We are not 
talking about (James’) “goodness” or “truth” but just adequacy, 
mere adequacy. (See my illustration Bounds and Limits in 
Chapter 4.)    
To get a broader picture however, let’s look first of all at 
my God’s Eye explanatory diagram from the “Freeman 
Appendix” of Chapter 4 again. Let me reference and try to 
explain more fully what this model signifies.  
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 Figure 29 
First we have to define our fundamentals and refine our 
characterizations.  The fact is that even this very model, (above), 
exists inside of the closed and bounded cognitive framework of 
man, (as discussed in Chapter 6) – of me, and of you.  We must 
start from there and we can never really get outside of it no 
matter how far we concatenate our reasoning. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
13 See also the Gleick reference shortly 
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The question of the “embodiment”, the “analogy”14, 
(automorphism), of my reviewer’s dilemma exists within our 
closed, (but very effective), cognitive model, but the question of 
possibility per se, i.e. what kind of possibility results from his 
limited appreciation of the scope of transformations!  Consider, 
for instance, the mappings from the domain to the range of the 
logistic difference equation of chaos theory, or Mandelbrot sets.  
James Gleick gives a pretty good introduction to the whole of the 
possibility. (Gleick, 1988)  These mappings explicitly break 
hierarchy.   
(In my early work, I had always understood sets as 
“unstructured manifolds” inside of my interpretation of Cassirer’s 
ideas.) 
Ours must be an automorphism” in the general sense 
rather than the specialized sense that is invoked here as the fact is 
that we are truly “blinded”, (ontologically incompetent, to state it 
baldly -in the “real” ontological sense), at the periphery of my 
previous “GOD’s EYE!” map.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
14 "How could [‘the brain’] itself embody a world analogous to that of my 
own?” 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30 
The diagram above is the ontic model I ultimately 
propose for cognition and it corresponds pretty well with 
Merleau-Ponty’s.    For even the previous conception itself, (my 
Freeman’s God’s eye conception), exists within the cognitively 
closed human world!  The answer I was attempting to propose to 
JCS was just too big to fit into that limited journal format. 
But within the biological symbolic form implicit in the 
previous model, (i.e. in terms of that model –call it the “Freeman 
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Model”), we receive input15 into the brain.  (Remember that this 
“brain” is still within our closed cognitive framework.)    
This input is passed through into the “objects”/percepts, 
‘the gears and levers”, (i.e.  the implicitly defined objects), of the 
brain –through these organizational nexuses which I propose are 
the “a/d converters”, (hierarchical/nonhierarchical converters), of 
the cortex and distributed16 as per Freeman’s diagram, 
(Freeman’s Figure 2, Chapter 4).  (There may be other, deeper 
interpretations of that conversion on the level of metacellular 
chemistry for instance, -I don’t pretend to certainty or 
completeness nor, I think, did Kant, -just conceptual legitimacy). 
This input travels downward through the diagram and we 
ultimately “act into the world”17 at the very bottom end of this 
loop.   We send output into the world, and it, (something or 
somewhat), comes back.  What it does and how is absolutely, that 
is, ontically hidden from us until the next re-entry loop.  
But within that loop reafferent feedback, (which I believe 
embodies the particular symbolic form we are employing –and 
intentionality?), our specialized and particular 
                                                 
 
 
15 I could, I am sure you realize, employ “scare quotes” almost everywhere in 
this discussion 
16 or “centralized” depending upon perspective- see the “telescope” reference in 
Chapter 4. 
17 Using Merleau-Ponty’s phrase 
viewpoint/worldview is “measured” against that transformed 
input.  It is our theoretical hypotheses that modulate and are 
modulated by our actions –by what we’re promulgating “into the 
world”.   
 Every time you or I do something, every time we “act 
into the world”, we are implementing a theoretic hypothesis 
which may, in fact, turn out to be wrong!  It is corrected or at 
least linearized when it “triggers” input right back through those 
very same a/d converters employed in the first place I believe.  
But we’re still dealing here with the implicitly defined and 
evolutionary “objects” -the “gears and levers” of the mind/brain.  
It’s a continual loop.  This cycle goes on forever and ever and 
ever.   
What is really and truly “out there” I don’t know, you 
don’t know, and nobody can know.  But inside of, interior to our 
model itself, this conception is legitimate.  This is “ontic 
indeterminism”.  It is not strategic indeterminism! 
You might object to this concept of cognition on the 
grounds of an infinite regress.  Sure it’s an infinite regress.  It 
exists within the closed cognitive framework of the human 
mind/brain and there’s no way it could be anything else.  But I 
think it works there.  It works in much the same manner within 
the presumptions of naïve realism or within any of the scientific 
theories, so it is really not such a new idea.   
“The brain” per se can, in fact, be the focus and a starting 
point of a different but legitimate symbolic form.  And why not?  
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Maturana began his conception from much the same grounds, and 
I think it is legitimate.  But again, this is just the sort of thing that 
transformations do. 
Within this context, we can now address my reviewer’s 
“automorphism requirement”: i.e. “Namely, we have to explain 
how it is that a pattern of neuronal firing can have the attributes 
that I designate by the word 'tree'.” 
If we take Cassirer’s “phenomena”, or James’ web of 
relationships of the world18 in the sense of my axiom of 
experience; if we identify them with “that which remains 
invariant under all consistent worldviews” as I proposed in 
Chapter 7, then epistemological automorphisms in the sense of 
Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” make sense and “the brain” can 
form the focus and origin of one specific independent symbolic 
form. 
  
                                                 
 
 
18  “Consciousness is not an entity, not a thing, but a flux and system of 
relations; it is a point at which the sequence and relationship of thoughts 
coincide illuminatingly with the sequence of events and the relationship of 
things.  In such moments it is reality itself, and no mere ‘phenomenon’ that 
flashes into thought; for beyond phenomena and ‘appearances’ there is nothing. 
,,, the ‘noumenon’ is simply the total of all phenomena, and the ‘Absolute’ [is] 
the web of relationships of the world.” 
Quoting from Chapter 7: 
The fable, (in concert with Quine I maintain), helps us to 
see that "experience" as such is not, (a priori or a posteriori), 
identifiable with any of its organizations or orientations.  Rather, 
it must be identified with the invariant relationality -i.e. with that 
which remains fixed- under all global, comprehensive and 
consistent orientations. 
  "Experience", (tentative working definition), is that for 
which both the king and the technician must account in some 
manner!19  It is not itself an orientation, however.  It is, rather, 
that ("thing") which must remain fixed, and I argue that it is a 
primitive of reason.  [It is a logically primitive invariant!]  
Scientific experiment extends, (generates), experience and 
thereby bounds (and shapes) the scope of consistent theories.  It 
adds new invariant relationality to the abstract frame, (and the 
history of abstract frames).  Following Quine however, it never 
determines them.” 
But our “objects” and “the things they do” are exactly 
what I propose as being the implicitly defined “objects” –i.e. the 
primitive, implicitly defined invariants of the brain and the 
schematic (naïve) model which embodies them.  If this were true, 
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if these were, in fact, the invariants of the various symbolic 
forms, if these constituted the basis of the phenomena 
themselves, then the conception of mutually valid automorphisms 
over these “objects” is not problematic.   This is exactly the sort 
of thing that automorphisms do.20   
These automorphisms are alternative and equipotent 
Cassirerian symbolic forms.  In fact, automorphisms are probably 
the easiest way to understand Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” –i.e. 
as epistemological automorphisms!   (See Chapter 9). 
From Cassirer’s standpoint, (and within the “naturalist forms”), 
we always maintain the equations; we always maintain the 
invariants of experience. 
“The naive realism of the ordinary view of the world, like 
the realism of dogmatic metaphysics, falls into this error, 
ever again.  It separates out of the totality of possible 
concepts of reality a single one and sets it up as a norm 
and pattern for all the others.  Thus certain necessary 
formal points of view, from which we seek to judge and 
                                                                                                           
 
 
19 This identifies, I propose, a viable and legitimate -and theory independent- 
working definition of experience. 
20 (FOOTNOTE HERE ? Automorphisms need not preserve operations – i.e. 
addition could go to multiplication, etc ?MacClane quote.?) 
 
understand the world of phenomena, are made into 
things, into absolute beings.[my emphasis]"XI 
 
"But above all it is the general form of natural law which 
we have to recognize as the real invariant and thus as the 
real logical framework of nature in general......No sort of 
things are truly invariant, but always only certain 
fundamental relations and functional dependencies 
retained in the symbolic language of our mathematics and 
physics, in certain equations." XII 
 
Where Cassirer and I Fundamentally Differ: 
At this point, I think I must differ with Cassirer.  I agree 
that “it is the general form of natural law which we have to 
recognize as the real invariant and thus as the real logical 
framework of nature in general.”  But I differ with his assertion 
that “no sort of things are truly invariant”. 
I agree with Cassirer that our specifically theoretical 
“objects” are not fixed, -that they are no more invariant than our 
theoretical hypotheses are invariant, (“No sort of things are truly 
invariant”).  Cassirer is saying that “the laws of nature” per se are 
invariant –and I agree with that.   
The part I differ with is his assertion that “no sort of 
things” [per se –i.e. whatever] “are truly invariant”.  I believe 
that our naïve “things”, meaning specifically our perceptual, 
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naïve realistic things, are evolutionarily created, (as seen within 
the Naturalist form), as an organization of process and that this 
picture, (form), “objects” and “calculus” combined is, in fact, 
invariant.  This is the “realist imperative” that I discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
The composite of a theoretical hypothesis plus its 
concomitant plastic, (i.e. non-invariant) “objects” which it can 
conceivably distribute differently21 than directly to our naïve 
“objects” must match against the sum total of our perceptual 
objects -the evolutionary “objects and the things they do” of the 
naïve realistic form.  They are what hold the different symbolic 
forms together and constitute the source and the target of these 
automorphisms. 
This is my hypothesis.  If they do match, then we have a 
successful theory to whatever level it has been tested to.  And I 
think, as biological/mechanical entities that that is all we can ever 
have.  I think, moreover, that it is all we will ever need to have!  
The strong parallel of quantum physics reasserts itself 
once again here.  Within its model we have a “state equation” 
which is some solution we’ve made to the whole, (or the 
applicable part), of reality.  It lasts until we do the next 
                                                 
 
 
21 This goes directly back to the schematic models of Chapter 4. 
experiment, (“action into the world”), in which case the whole of 
the model is recast.   
This is a very similar situation that I postulate within my 
model.  We act into the world but what’s going to come back, we 
can’t know.  The new input has to be reintegrated into a new 
“state equation” which generates new hypotheses.  I think the 
parallel is very, very strong, and I think it works.   
This parallel is interesting because it makes the 
functioning of the brain very much like the functioning of 
quantum physics.  It establishes that we’re adopting the same 
strategy that physics did at the very small and the very large 
scale.  But this is at the middle, biological scale and it deals with 
algorithms fundamentally.  
As I stated much earlier, I think that “the mind” is the 
brain’s rule of structural coupling.  But this “rule” must be 
understood in Cassirer’s sense of the logical rule of a concept –
and in its extended sense of the rule of the concept of implicit 
definition. 
It has been argued that Cassirer’s “symbolic forms” 
departed from the tradition of Kant, specifically in the issue of 
innate categories.XIII  I don’t think this criticism would have 
bothered Cassirer particularly no more than I believe it would 
have bothered Kant.  Cassirer quoted Kant, (paraphrasing), as 
acknowledging that his ideas were a beginning, not an end, and 
that change and development were inevitable. 
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The reviewer’s second question challenges the existence 
of any possibility of an answer to the dilemma he proposes.  In 
terms of the reviewer’s “‘objects’ that we construct -including the 
‘brain’ which mirrors everything he, (I), do”, it’s a different issue 
than discussed above.   
We’re talking here specifically about the possibility of an 
automorphism that maps from the worldview that the reviewer 
has, (essentially that of naïve realism), into a specific worldview 
that orients the whole thing in a different way.  (This is Cassirer’s 
“Symbolic Forms” of Chapter 7.)  It’s a specifically 
epistemological automorphism, another symbolic form.   This 
symbolic form starts from the brain as its central organizing 
point, (“asks its questions” from that beginning), and builds 
outward to include all of the things he does.  I think it’s perfectly 
legitimate as an automorphism.  (Maturana began much the same 
way.) 
In the “Freeman diagram”, you see output into the world 
and coming back through our primitive “gears and levers” and 
with a concomitant reafferent feedback besides which latter 
embodies, (and corrects), our (intentional) theoretical hypotheses.  
In these terms I think it makes a great deal of sense.   
I think it works for what we need it to do.  I think the 
perspective of “the brain” as such can be oriented that way and 
that it is a legitimate biological and cognitive symbolic form. 
It’s superior to the reviewer’s own naive realistic 
worldview that he starts with and which he is advocating 
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essentially unchanged in the end.  It supplies a specific rationale 
for “consciousness” as well which for him is innately 
impossible!22  I think my perspective is legitimate and answers 
the basic biological question, and I don’t have any deep problems 
in his critique.  The biggest remaining problem that I have is the 
one from organism to externality and I think that Maturana and 
Varela have framed the essential problem very, very well.  
There remains one last fundamental objection to my thesis 
which I have long considered and which is exposed throughout 
this dialogue: why then, does it work so well?  I have thought this 
over deeply, and perhaps the best answer that I can make is of a 
“hive of bees” completing their hive.  That is,  I think good 
science is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
 
The Anthropic Principle    
Or, to put it in a more respectable setting, I think it may 
be the ultimate fulfillment of the concept that I first saw in 
Penrose’s book:  of the “anthropic principle”.    
But the usage I imply here is a deeper sense and meaning 
of the word.  It is not that “if the world were not as it is, then we 
would not be here to see it”, (Penrose, paraphrase), but rather in a 
                                                 
 
 
22 Save in the “quiddities” of dualism, for instance. 
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sense where “our seeing it that way” allows an algorithmic 
interaction with a nameless reality.  Put more simply, we can 
only see what we are “designed” = “configured” to see.  It is not 
a matter of external existance, but rather one of “structural 
coupling”! 
We are, however, allowed to extend and expand that 
vision.  But this must be combined with a biological perspective 
under Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” to attain the full vision. 
 
Cassirer and God’s Eye: 
Durant23, as well as my JCS reviewer exhibit a fault 
common with just about all the epistemological philosophers, (to 
include even  Kant24 himself).  They always posit “a God’s eye 
view”25.   
 The only plausible scientific alternative to this, the 
traditional, absolutist approach to epistemology, that I can 
                                                 
 
 
23 For instance, when Durant says: “The tree will wither and die whether or not 
anyone sees it or not.”  This is a statement that says we really, (ontologically), 
know!  This is an ontological assertion. 
24 E.g.  where do the “mind” and the “brain”, i.e. cognition actually exist?  This 
was Kant’s and  Maturana’s flaw as well. 
25 They always make statements such as “This” is “a brain”, or “The mind does 
such and so”, for instance.  These are statements with purportedly absolute 
ontological meanings. 
conceive, (to repeat a section of Chapter 6), is in a relativism, 
(albeit a rigid relativism), of epistemology itself.  
 Cassirer supplied just such a relativism in his “theory of 
symbolic forms”, and mathematics, in its conception of 
“mathematical ideals” confirms its essence.  But Cassirer’s thesis, 
at its bottom is conceptual; it is not based in classes or “objects”.  
It deals instead with perspectives.  It deals with abstract 
“domains”.  It deals with the (unstructured) “manifold”.  It is a 
conceptual, (rather than a set-theoretic), scheme. 
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Repeating Hertz: 
"The images of which we are speaking are our ideas of 
things; they have with things the one essential agreement 
which lies in the fulfillment of the stated requirement, [of 
successful consequences], but further agreement with 
things is not necessary to their purpose.  Actually we do 
not know and have no means of finding out whether our 
ideas of things accord with them in any other respect than 
in this one fundamental relation."[Hertz]XIV 26  (Note: 
there is an echo of James in this.) 
It is just Cassirer’s theme –as modified with Maturana’s 
and within my structuralist perspective of the “schematic model” 
of Chapter 4 that I pursued en route to my third thesis.   
It is the only philosophical perspective that allows us to 
use ordinary descriptive, i.e. naïve realistic language 
“heterophenomenologically” using Dennett’s term.  It allows us 
to use such language without an absolute ontic commitment and 
allows the employment of a “relativized naturalism”27 as well –
i.e. one that allows us to describe reality in our normal, “natural” 
terms. 
                                                 
 
 
26 but there can even be no “things” at all –they may even be “whats”. 
27 As developed in Chapter 7 
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"Each of the original directions of knowledge, each 
interpretation, which it makes of phenomena to combine 
them into the unity of a theoretical connection or into a 
definite unity of meaning, involves a special 
understanding and formulation of the concept of 
reality."XV [Cassirer] 
Repeating myself yet again, ordinary naturalism confuses 
a particular organization, (mathematical physics), with the 
phenomena which are organized.  That is the basis of its assertion 
of reference -and "scientific realism"28.  "The "objects", (the 
organizational primitives -i.e. Hertz’s "images"), of one 
particular form are assumed, (incorrectly), to reference ontology 
-to relate to "an ultimate metaphysical unity".  “Scientific realism 
thinks it can salvage its strange entities with “hierarchy” and 
“emergence”, but my objections as stated in the very preface to 
this book, as well as the whole current effort to reground 
mathematics beyond set theory effectively counters that claim, I 
believe.  (See my discussion in the Précis: In a Nutshell which I 
think is conclusive). 
"Where there exist such diversities in fundamental 
direction of consideration, the results of consideration 
                                                 
 
 
28 another misnomer 
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cannot be directly compared and measured with each 
other.  The naive realism of the ordinary view of the 
world,29 like the realism of dogmatic metaphysics, falls 
into this error, ever again.  It separates out of the totality 
of possible concepts of reality a single one and sets it up 
as a norm and pattern for all the others.  Thus certain 
necessary formal points of view, from which we seek to 
judge and understand the world of phenomena, are made 
into things, into absolute beings. [Cassirer, my 
emphasis]"XVI 30 
  What these "formal points of view" do, instead, is 
organize phenomena.  What is consistent under all forms, 
however, are the phenomena themselves.  
It results, (and I repeat myself again), in an (improper) 
assignment of (unique) metaphysical reference rather than a 
(legitimate) judgment of empirical, (i.e. experiential), adequacy 
for the primitives of its theories. 
 "Only when we resist the temptation to compress the 
totality of forms, which here result, into an ultimate 
metaphysical unity, into the unity and simplicity of an 
                                                 
 
 
29 but see the prior discussion of naïve realism as a biological algorithm 
30 Naturalism, at whatever level of sophistication, clearly falls under this 
injunction. 
absolute 'world ground' and to deduce it from the latter, 
do we grasp its true concrete import and fullness.  No 
individual form can indeed claim to grasp absolute 
'reality' as such and to give it complete and adequate 
expression.[my emphasis]"XVII  XVIII 
 
In Defense of Kant: 
I have said it elsewhere, but I think that Immanuel Kant 
may be the most misunderstood, misconstrued, and unfairly 
trivialized thinker in the history of the mind-brain problem.  This 
is quite understandable from the perspective of my earlier 
comment about the necessity of an inbuilt realist imperative in 
the human brain. 
I arguedXIX that from a biological perspective it is not 
important that the “operator” of such a complicated process 
knows what it is, (specifically), that he is doing.   It is important 
only that he does it well. It is crucially important that he does it 
diligently, however. It is imperative that he be locked into the 
loop of his virtual reality -that he “pay attention”. This introduces 
the necessity of an inbuilt realistic imperative -i.e. a mechanical 
guarantee of his dedication, (see P.S. Churchland / Hume).  
The universal and dogmatic belief in the simple reality of 
our natural world is thus itself a consequence of my thesis -and 
the greatest obstacle to its acceptance! 
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Durant ultimately dismissed Kant for his “subjectivism” –
in Durant’s words “‘the world is my idea’ as Schopenhauer 
honestly31 put it”.  Bertrand Russell,XX though initially a Kantian, 
expressed his absolute joy at getting his “objects” back once he 
had renounced those ideas.  Scientists and philosophers have 
spent two centuries trivializing Kant’s brilliant insight.  I think 
it’s time to turn our perspective around.  Science will demand it!  
The science of Mind will demand it. 
Kant, by his own words characterized himself as a 
“critical idealist”, and I think that may be the biggest mistake he 
ever made!  As I noted in Chapter 6, there is a footnote to this 
however.  Kant himself was never satisfied with "critical 
idealism" but was forced to retain it for historical reasons.   
  Kant, I think, was not an “idealist” in any sense at all -
not even a “critical” idealist as the references to his own words 
above clearly proves.  He was rather what I have termed an 
“ontic indeterminist” which I think is more descriptive of his 
actual perspective.   
But this is still a “realist” in the most essential sense of 
the word!  Kant was very much a realist about the existence of 
externality.  His question instead was what it, i.e. externality, in 
                                                 
 
 
31 Durant’s characterization 
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fact actually was.32  But this is the question that physical science 
continually asks.33  Kant’s work has severe historical limitations 
to be sure, but he never claimed his program was completed.  
This was his implicit sanction for the subsequent evolution of the 
neo-Kantians, of whom Cassirer was perhaps the most 
outstanding. 
I have moved beyond Kant, I believe, but I accept him for 
the genius he was. 
                                                 
 
 
32 Kant reduced externality to a “something”.  Maturana reduced it to a 
“somewhat”.  I have reduced it to the “axiom of externality”.  It is an intentional 
axiom of realist reason. 
33 There is a great similarity between the relationship of Schrödinger’s equations 
and the act of measurement and the reafferent aspect of “acting into the world” 
and the feedback generated by it as noted in my Freeman Appendix.  Neither 
really has presumptive “objects” before the fact. 
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Chapter 13: Conclusions &Opinions 
Scientific Conclusions: 
I consider my most important result, (though you may 
think this strange), the Naturalist one: i.e. that "mind" is the 
(reduced) "concept" of the brain!I  I hold that it is both legitimate 
and important within the (reinterpreted and relativized) Naturalist 
framework and leads to definite and practical empiric lines of 
research.   
That Naturalism is itself thereby relativized detracts 
neither from its utility nor from its importance -no more than did 
the introduction of relativity or indeterminacy into modern 
physics lessen its viability or importance.  Rather, it produced 
profound and immediate practical results.   
Naive realism is a biological and behavioral algorithm 
superb for normal life, and Naturalism, its natural extrapolation, 
is valuable beyond measure -as well it should be under my 
hypotheses.  It is to the ultimate empirical results, (or not), of my 
thesis, however and finally, that I will equate its ultimate value. 
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So where do we go from here? 
  The biggest problem still remaining for the science of 
man is the physical brain itself.  Physical science thinks it has 
solved the essential problem of everything else, (almost), but how 
large is the scope of its knowledge?  A few billion pieces of 
knowledge, I think.  Minsky thinks it is just a few pieces.1  
But, conversely, how big is the physical brain in itself?  It 
is 100 billion cells alone, and its synapses are of the order of 10 
trillion.  Think of the combinations and the complexity of our 
original and foundational mechanism which is, furthermore, self-
referential by definition.    
Which is the larger, more difficult problem?  I think the 
answer is pretty clear.  The focus on the brain will become the 
primary focus of any future science. 
 
Devil's Advocate: 
Though I have argued against our knowledge of 
externality, and for a schematic organization of process, could 
                                                 
 
 
1 Dreyfus cites Minsky's attempt to specify the magnitude of the mass of 
knowledge necessary for humanoid intelligence.  Minsky estimates the number 
of facts required as on the order of one hundred thousand for reasonable 
behavior in ordinary situations, a million for a very great intelligence.  If this 
doesn't satisfy us, we are to multiply this figure by ten! Dreyfus 1992.   Minsky 
apparently thinks that ten million is a huge number!  I don’t think it is. 
 467
not our external, metaphysical world still be like the objects of 
our cognition.  Of course it could!  The possibility is suggested in 
my conception of interface.   
Since implicit definition defines our objects within, 
conceivably it might, as well, define the "objects" of external 
reality without!  But this is a profession of extreme faith, and not 
of science.2 
"If anyone adopts such a belief, he or she does it as a leap 
of faith.  To make such a leap does not make us ipso facto 
irrational; but we should be able to live in the light of day, 
where our decisions are acknowledged and avowed as our 
own, and not disguised as the compulsion of reason."II 
I, however, do not choose to, (nor do I have to), make 
such a leap of faith.  I propose that what we have is a viable, (and 
truly real!), working model that simply "does the job", i.e. it is at 
least compatible, and probably beneficialIII  vis a vis absolute 
externality. 
                                                 
 
 
2 It is a question of bounds and limits again.  Or, more simply, of the distinction 
between an upper bound and a least upper bound.  Reality clearly sets definite 
upper bounds to (evolutionary) development, but does it convey to the organism 
a least upper bound, (which would be defining)?  The former encompasses (raw) 
"structural coupling", but the latter would be necessary for "congruent structural 
coupling".  It is an assumption equivalent to the "parallel postulate", you see! 
 
Come, isn't it the height of arrogance to presume, (under 
the Naturalist presumption), that this race of apes, barely able to 
scribble for a mere few thousand years, has been able to divine 
the nature of absolute reality?  How much more probable is it not, 
(changing the metaphor), that we are merely constructing "a 
hive"? 
Why do we think we know even the boundaries of all the 
possible solutions to all of the problems of reality?  Whence 
comes our arrogance that we feel we have solved the ultimate 
problems of the universe and of our existence in it? 
Is it not more believable, (under the very Naturalist 
assumption), that we have merely expressed our own particular 
mode of existence, -that human civilization, (incorporating 
human minds), like a swarm of bees, has simply built a hive?   
What is this logic we are so sure of?  Ultimately, 
biologically, it is an expression of the "structural coupling" of the 
race with its environment.  But the invariants of that coupling are 
derived from the structure of the uniquely human brain.   
Other brains, other modes of coupling almost certainly 
would embody another protologic.  Ordinary logic, (i.e. 
"associationist" logic -after Dreyfus' term), denies its biological 
roots.  It believes it has touched eternity and verity.  How?  Why?  
What teleological mystery does it hide?   
When we thought that man was created by God in his 
image and that God gave us this open channel to truth, then there 
was a meaningful rationale for such a view.  But when man 
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became, purely and simply, a material animal, derived 
mechanistically and randomly by material combination, then this 
mechanistic process lost all justification as correlating with 
anything other than its own mechanical necessities. 
  But it works!  How and why?  Perhaps that is itself the 
answer.  It is an operative process that works in the world in 
which it lives!  This provides no guarantee of its ontological 
posits at all however -it is an operative process that works -and 
that's all! 
 
So Why Bother? 
But if this is the ultimate answer, if this "ontic 
indeterminism" is the conclusion we must reach, what is the point 
of it all?   
Throughout I have admitted the (intuitive) difficulties of 
my thesis.  But modern physics has much the same difficulty -its 
picture of reality, though intensely beautiful and exotic, offends 
those same normal sensibilities.   
The (why bother) answer for physics is that that very 
picture produces desirable, powerful, and practical results right at 
the human, (naive), scale, and which we cannot deny.  The 
transistor, nuclear power, working telephones and radios, ... are 
necessary and practical consequences of that very theory -and 
they would be impossible without it.   
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I propose that this will be very much the case for my 
conception.  Though admittedly offensive to our (naive) realist 
sensibilities, if it is correctIV  it will lay the scientific and 
mathematical theoretical ground necessary for the quantum 
advances in neuroscience, for instance, which will finally and 
specifically, (rather than non-specifically and destructively), cure 
the terrible aberrations of mental illness. 
  But the mind-brain puzzle has far larger implications 
than that.  It deals with the problem of man in all its aspects.  It 
deals with all his social, ethical and artistic parts.3   The final 
implications must not be underestimated. 
This is the "why bother".  Even offensive theories can 
yield useful and powerful results, necessary to man!  The final 
test, the final judgment therefore, must be made on results.  But, 
before results can be obtained, it is necessary, first, to entertain 
the possibility! 
My reconception of fundamentals, though radical, is 
absolutely consistent with the historical progress of science -of 
physics, biology, mathematics and logic.  It solves the biological 
                                                 
 
 
3 I think it would be a real mistake to discount the possibility of real, purely 
physical implications from my thesis.  In the transition beyond "objects", 
wholly new degrees of freedom may be possible for physics itself. 
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and the philosophical problems inherent in the mind-body 
problem, and exorcises the "homunculus" once and for all.   
It provides an Archimedean fulcrum to overturn our naive 
realistic presuppositions, (inherited by "scientific realism"), and 
let us get on to the serious business of creating a science of mind 
and brain.  It provides a viable context in which I believe 
workable theories are now, finally, possible.  
No substantial progress will ever be made in dealing with 
"mind", or in the treatment of its terrible, destructive aberrations, 
(both individual and societal), -until the mind-body problem itself 
is solved and workable tools are developed.   
To deal with the mind, we must deal with its "objects" 
and the relations between them.  To deal with the brain, we must 
deal with its process.  To constructively and specificallyV  affect 
the processes of mindVI via the brain, the relationship between 
the two must be understood! 
The simplistic orientations of naive realism, ("though 
grown up and sporting a beard" -to coin a phrase), just will not 
stand any longer.  Great issues, to include the most profound 
social, ethical and spiritual aspirations of the race, depend upon 
the resolution of this problem -and upon its consequent, the 
establishment of a mature and viable neuroscience.   
There is too much pain in our world, and too much need, -
dependant upon real solutions to these problems, to cling to the 
playgrounds of our intellectual youth. 
 
How do we live? 
So, (given my thesis), what is the point?  Do we exist, 
therefore merely contemplating our navels, lost in the "ontic 
indeterminism" of metaphysics?  No.   
I, for one, rarely even think about metaphysics, but love 
and feel pain, pay attention to passing cars, and generally live my 
life as you, (or any dogmatic Naturalist), would.  I practice 
Descartes' interim life strategy of normalcy, (by necessity), and 
pretty much live my life as I always have.   I speak the language 
of Naturalism because it is good and fecund language and 
because it is, well ..."natural"! 
When I choose to consider the connection however, I 
know that by following my inbuilt model, (and extending it 
through the discovery of new science, let’s say), I am in harmony 
with that nameless externality.  I do not use my model, you see, I 
live in it! 
 
My "Act of Faith": 
But what do I, personally and as my act of faith, believe?   
(I, after all, get to have beliefs as well!)  Though I do not believe 
in the necessity of spatially and temporally separate metaphysical 
objects, (consistent, certainly, with the views of modern physics), 
nor in the metaphysical "aether" in which they are still 
conceived(!), I, (personally), believe in the metaphysical 
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existence of other minds!4  (That there is still more, -an absolute 
externality, "phenomena substantia"- I also believe.)   
But as per those other minds, specifically as minds, (as 
per my second thesis), I believe they are all precisely products of 
implicit definition, variations on, (values of), a single universal 
function.  They are, I believe therefore, continuous variations of 
me.  We are all, I believe consequently, more than brothers, but 
"states" of the same being.   
"You" are "me" in a different "place", (state) -there is no 
necessary spatial or temporal separation between us, i.e. there is 
no necessary metaphysical "aether" between us! 
But somebody already said all that, didn't they? 
                                                 
 
 
4 I also believe in a continuity of sentiency, at least with the higher animals -for 
reasons which should be perfectly obvious by now.  Just where the "cutoff point" 
may be, I would not be presumptuous enough to speculate.  Might not these be 
the “extra-terrestrial”/ alien intelligences we have so long desired to meet? 
 
"'I tell you the truth, whatever you did for one of the least 
of these brothers of mine, you did for me. ...  whatever 
you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do 
for me.'" (Mat. 25:40-45) 
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Chapter 14: Epilogue 
How do you convince a bird, living in a dying tree, to 
leave its accustomed perch, its familiar nest, and go to inhabit 
another?  You may praise the new view, and describe fantastic 
horizons invisible to the old.  You may catalogue the prospects of 
juicy worms, temperate climes, and soaring flights through 
inestimable thermals.   
But the bird, clutching stubbornly to its tattered branch, 
may only envision the loss of its well-defined routines.  The path 
to an easy patch of straw for its nest or a worm-rich meadow 
might become convoluted or even impossible because of distance 
or predators!  It cannot even envision the possibilities of the new 
place unless it is willing to chance an exploratory flight.   
Its world is simple and uncomplicated -or at least the 
complications are well known.  This has been my problem here.  
I believe the mind-body problem is the most difficult in the 
history of the human intellect.  It hinges on the problem of 
cognition -and that is the problem of everything!  Its solution, I 
feel, involves a brand new "roost" -a new intellectual perspective 
with horizons different but incomparably broader than before. 
Admittedly however, though it proffers "sunsets of 
unmatched vividness", and "new and fertile meadows", it 
involves a definite risk as well.  It may turn out, after all, that the 
"nest" I propose lies over fallow fields and iron-hard soil where 
no "worms" might survive!   
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You are right, therefore, to be conservative and cautious 
in the selection of your ultimate habitat, but you are wrong if you 
are timid in your survey -your future may depend on it.  I invite 
you to conquer your fear of vertigo and try your wings in an 
exploratory flight to this very different tree of knowledge. 
"Safe (that is, probable) hypotheses are a dime a dozen, 
and the safest are logical truths.  If what science is 
seeking is primarily a body of certain truths, it should 
stick to spinning out logical theorems.  The trouble with 
such safety, however, is that it doesn't get us anywhere." 
(P.S. Churchland)I   
There are really just two schools of thought on the mind-
body problem.  One holds that the relationship between the mind 
and the brain is inherently unsolvable.  It holds that the natures of 
mind and brain are (1) either absolutely incommensurate, (are of 
different kinds), or (2) the problem is beyond intrinsic limitations 
on human understanding.   
The other school holds that the relationship is perfectly 
direct and unproblematic, albeit totally one-sided and 
exceedingly complex.  The first offers no practical hope 
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whatsoever for the dysfunctions of the human mind, but the latter 
destroys the reason for caring in the first place.   
Its solution is that we are all automatons, "zombies"!  
Mind, in its ordinary sense, is a fantasy, a "figment" of the 
imagination!  What, then, does it matter whether another 
automaton makes "pain" noises rather than "happy" noises?  
 Less delicately, what possible objection could there be to 
the Dachau "fetus series" or to the atrocities in Bosnia?  The 
solutions offered by both schools, moreover, are counterintuitive, 
limit the scope of empirical investigation and involve significant 
logical difficulties.  I have offered a new alternative capable of 
resolving the whole of the problem and commensurate with the 
whole of the human spirit. 
My thesis opens the further and distinct possibility of an 
actual "physics", i.e. a mathematical and scientific mechanics of 
mind and brain, as it defines, for the first time, an appropriate 
context in which it could be formulated.  Just as the SUPERBII 
theories of Newton, Maxwell, and Einstein were literally 
unthinkable in the cosmological context of Ptolemy or in the 
physical (and gravitational) context of Aristotle, neither can the 
SUPERB theories which must eventually encompass the mind 
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and the brain arise without the context -and the continuum -which 
will make them possible. 
I believe the mind-body problem is the most important 
problem in the history of our (human) species.  Subsuming both 
science and ethics, it will ultimately determine our future as a 
civilization.   
Though this sounds overly dramatic and even downright 
pompous, reflection shows that it is not.  Answers to what we are, 
and why we are will determine what we can do and what we will 
do.III  Profound belief determines actual practice!   
The bounds of future civilization will be set by our 
ultimate understanding of our own being.  This problem 
demands, therefore, the greatest latitude and the greatest 
tolerance to radical ideas.  It is too important to be treated 
otherwise. 
It has been said of scientists, (and it certainly applies to 
philosophers of mind as well), that they live, alternately, in two 
disjoint worlds.  They do not take their reality home with them.  
The reality they believe as professionals is not the reality they 
believe when they dodge cars on the freeway or make love.  None 
will put out a saucer of milk for Schrödinger’s cat. 
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Is Dennett prepared during his self-stimulating 
monologue, (whilst sitting in his rocker and listening to Vivaldi), 
to accept himself solely as a "center of narrative gravity", solely 
as the cumulative product of temporally and spatially separate 
and discrete processes, (the "Final Edition" published on his 
"Demonic Press"), lacking "figment" or "qualia"?  I, personally, 
am perhaps willing to accept him as such, but I am certainly not 
willing to accept me as such. 
Like Dennett, I have been wrestling with this problem for 
over 50 years.  I came to it not from philosophical curiosity or 
"epistemic hunger", but as a result of personal tragedy -the loss of 
a loved one, (my mother), to the maw of mental illness.  
Frustration -and anger- at the inability of science to help her and 
a survey of the dismal "mythological",1 (Freudian and quasi-
Freudian), state of then-current thinking on the subjectIV caused 
me to begin a personal and private search, of necessity based in 
                                                 
 
 
1 echoing Einstein's characterization of Freudianism 
 
  
 
 
 
480
logical and abstract theoretical criteria -but aimed at an empiric 
goal.2 
Emerging from my "cave", (of contemplation), just a few 
years ago, I was surprised and fascinated by the illuminating and 
brilliant bonfires which had been lit on the plains of biology and 
philosophy.  Since then, with more than a little trepidation, I have 
been scouting each of the major encampments so lit.   
I have concluded that I have something still new and 
novel to say.  I think that my torch, crafted as much by art as by 
science, carries a unique Promethean flame.  I think I have solved 
the essence of the problem of mind-brain.  Now I, like Benjamin 
Franklin, Rousseau's "backwoods philosopher", stand before the 
sophisticates of Paris in my bearskin cap.V 
                                                 
 
 
2 Since then, my perspectives have widened.  I have come to believe that the 
tragedies of mental illness are echoed in the tragedies of the human social 
condition -the wars, the hatred, the arrogance, the exploitation of man by his 
fellow man, these are other aspects of the same basic problem.  Under the 
perspective of dogmatic Naturalism, these are plausible and normal, and 
therefore necessary.  I do not believe they are. 
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Though my thesis admittedly opens new and fundamental 
problems -more, perhaps, even than it solves, that very fact 
unlocks whole new worlds of possibility for scientific advance 
and in itself constitutes an argument for serious consideration.   
If, in fact, we have already "arrived", if you are satisfied 
that we do, in fact, already possess in rough form a valid picture 
of the whole of our reality, then the very poverty of that reality as 
regards the human condition must make you very sad -and kindle 
the hope that something more is possible.  I think it is! 
Science has provided the tools for an enlarged and more 
sophisticated physical life, but taken away the reasons for living 
it!
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Chapter 15: Book Conclusion 
 Is this a truly “outrageous”I proposal?  It certainly is!   
However totally "antirealistic" it may sound however, I argue that 
my thesis is more compatible with contemporary science than 
any alternative currently proposed.  It preserves science and 
ordinary experience as well.  [It is not far removed from the spirit 
of modern physics either.]  
I will insert the whole of the opening quote from W.V.O. 
Quine again here, as I think it must be considered as a whole. 
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from 
the most casual matters of geography and history to the 
profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which 
impinges on experience only along the edges.  Or, to 
change the figure, total science is like a field of force 
whose boundary conditions are experience.  A conflict 
with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments 
in the interior of the field.  Truth values have to be 
redistributed over some of our statements.  Reevaluation 
of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because 
of their logical interconnections- the logical laws being in 
turn simply certain further statements of the system, 
certain further elements of the field.  Having reevaluated 
one statement we must reevaluate some others, which 
may be statements logically connected with the first or 
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may be the statements of logical connections themselves.  
But the total field is so underdetermined by its boundary 
conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of 
choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of 
any single contrary experience.  No particular experiences 
are linked with any particular statements in the interior of 
the field, except indirectly through considerations of 
equilibrium affecting the field as a whole.......  
Furthermore it becomes folly to see a boundary between 
synthetic statements… and analytic statements...Any 
statement can be held true come what may, if we make 
drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system...  
Conversely… no statement is immune to revision… even 
the logical law of the excluded middle... and what 
difference is there in principle between such a shift and 
the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein 
Newton, or Darwin Aristotle?"II 
We have already seen deep contradictions “at the 
periphery” -eg Raichle, W.J. Freeman, Edelman, 
Maturana….which force us to profound changes “in the interior 
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of the field” comparable to Quine’s “even the law of the excluded 
middle”.  In fact,  they force us beyond even “objects”.  
"One could even end up, though we ourselves shall not, 
by finding that the smoothest and most adequate overall 
account of the world does not after all accord existence to 
ordinary physical things.....Such eventual departures from 
Johnsonian usage”, (Samuel Johnson is said to have 
demonstrated the reality of a rock by kicking it!), “could 
partake of the spirit of science and even of the 
evolutionary spirit of ordinary language itself."III  
My book supplies such a perspective.  How could “the 
color phi”, “chinese rooms”, “cats on mats”, … tenuous purely 
philosophical arguments at best, be more important than these 
deep biological and physical facts? 
This is such a theory, but, at the same time, it also allows 
us “to have a life!” 
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Consider once again the parallel between the most 
SUPERB1, (according to Roger Penrose), of modern physical 
theories,2 and my own conclusions: 
"There is a very precise equation, the Schroedinger 
equation, which provides a completely deterministic time-
evolution for this [quantum] state.  But there is something 
very odd about the relation between the time-evolved 
quantum state and the actual behavior of the physical 
world that is observed to take place.  From time to time -
whenever we consider that a 'measurement' has occurred -
we must discard the quantum state that we have been 
laboriously evolving, and use it only to compute various 
probabilities that the state will  'jump' to one or another of 
a set of new possible states."  (ibid, P.226, his emphases) 
                                                 
 
 
1 His “CAPS” 
2 F.  Quantum mechanics:  Explains "hitherto inexplicable phenomena...The 
laws of chemistry, the stability of atoms, the sharpness of spectral lines...the 
curious phenomenon of superconductivity.. and the behavior of lasers are just a 
few amongst these." (P.153)  "No observational discrepancies" (at all) "with that 
theory are known." 
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In this “more optimistic” view, it is only "in relation to 
the results of 'measurements'" that concrete reality emerges -i.e. 
that a specific rendition of space-time is enabled. 
Now compare this one last time to the re-afferent model I 
presented in the Freeman Appendix of Chapter 4.  Each evolves a 
“state” equation and then performs a “measurement”, (action into 
the world), which then causes a new state equation, 
(Schrödinger/W.J. Freeman) to be formed until the next 
“measurement” is performed.  
 
Quoting Penrose once again: 
“What kind of a picture of ‘physical reality’ does” 
[quantum physics] “provide us with? …Many physicists 
find themselves despairing of ever finding such a picture.  
They claim instead to be happy with the view that 
quantum theory provides merely a calculational 
procedure”, [an algorithm], “for computing probabilities 
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and not an objective picture of the real world.  Some, 
indeed, assert that quantum theory proclaims no objective 
picture to be possible –at least none which is consistent 
with physical facts.” IV 
Neils Bohr, the recognized "father" of quantum theory 
said that a realistic  picture of ontology was unattainable! He 
characterized his new science as a pure algorithm, (i.e.: a rote, 
purely pragmatic but profoundly and overwhelmingly useful 
procedure), instead. What the actual reality beneath it is, he said, 
we cannot know and cannot picture. His theoretical world could 
not, (cannot), fit any normal sense of the real world. And yet it 
works and leads to the production of new things -transistors, 
nuclear power plants, etc. 
How close these conceptions are!  But quantum physics, 
according to Penrose is considered the most “SUPERB” theory in 
our current repertoire.  It gives you something to think about, 
doesn’t it? 
 I invite comments and would welcome constructive help 
in my lifelong quest for a pragmatic answer to this, our deepest 
and most urgent problem.  I sincerely believe it will determine 
 
  
 
    
 
489
the future of our species as it lies at the bottom of our deepest and 
most destructive dilemmas.3 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
3 Note:  I will not expose my humanistic or ethical views, (and they are quite 
broad and fiercely important to me), as it is vitally important that this problem 
be solved scientifically and soon, and advancing my personal beliefs would 
only hinder the process.  I will only say that I think this is the most urgent and 
the most important problem that humankind has ever faced.  Without its input, 
I think we will exterminate ourselves very shortly –I agree with Stephen 
Hawking on this matter. 
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(Note:  I will respond to any decently proposed questions at 
jiglowitz@rcsis.com . 
Please put some verbiage corresponding to “In Response 
to your Theories” in the subject line as, else, I will probably 
delete it as “spam” unread.) 
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Appendix A:The Dennett Appendix and the Color 
Phi, (from Iglowitz 1995) 
Perhaps the hardest hurdle for my conception is what I 
call “the static problem”.  The axiom systems of current 
mathematics tend to create uniform, "static" fields of objects: the 
integers, for instance, or the real numbers.  
True, there are special, unique objects within them, pi, or 
e, or 1 for instance, but these are not promising for the kind of 
usage we will need to see for viable mental objects. 
 To this point, the model I have proposed stands more in 
the sense of a Platonic "form", and lacks the viability of 
Aristotle's conjunction of "form and matter" for the existence of 
actual, special objects.  
Let me try to suggest the beginnings of a solution for the 
existence of such objects within such a system. Let me try to 
suggest a rationale for actual perceptual objects! 
Daniel Dennett, (though he is a confirmed anti-mentalist), 
has provided an inspiration. It derives from his treatment of the 
"color phi" phenomenon, -though his conclusion must be stood 
on its head. I suggest that the answer to the "static problem" and 
the ground of viable perceptual objects lies in recognizing 
intentionality as a primary component of brain process.  It is a 
necessary and complementary (system of) "axiom(s)".  
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Towards a Working Model of Real Minds: Dennett, 
Helmholtz and Cassirer 
I really liked Daniel Dennett's "Consciousness 
Explained"I.  It is not because I could agree with his conclusions, 
(except in a certain sense), that I liked it, but because it is a 
brutally candid and forthright exposition of the Naturalist 
position, proceeding with compelling logic, and without hedging.   
I respect that!  It is, moreover, a phenomenologically pure 
position.  I think it is, (agreeing with his own parenthetical 
question), really "Consciousness Explained Away" however, 
rather than "Consciousness Explained" because, at the end, "we 
are all zombies".1   
                                                 
 
 
1 I know, I know!  I must, in threat of disingenuousness, quote his footnote to 
this comment: "it would be an act of the utmost intellectual dishonesty to 
quote this statement out of context." 
     But the context he demands is 470 pages of careful redefinition and 
argument against all the normal senses of mental function and existence -
qualia, figment, the "substance of mind".  The upshot is that it is O.K., (i.e. 
socially correct), to be a zombie!  But the sense in which his statement would 
normally be understood out of context is essentially what it still means within 
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There is one crucial argument he makes against the 
existence of mental states, (i.e. "figment"), however, in which I 
think he has correctly identified a profound antinomy -and, I 
believe, a necessary and major modification to our ordinary 
conception of mind.  He has argued it from "the color phi". 
"The color phi" names an actual experiment, suggested by 
Nelson Goodman, wherein two spots of light are projected in 
succession, (at different locations), on a darkened screen for 150 
msec intervals with a 50 msec interval between them.  The first 
spot, however, is of a different color, (red, say), than the second, 
(green).  Just as in the case of motion pictures, (the "phi 
phenomenon"), subjects report seeing the continuous motion of a 
single spot, but interestingly, they report that it changes color, 
(from red to green), midway between the two termini!2 
                                                                                                           
 
 
it.  He attempts to make any objection, (or any comment on its own prima 
facie unintuitiveness), unraisable.  There is another cult, (besides the 
Feenomanists!), in the jungle, you see! :-) 
2 and not, for instance, that it is red all the way till its terminus, with a final and 
sudden change-to-green. 
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 Dennett bases a very interesting, (and, I feel a very 
important), argument against the very possibility of a "Cartesian 
Theatre", against a unity, (and "figment" = substance), of 
consciousness on this well documented and reproducible 
experiment.  Dennett's argument, in brief, is this: 
Mental states, the "Cartesian Theatre", if they exist, are 
subject to the laws of causality, of time precedence.  For one 
event to affect another, it must occur before it.  Let me, for 
discussion's sake, label the events described.  Let E1 be the 
("heterophenomenological"3), perception, (hereinafter to be 
called by me "h-perception"), of the first, (red), spot.  Let E2 be 
the h-perception of the red-changing-to-green, and let E3 be the 
h-perception of the final green spot. 
Dennett argues, based on the principle of causality that E2 
cannot occur until after E3.  Since there were only two actual, 
                                                 
 
 
3 Dennett introduces the criterion "heterophenomenological" to describe "mental 
events", which he does not believe in, to describe whatever-it-is that is named by 
them,  i.e. to talk about them as they are (linguistically) used by real bodies and 
brains, (which he does believe in), but with a neutral metaphysical commitment. 
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(physical), events, (the first and second projected spots), he 
argues that the h-perceived midpoint, (the "mental event", i.e. 
red-changing-to-green), cannot occur until after the reception of 
the second actual event, (green projection), as it was that which 
provided the very sensory data necessary to the h-perception of 
change.   
Other than a (mystical) hypothesis of "projection 
backward in time", there remain for Dennett just two possibilities 
for an internal, "Cartesian Theatre" consistent with the 
experiment: the "Stalinesque" and the "Orwellian" hypotheses. 
The first involves the creation of a "show trial" staged by 
a subterranean "central committee", (after the fact of both real 
events, of course, and involving a "delay loop"), wherein the 
complete, (and partially fabricated), sequence, (red ->red-
changing-to-green -> green), is "projected", (i.e. achieves 
sentiency).   
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Under this hypothesis, the whole of our sentiency, our 
consciousness, occurs "after the fact".  The second possibility, the 
"Orwellian" hypothesis, is that the actual events are received by 
our sentient faculty as is, but that our memory then rewrites 
history, (just as the thought police of Orwell's "1984" did), so that 
we remember not two disjoint and separate events, but the 
connected, and pragmatically more probable sequence red -> red-
changing-to-green -> green. 
Dennett argues that ultimately neither theory is decidable 
-that either is consistent with whatever level and kind of 
experimental detail science may ultimately supply, and that, 
therefore, the only pragmatic distinction between them is purely 
linguistic, and therefore trivial.   
He argues that there is no "great divide", no actual 
moment, (nor existence), of sentiency, but only the underlying 
brain process, (which all theories must countenance), itself.  
Based on the "spatial and temporal smearing of the observer's 
point of view", he expounds his thesis of "multiple drafts" 
wherein there is no "theatre", only brain process -and its various 
"speakings", (drafts). 
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And yet the observer himself has absolutely no problem 
with these events!  His perspective is very clear: E1 -> E2 -> E3.  
It is our interpretation, (and rationale), for this sequence that 
causes the problem. 
I think Dennett has a very strong argument, but I want to 
refocus it.  Nondecidability is all very well and good, but it is a 
much weaker line than the one he started out with- on the 
possibility of synchronization!  In a very real sense, I feel it is 
very similar in intent and consequence to Einstein's famous 
"train" argument against simultaneity. 
Consider, (with Einstein), an imaginary train moving 
(very fast)4 down a track, with an observer standing midway on 
top of the moving train and observing two (hypothetically 
instantaneous) flashbulbs going off at either end of the train.   
The train goes by another (stationary) observer standing 
(hypothetically infinitely) close by the track as the bulbs go off.  
Suppose that the moving observer, (OT), reports both flashes as 
                                                 
 
 
4 nearing the speed of light 
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simultaneous.  He argues that since both photon pulses reach him 
simultaneously, (granted for all frames on the local, infinitesimal 
scale, and thus agreed on (?) by both observers who are assumed 
infinitely close -i.e. side by side), that therefore the pulse from 
the rear of the train, having to "catch" him, must have left its 
source sooner than the pulse from the front which added his 
velocity to its own and so must have left later.    
Relative to OS, (stationary observer), however, the two 
sources travel the same distance to a stationary target, (himself).  
Since OT and OS are momentarily adjacent to each other, (i.e. 
within a local frame), they should be able to agree that the two 
pulses arrive there simultaneously.   
What they cannot agree on, however, (in that instance), is 
whether the events, (the flashes), occurred simultaneously -nor 
that the other could have thought, (i.e. could have observed), 
them so!  Time, in Dennett's words, is "smeared"!5  We could, of 
                                                 
 
 
5 Are the observers, (and the experimental apparatus), then 
"heterophenomenological"? 
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course and significantlyII, vary the parameters of the stated 
problem to make either event "earlier" and the other "later".6 
The argument7 is that from the standpoint of one 
observer, he must maintain that the other cannot see them as 
simultaneous, and vice versa!  Thus from OS's standpoint, if he
sees them as simultaneous, then, since he is stationary, th
occurred simultaneously.  But if they occurred simultaneously, 
and since OT is moving, then OT cannot, (OS argues), see
as simultaneous, (and conversely).  And yet both observers pas
through an infinitesimal local frame of reference, (side-by-side).  
Time is "smeared"! 
 
ey 
 them 
s 
                                                
Just as Einstein's two observers, near the limits of 
physical possibility, cannot agree whether the two lights were 
simultaneously flashed at the ends of the train or not, (i.e. cannot 
 
 
 
6 i.e. if the front pulse arrived at the correct interval before the rear pulse, OT 
could argue that they were, in fact, simultaneous, but OS would obviously 
argue to the contrary.  This would be a better match to Dennett’s specific 
problem. 
7 assuming the legitimacy of “simultaneity” itself 
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establish a common temporal frame of reference), nor that the 
other could observe them locally as such, neither, given Dennett's 
pointed argument, can we establish a common temporal frame of 
reference for "the world" and "the mind" at the limits of 
cognition.8 
I agree with Dennett that "the color phi" identifies a 
legitimate and critical aspect of the mind-body problem.  The 
spatial and temporal "smearing" of the percept and the non-
explicit reference of qualia that he demonstrates forces a 
profound extension to our traditional conception of the "theatre".   
But his dimensional "smearing" actually fits very well9 
with the model I am proposing.  I submit that it is more plausible 
in terms of the "focus" and "function" of an operational object 
                                                 
 
 
8 For macroscopic science, these limits are at the scale of the speed of light.  For 
atomic physics, they are at the scale of Planck's constant.  And for the brain, I 
suggest, they are at the scale of minimal biological response times, i.e. in the 100 
msec. range. 
9 when taken "heterophenomenologically" -i.e. with a neutral ontic commitment.  
Heterophenomenology works both ways! 
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than in terms of his "multiple drafts", "demons" and "memes" in 
the "real world".   
Cassirer on the Color Phi: 
His objections to the ordinary "Cartesian theatre" are 
admittedly valid, but so were those of Cassirer and Helmholtz 
long before him: 
"For example, if we conceive the different perceptual 
images, which we receive from one and the same 'object' 
according to our distance from it and according to 
changing illumination, as comprehended in a series of 
perceptual images, then from the standpoint of immediate 
psychological experience, no property can be indicated at 
first by which any of these varying images should have 
preeminence over any other.  Only the totality of these 
data of perception constitutes what we call empirical 
knowledge of the object; and in this totality no single 
element is absolutely superfluous.  No one of the 
successive perspective aspects can claim to be the only 
valid, absolute expression of the 'object itself;' rather all 
the cognitive value of any particular perception belongs to 
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it only in connection with other contents, with which it 
combines into an empirical whole.” 
“...In this sense, the presentation of the stereometric form 
plays 'the  role of a concept'", (my emphasis), 
"'compounded from a great series of sense perceptions, 
which, however, could not necessarily be construed in 
verbally expressible definitions, such as the geometrician 
uses, but only through the living presentation of the law, 
according to which the perspective images follow each 
other.'  This ordering by a concept means, however, that 
the various elements do not lie alongside of each other 
like the parts of an aggregate, but that we estimate each of 
them according to its systematic significance...."  
(Cassirer, 1923, pp. 288-289, citing Helmholtz) 
But Cassirer's own drastic reformulation of the formal 
[technical] “concept” itself must be considered for an 
understanding of his meaning here.  The “concept”, for Cassirer 
as we have spent a lot of time understanding, is a function.  It is 
like "the form of a series", independent and distinct from what it 
orders.III  This is the "systematic significance" which he purports.   
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I urge, extending Cassirer's insight and in the sense of my 
conclusions of Chapter 3, [ Iglowitz, 1995] that the stereometric 
form itself, the actual percept,10 then plays the role of, (is), a 
function. 
From the standpoint of (relativized) Naturalism,11 if we 
take the mind to be schematic, but specifically a "predictive" and 
"intentional" schematic model, (which extension I will suggest 
shortly), rather than a static and "representative" oneIV, then the 
temporal and spatial "smearing" of the percept do not have the 
implications against the "theatre" per se that Dennett attributes to 
them.   
I have argued that the percept itself is conceptual, (albeit 
specialized, invariant and constitutive), and therefore, following 
Cassirer, functional.  It is an entity of order and process -and it is 
                                                 
 
 
10  This, the percept as concept, is clearly at odds with, but, (I have argued), a 
legitimate extension of, Cassirer's ideas.  He did not have the perspective of 
the schematic object. 
11 cf. Chapter 5 
 
  
 
 
 
504
"smeared".  That is the normal nature of functions -functions are 
smeared!  [Note June, 2010: Reconsider the continuum itself!] 
What Dennett explains by "multiple drafts", (and the 
"demonic" process he envisions beneath them), I explain by 
"focus".  We focus the percept, (via implicit definition) according 
to operational need. 
 
An Extension of the Schematic Model: A Brief Sketch 
Let me frame the following in the language of ordinary 
Naturalism, (this will be a short appendix).  I want to sketch a 
very large canvas very quickly.12 In "the color phi", I think that 
Dennett has identified a very important difficulty in our ordinary 
conception of mind.  It suggests an enlargement and a more 
                                                 
 
 
12 I could, of course, try to footnote every misconception and every possible 
claim of inconsistency, but I already did that in my original MS.  I think I have 
paid my dues.  "Predictivity", "intentionality", et al are, under my thesis, 
perfectly valid conceptions within the Naturalist "form" - and I may consistently 
use them as such without self-contradiction!  Within the context of my larger 
perspective, they are model-model correlations, synthetic a priori "slices" across 
the phenomena. [Iglowitz, 1995] 
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sophisticated perspective on the schematism I have argued 
heretofore.  Though I think I have successfully laid the solid 
foundation, let me now briefly sketch the design of the cathedral 
itself, i.e. the design of real minds!  
I have dealt, previously, with the schematic object.  I 
argued that the object of perception is a schematic artifact of 
reactive brain process, specifically "designed" to optimize a 
simple and efficient "calculus" of response.   
But the converse side to that argument is that a calculus 
was actually enabled!  What are the (Naturalistic) implications of 
that calculus, and of the schematic model?V 
A Thought Experiment 
Follow me in a thought experiment!  Keeping your eyes 
fixed to the front, you perceive, (in your perceptual model), this 
paper in front of you, the wall behind it, and, perhaps, the 
pictures of your family.  There may be pens and pencils, books.  
You may hear music from the stereo next to you, (and perhaps 
still in peripheral vision).  There may be a window, and the lights 
of the neighbor's house beyond it. 
  But there is no wall behind you!  There is no car in the 
driveway outside of your house -indeed, there is no "house" at all.  
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There is no city, no taxes, no friends.  The sun does not exist in 
this model.  There is no government, no "universe", -no 
tomorrow!  The (purely) perceptual model is incomplete as a 
model of "reality" and it is, (Naturally!), inadequate even to keep 
you alive!   
There is something else necessary for completeness of the 
model detailed in this book, i.e. a new perspective on it.  It is an 
intentional aspect.  It is necessary to supply the object behind 
your back and the reality "over the hill"!  It supplies the 
connection to "tomorrow" and "yesterday".  It supplies 
"causality".  It is necessary for the completeness of a model of 
"the world".  It is necessary, (specifically following Dennett!), 
even for the individual "objects" of perception itself, (E1 and E3 
for instance). 
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   Figure 31 
This model, I suggest, is where E2, (the object of 
Dennett's perplexity), lives.  It cohabits there very comfortably 
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with E1 and E3 which, I argue, are also predictive and schematic 
objects.  There is a seamless integration, (above the scale of 100 
ms, let us say), of what we normally think of as our pure percepts 
and the intentional fabric within which they are woven.13   
This model, I believe, is the actual "home" of mind, and 
the legitimate purview of a truly scientific psychiatry.VI 
                                                 
 
 
13 Let us turn Dennett's argument around.  Dennett argues strongly and 
convincingly that "figment", (mental states), are logically inconsistent with our, 
(his), ordinary (naïve) views of cognition and reality.  If, instead of accepting his 
conclusion however, we choose to accept the reality of that figment -E1, E3, and 
E2, -if we believe that E2 is actually perceived, (whatever it may be), then his 
argument takes on a different import and works against the very ground in which 
it was framed: i.e. his ordinary view of cognition and the Naturalism, 
("objectivism"), in which he embedded it.  The "color phi", he says himself, 
embodies a precise and reproducible experiment –both you and I would expect 
to see E2! 
 
I consider the "phi phenomenon" itself more interesting than the "color phi", 
however.  The credibility and intentional depth of a series of oversized, rapidly 
sequenced still pictures, (a movie), is quite suggestive.  Its potential for an 
uncanny parallelism with our ordinary experience suggests that the latter, (i.e. 
ordinary experience), is itself a predictive and integrative phenomenon grounded 
in a schematic, intentional model in precisely the same manner as I propose the 
"color phi" to be.  
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"Now what is a phenomenal space?  Is it a physical space 
inside the brain?  Is it the onstage space in a theater of 
consciousness located in the brain?  Not literally.  But 
metaphorically?  In the previous chapter we saw a way of 
making sense of such metaphorical spaces, in the example 
of the 'mental images' that Shakey, [a robot], manipulated.   
In a strict but metaphorical sense, Shakey drew shapes in 
space, paid attention to particular points in that space, 
based conclusions on what he found at those points in 
space.  But the space was only a logical space.   
It was like the space of Sherlock Holmes's London, a 
space of a fictional world, but a fictional world 
systematically anchored to actual physical events going 
on in the ordinary space in Shakey's 'brain'.  If we took 
Shakey's utterances as expressions of his 'beliefs', then we 
could say that it was a space Shakey believed in, but that 
did not make it real, any more than someone's belief in 
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Feenoman would make Feenoman real.  Both are merely 
intentional objects....  So we do have a way of making 
sense of the ideas of phenomenal space -as a logical 
space."14   
But this is my exact conclusion of Chapter 3. [Iglowitz, 
1995]  Dennett and I are not so very far apart after all -save in our 
metaphysics, (wherein we are very different).  Mind is a logical 
entity -i.e. its "space" is a logical space.  
 But Dennett's "mind" is based in abstractive, 
associationist logic (after Dreyfus' usageVII), and dead, and mine 
is based in a functional logic, (the constitutive logic of Kant and 
of biology), and live.  We are not zombies! 
On the issue of metaphysics, on the other hand, 
surprisingly Dennett specifically argues that "nature does not 
build epistemic engines."VIII Why, then, does he think that he, 
                                                 
 
 
14 Dennett, 1991, pps.130-131, my emphasis. 
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either as a physical engine of process, (and the "demons" of 
process), or as a linguistic engine of "memes", -is epistemic, (i.e. 
metaphysically so)?  Or that his book is so? 
I don't think that he, or I, are.  This was my exact 
conclusion of Chapter 5. 
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Appendix B: Lakoff, Edelman, and 
“Hierarchy”1 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, (Iglowitz, 1995), I had 
not seen George Lakoff’s “Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things” 
nor Gerald Edelman’s “Bright Air, Brilliant Fire" until very 
recently.  It was remarkable to me, therefore, to see how closely 
Lakoff’s logical and epistemological conclusions resembled those 
of Cassirer2,  (considered as the combination of Cassirer’s dual 
theses: his logical thesis of “the functional Concept of 
mathematics" and  his epistemological thesis of “Symbolic 
Forms”), and how closely Edelman’s biological and 
philosophical  answers,  based in Lakoff’s and his own original 
work,  resembled my own conclusions.   
There is an uncanny parallelism of structure, (though not 
of consequence), between the paths we have followed to arrive at 
our conclusions.  Our structural differences are differences of 
degree –but important differences.  I believe that Lakoff, (and 
Edelman), have gone too far in the case of logic, and not far 
enough in the case of epistemology.   
                                                 
 
 
1 [Note:  This is the original Lakoff/Edelman appendix from Iglowitz 1998 
sans the discussion of mathematical “ideals” which latter is presented 
elsewhere in this book.  Pretty much everything else is reproduced.] 
2  Of which Lakoff, apparently, was unaware 
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They fail3, crucially thereby, to provide the grounds for 
an answer to the ultimate problem: i.e. how can “mind” o
“consciousness”, (normally taken) coexist with the existence of 
the brain?   
r 
                                                
 
Lakoff: 
Lakoff grounds his work in logical reflections of 
Wittgenstein4 which questioned the adequacy of the classical 
logical Concept and in the work of Rosch and a host of modern 
empirical researchers which further challenged that classical 
Concept by demonstrating exceptions in actual human usage of 
language and concepts across cultures and even within our own 
legitimate contemporary usage.  From these grounds and his own 
 
 
 
3  -innocently for Lakoff who never promised such an answer, but more 
pointedly for Edelman who did 
4 E.g. Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances” 
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original work, Lakoff drew strong conclusions about the nature of 
logic5 –and the human mind- itself.  
The Classical Concept 
The classical concept6 is defined “by necessary and 
sufficient conditions” -that is, by set theoretic definitions on 
properties.  It is an elementary theorem of logic that the whole of 
the operations of sentential logic, for instance, may be grounded 
solely in the primitive operations of intersection and 
complement.7  More generally, logical sets and categories, 
(concepts8), are defined on presumed “atomic properties” and are 
                                                 
 
 
5  compare Cassirer: "... Every attempt to transform logic must concentrate 
above all upon this one point: all criticism of formal logic is comprised in 
criticism of the general doctrine of the construction of concepts." –cited at the 
beginning of my Chapter 3. 
6   Lakoff is concerned with primarily with categories, but the distinction is 
technical and not necessary to this discussion.  Cassirer dealt specifically with 
concepts, but he covered essentially the same ground. 
7 Or on other subsets of set operations as well 
8   See prior footnote: categories vs. concepts 
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commensurable wholly based on the set-theoretic possibilities of 
those sets –i.e. union, intersection, complement, etc. 
Concept-sets, (within this classical perspective), express a 
hierarchical “container schema” moreover, (using Lakoff’s 
language). Though Lakoff frames his discussion to the same end 
slightly differently, by this I mean that whenever we classically 
specify a genus, we do so by eliminating one or more of these 
atomic properties, (by intersection of the properties of species), at 
the same time thereby specifying an expanded extension, (union) 
–i.e. the set of “objects” which the genus concept encompasses.   
The delimitation, (by property containment), of the genus 
category is contained within, (is a subset - an intersection of), that 
of the species category while the extension of the species 
category, conversely, is contained within, (is a subset of),  the 
extension of the genus category.   
In specifying a species on the other hand, we do so by 
adding one or more properties –ultimately “atomic properties” to 
the properties of the genus and this species concept encompasses 
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a diminished, (intersectional), extension of the extension of the 
genus.9  This classical categorization therefore expresses an 
absolute, rigid and nested hierarchy of levels and containment.  In 
Lakoff’s terms it expresses a hierarchical “container schema”.10 
Ultimately, (because they are nested), at the limits these 
processes specify  
(1) a largest concept: “something”, (defined by no atomic 
properties), whose extension is “everything”, and 
 (2)  a smallest concept: a particular  “object” in reality, 
(or possible reality), defined by all its atomic properties11.   
Given the classical paradigm then, reason necessarily 
begins with “something”, (the most general concept), and points, 
inexorably, to some particular ”thing”, i.e. a specific object.12 
                                                 
 
 
9 “Cross categorization”, the “other . . . classical … principle of organization for 
categories” refers to the various possibilities at any stage of genus or species 
categorization – on the particular choices of which “atomic properties” are to 
be eliminated or added.  Cf Lakoff pps. 166-167 
10  ibid 
11 to include spatio-temporal properties 
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But Lakoff plausibly argues that concepts13 in legitimate 
human usage are actually determined by any rule, (to include the 
classical rules of set operations on properties as just one special 
case of a rule), or even by no rule at all !  
 Thus metaphorically based categories, such as the 
Japanese concept of “hon” are generated, (determined by), a 
metaphoric rule of extension and metonymically based categories 
are generated by a rule of metonymy.  (Metonymy is the case 
where one particular instance of a category is made to stand for 
the category.)  “Don’t let El Salvador” become another Vietnam” 
is an example Lakoff uses of a metonymically based category.14   
Here “Vietnam” stands for the concept of all hopeless, unending 
…. wars. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
12 or the exact converse –i.e. beginning with some specific object or objects in 
reality or possible reality and ending with everything! 
13 he would say “categories” 
14 P. 77.  Actually I like his “ham sandwich” better, but it was pre-empted by 
Edelman! 
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In the case of “radial categories” on the other hand, such 
as the concept of  “mother”, (to include birth mother, adoptive 
mother, foster mother, surrogate mother, etc.), or of “Balam”15 in 
the Dyirbal aboriginal language in Australia, they are determined 
by simple historical accident –they are not generated from the 
central model by general rules 
[but] .. must be learned one by one.”16  (Extensions from 
the central model are not “random” however, but are 
“motivated”, his emphasis,  “by the central model plus certain 
general principles of extension.”)17  
                                                 
 
 
15 The category which is the source of his title and includes, among other things, 
women, fire, and dangerous things. 
16 Lakoff, P.91 
17  As I will repeat later, this discussion of Lakoff’s thesis is woefully 
inadequate, but it will have to do for the purposes of this appendix.  He states 
as the “main thesis of [his] book .. that we organize our knowledge by means 
of structures called idealized cognitive models, or ICMs, and that category 
structures and prototype effects are by-products of that organization.” Ibid, 
p.68 
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He argues his case rigorously and scientifically by 
exhibiting myriad examples that are not compliant with the 
classical Concept and analytically by demonstrating the 
degradation of concepts in actual  bi-cultural environments –i.e. 
where a culture and language is being overrun by another, 
(“language death”),  as is the case with the Dyirbal aboriginal 
language in modern Australia.18  The degradation is characterized 
by the loss of blocks of suborganizations, not of random 
individual elements. 
Lakoff’s logic is not trivialized by this “free formation” of 
concepts however, (as it might seem it would be19- logic being 
[paraphrase] “mostly concerned with categories”), as he bases 
                                                 
 
 
18 See Lakoff, pps. 96-102 
19 If, according to Lakoff, (1) legitimate concepts may be formed on any 
principle or no principle, and if, also according to Lakoff, (2), most of the 
business of logic is concepts, (categories), then it would appear, (at first 
glance), that (3) logic could prove any conclusion.  But if logic can prove 
anything, then it can prove nothing!  Thus it would appear, on the face of it, 
that his purported impossibility of a rigorous, comprehensive structure for 
categories in general would imply the invalidation of logic in general. 
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logic and the relevance of concepts ultimately in a preconceptual 
context rather than in the concepts themselves.  Concepts, 
(categories), he argues, are not created in a vacuum, but within 
preconceptual schemas: “idealized cognitive models”, (ICMs).  
The latter are ultimately determined, (he argues), by the function 
of the body in the external world–all describable from “body in 
the world”.   
“There are at least two kinds of structure in our 
preconceptual experiences: 
A. Basic-Level structure: Basic-level categories are 
defined by the convergence of our gestalt perception, our 
capacity for bodily movement, and our ability to form rich 
mental images. 
B. Kinesthetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas 
are relatively simple structures that constantly recur in our 
everyday bodily experience: CONTAINERS, PATHS, 
LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various 
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orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, 
PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc.”20 
These schemas, however, being at the basis of our 
reasoning21, are necessarily mutually relativistic and equipotent 
and we utilize them on a “best fit” rationale.  The concepts that 
arise within them need not be commensurate across them.  Thus 
he arrives at a relativism of logic and concepts. 
Lakoff’s Concept/category in many ways resembles 
Cassirer’s22 and he rejects, (as does Cassirer), the classical 
                                                 
 
 
20  Lakoff, p.267. 
21  rather than categories 
22 There is an uncanny parallelism of argument throughout between Lakoff’s 
and Cassirer’s treatment of logic.  Consider, as an example, the following: 
“Category cue validity defined for such psychological (or interactional) 
attributes might correlate“, (his emphasis), “with basic-level categorization, 
but it would not pick out basic-level categories; they would already have to 
have been picked out in order to apply the definition of category of category 
cue validity so that there was such a correlation.” (Lakoff: P.54, my emphasis)  
This is almost an exact parallel to one aspect of Cassirer’s argument against 
the classical concept, and the “theory of attention”, (see my Chapter 3), –and 
for a “new form of consciousness”.  
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“necessary and sufficient conditions”, (as he phrases it), which 
ground set theoretic abstraction and the Aristotelian generic 
Concept.   His logical and ultimately epistemological relativism, 
(in his “idealized cognitive models”), is also very similar to, 
(though it is not as abstract and comprehensive as), Cassirer's 
“Symbolic Forms” which is described in my Chapter 5. (Chapters 
7 & 8 in the current writing.) 
Cassirer and Lakoff’s Logic 
Cassirer rejected the logical sufficiency of classical 
categorization as does Lakoff, but he did not reject the possibility 
of the possible existance of an absolute, comprehensive structure 
for categories, (which Lakoff does).  Instead Cassirer retained an 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 Discussing Erdman, Cassirer writes: “…instead of the community of ‘marks,’ 
the unification of elements in a concept is decided by their ‘connection by 
implication.’  And this criterion, here only introduced by way of supplement 
and as a secondary aspect, proves on closer analysis to be the real logical 
prius; “  (his emphasis), “for we have already seen that ‘abstraction’ remains 
aimless and unmeaning if it does not consider the elements from which it 
takes the concept to be from the first arranged and connected by a certain 
relation.”  Cassirer, “Substance and Function”, p.24 
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overall formal structure for categorization in the notion of a 
mathematically functional rule or series. 
Cassirer did not question the legitimacy of the classical 
schema, but he did question its necessity and sufficiency.   
(Which is pretty much where Lakoff and myself stand as well.)  
He argued that the latter is, in fact, a special and limit case of the 
Concept and of the possibilities of logic.  Cassirer maintained 
that many concepts –and specifically the very concepts of 
mathematical and physical science23 –demonstrate another mode 
of concept formation and specification than the classical scheme,  
(this is the subject of my [old] Chapter 2).  Both concept 
formation upward, (genera), and downward, (speciation), can 
obey another rule-based law, i.e. the properties of their 
extensions can embody a series other than the specific series of 
identity. 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
23 Cf Cassirer, “Substance and Function”, “Einstein’s Theory of Relativity”.  
Incidentally, the original title for “Substance and Function” was 
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  As a crude example, one member of the extension of a 
concept, (using an example drawn from numeric sets), might 
contain the numeral “2”, another the numeral “4”,  another “8”, 
“16”… rather than the numeral “2” being in all of them.   Thus 
the concept would express, (and be formed on the principle of), 
the series 2,4,8,16,…  across its extension rather than being based 
in the series of identity:  2, 2, 2,…. , (the classical schema).  The  
extension of a category, therefore, may be defined based upon the 
possession of some property belonging to a series or function on 
properties rather than on the possession of some identical 
property(ies).   Concepts can be specified by a function other 
than identity. 24 
                                                                                                           
 
 
“Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff”, i.e. Substance Concepts and Function 
Concepts! 
24 Cassirer's "series" could be ordered by radically variant principles, however: 
"according to equality", (which is the special case of the "generic concept"), 
"or inequality, number and magnitude, spatial and temporal relations, or 
causal dependence"24 -so long as the principle is definite and consistent.  But 
please remember that these are principles of category construction rather than 
properties of categories.  see my Chapter 3 
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Cassirer has supplied a clear counterexample and an 
alternative to the classical schema, (which I explained at length 
and further extended as the subject of [the old]Chapter 3).  
Simplistically, (and as crude illustration), we may have three 
pieces of “metal” in front of us for instance, wherein none of 
their properties are the same!   
The first is a one pound piece of gold, (color: yellow, 
specific gravity: a.aaaa…., conductivity: b.bbbb…., etc.), the 
second a two pound piece of lead, (color: gray, specific gravity: 
l.lll…, conductivity: m.mmm…., etc), and the third a three pound 
piece of tin: (…, …., …., etc.)  None of these properties need be 
identical however.  They are related as “metal”, (and are 
specified as “metal objects”), because the color of each, (for 
instance),  is a value of the function: COL(x) ε  {yellow, gray, 
silver,…), the specific gravity of each is a value of the function 
SG(x) ε {lll…, ggg…, …}, and so on.   
These objects, (the objects called “metal objects”),  can 
“cross party lines”, so to speak –i.e. they are not the product of 
strict set-theoretic intersection of atomic properties.  In the 
illustration their intersection across these properties is null!  The 
extension of scientific and mathematical concepts, (specifically, 
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Cassirer argues), need have no atomic properties in common25 . 
Repeating a short citation from my Chapter 3: 
"Lambert pointed out that it was the exclusive merit of 
mathematical 'general concepts' not to cancel the 
determinations of the special cases, but in all strictness 
fully to retain them.  When a mathematician makes his 
formula more general, this means not only that he is to 
retain all the more special cases, but also be able to 
deduce them from the universal formula."26 
But this possibility of deduction does not exist in the case 
of the scholastic, (Aristotelian), concepts, "since these, 
according to the traditional formula, are formed by 
neglecting the particular, and hence the reproduction of 
the particular moments of the concept seems excluded."27 
                                                 
 
 
25  Compare Wittgenstein’s “family resemblances”. 
26  Cassirer, “Substance and Function”,  P.20-23 
27  ibid P.20-23, my emphasis 
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"The ideal of a scientific concept here appears in 
opposition to the schematic general presentation which is 
expressed by a mere word.  The genuine concept does not 
disregard the peculiarities and particularities which it 
holds under it, but seeks to show the necessity of the 
occurrence and connection of just these particularities.  
What it gives is a universal rule for the connection of the 
particulars themselves....  Fixed properties are replaced by 
universal rules that permit us to survey a total series of 
possible determinations at a single glance."28 
Consider “the ellipse as a simple mathematical example 
of a genus” for instance.  Its species are functionally related –and 
fully recoverable-  in the defining equation of ellipses in general. 
Conversely in the specification of species and subspecies,  
(“downward”), the process does not necessarily lie in the addition 
of (identical) atomic properties either, (the members of the 
                                                 
 
 
28  ibid P.20-23 
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extension of a subspecies, which is also a category, need not 
contain (any) identical atomic properties by the same reasoning),  
but can be accomplished instead in the identification of the value 
of a sub-function whose possibility is implicit within the genus.29   
Ultimately, (and recursively),  the question proposes 
itself: need there be a lowest, “bottom” level concept at all?30 
Speciation is no longer necessarily intersection or containment,31 
(it is no longer necessarily nested), so there is always the 
possibility of another, further rule of assembly  for a subspecies 
                                                 
 
 
29  Since we can build a genus without commonality, so can we build a super-
genus.  Turning our perspective around, then, we may speciate downward 
from that super-genus without the utilization of commonality! 
30 The other pole is clearly impossible.  There is clearly no Concept, (category), 
of all concepts under Cassirer’s vision as it would necessarily be defined on 
“the rule of all rules”.  But some, (most), rules are obviously inconsistent with 
other rules –disallowing the concept. 
31  Since there is no longer a necessary presumption of nesting, the implication 
that there must be a “least member” is no longer justified.  
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of any species –at any level!32  There is thus no longer a 
necessary logical focus on an ultimate “thing”.  
Cassirer argues that the ultimate “objects” , (the 
“theoretical objects”), of mathematics and physical science are 
“implicitly defined” by,  (and express),  the fundamental laws of 
the science itself.  He argues that they are instances of complex 
speciation based in the general functional rules, (the laws), of the 
sciences themselves and not objects “in reality”. 
Some of Lakoff’s categories, it is true, are also rule based, 
(other than the classical rule), but in the case of his “radial 
categories”, they may be formed by historical accident.  Lakoff 
concluded that categories may be formed by classical rules, other 
rules or “no rule at all”!   But this characterization divorces him 
from the possibility of any universally comprehensive categorical 
structure.33   
                                                 
 
 
32 Remember that under Cassirer's Concept, we do not eliminate properties to 
speciate, but rather functions. 
33 Cf: the discussion of the crucial role of comprehensiveness vis a vis 
mathematical ideals near the end of this Afterword. 
 
  
 
    
 
531
Cassirer includes this special latter case as an ad hoc rule, 
(series), however, rather than as an example of “no rule”.  It 
would correspond to the special case in mathematical set theory 
wherein a set is defined by the explicit listing of its members.   
Cassirer’s conception may be likened to a line segment 
bounded on one end by the classical criterion of identity of 
properties across members, (a “unity”), with the central section 
composed of any and all functional rules, (i.e. rules of 
series/regular functions on those properties), and bounded at the 
other end by the rule of explicit listing, i.e. no other rule, (a 
“zero”).  This view reconciles the two conceptions, I think, and 
might be acceptable to Lakoff.34  What it does besides, however, 
                                                 
 
 
34   Compare Lakoff, p.146 : “in the classical theory, you have two choices for 
characterizing set membership: you can predict the members (by precise 
necessary and sufficient conditions, or by rule), or you can arbitrarily list 
them, if there is a finite list.  The only choices are predictability (using rules or 
necessary and sufficient conditions) and arbitrariness (giving a list).  But in a 
theory of natural categorization, the concept of motivation”, (his emphasis), 
“is available.  Cases that are fully motivated are predictable and those that are 
totally unmotivated are arbitrary.  But most cases fall in between –they are 
partly motivated.”  [Note 2010: But Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” are 
definitely motivated –as intentional perspectives!]  
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is reveal a comprehensive structure across the whole of 
categories/concepts.   
I have suggested a further extension beyond Cassirer’s 
“Functional Concept” and sets of n-tuples however in my 
arguments of Chapter 3.  Just why is the color of “gold-metal” 
yellow instead of gray?  Why is “gold” a particular n-tuple rather 
than some other mix of possible place-values?  Physical scientists 
will never agree with Lakoff, for instance, that it could be just an 
(accidental) property of a “radial category”, nor, possibly even 
with Cassirer, that it is simply an element in a multi-place series.  
                                                                                                           
 
 
Cassirer suggested another, (and more classical), “middle ground” wherein the 
principle of “necessary and sufficient” is not grounded in an identity of 
properties, but in a functional relationship between them.  The relationship 
between their proposals is more complex than is possible to describe here, but 
as a thumbnail sketch of my opinion,  the deficiencies in the classical category 
that Cassirer resolves in his “Functional Concept of Mathematics”, Lakoff 
attributes to his Cognitive Models whereas the deficiencies in classical 
metaphysics are resolved by both of them very similarly in the 
epistemological relativity of “Symbolic Forms” by Cassirer and of “ICM’s” 
by Lakoff.  Cassirer’s is the more general of the two solutions to the latter 
problem, however, as it is not framed within a specific image of the world, but 
within the constraints only of abstract epistemology as Kant definitively 
iterated them. 
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 They will insist that it must be a necessary property 
determined by physical law.  Cassirer apparently glimpsed this 
connection in his conception of the “ideal objects” of the 
sciences, but he never fully exploited it.  (I have pursued it in my 
“Concept of Implicit Definition”.35) 
Both Lakoff and Cassirer followed the paths of their 
logical conclusions to see the essential flaw in “naïve realism”, 
(as Cassirer termed it), and “objectivism”, in Lakoff’s words, (I 
have used the term “naturalism”).  If the classical logical schema 
of strict hierarchical containment were legitimate, and, more 
importantly, if it were necessary and sufficient, then the only 
possibility of science, as the resolution of experience and reality 
with logic, would lie in the absolute objective existence, 
(however reduced),  of our ordinary objects.   
If valid logic and conceptualization is broader than that, 
however, then the possibility of reality is considerably enriched.  
Valid conceptual,  (or utilitarian cognitive), “objects” need not 
                                                 
 
 
35  Cf my Chapter 3 
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then express “membranes” around spatio-temporally contiguous 
properties of ontological, (i.e. metaphysical), objects or groups of 
such objects!36  They can “cross party lines”! 
 Cassirer had no problems with such an implication.  It 
was implicit, of course, in his neo-Kantian origins.  Lakoff did.  
In his laudable commitment to realism, he was forced to consider 
the minimal necessary requirements of such a (scientific) 
realism.37 
Putnams’ Requirements 
He lists Putnam’s requirements of “internal realism”38 as: 
                                                 
 
 
36 This discussion constitutes my answer to one of the more difficult objections 
to my first thesis wherein it is objected that “schematism” is “just a level of 
abstraction”, (Richard Reiner, private communication).  The discussion above 
shows why it need not be! 
37   The criteria of Putnam’s, Lakoff’s and Edelman’s basic realism are, I have 
argued in my chapters 3 and 4, essentially the same ones definitively 
identified by Kant.  Kant is grossly mischaracterized as an “idealist”.  He was, 
in fact, the penultimate modern realist in just the sense demanded by these 
thinkers.  See chapters 3 and 4. 
38 Which he uses as the jumping off point for his own “experiential realism”.  
Edelman, incidentally, has adopted Putnam’s definition pretty much “as is”. 
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 (1)  “A commitment to the existence of a real world 
external to human beings 
(2)  a link between conceptual schemes and the world via 
real human experience; experience is not purely internal, 
but is constrained at every instant by the real world of 
which we are an inextricable part 
(3)   a concept of truth that is based not only on internal 
coherence and “rational acceptability”, but, most 
important, on coherence with our constant real experience 
(4) a commitment to the possibility of real human 
knowledge of the world.”39 
He has extended and refined Putnam’s position somewhat 
from this basis, (his “basic realism”), to be able to answer certain 
further questions that arise, but this is a reasonably concise 
rendition of his stance vis a vis realism.  
                                                 
 
 
39  P.263 
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 I have discussed his position, (as reiterated by  Edelman), 
briefly in the preface to my Chapter 2, [Chapter 6 here], wherein 
I agreed with (1) – (3), but strongly qualified (4).  I had argued 
the equivalent of his essential conclusions as the subjects of my 
[old] chapters 3 and 4, [Chapters 4 and 6 in this MS 
respectively]: i.e. the bare and unstructured “axiom of 
externality”, and the bare and unstructured “axiom of experience” 
respectively.  These are purely intentional postulates, 
foundational to Scientific Realism.   
Because of his conclusions, Lakoff was further forced 
into a position of epistemological, (as well as logical), relativism 
–against what has been called a “God-eye view of reality”.40  
  Lakoff’s relativism, necessary because of his logical 
conclusions but challenged in his own mind, (admirably, I 
maintain, as I consider myself a strong realist as well), by his 
fervent commitment to science and realism, is ill-defined 
                                                 
 
 
40 cf my Chapter 5 for a discussion of Cassirer’s arguments on the same subject 
and of my extension of them. 
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however.  Though he talks about relativism at length, he never 
clearly defines it.  He begins by noting the anathema which  
“relativism” is considered  by the scientific world, but argues that 
there are, in fact, many different forms of relativism.  (Neither he,  
nor I,  advocate a “relativism of everything”.)  The most cogent 
interpretation I can give to his position, (Whorf aside), is that he 
advocates a cognitive and logical relativism based on bodily 
function, (in the world), which leads to a relativism of contexts, 
(ICM’s), which employ different categorical, (conceptual), 
schemas.  Within each of these ICM’s, there does exist a 
structure consistent with rigor, however,41 but ultimately the 
ICM’s themselves are relativistic.    
I like what Lakoff has done, (hugely!), but his ICMs, the 
relativism in which he has based them, and his epistemology are 
deficient insofar as they are all derived from, (grounded in the 
                                                 
 
 
41 “The main thesis of this book is that we organize our knowledge by means of 
structures called idealized cognitive models, or ICM’s, and that category 
structures and prototype effects are by-products of that organization..”  
Lakoff, 1987, p.68, his emphasis. 
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concept of), the human body and the functions of that body in the 
world.  This is his overview, and this is the context within which 
they are framed.  That very body in the world is conceived in the 
primary set theoretic sense, (he would call it the “container 
schema” ICM), however!   
But if they all may be described within the container 
schema, (the body in the world), then ultimately all of his ICMs 
and his epistemology are theoretically reducible to a container 
schema! [2010 Similarly to my critique of Maturana’s ultimate 
thesis, I maintain that] this is a contradiction of his own position 
against a “God’s eye” picture of the world.42  It is the generality 
of Cassirer’s solutions43and of my extensions of them, (founded 
ultimately in a neo-Kantian perspective), which allows the 
solution of the general logical  and ultimately of the 
epistemological problems.   
                                                 
 
 
42 I.e.  all his arguments against it are reducible within it.  I will have more to 
say on this subject shortly and will suggest a way out of his dilemma. 
43 and their origins in science and mathematics 
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Though Lakoff rejects the view that “anything goes” –that 
any conceptual system is as good as any other, nowhere does he 
approach the possibility of a scientific, mathematical relativism 
which would give rigor to his conceptions –save within a tacit 
objectivist context.  It is the possibility of a general and 
comprehensive structure of the Concept which allows the true 
relativity of the essential forms/ICMs.   
I will argue shortly, (in the sense of mathematically 
conceived “ideals” –[2010  see Chapter 9]), that the various 
“generators” of such an ideal must each be capable of generating 
the whole of the “space” of that ideal –to include all possible 
alternative generators as well.  Thus each (legitimate) structure 
must be comprehensive to be translatable, (i.e. capable of itself 
being generated by another set of generators).  But its 
concepts/categories/objects may be distributed in the 
translation.44   
                                                 
 
 
44 cf my Chapter 5 
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This is intelligible only outside of the classical conception 
of logic, and is the essence of my conclusion of Chapter 5.   
Lakoff’s “Concept” is certainly broader than the classical 
concept, but he takes his arguments too far –against any rule of 
concept formation. 
Please do not misunderstand me.  I loved Lakoff’s book.  
It is brilliant, far reaching, and, I believe, essentially valid.  He 
develops and documents his arguments solidly, but I think his 
strongest point is in his clear and cogent examples from our own 
normal usage45, (as well as from extensive empirical studies), 
which makes his essential case almost unanswerable.   
His conception is considerably richer than it is possible to 
describe within the confines of an appendix, nor is it as simplistic 
as I have characterized it.  We have huge areas of agreement and 
possible interaction,  (his and Rosch’s “basic level categories” 
have a natural correlate in my “schematic perceptual objects”, for 
instance.) 
                                                 
 
 
45 Cassirer’s case was grounded primarily in scientific examples. 
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Lakoff’s ICM’s 
Lakoff’s ICMs are biologically based –on the human 
organism.  Human cognition and human reason consists, for 
Lakoff, in the application of the best fit of these inbuilt ICM’s, 
(and their respective categories), to a given problem or situation.  
They constitute an “embodied logic” deriving from the nature of 
the human organism itself. There is an obvious parallel between 
Lakoff’s “embodied logic” and the more general case I have 
argued.  I have argued that logic is indeed embodied, but at the 
primitive level of cellular process!  This more general 
characterization allows the crucial epistemological move,46 
(which Lakoff’s does not), beyond the  “God’s eye view” he 
disclaims. 
The distinction is important because at the cellular level 
of phenomenology biology becomes a pure form, (in Cassirer's 
sense within his “Symbolic Forms” and compatible with 
                                                 
 
 
46 Through what Maturana and Varela call “structural coupling” 
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Cassirer's Hertzian premise).  This is especially transparent in 
Maturana and Varela's book, for instance, (see Chapter 6), i.e. in 
its explicit constructiveness and the subsequent purity of their 
phenomenology.  
 
Citing a few pertinent examples quoted earlier in Chapter 
6: 
Maturana: 
"Our intention, therefore, is to proceed scientifically: if 
we cannot provide a list that characterizes a living being, 
why not propose a system47 that generates all the 
phenomena proper to a living being?  The evidence that 
an autopoietic unity has exactly all these features becomes 
evident in the light of what we know about the 
interdependence between metabolism and cellular 
structure."  
                                                 
 
 
47 i.e.: an “axiomatic system”! 
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"Autopoietic unities specify biological phenomenology as 
the phenomenology proper of those unities", (my 
emphasis), "with features distinct from physical 
phenomenology... because the phenomena they generate 
in functioning as autopoietic unities depend on their 
organization and the way this organization comes about, 
and not on the physical nature of their components." 
"Ontogeny is the history of structural changes in a 
particular living being.  In this history each living being 
begins with an initial structure.  This structure conditions 
the course of its interactions and restricts the structural 
changes that the interactions may trigger in it", (my 
emphasis).  "At the same time, it is born in a particular 
place, in a medium that constitutes the ambience in which 
it emerges and in which it interacts.   
This ambience appears to have a structural dynamics of 
its own, operationally distinct from the living being.  This 
is a crucial point.  As observers, we have distinguished 
the living system as a unity from its background and have 
characterized it as a definite organization.  We have thus 
distinguished two structures that are going to be 
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considered operationally independent of each other, (my 
emphasis), "living being and environment." 
These are purely constructive and operational definitions, 
(or capable of being made so within "structural coupling"), in the 
precise sense of Hertz and Cassirer and clearly mesh with the 
substance of my Chapter 5.  They are Hertzian "images" with a 
definite, predictive logical structure.  They are clear examples of 
Cassirer’s “each asks questions, each from its particular 
standpoint”! 
At the level of cellular biology therefore, biology 
becomes a pure form, and, as such, it, (and the logic I posit 
within it), is capable of legitimate embodiment48 within the now 
viable scientific epistemological relativism espoused by Cassirer 
and myself.  It is this deeper placement, (and not as reductive 
physics), which allows an escape from the inconsistent "God's 
                                                 
 
 
48 i.e. as a legitimate, fundamental "symbolic form" 
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eye view" implicit in Lakoff's and Edelman's theses, and enables 
a truly consistent and viable epistemological relativism. 
  It is because of Lakoff's Wittgensteinian origins, I think, 
that he has gone too far, (-and not far enough).  Had he started 
from Cassirer instead, the case might have been different.  I will 
return to Lakoff presently to suggest a “cleaner” solution to his 
problem consistent with his apparent needs –in the mathematical 
notion of “ideals”. [again see Chapter 9]  There is a way to save 
it, but I think it is too limited and inconsistent with the dictates of 
modern biology as espoused, for instance, by Edelman. 
 
Edelman: 
Gerald Edelman has adopted Lakoff’s, (and Putnam’s), 
logical and epistemological conclusions as the philosophical 
underpinning to his own theories of  “Neuronal Group Selection”, 
(TNGS), and “re-entrant topobiological maps”.  He proposed the 
combined result as an actual answer to the problem of mind-
brain.  Though Edelman's is a very plausible theory of brain 
development and function, it is limited to dealing with “mind” 
only reductively  -i.e. as strictly biological and therefore physical 
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process and falls to the same objections that I, (and the 
preponderant Naturalist camp as well), have raised.   
“Mind”, normally taken, is therefore superfluous therein!  
Edelman explicitly denies the “homunculus”, (as do I), but his 
“Cartesian theatre” is specifically a physical and spatial one.  It is 
spatially and temporally distributed.  Though he does not 
explicitly deny the existence of “mind” as ordinarily taken, he 
tacitly reinterprets it and reduces it to a description of process.  
He fits very comfortably, I feel therefore, within the naturalism, 
(and “objectivism”), which Dennett, Churchland, et al espouse.   
I do not question the insightfulness or the importance of 
Edelman’s work –it is profoundly important and very solid  –but, 
because of its limitations, (derived from Lakoff), it falls short of 
an answer to the problem of consciousness, retains internal 
inconsistencies, and does not resolve the mind-body dilemma. 
Starting with the nature and limitations of embryology, 
Edelman makes a case for a very different concept of 
“recognition systems”.  His exemplar “recognition system” is the 
immune system for whose investigation he won the Nobel Prize.  
The immune system, he argues, does not depend on information 
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about the world –i.e. we do not create new antibodies from 
informational templates resident in newly arrived antigens.   
Rather, science finds that the body randomly generates a 
huge diversity of antibodies before the fact and reactively selects 
from this pre-existing diversity “ex post facto” as he phrases it.  
This, the immune system, is a system of process, not of 
information. 
“A recognition system … exists in one physical domain”, 
(for the immune system it is within an individual’s body), 
“ and responds to novelty arising independently in another 
domain, (for the immune system it is a foreign molecule 
among the millions upon millions of possible chemically 
different molecules) by a specific binding event and an 
adaptive cellular response.  It does this without requiring 
that information about the shape that needs to be 
recognized be transferred to the recognizing system at the 
time when it makes the recognizer molecules or 
antibodies.  Instead, the recognizing system first 
generates a diverse population of antibody molecules and 
then selects ex post facto those that fit or match.  It does 
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this continually and, for the most part, adaptively.” 
Edelman, P.78 
Cognition, our ultimate “recognition system”, he argues, 
is a parallel case and must be reconceived accordingly.  
Because of the sheer size, and the place and time 
sensitivity of embryological neural development, the 
neural system, (he argues), is progressively “pruned”  ex 
post facto from random preexisting variety over the stages 
of its development in like manner to the immune system.  
“given the stochastic (or statistically varying) nature of 
the developmental driving forces provided by cellular 
processes such as cell division, movement, and death, in 
some regions of the developing nervous system up to 70 
percent of the neurons die before the structure of that 
region is completed!  In general, therefore, uniquely 
specified connections cannot exist.”  
 “the principles governing these changes are epigenetic –
meaning that key events occur only if certain previous 
events have taken place.  An important consequence is 
that the connections among the cells are therefore not 
 
  
 
    
 
549
precisely prespecified in the genes of the animal.” 
Edelman, pps. 23- 25 
Of the great diversity of (preexisting) neural connections 
generated at any stage, particular connections are reinforced and 
kept, or pruned and deleted, in tune with place and time 
dependent events the scenario of which is too complex “by 
several orders of magnitude” to be embodied in the human 
genome.  This pruning is achieved operationally, not 
informationally.  Embryological development is too complex, too 
dependent on place and time to be prespecified.  His argument in 
some ways parallels my own of [old] appendix A wherein I 
argued that there simply hasn’t been enough time in evolutionary 
history, (nor ever will be), to create such an information engine. 
In his “ex  post facto” adaptive “TNGS”, Edelman argues  
a criterion of competence , (as, indeed, did Darwin –and as did I 
in my first chapter),  rather than one of information in the 
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evolution and development of organisms –and specifically of the 
human organism. 
“The immune selective system has some intriguing 
properties.  First, there is more than one way to recognize 
successfully any particular shape. (my emphasis) 49 
Second, no two individuals do it exactly the same way; 
that is, no two individuals have identical antibodies.  
Third, the system has a kind of cellular memory.” 
Edelman, P.78 (These comments are directly relevant to 
my discussion of bounds and limits and the “parallel 
postulate” of cognitive science.)  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
49 You might want to look at my “Bounds and Limits” diagram here –Chapter 
4, Figure 18 
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God’s and Edelman’s Eye 
He too disclaims the possibility of a “God’s eye view” of 
reality by an organism.50  But competence, as I have argued, does 
not imply parallelism.  It is the question of bounds and limits that 
I have argued previously,51 and Edelman falls into the same 
epistemological trap as does Lakoff, (and Maturana and Varela as 
well).  Other than this failing, however, I believe his overall 
position and arguments are very strong. 
On “Presentation” 
Edelman challenges ordinary logic and ordinary 
epistemology, (the classical, “objectivist”/”naturalist” views), for 
                                                 
 
 
50 cf: my “Axiom of Externality” and “Axiom of Experience”, (Chapters 3 and 
4). 
51 Let me repeat a footnote of my Chapter 1:  The question, of course, is whether 
"information" is necessary to competence.  I will argue, (in Chapter 4), that it 
involves a distinction between "bounds" and "greatest lower bounds" of 
biologic survival.  A given organism, (to include human beings), must reflect 
a lower bound of competence in the world.  But "information" requires that it 
reflect a greatest lower bound, and this is inconsistent with the fundamental 
premises of evolution.  It is the "parallel postulate" of cognitive science. 
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some of the same reasons that I do.  In his TNGS, he has framed 
the same problem, and reached largely the same conclusion that I 
did under the issue of “presentation”.   
“some of the reasons for considering brain science a 
science of recognition",  [under his special definition of 
"recognition systems" cited above].  " The first reason is 
almost too obvious: brain science and the study of 
behavior are concerned with the adaptive matching of 
animals to their environments.  In considering brain 
science as a science of recognition I am implying that 
recognition is not an instructive process.  No direct 
information transfer occurs, just as none occurs in 
evolutionary or immune processes.  Instead recognition is 
selective.” 
“a potent additional reason for adopting a selective rather 
than an instructive  viewpoint has to do with the 
homunculus. …the little man that one must postulate ‘at 
the top of the mind’, acting as an interpreter of signals and 
symbols in any instructive theory of mind…. But then 
another homunculus required in his head and so on, in an 
infinite regress…  selectional systems, in which matching 
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occurs ex post facto on an already existing diverse 
repertoire, need no special creations, no homunculi, and 
no such regress.” Edelman pps. 81-82 
Presentation in any sense other than an eliminative one 
requires a homunculus, and this is the problem that Edelman 
believes he has solved- in essentially the same way that I did.  
But, in doing so, he believed he had solved the whole of the 
mind-body problem. 
Re-entrant Maps 
To this point, (his theory of “TNGS”), his argument is 
very plausible and compatible with my own conclusions.  His 
rationale from that point onward, however, bears examination. 
His theory of re-entrant topobiological maps, (reactively 
linked cortical surfaces),  is quite plausible and highly interesting, 
but, ultimately, it is tied to a truly topological correspondence of 
those maps with the “real” world, (contrary to his conclusions of 
the first part of his thesis –see Chapter 4, Figure 13 “Edelman’s 
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Epistemological Error”).  “Maps… correlate happenings at one 
spatial location in the world without a higher-order 
supervisor…”52 
  These maps themselves do, therefore, embody a “God’s 
eye view”, (contrary to the implications of TNGS).  I have 
suggested a different orientation of Edelman’s schema in the 
discussion of my Chapter 4, wherein I suggested we step back 
from our human (animal) cognitive prejudice and consider the 
larger “global mapping” also described by Edelman, (which 
relates “non-mapped” areas of the brain to the topobiological 
maps), as the primary focus of biological process.  (See 
illustration in Chapter 4: Figure 13 “A Metacellular Perspective).  
Under this perspective, the “objects” of our topobiological maps 
may be reconceived, not as God’s-eye renditions of ontology, but 
rather as organizational foci, (efficacious artifacts), of process.53 
                                                 
 
 
52 Edelman, p.87, my emphasis 
53 An aside:  While I hope it should be clear by now that I have no affinity for 
traditional idealism, I think it is worth quoting a short passage from Edelman 
as it talks about levels of “strangeness” in theories:    
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Edelman rationalizes his biological solution to the 
problem of the brain and the mind upon Lakoff’s, (and 
                                                                                                           
 
 
 
“and Berkeley’s monistic idealism –suggesting that inasmuch as all knowledge 
is gained through the senses, the whole world is a mental matter –falters 
before the facts of evolution.  It would be very strange indeed if we mentally 
created an environment that then subjected us (mentally) to natural selection.” 
Edelman, p. 35 
 
Berkeley aside, Edelman seems very put out with the very strangeness of the 
(recursive, re-entrant?) complication of such an idea.  The complication, he 
implies, boggles the mind!  But much of modern science is even more mind-
boggling.  My thesis proposes an even greater “boggle”, but results in an 
integration of epistemology and an actual solution to the mind-body problem. 
 Modern epistemology is radical at both the extremely small and at the 
extremely large  (and fast) scales.  It is only as algorithms they are 
comprehensible.  And yet everyone, (read this as “most realists”), seems to 
accept that at the middle scale epistemology must be simple.  Consider instead 
the truly mind boggling possibility I propose that the middle scale is 
algorithmic as well!  Does this not explain “the prototype” which Rosch 
demonstrated and which ground Lakoff’s and Edelman’s very logical theses.  
Prototypes and the logical relations between them would, under this view, 
represent the “objects” and the “calculus” of algorithmic biology.  If this 
thesis be accepted, then continuity, temporarily removed from epistemology 
by modern science, is restored across the board.  This is a major 
epistemological and scientific result and worth the price we must pay for it.  
So was quantum mechanics! 
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Putnam’s), answer.  To him that answer is important because it 
allows a rationale for the brain which is not based in information 
as, in fact, he has concluded that it is not, (inconsistently with his 
theory of re-entrant maps, I maintain).  He therefore reaches a 
conclusion very similar to my own.  But again, like Lakoff’s, his 
conception is too limited and incorporates an inherent 
contradiction.  His concept of the world, like Lakoff's is based in 
a container schema.  We, you and I and Lakoff and Edelman, are 
organisms too after all.  But then “TNGS” requires that even our 
brains are not informational!54  It is the generality of Cassirer’s 
“Symbolic Forms” –and of my extension of it –the generality of 
the Concept and the generality of the scientific relativism which 
allows a consistent and meaningful solution55 to the problems of 
the brain, mind and epistemology. 
                                                 
 
 
54   I think that Edelman would comment here, as he did on another occasion, 
that this conclusion would “boggle the mind”!  Maybe so, but I think we’d 
better get used to such a state.  Modern physics?  Edelman’s own conclusions? 
… 
55 by allowing a reorientation of the problem to a consideration of forms rather 
than of information 
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What Edelman has not solved: the problem of the Cartesian 
Theatre 
What Edelman has not solved is the other problem, the 
problem of the “Cartesian theatre”56, (i.e. “mind”, ordinarily 
taken), and this is the most important problem.  It is that which 
we normally mean when we use the terms “consciousness”, 
“sentiency”, etc.   
Its comprehensive solution is the subject of Chapters 1 
through 5:  the Concept of Implicit Definition and its integration 
with biology as the unified rule of ontogenic coupling.   
Edelman’s solution remains an essentially naturalist, (objectivist), 
one itself however and is, I argue moreover, epistemologically 
inconsistent.  It is compatible with the rest of the eliminativist 
camp in that ultimately all his correspondences, (his stated 
epistemology to the contrary), are from topobiological maps, 
themselves topologically corresponding to “the (real) world”!   
                                                 
 
 
56 after Dennett 
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His “mind” is purely process, spatially and temporally 
localized –and known!  His is “a God’s eye view”. 
Edelman is very derisive of Penrose’s “Emperor’s New 
Mind”,57 but I think he has missed a major aspect of it.  Penrose, 
(though he doesn’t say so explicitly),  and the rest of the 
“quantum people” are trying, (Gödel aside), I think, to supply a 
“non-localization” –i.e. a spatial universality to the brain’s 
perceptual and cognitive objects- to make headway on the 
problem of knowing.  They are trying to conceive an answer to 
Leibniz’ problem of the “one and the many” within a physical 
space.  
The “chaos theory people” stand in a similar motivation I 
think, but attacking the logical problem of the object from a 
perspective of localized process, conceiving our objects as 
“attractors”.    But even were such solutions meaningful, (and 
they are interesting), they would miss the requirement of a self-
                                                 
 
 
57  “Penrose’s account is a bit like that of a schoolboy who, not knowing the 
formula of sulfuric acid asked for on an exam, gives instead a beautiful 
account of his dog Spot.”  Edelman, P.217 
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standing logical space in depth which the Concept of Implicit 
Definition, as combined with the schematic model of biology, 
supplies and which furnishes the foundation of “meaning” and 
“knowing”.  Dennett glimpsed such a possibility58 for a Cartesian 
theatre based in logic in Shakey the Robot’s program, (as I cited 
previously59), but his naturalist/objectivist metaphysical 
prejudice enervated the concept before it could bear fruit.  
                                                
But ordinary logic,60 (Shakey’s program for instance), is 
inadequate to the problem.  It is essentially dimensional: linear, 
planar, multi-dimensional, missing the integration in depth –
missing the autonomy and (logical) self-sufficiency which is 
necessary to knowing and to meaning. 61 62  
 
 
 
58 but using an inadequate logic 
59  cf the "Dennett Appendix" - "the color phi" 
60 “associationist logic” in Dreyfus’ term 
61 Wittgenstein’s objection is clearly pertinent here.  He raised the question of 
the necessity for one to have another rule: i.e. another rule to apply any given 
rule.  C.I.D./biology, however, supplies a consistent rationale.  “One” is a rule, 
“one” doesn’t apply the rule.  “One” is the single, “ex post facto” and unified 
rule of ontogenic coupling!   
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That aspect of ordinary mind we call the “Cartesian 
Theatre” does not work as a linear, a planar, or even as a 
multidimensional spaceI -even as a logical space.  As I argued in 
chapters  2 and 5 each requires “presentation”, either physical or 
logical.  Nor do such conceptions supply “knowing”, “meaning” 
or “motivation”, except as unnatural and gratuitous appendages. 
C.I.D. and the schematic model focus logic and cognition 
in biology.  Biology has innate depth and structure –derived from 
the single principle of efficacy as coupled with Darwinian 
survival –of ontogenic coupling, and these necessarily pass to the 
logic and the cognition which are embedded in it!  The Concept 
of Implicit Definition as coupled with the schematic model63 
supplies an integration and a rationale in depth –and an 
                                                                                                           
 
 
62 and which could provide the enrichment necessary to the possibility of future 
scientific development moreover.  All the other proposals yet presented are 
essentially just explanatory –i.e. logically reductive- and hold little promise 
for further exploitation. 
63 i.e. the “concordance” mentioned in the Introduction 
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autonomy- implicit in its biological roots.64  Edelman got very 
close to this answer, but his efforts were frustrated by his 
epistemological beginnings. 
 Cassirer, (“symbolic forms”), Rosch, (“prototypes” and 
“basic levels”), and Lakoff, (ICM’s), demonstrate that 
dimensional logic is not adequate to the realities of the human 
mind.  Nor, even putting aside the problem of “information”,  
(Maturana and Varela, Freeman, Edelman), can such a logic 
supply meaning or motivation except in a very unnatural and 
perverted sense.  It is biology itself which supplies this aspect –in 
the concept of a schematic model and an enlarged logic.  This is 
my argument of as culminated in Chapter 11.  
                                                 
 
 
64  It supplies “the rule which we need to apply the rule which we 
need to apply the rule …” demanded by Wittgenstein.  
Ultimately it is a constitutive rule.  But one doesn’t “apply" this 
rule.  Rather, “one” is a rule –namely the constitutive rule of 
ontogenic coupling as the term is used by Maturana and Varela. 
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On Epistemology: 
But let me be more generous to Lakoff and Edelman.  In 
basing their conceptions on our ordinary world, or, to call a spade 
a spade, on our ordinary naïve realistic conception of the world, 
(people, baseballs, cars and all the things they do), they are trying 
to preserve experience!  This they identify with realism.  They 
seek to preserve their logical and biological conclusions with the 
objects of that ordinary realism,65 and their relativism is a 
laudable and understandable attempt at a reconciliation.  
 I have explained my answer to the same problem in terms 
of the multiple possible axiomatic foundations of mathematical 
                                                 
 
 
65 cf Lakoff’s discussion, (p.262) of the “objects” of our 
experience –his chair, for instance.  “It is important not to read 
Putnam out of context here, especially when he talks about 
objects.  An ‘object’ is a single bounded entity…. Putnam, being 
a realist, does not deny that objects exist.  Take, for example, the 
chair I am sitting on. It exists.  If it didn’t, I would have fallen on 
the floor.” (my emphasis).  Compare this reference with my 
modification of Kant’s position on “objects” which I advocated 
in the footnote in Chapter 5. 
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systems, but another line of understanding is possible.  Consider 
the notion of “mathematical “ideals” as presented in Chapter 9. 
Those mathematical “ideals” described there open a door 
to a better conclusion to Lakoff’s and Edelman’s arguments, and 
a simpler understanding of my own.  None of these generators 
stands prior to any other, nor does it “create” the figure 
comprehended.  Each stands, rather, as an equipotent and 
relativistic “logical”, (i.e. explanatory), basis fully exhausting the 
actuality of the figure. 
But we must consider this example in the larger context of 
mathematics.  Not only can such descriptions be relativized in 
relation to a fixed coordinate system, but the very coordinate 
systems themselves stand in like case.  Axes need not be 
orthogonal, nor need they be rectilinear, (e.g. polar coordinates 
are possible).  Nor need they be fixed.  They may be in 
translation –e.g. relative motion, (which translates to special 
relativity), and they need not be Euclidean, (nor Hyperbolic nor 
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Spherical).   Russell, for instance, further argued66 that our 
descriptions of phenomena might even be based in projective 
geometry.   
But need they be even spatial?  Can we not conceive of 
such explanations being framed as abstract transformations, 
which latter are not defined on spaces, but on abstract sets!  
Abstract sets, however, fall naturally within the scope of 
axiomatics wherein I grounded C.I.D. 
 Such a relativism of descriptions, combined with a 
scientific relativism of logic and epistemology themselves as 
argued by Cassirer, Lakoff, and myself, (superseding the 
traditional “container schema” and broadening the very ideas of 
“set” and “object” themselves), points to the further possibility 
for such an “idealistic”, (in the mathematical sense), foundation 
of logic itself.   
                                                 
 
 
66 Russell, “Foundations of Geometry”, 1956 
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Need mathematics, or logic, be necessarily grounded in 
objectivist sets, (ultimate “atomic” –i.e. least objects -and a fixed 
"Universe" of such objects), or could it not pick itself up by its 
own bootstraps, (following the cue of mathematical “ideals”67 
and the findings of Cassirer and Lakoff), and stand without 
them?68   This is a question –not an easy one to be sure- for 
abstract mathematics and the future of logic. 
 If we think of “experience” in the abstract –i.e. as the 
“axiom” without interpretation, (i.e. “impartially” in the sense of 
“basic realism”),  – then I think an “ideal” in this sense is a very 
reasonable way of understanding it – beyond any particular 
“generator”, beyond any particular interpretation.69  But it is not 
necessarily a spatial interpretation either.  Ideals are broader than 
this. 
                                                 
 
 
67  though presently itself conceived in set-theoretic terms 
68 This would be the truly transcendental logic after which Kant sought. 
69  “context-free” in Van Fraassen’s term 
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On a narrower focus, the possible generators of a 
mathematical ideal rigorously parallel the explanatory 
possibilities which can absolutely preserve the objects of ordinary 
experience and naïve realism, (conserving shapes, boundaries, 
etc.).  As such, the ideal they ground is entirely commensurate 
with Lakoff’s and Edelman’s conceptions and logically validates 
their (limited) relativism. 
Within the perspective of that same “basic realism”, the 
“experience“ we deal with need not be taken as ultimately 
informational however,70 but can be taken as specifically 
organizational and operative instead71 as I have argued in my 
Chapter 4 and consistently with Edelman’s “TNGS”.    
Though connected with externality, (as representative of 
successful- .i.e. adequate process72), it need not be further taken 
as conveying information about that externality.  It need not be 
                                                 
 
 
70  This my qualification on Putnam’s 4th requirement of basic realism 
71  contrary to Putnam’s 4th requirement 
72  “ex post facto”, in Edelman’s words 
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taken as paralleling externality.  The latter presumption, I have 
argued, goes far beyond the needs and the implications of 
Darwinian biology. 
 The deeper issue is that of an adequate definition of 
“experience” itself.  Need we identify it with the absolute and 
necessary preservation of ordinary objects?  Or, might we not, 
consistent with the foundations of their own conceptions and the 
work of Rosch upon which it is grounded, consider even our 
ordinary perceptual objects as “prototypes” of a larger 
experience? Prototypes are objects of utility, of efficacy, after all, 
they are not foundational objects.73  Could not our ordinary 
objects be considered, (as I have argued), as prototypes, 
(“schematic perceptual objects”), of a biological calculus? 
“Experience” in a modern sense must be broadened to 
include the experience of the results of scientific experiment, and 
that experience, at least insofar as modern physics is concerned, 
                                                 
 
 
73 see Lakoff for a discussion of Rosch, prototypes, and the logical 
significance of the latter.  It is a very illuminating discussion. 
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is not commensurate with the preservation of objects, nor is it 
commensurate with ordinary spatiality.   
Without even considering the deeper implications of QM 
or of Relativity, one need only consider results of the “twin slit” 
experiment or the implications of its multiple execution to see the 
point.  Not even cardinality is preserved!74  Similarly, consider 
Penrose’s “most optimistic" view of quantum mechanics, (most 
optimistic for objectivism/naturalism, that is):75 
                                                 
 
 
74  In answer to a question I asked on this point, a physicist correspondent of 
mine replied that “Yes, you can have many slits one after another, (it is better 
with Mach-Zehnder interferometers than slits, with the same result that one 
doesn’t know if the photon went through or was reflected by a mirror….  We 
can say that one photon may be in an arbitrary number of places at once.”   
(Wlodek Duch, private correspondence)  My point was that even the 
cardinality of this basic object, (the photon), was purely arbitrary –it could be 
1 or 2 or 3 or 1,000,001 or …, depending on the branching structure of 
successive slits and the design of the experiment.  But innate cardinality is 
perhaps the most basic “property” we ascribe to ordinary objects, so I think 
the conclusion is significant. 
75  Repeating a section of a prior appendix 
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"I shall follow the more positive line which attributes 
objective physical reality to the quantum description: the 
quantum state. 
"I have been taking the view that the 'objectively real' 
state of an individual particle is indeed described by its 
wavefunction psi.  It seems that many people find this a 
difficult position to adhere to in a serious way.  One 
reason for this appears to be that it involves our regarding 
individual particles being spread out spatially, rather than 
always being concentrated at single points.  For a 
momentum state, this spread is at its most extreme, since 
psi is distributed equally all over the whole of space, (my 
emphasis),...It would seem that we must indeed come to 
terms with this picture of a particle which can be spread 
out over large regions of space, and which is likely to 
remain spread out until the next position measurement is 
carried out...." 
   The particle -this smallest part of our "object"- is not 
included, (spatially, reductively, nested), within the spatiality of 
the atom or within the molecule -or even within the human scale 
object of which it is the theoretical (and supposed material) 
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foundation.  Naturalism/objectivism can no longer support, 
therefore, even a consistent hierarchy of spatial scale!76   
At the human level, of course, it is a very useful tool, and 
that is just what I propose it is -constructed by evolution!  
Science and logic suggest other, non-scaled and non-hierarchical 
organizations -i.e. they support any other efficacious 
organization.  It is a simple matter of utility. 
Conclusion 
To conclude this appendix, let me repeat that I truly 
admire Lakoff’s and Edelman’s work.  It is both profound and 
crucial to the resolution of the ultimate problem.  But then I 
really like the work of all the authors I have cited –even those 
                                                 
 
 
76  Compare Lakoff, p.195: “In the case of biological categories, science is not 
on its [objectivist philosophy’s] side.  Classical categories and natural kinds 
are remnants of pre-Darwinian philosophy.  They fit the biology of the ancient 
Greeks very well….but they do not accord with phenomena that are central to 
evolution.   … Objectivist semantics and cognition and, to a large extent, even 
objectivist metaphysics are in conflict with post-Darwinian biology.  I’d put 
my money on biology.” 
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most contrary to my own conclusions.  (I would not cite or spend 
much time on anything of lesser quality –the problem is too huge 
and too difficult to be distracted.)   
Dennett’s work, for example, is very beautiful to me in 
his honorable and perceptive pursuit of the hard implications of 
naturalism.  P.S. Churchland, as another example, has a “clean” 
mind and frames the problem wonderfully from the perspectives 
of biology and philosophy.  None of them has resolved the 
fundamental problem, however, though all have come very close 
in different aspects of it.   
This is a hard problem, the hardest one, I maintain, that 
the human mind has ever dealt with.  To solve it requires an 
intellectual ruthlessness, and specifically, a ruthless realism! 
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A Note for Impatient or Skeptical Minds 
I (www.foothill.net/~jerryi/mp3_3RD_ED_FILES)  is a link to my book mp3 
versions of the chapters if you might be interested in listening to them on your 
IPod ©. 
 
Preface 
I  W.V.O. Quine, 1953, pps.42-43 
 
II W. V.O. Quine 1960, pps.3-4, my emphasis 
III Boorstin quoting Kepler in “The Discoverers”, Random House. 
 
Chapter 1 
I see Chapter 2 for citation 
II Sometimes an image works better than an explanation.  There was a 
wonderful episode on “The Outer Limits” television show, I think, that made 
the point graphically.  Let me describe and summarize it: 
 A spaceship has been detected approaching Earth, and one of the 
earthly technicians has been assigned to stay in touch with one of its occupants 
over the years before it can actually land. It will take years because of its 
distance from the Earth.  The Earth-based technician begins to fall in love with 
“her” and they develop a romance through their communication over this time.  
Finally the magic day arrives and he goes to the spaceport to finally meet and 
hold his new love.  The spaceship door opens and she emerges.  But “she” has 
the form of an Octopus!  Think about that graphic image relative to my claim!  
Suppose we were all “blind”! 
Chapter 2 
I [Dennett 1991] 
II The question was highly pertinent for me in that my mother had been 
recently diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic. 
III Birkhoff & MacClane 1955 
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IV -which, (via the axioms themselves), was solely and precisely the way I had 
been obliged to actually work with them. 
V Resnik 1992  
VI Stefanik, 1994 
VII Schlick, 1974 (translation)/1917 (original), my emphasis 
VIII I feel I have completed most of the ancillary and exploratory work already, 
but I definitely need help on the level of foundations and of mechanics.  This 
book explores that level itself.  Ultimately I hope to encourage some inspired 
mathematical genius to develop the actual mathematical “calculus” of the 
brain.  He will stand with Newton in history. 
IX I will clarify this transition into “axioms” shortly.  Mac Clane’s book dealt 
exclusively with axiom systems. 
X Hilbert -from Shapiro, 2005, my emphasis 
XI ibid 
XII This is one aspect of what I have termed “the static problem”.  ( Iglowitz, 
1995, Dennett Appendix)  I am not totally happy with that answer –I think the 
current paper addresses it more honestly. 
XIII I fell in love with mathematics way back then but was horrified when I 
glimpsed her concealed ugliness reflected in her “makeup mirror”, (of set 
theory) and, shocked, sadly abandoned her!  I turned instead to pursue the 
biological and philosophical implications of my original insight –and this has 
been the driving force and focus of most of the rest of my life. 
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XIV The question of the desired structure of these sections of the book arises 
immediately.  Frankly I hope you will turn to the source material for a more-
than-amateur exposition.  I specifically recommend Richard Stefanik’s 
“Structuralism, Category Theory and Philosophy of Mathematics” for a very 
deep and lucid introduction to the subject and further references.  But if you’re 
starting here you will at least hear an introduction to the subject, and a linkage 
with my own ideas –which linkage is quite deep. 
XV Resnik 1992 
XVI Benacerraf is considered the founder of mathematical structuralism 
XVII Benacerraf, 1983 
XVIII Saunders Mac Lane is widely regarded as one of the most significant 
mathematicians of the 20th century. 
XIX Mac Lane, 385, my emphasis 
 
XX Stefanik 1994, my emphasis 
 
XXI Stefanik 1994 
XXII I think this argument would not be viable under intuitionist logic for 
instance. 
XXIII Expanding Resnik, 530 
XXIV which is exactly the sense of “the objects” of mathematical structures 
XXV please refer back to the prior Hilbert quote –the objects are defined by the 
whole of the axiom system 
XXVI  Iglowitz, 1995 
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XXVII This does not necessarily lead to epiphenomenalism, at least not in its 
ordinary sense.  My reflections in the Freeman appendix, [Iglowitz, 2005] 
suggest another usage.  The feedback, incorporating intentional perspectives, 
(axioms), through the primitive, (and fixed), evolutionary objects opens a 
possibility.  Of course, even this usage could be interpreted on the level of 
primitive axioms.  It is a problem of prediction and organization.  –see my 
letter to Rosen quoted later.  I think they serve as operational metaphors. 
XXVIII See Bell 1988 for word usage 
XXIX Kant didn’t particularly like this name himself either, but he was forced 
into it.  See the later citations from Kant himself which explains his reasoning.  
I think it was his greatest mistake.  I have termed it “ontic indeterminism” 
which I think expresses his conception far better. 
XXX Cassirer, 1957, p. 76 
XXXI I tried to synopsize Cassirer’s “Symbolic Forms” in Chapter 5 of my MS.  
I truly love Cassirer’s mind, but his writing style is oblique in the extreme. 
XXXII See my presentation of Cassirer’s alternative logic to follow. 
XXXIII Bell, 1988, 245, my emphasis 
XXXIV but especially the Lorentzian transformations -or even Galileo’s for that 
matter 
XXXV See Chapter 4 and Iglowitz, 2005 for a specific rationale and a close 
parallel in W.J. Freeman’s non-hierarchical brain map. 
XXXVI Maturana is another crucial and brilliant source necessary to the problem 
at this point. 
XXXVII  Iglowitz, 2005, and especially its Freeman Appendix 
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XXXVIII See “Afterward: Lakoff/Edelman” [Iglowitz, 1995] for a discussion of 
mathematical “ideals” which bears on this discussion.  Afterthought:  I 
appended a graphical rendition of the discussion of “ideals” to Chapter 9 
which might make it easier to follow my conclusions. 
XXXIX this relates to the issues of “hierarchy” which I will discuss in Chapter 3. 
XL Iglowitz, 1995 
XLI Which, of course, harks back to Kant 
XLII This is precisely the question that structuralism addresses. 
XLIII E.g. Maturana, Edelman, W.J. Freeman, etc. 
XLIV Maturana, 1987 
XLV Goldblatt: “Topoi: The Categorial Analysis of Logic”, Goldblatt, Robert, 
Dover 1984, p.3 
XLVI I once again strongly encourage you to turn to the sources themselves. 
XLVII Shapiro 2005 
XLVIII See my prior footnote on this subject 
XLIX Iglowitz, 2005 
L Iglowitz 2005 
LI Shapiro’s “contentful” seems to equate pretty much with “ontological” 
LII I disagree, and so, I think, would the “young Hilbert”. 
LIII This is precisely my point –I think it is precisely the issue.  I think it is not 
vicious at all but is instead perfectly “consistent” (sic) with the whole of 
Hilbert’s early perspective! 
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LIV “assertatory” = “contentful” = “ontological”???? 
LV ibid] (my emphasis) 
LVI and why not, Platonism aside?  Saunders Mac Lane, [Private 
correspondence], expressed a view equivalent to Shapiro’s to me which I will 
address presently.  
 
Chapter 3 
I I would dearly love to hear input from real, (but open-minded), 
mathematicians of a philosophical bent on this phase of my argument.  This is 
about as far as I can take it.  I truly need and would sincerely value their input. 
II Compare also Lakoff: 1987, p.353.  “Most of the subject matter of classical 
logic is categorization.” 
III  Cassirer 1923 pps.3-4   He continues: "The Aristotelian logic, in its general 
principles, is a true expression and mirror of the Aristotelian metaphysics.  
Only in connection with the belief upon which the latter rests, can it be 
understood in its peculiar motives.  The conception of the nature and divisions 
of being predetermines the conception of the fundamental forms of thought.  
In the further development of logic, however, its connections with the 
Aristotelian ontology in its special form begin to loosen; still its connection 
with the basic doctrine of the latter persists, and clearly reappears at definite 
turning points of historical evolution.  Indeed, the basic significance, which is 
ascribed to the theory of the concept in the structure of logic, points to this 
connection. ..." 
   [But] "... The work of centuries in the formulation of fundamental doctrines 
seems more and more to crumble away; while on the other hand, great new 
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groups of problems, resulting from the general mathematical theory of the 
manifold, now press to the foreground.  This theory appears increasingly as the 
common goal toward which the various logical problems, that were formerly 
investigated separately, tend and through which they receive their ideal unity." 
     It is just this "general mathematical theory of the manifold" to which he 
refers at the end which, I will argue, forces an even further extension of 
Cassirer's own arguments. 
IV See Iglowitz, 1995, Chapter 2 for a full discussion 
V This passage, (mirroring, incidentally, the mathematical "power set"), 
suggests also the absolute hierarchy of concepts, (and theories), already 
implicit in the classical conception.  Cassirer's alternative, (which I will 
discuss shortly), reveals a new possibility, developing into his theory of 
"symbolic forms" which I have elaborated and tried to simplify in Chapter 7 of 
this book. 
VI Please forgive the Capital, but the problem lies in talking about “the concept 
of the concept” and the fact that this is not in any sense trivial to the issue. 
VII Note: This is a usage of the word entirely distinct from my later usage of 
the word! 
VIII Cassirer still saw perceptual objects as the basis of his functional rule, 
however. 
IX  ibid, P.23.  Rosch and Lakoff have argued in more recent times, (based in 
hard empirical data), that the categories of actual human beings, actual human 
cultures, actual human languages are not, in fact, grounded in the classical 
Aristotelian "Concept" but are based, instead, in prototype, metaphor, 
metonymy, association, radial categories, etc.  But what are these, (in their 
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anthropological totality), but the free posit of rules of category formation?  
Cassirer has provided a more classical and rigorous conceptualization.  It 
incorporates the possibility of all (consistent) rules in a classical formulation. 
 Clearly this does better correspond with ordinary and scientific usage than 
does the classical concept.  It is the functionality of our definitions which 
specifies the concept.  The mathematical "subset" is the limiting rather than the 
typical case. 
X  ibid P.16 
XI See prior footnote: Stewart, “Fibonacci Forgeries” 
XII  ibid p.26 
XIII ibid 
XIV  In my opinion Cantor is a perect illustration of the case. 
XV For the first time I understood the gaps between the conceptual lucidity of 
the opening few days of any given mathematics course to the “therefore…” it 
had so invariably falsely claimed. 
XVI See Wilder, 1952 
XVII Math-speak for “Does not exist”? 
XVIII Goldblatt, Robert, Dover 1984, p.1 
XIX Which I also read that summer.  
XX rather than its ontic references 
XXI This is related to W.J. Freeman 1994 which connection I will pursue 
shortly 
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XXII W.J. Freeman’s “equivalence classes” might be a reasonable beginning 
here. 
XXIII Edelman, 1992 
XXIV Cassirer, 1923, pp. 288-289 
XXV See Iglowitz, 1995, Chapter 2 
XXVI I think it is the most complex 
XXVII and the brain is surely an operative organ 
XXVIII W. V.O. Quine 1960, pps.3-4, my emphasis 
XXIX Freeman, 1995, my emphasis.  I will repeat this citation in reference to an 
argument by Shapiro as well shortly. 
XXX Alternatively, as combined with the mathematical conception of the 
“Ideal”. 
XXXI Which was never responded to 
XXXII identical 
XXXIII[Iglowitz, private correspondence]  
XXXIV [Kuhn, 1957] 
XXXV [ibid] 
XXXVI  [ibid] 
XXXVII Penrose, 1989 
XXXVIII Iglowitz 2005 
XXXIX  W.V.O. Quine, 1953, pps.42-43 
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XL See my “Rosen” discussion later. 
XLI Cassirer’s “Substance and Function” is an excellent reference to this 
“abstractive logic”.  See especially the first few chapters. 
XLII What kind of conditionality is another issue.  Material implication, for 
instance, is not a direct gift from God.  See Quine, 1953 
XLIII After Quine’s usage. 
XLIV W.J. Freeman has objected to this usage, but I think if I qualify it to be: 
“the (not necessarily hierarchically) reactive”, I think he might approve. 
XLV An idea discussed with a correspondent who suggested it.  D.E., ~2005 
XLVI See my illustration “Bounds and Limits”. [Iglowitz, 2005] 
 
Chapter 4 
I Maturana and Varela, 1987 
II Is this not the usual case between conflicting theories and perspectives? 
III Edelman, 1992, pps.236-237, his emphasis. 
IV Iglowitz, 1995, especially Chapter 4 
V together: all the possible conceptual contexts 
VI c.f. the arguments of Chapters Two, the current paper, (Exotic 
Mathematics), and Chapter Four for a detailed rationale 
VII See the later discussion of mathematical “ideals” which bears on this 
discussion. 
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VIII this relates to the issues of “hierarchy” which I will discuss shortly 
IX [A recent reference 2009:  See Durant on Kant where the same kind of 
arguments are made.] 
X Cf Lakoff, 1987. Also see Iglowitz, 1995, “Afterward: Lakoff, Edelman…” 
XI Edelman, 1992, the problem is that he does not really explore this 
dimension, but W.J.Freeman –as presented shortly –does! 
XII See prior footnote about his ambivalent use of the word “spatial”. 
XIII See Maturana, 1987 and Edelman, 1992 
XIV My function, however, is to introduce a mechanics –which I have done.  
Merleau-Ponty is not “my philosopher”, but the concept seems pregnant. 
XV “Of the virtually unlimited information available in the world around us, the 
equivalent of 10 billion bits per second arrives on the retina at the back of the 
eye.  Because the optic nerve attached to the retina has only a million output 
connections, just six million bits per second can leave the retina, and only 
10,000 bits per second make it to the visual cortex. 
…After further processing, visual information feeds into the brain regions 
responsible for forming our conscious perception.  Surprisingly, the amount of 
information constituting that conscious perception is less than 100 bits per 
second.  Such a thin stream of data probably could not produce a perception if 
that were all the brain took into account; the intrinsic activity must play a role. 
…Yet another indication of the brain’s intrinsic processing power comes from 
counting the number of synapses, the contact points between neurons.  In the 
visual cortex, the number of synapses devoted to incoming visual information 
is less than 10 percent of those present.  Thus, the vast majority must represent 
internal connections among neurons in that brain region.”  (This is very much 
in accord with both Maturana’s and W.J. Freeman’s conceptions.) 
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…. Although six million bits are transmitted through the optic nerve, for 
instance, only 10,000 bits make it to the brain’s visual processing area, and 
only a few hundred are involved in formulating a conscious perception –too 
little to generate a meaningful perception on their own.  The finding suggested 
that the brain probably makes constant predictions about the outside 
environment in anticipation of paltry sensory inputs reaching it from the 
outside world.”  (My emphasis) 
From Scientific American March 2010 “The Brain’s Dark Energy” 
Marcus Reichle, Washington University School of Medicine in Saint Louis 
 
But Reichle does not draw the obvious conclusions, as indeed, nobody else does.  
His conclusions are confounded by the epistemological paradox of his own 
arguments –his is a brain also, and subject to the same limitations.  Those 
answers lie in the relativism of epistemology I propose. 
 
XVI cf Dennett, Dreyfus on the “large database problem” 
XVII This is typically the case. A project manager, for instance, must deal with 
all, (and often conflicting), aspects of his task -from actual operation to 
acquisition, to personnel problems, to assuring even that there are meals and 
functional bathrooms! Any one of these factors, (or some combination of 
them), -even the most trivial- could cause failure of his project. A more 
poignant example might involve a U.N. military commander in Bosnia. He 
would necessarily need to correlate many conflicting imperatives -from the 
geopolitical to the humanitarian to the military to the purely mundane! Or, in a 
metaphor on the earlier discussion, he might need to take a “Marxist” 
perspective for one aspect of his task, and a “royalist” perspective for another! 
 
XVIII Simple adequacy is quite distinct from information or 
parallelismhowever. 
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XIX See Iglowitz, 1995: Lakoff/Edelman appendix for a discussion of 
abstraction and hierarchy 
XX See Birkhoff & Mac Lane, 1955, p.350, discussion of the “duality 
principle” which vindicates this move. More simply put, and using Edelman’s 
vision, it is a question of which end of the “global mapping” we look from! 
XXI The “anthropic principle” as usually interpreted, on the other hand, is 
clearly self-serving and tautological.  There is another deeper sense of the 
principle I discussed in the section: The JCS Review which I think is more 
pertinent. (Chapter 11)  
XXII Freeman has objected to my characterization of the human brain as an 
“organ of response”.  I understand his objection, as it seems to imply 
acceptance of “stimulus-response” causality” –which is clearly not my 
intention.  At this level of discussion, I think the characterization is warranted 
however. 
XXIII Maturana and Varela, 1987 
XXIV See Dreyfus on the “large database problem”. Also see Appendix A of 
Iglowitz, 1995 for a “combinatory” counterargument. 
XXV See Cassirer, 1923 
XXVI See prior note about Freeman’s objection to “response” 
XXVII  “HIKE”  (:-) A tiny bit of humor. 
XXVIII see P.S. Churchland re: Hume 
 
Chapter 5 
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I This is the subject of the beginnings of this paper which is itself the best 
beginning reference. 
II My function, however, is to introduce a mechanics –which I have done.  
Merleau-Ponty is not “my philosopher”, but the concept seems pregnant. 
 
Chapter 6 
I Kant, Prolegomena, p.10 
II "Prolegomena", P. 11 
III  cf Chapter 7 
IV ibid 
V  Maturana and Varela, 1987 
VI  See Chapter 7  re: Quine 
VII Maturana and Varela, 1987 
VIII  afterwards "Maturana" 
IX  ibid P.48, my emphasis 
X  ibid Pps. 39-40 
XI  ibid P.51 
XII  ibid P.63 
XIII  ibid Pps.74-75 
XIV  ibid Pps.63-64 
XV  ibid P.96 
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XVI  ibid P.74 
XVII  ibid Pps.80-81 
XVIII  ibid Pps.95-102, (my emphasis) 
XIX  ibid Pps.147-148 
XX  ibid Pps.157-159 
XXI  cf Appendix A 
XXII  ibid p.159 
XXIII  ibid Pps.163,164 
XXIV  ibid P.124, my emphasis 
XXV  ibid Pps.129-133, my emphasis 
XXVI  op.cit p.133 
XXVII  ibid Pps.133-134 
XXVIII  cf Dennett, 1991 
XXIX  cf P.S. Churchland, 1986, Dennett, 1991 
XXX Dennett, 1991, P.382, my emphasis 
XXXI An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth", Bertrand Russell, Pp. 14-15 
XXXII  cf Fine, 1986. p.97 
XXXIII  op.cit Pps.234-244, my emphasis 
XXXIV  cf Penrose 
XXXV  cf Chapter 5 
XXXVI  This is also, obviously, a reiteration of Maturana's "razor's edge". 
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XXXVII Kant, "Prolegomena" pps.36-37 
XXXVIII  Kant, "Critique of Pure Reason", 2nd edition, 333, translated by 
Woglom and Hendel, and cited in Cassirer: "The Problem of Knowledge", 
1950, Pps. 101-102  I prefer this to Smith's rendering. 
XXXIX  cf Chapter 5 
XL Maturana & Varela, 1987 
XLI Afterwards “Maturana” 
XLII Kant, “Critiqueof Pure Reason” 
XLIII  ibid P.96 
XLIV  ibid Pps.63-64 
XLV H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik", p.1 ff, my emphasis 
 
Chapter 7 
I  Quine, 1953, pps.42-43 
II  cf heading above! 
III Penrose 1989 
IV See Chapter 3 
V Cassirer, 1953, p. 75 
VI ibid, p.75 
VII ibid 
VIII ibid 
IX H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik", p.1 ff, my emphasis 
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X Cassirer, op cit p.76 
XI ibid 
XII Cassirer, 1954, p.76 
XIII ibid 
XIV ibid 
XV see Chapter 3 
XVI ibid 
XVII ibid 
XVIII ibid 
XIX ibid p.77, my emphasis 
XX ibid 
XXI Cassirer 1953 
XXII ibid, P.446, my emphasis 
XXIII ibid, p.447 
XXIV ibid, p.446 
XXV ibid, p.447 
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XXVI Cassirer,  1923, pps.374-379, my emphasis 
I Van Fraassen, 1991, pps.4-5 
II ibid 
  
 
 
 
 
596
                                                                                                           
 
 
III ibid 
IV ibid p.94 
V Cassirer, 1953, p.77 
VI ibid. pps. 77-78, my emphasis 
VII ibid, my emphasis 
VIII ibid 
IX ibid 
X Cassirer, 1923, p.446 
XI ibid, my emphasis 
XII ibid, p.446 
XIII ibid, p.447 
XIV ibid, p.447 
XV op.cit Pps.234-244, my emphasis 
XVI W. V.O. Quine 1960, pps.3-4 
 
Chapter 10 
I cf Iglowitz, 1995 
 
Chapter 11 
I Note:  the “.doc” version of this paper allows this figure to be adequately 
zoomed for legibility of all text.  I have not been able to get this resolution in 
the PDF form. 
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Chapter 12 
I Durant, 1926 
II My emphasis 
III Durant, 1926 
IV See Iglowitz, 1995, Chapter 3 
V My emphasis 
VI See Chapter 3, this paper 
VII My emphasis 
VIII Durant, Will. 1926, my emphasis 
IX Here at this point, I am sad to say, he broaches his integrity by attributing a 
dishonest motive to Kant.  “The truth is that Kant was too anxious to prove the 
subjectivity of space as a refuge from materialism; he feared the argument that 
if space is objective and universal, God must exist in space, and therefore be 
spatial and material.  This is an ad hominem argument, pure and simple and 
does not do justice to Durant’s intrinsic integrity. 
X i.e. William James 
XI ibid, p.447 
XII Cassirer,  1923, pps.374-379, my emphasis 
XIII See Smart, 1949.  Smart, though not in agreement, does an excellent job of 
elucidating the essential perspectives and is well worth reading. 
XIV H. Hertz, "Die Prinzipien der Mechanik", p.1 ff, my emphasis 
XV ibid, P.446, my emphasis 
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XVI ibid, p.447 
XVII ibid, p.446 
XVIII End repeat of Chapter 5 section. 
 
XIX Iglowitz, 1995 
XX Russell, Bertrand. 1967 
 
Chapter 13 
 
I Alternatively, it is the brain's rule of ontogenic coupling 
II Bas Van Fraassen, Quantum Mechanics, p.17 
III  "beneficial" is itself a synthetic a priori perspective 
IV and I do not dogmatically assert that it is.  The future of science must 
answer this question. 
V i.e. at the "fine-grained" level of mind 
VI or to gain reflective insights on them 
 
Chapter 14 
I P.S. Churchland, 1988, P.260 
II cf Appendix D, (Penrose) 
III Consider Nazism, as just one recent example. 
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IV And their damnable and blatant arrogance about it! 
V Van Doren, 1938 
 
Chapter 15 
I E.g. Crick’s usage of the term.  I do not consider his thesis in any sense to be 
other than quite ordinary from a materialist standpoint. 
II  W.V.O. Quine, 1953, pps.42-43 
III W. V.O. Quine 1960, pps.3-4, my emphasis 
IV  Penrose, 1989.  P. 243, my emphasis 
 
 
Appendix A 
I Dennett, 1991 
II i.e. -relative to Dennett's problem 
III See Cassirer 1953, and Iglowitz, 1995 
IV i.e. vis-à-vis current process 
V See  Iglowitz 2005 
VI  Consider the world-views implicit in paranoia or schizophrenia, for 
instance, or in bipolar orientations 
VII  Or "objectivist logic” after Lakoff's usage 
VIII Dennett, 1991, P.382 
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Appendix B 
I cf Wlodek Duch for instance 
